The effects of major U.S. domestic airline code sharing and profit sharing rule

This paper presents a structural model of code sharing among major U.S. domestic airlines and estimates a profit‐sharing rule. The profit‐sharing rule between partner firms in code sharing is estimated at 0.92, which suggests that the operating carrier acquires around 92% of profits from a round‐trip, and the marketing carrier retains 8% as a commission fee. Meanwhile, the economies of code sharing reduces marginal cost, and firms are able to price at higher markups. This implies that demand increases and consumers have larger surplus if code sharing creates new products.     

Financial participation and performance in Europe

This article assesses whether financial participation (profit‐sharing and employee share ownership plans) is associated with positive performance outcomes, and whether direct and indirect employee participation complement financial participation in this respect. It also examines whether employee involvement in the design of financial participation afects performance outcomes. The article uses data from a survey of listed firms in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Several outcome measures are used, based on respondents' assessments of the effects of financial participation. Higher participation in equity‐based plans, but not in profit‐sharing, is found to be associated with more successfil outcomes. None of fhe other forms of employe? pnrticipafion uins found to contribute to the success of financial participation. The results therefore cast some doubt on complementarity between financial and other forms of participation.     

Profit Sharing and Training*

We analyze the impact of profit sharing on training intensity. Profit sharing may affect training because it is a credible commitment by firms to reward firm‐specific skills, may reduce turnover and leads to peer group pressure to participate in training courses. To eliminate possible selectivity effects, we combine matching with difference‐in‐differences. We identify the proportion of employees participating in profits and differentiate profit sharing according to the percentage of the workers covered. Using German establishment data we find that profit sharing only has a significant effect on training intensity if the majority of the workforce benefits from it.     

Leverage and the price volatility of equity shares in equilibrium

The traditional valuation formulas for corporate debt, which are derived in a complete market setting and are based on the no-arbitrage principle, imply that equity prices become more volatile as leverage increases. If the asset structure is incomplete, the presence of corporate debt affects the linear subspace spanned by the payoffs of the existing assets, and the pricing of corporate debt and shares of levered firms becomes a simultaneous valuation problem. This paper characterizes the relationship between the price of corporate debt and the share price of a levered firm in an equilibrium framework where corporate debt is a non-redundant asset. While, in the absence of bankruptcy, higher leverage always implies riskier equity, it does not necessarily mean more volatile equity prices. In fact, the link between leverage and equity price volatility depends in a particular way on investors’ preferences towards risk.     

Profit sharing with a contest among agents

We consider how an internal competition in the form of a contest among agents can be combined with profit sharing in team production. The principal can choose to share between the principal and the agents as well as the sharing rule with a competitive contest among the agents. We show that under some conditions, a pure strategy equilibrium of profit sharing exists. In equilibrium, internal sharing involves a contest that is more competitive than proportional sharing, and the principal can get higher profit compared to proportional sharing.     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equity–Efficiency Optimizing Resource Allocation: The Role of Time Preferences in a Repeated Irrigation Game

We study repeated water allocation decisions among small scale irrigation users in Tanzania. In a treatment replicating water scarcity conditions, convexities in production make that substantial efficiency gains can be obtained by deviating from equal sharing, leading to an equity–efficiency trade‐off. In a repeated game setting, it becomes possible to reconcile efficiency with equity by rotating the person who receives the largest share, but such a strategy requires a longer run perspective. Correlating experimental data from an irrigation game with individual time preference data, we find that less patient irrigators are less likely to use a rotation strategy.     

Profit‐sharing plans and affective commitment: Does the context matter?

This article analyzes the relationship between profit‐sharing plans (PSP) and affective commitment and how it is affected by the context of the PSP application. Overall, there is a positive relationship between profit sharing and commitment that is strongest in very small firms. The efficacy of a PSP in improving employees' affective commitment appears to be greatest in firms with low job‐related employee participation. Its application in workplaces where employees enjoy high levels of participation appears to have little impact and may even result in slight declines in affective commitment. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The impact of private benefits on institutional ownership change: evidence from markets with different sentiments

This study investigates the relationship between private benefits and institutional ownership change in markets characterized by different investors’ sentiments. High-sentiment markets tend to overvalue a firm and thereby offer institutional investors a chance to sell shares and profit from overvaluation by forgoing the private benefits otherwise obtainable. Empirical analysis of ownership data from 1990 to 2008 reveals that, in high-sentiment markets, institutional investors sell more shares low in private benefits (dual-class firm share) than shares high in private benefits (non-dual-class firm share). In contrast, firm insiders, who consume significant private benefits in both dual-class and non-dual class firms, sell more dual-class firm shares in both high- and low-sentiment markets. Their ownership disposition is more likely driven by the need for diversification. Subsample analyses show that public pension funds drive the market-sentiment-related change of institutional ownership.     

Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition

The objective of this paper is to show how efficiency can be implemented in a market with strictly complementary inputs when the productive firms undertake unobservable effort. The observable output is a joint undertaking by a partnership consisting of two types of firms. It is shown that simple linear sharing rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing rule can implement the first‐best outcome provided that commitment to the proposed sharing rule is possible. This is so even when the sharing rule is proposed by one of the active partners. When opening up for the possibility of renegotiating sharing contracts that have undesirable properties for one or more of the firms, it becomes more difficult to implement socially efficient solutions. Implementation of the socially efficient outcome requires that the sharing rule is proposed by an outsider to the partnership. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Profit Sharing on the Performance of Financial Services Firms*

abstract Relying on macro theories (agency and organizational control) as well as micro theories (goal setting and expectancy), this study investigates the impact of profit‐sharing plan (PSP) adoption on the value creation process of financial services firms. The study relies on a comprehensive methodological approach that is both quantitative, with a dual cross‐sectional/longitudinal (pre‐post) design that compares PSP adopters with a control group of PSP non‐adopter firms, and qualitative through interviews with some adopting firms’ managing directors. Results show that firms adopting a PSP enhance their profitability in comparison to both their own prior performance and to firms that are not adopting a PSP. Results also show that the adoption of a PSP: (a) positively influences only profit drivers that are under employee control; and (b) is more likely to have a long term, positive impact on external profit drivers than on internal profit drivers. Qualitative data from field interviews corroborate and enrich these quantitative findings.     

Peer‐to‐Peer File Sharing and the Market for Digital Information Goods

We study competitive interaction between two alternative models of digital content distribution over the Internet: peer‐to‐peer (p2p) file sharing and centralized client–server distribution. We present microfoundations for a stylized model of p2p file sharing where all peers are endowed with standard preferences and show that the endogenous structure of the network is conducive to sharing by a significant number of peers, even if sharing is costlier than freeriding. We build on this model of p2p to analyze the optimal strategy of a profit‐maximizing firm, such as Apple, that offers content available at positive prices. We characterize the size of the p2p network as a function of the firm's pricing strategy, and show that the firm may be better off setting high prices, allowing the network to survive, and that the p2p network may work more efficiently in the presence of the firm than in its absence.     

State Lotteries as a Multiproduct Monopoly

Stemming from the concept of multiproduct monopoly, we adjust the usual profit maximizing rule of the effective price model, to account for substitutability or complementarity among lottery products as well as a richer structure of prizes in the expected profit function. The new pricing rule is used to assess pricing decisions of the Greek lottery operator, based on a recent sample of two popular pari‐mutuel lottery games' data. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Input Suppliers,Differential Pricing,and Information Sharing Agreements

It is common for firms to systematically share information with their input suppliers. Although such agreements with horizontal rivals have been analyzed, there has been little work examining vertical sharing, and that analysis has focused on suppliers that set uniform prices. However, there has been a systematic change in the US policy toward vertical relationships in the past decades: both FTC inaction and courts rulings have curtailed the effect of Robinson‐Patman, a law meant to prevent differential pricing. Furthermore, it is not clear if differential pricing reflects the suppliers' or the buyers' power. The interaction of these effects is examined.     

基于信息共享的供应链定价策略及利润增值研究

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的供应链系统,在非线性市场需求的前提下,应用博弈理论对供应链系统的定价策略进行了分析,分别得出信息共享时的博弈均衡解和信息不共享时的博弈均衡解;进一步分析了信息共享程度的大小与批发价、零售价以及双方利润之间的关系,得出信息共享程度越高,制造商和零售商的利润越大,信息共享实现了帕累托改进。最后,通过实例对结论进行了验证。     

Otra Empanada en la Parilla: Examining the Role of Culture and Information Sharing in Chile and Australia

One of the biggest assets of a firm is its information base. Included in this information base is a knowledge of prior errors and failures. Extant research suggests that while the propensity to share “bad news” (i.e. a prior error) is dependent on the cost of sharing, the perceived value of that cost may be culturally dependent. One area of interest that has received substantial attention in the prior literature has been cross‐cultural differences in negative information sharing in general, as well as the particular context in which the individual's superior is either present or absent during the information‐sharing process. Our study examines the role of the two cultural values (individualism/collectivism and to a lesser extent power distance) in explaining national differences in information sharing. By focusing on a sample from Chile and Australia, we were able to remove the regional cultural dimension of face, which has been inherent in prior studies that used Greater China as the representative of a collectivist society. Results from our quasi experiment show that when a supervisor is present during information sharing, collectivist Chilean decision‐makers are more willing to share negative information with their colleagues than their counterpart and individualist Australian decision‐makers. Our results also show that when a supervisor is absent, both Australian and Chilean decision‐makers are willing to share more negative information but the increase in the Australian propensity is significantly greater than that of the Chileans.     

Determination of expected cost of equity with the CAPM: Theoretical extension using the law of error propagation

The determination of the expected return on equity based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is an internationally recognized method, although the underlying theory is not without criticism and therefore leaves sufficient room for interpretation. Strictly speaking, the expected return on equity cannot be determined per se, as all parameters of the CAPM have to be estimated and contain measurement errors. The statistical measurement errors would have to be included in the calculation of the expected return on equity. The paper discusses the current view on how the expected return on equity is determined in the Germen‐speaking countries and presents an approach to transfer the measurement errors of the parameter risk‐free rate, market risk premium, and company beta to the calculated return on equity using the Gaussian law of error propagation.     

Stakeholder Engagement: Defining Strategic Advantage for Sustainable Construction

Although sustainable development is increasingly becoming a part of business plans, it is unclear what makes the economic, social and environmental dynamics strategically compatible. This research examines which of the following in sustainable development – government policy, managerial attitude and stakeholder engagement – is the most influential on the profitability of companies in the UK construction sector. Quantitative and qualitative analyses were rendered through a survey and semi‐structured interviews. Patterns of ambiguity in legislation were discovered as an obstacle for changing the sector's mind‐set. Stakeholder engagement was identified as the defining factor increasing managers' awareness, helping legislation to be effectively implemented and making sustainability highly appealing to clients. These findings indicate that to gain competitive advantage, companies should embark on long‐term strategic alliances which adopt the proposals of environmental non‐governmental organisations and closely follow public opinion. This, strengthens brand equity, allows for premium pricing, increases market share and maximizes profit. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

The pricing accuracy of alternative equity valuation models: Scandinavian evidence

In many decision contexts, there is a need for benchmark equity valuations, based on simplified modeling and publicly available information. Prior research on U.S. data however shows that the accuracy of such valuation models can be low and sensitive to the choice of model specifications and value driver predictions. In this paper, we test the applicability and pricing accuracy of three fundamental valuation (dividend discount, residual income, and abnormal earnings growth) models, all based on forecasts of company dividends, earnings, and/or equity book values. Extending prior research, we apply these models to Scandinavian firms with accounting data from the period 2005–2014, explicitly testing two approaches for the prediction of the value drivers—exogenously forecasted numbers versus projected historical numbers. Given access to the forecasted value drivers, the dividend discount model comes out as the most accurate valuation model. In particular, this holds in a comparison between the most parsimonious model specifications. The residual income valuation model generates the best pricing accuracy given the prediction of value drivers based on historical financial numbers. Notably, we observe pricing errors that in general are lower than what has been reported in prior U.S.‐based research for the dividend discount and the residual income valuation models. The pricing accuracy of the abnormal earnings growth models is surprisingly weak in the Scandinavian setting. However, these models improve somewhat after a couple of complexity adjustments, in particular with value driver predictions based on the projected history setting.     

Financial participation and recruitment and retention: causes and consequences

Using a sample of over 5000 establishments in Germany, we analyze the antecedents and effects of profit sharing (PS) and employee share ownership (ESO) with respect to the ability of firms to meet their recruitment and retention objectives and to achieve employment growth. We draw on both economic and behavioral perspectives to argue that firms that adopt PS and ESO plans do so in order to attract and retain employees. Using logistic regression and a propensity score matching technique, we find that firms that face higher recruitment problems, and those that have greater employment growth objectives, are more likely to use ESO and PS. Unlike ESO, PS enhances firm-level employment growth. However, neither ESO nor PS help firms to fully resolve recruitment and retention problems.