企业慈善捐赠带来价值回报吗——以利益相关者满足程度为调节变量的上市公司实证研究

慈善捐赠与企业价值之间的关系是企业社会责任研究关注的热点问题。本文就利益相关者满足程度对慈善捐赠影响企业价值的调节作用,进行了理论分析和实证检验。利用中国A股上市公司2002—2008年慈善捐赠的面板数据,研究发现,慈善捐赠价值效应以利益相关者满足程度为条件,即利益相关者满足程度越高时,慈善捐赠提升企业价值的效果才会越明显。进一步的研究表明,企业资源与董事会治理水平以及市场化程度,分别弱化和强化了利益相关者满足程度在慈善捐赠价值效应中的调节作用。本研究为评价慈善捐赠对企业价值的影响提供了更深层次的思考,对企业更好地履行慈善捐赠责任亦有重要启示。     

企业社会责任与财务绩效关系的实证研究——利益相关者视角的面板数据分析

本文按照资本形态的不同,将利益相关者划分为货币资本利益相关者、人力资本利益相关者、生态资本利益相关者、社会资本利益相关者,构建了企业社会责任的利益相关者模型。以46家上市公司2003—2007年的数据为依据,运用面板数据模型,研究了企业社会责任与财务绩效之间的关系。研究表明:我国上市公司已经开始关注其社会责任,但社会责任的披露信息仍然很少;大多数企业社会责任变量对当期财务绩效的影响为负;长期来看,企业履行社会责任对其财务绩效具有正向影响作用。     

企业慈善捐赠行为影响因素的实证分析——以广东省民营企业为例

以利益相关者理论为基础,从企业内部的资源和能力、外部的政府行为两个角度出发来考察广东省民营企业慈善捐赠行为的影响因素。运用Logistic回归模型,通过对273份有效问卷的实证分析,发现民营企业慈善捐赠行为与企业现金流的多寡没有显著关系,但企业形象、企业慈善决策机制、企业规模大小、企业所处的生命周期阶段对民营企业是否进行慈善捐赠有显著影响。我国民营企业应结合其资源能力和外部环境。开展战略性慈善捐赠,这是关乎其健康持续成长的重要要素。     

基于DEA模型的企业利益相关者关系经营效率评价研究——基于我国家电业上市公司的实证分析

随着利益相关者经营观念的不断深入,利益相关者关系影响企业财务绩效,良好的利益相关者关系是企业重要的优势资源,这一观点已得到了学术界和实业界的广泛认可,然而,对企业利益相关者关系经营的效率如何研究却较少.在深入揭示利益相关者关系与企业财务绩效之间的投入--产出关系基础上,本文以我国家电业上市公司为样本,运用DEA模型,对利益相关者关系与企业财务绩效之间的投入--产出效率进行了评价,以针对如何提高企业财务绩效提出合理化建议.     

国外企业声誉排名启示

正企业经营行为作用于所有利益相关者,如果企业从每一类利益相关者处获得支持,那么建立良好的声誉水到渠成;而如果有一类利益相关者强烈反对企业的某一项决策,那么企业声誉一定会受到影响。作为一种特殊资本,企业声誉构建是一个长期的过程     

利益相关者满足与企业价值的相关性研究——基于我国酒店餐饮上市公司面板数据的实证分析

由于缺乏对利益相关者与企业价值间内在机理的理论分析,导致基于利益相关者的企业价值理论在指导企业经营实践中未能发挥应有的作用。本文根据价值链理论,界定了对企业价值有影响的利益相关者范围。结合期望理论,引入利益相关者满足,作为分析影响利益相关者投入继而影响企业价值的指示变量,从理论上分析了利益相关者满足影响企业价值的内在机理,指出利益相关者企业价值经营的关键在于研究利益相关者满足合理性,并进一步采用面板数据模型对我国酒店餐饮类上市公司数据进行实证分析。研究结果表明利益相关者满足与企业价值间存在着显著的相关性;通过β值的分析显示不同利益相关者的满足水平存在着不合理现象,企业存在通过不同利益相关者满足水平的调整提升企业价值的可能。     

知识与财务管理

一、知识经济时代企业财务管理的目标多元化现代企业实际上是财务资本与知识资本这两种资本及其所有权之间的“复合契约” ,是“利益相关者”的产权合作。从“利益相关者合作产权”的观点出发 ,企业财务管理的目标应重新确立。第一 ,财务目标多元化。知识经济的到来 ,扩展了企业资本范围 ,改变了企业的资本结构 ,物质资本的地位将相对下降 ,而知识资本的地位将相对上升。人力资本将成为决定企业乃至整个社会和经济发展的最重要资源 ,是决定社会财富分配的最主要因素。因此 ,财务目标不仅要考虑财务资本所有者的资本增值最大化、债权者的偿债…     

营销价值观与组织绩效关系的实证研究:兼论企业所有制的影响

本文重点讨论了营销学中作为指导企业营销活动的价值观——市场导向与利益相关者导向的理论架构，并检验了利益相关者导向与组织绩效之间的关系。同时，还针对文献中欠缺的中国企业所有制的影响，进行了分析。研究结果发现，利益相关者导向对中国企业的组织绩效具有积极影响。但中国不同所有制的企业，在利益相关者导向和组织绩效上差异很大。     

企业社会绩效评价的利益相关者模式

国内企业综合评价还停留在财务综合评价阶段，所以在评价的内容上编重于企业的经营绩效而忽视了企业社会绩效的评价。而20世纪70年代以来西方学者在利益相关者理论的基础上提出了多种评价企业社会绩效的利益相关者模式，试图更确切地评价企业的社会绩效。本文将总结借鉴国外较有代表性的两种企业社会绩效评价模式，并试图在此基础上探讨适合我国国情的企业社会绩效评价模式。     

关于资产负债表的经济学思考

本文从管理学与经济学相结合的视角对资产负债表进行重新认识,探寻资产负债表上各项目的内涵及其与管理的关系,解读企业各利益相关者的博弈行为。本文指出:企业战略直接制约了企业资产的基本结构;企业资产的基本结构与盈利模式揭示了企业对战略承诺的遵守与实施;企业资产运用的效率表现为企业基于经营活动或投资活动的两种核心竞争力;企业资本结构的安排与优化揭示了企业各资源供给者在同一利益共同体下的产权与控制权的博弈过程;企业利益相关者之间的博弈均衡即企业资本结构的长期稳定是企业可持续发展的保障机制。     

Stepping across for social approval: Ties to independent foundations' boards after financial restatement

Research Summary: Integrating research on independent philanthropy and organizational misconduct, we argue that affiliations with independent foundations provide social approval benefits for firms that restate their financials. We use a panel of S&P 500 companies from 2004 to 2011 to investigate the addition of foundation board ties by restating firms. CEOs of restating firms add more new foundation board ties than CEOs of non‐restating firms, while existing corporate philanthropy and greater corporate reputation diminish this effect. We also find that new ties to foundations boards influences media tenor for restating firms more than it does for non‐restating peers. Our study offers a nuanced analysis of the post‐crisis actions of restating firms relative to non‐restating peers and highlights the relevance of ties to nonprofit boards for corporate governance. Managerial Summary: Firms oftentimes fire their top executives in the aftermath of misconduct, but such response is itself disruptive for the firm's operations. Instead, we suggest that forging ties to independent foundations can help firms in such contexts without unsettling effects. Our results show that, after a restatement event, CEOs of misconduct firms are especially likely to join new foundation boards as trustees and thus seem to be aware of the benefits of these associations. CEOs from firms with existing in‐house philanthropy or a high reputation do not join as many new foundations' boards of trustees. We also find that new firm‐foundation links are promptly and positively evaluated by the media, thus helping misconduct firms regain social approval.     

With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non‐shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non‐shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long‐term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short‐termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long‐term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short‐termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm litigation risk and the insurance value of corporate social performance

This paper advances the risk management perspective that superior social performance enhances firm value by serving as an ex ante valuable insurance mechanism. We posit that good social performance is more valuable as an insurance mechanism for firms with higher litigation risks. Moreover, value generation of corporate social performance (CSP) depends on whether a firm has gained pragmatic legitimacy (i.e., a firm's financial health) and moral legitimacy (i.e., whether or not a firm operates in a socially contested industry) among its stakeholders. We find that the value of CSP as insurance against litigation risk is practically significant, adding 2 to 4 percent to firm value. But CSP is less likely to create value if the firm is in financial distress or is operating in socially contested industries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A review of: “ENGINEERING ECONOMICS” by James L. Riggs,McGraw-Hill Book Company: New York, 1977, 609 pages, $19.50 list.

The relevance of corporate investment decisions lies in their impact on shareholder wealth. It not only depends on the investment project but also on the corporate dynamics that turns it into the sequence of shareholders’ capital contributions, dividends, and gross terminal value that constitutes the shareholders’ investment project (SIP). We develop a model to calculate the SIP cash flows and the values of its interim capitals following the average internal rate of return (AIRR) paradigm. The shareholders’ final value depends on two reinvestment rates that, respectively, capture the returns obtained by the retained cash flows and the dividends reinvested by shareholders. On this basis, we approach the analysis of value creation combining both reinvestment rates in the shareholders’ net present value (SNPV). This model enables us to obtain the AIRR of the SIP and a variant of it, the equity growth rate that embeds the impact of internal and external reinvestment on the shareholders’ final value.     

Looking good by doing good: The antecedents and consequences of stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief

Stakeholder theory suggests a relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance (CFP) because certain stakeholders reward certain types of CSR. This argument assumes that stakeholders attend to firms' CSR activities—an assumption that has yet to be examined. We fill this gap by extending stakeholder theory to the context of stakeholder attention to firm CSR and exploring the antecedents and consequences of stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief CSR. We test the resulting hypotheses on a sample of public companies that engaged in natural disaster relief efforts, finding that stakeholder attention partially mediated the relationship between disaster relief and CFP and that stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief was driven by the legitimacy, urgency, and enactment of disaster relief CSR initiatives. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rent appropriation of knowledge‐based assets and firm performance when institutions are weak: A study of Chinese publicly listed firms

Research summary : A firm's strategic investments in knowledge‐based assets through research and development (R&D) can generate economic rents for the firm, and thus are expected to affect positively a firm's financial performance. However, weak protection of minority shareholders, weak property rights, and ineffective law enforcement can allow those rents to be appropriated disproportionately by a firm's powerful insiders such as large owners and top managers. Recent data on Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2012 were used to demonstrate that the expected positive relationship between knowledge assets and performance is weaker in transition economies when a firm's ownership is highly concentrated and its managers have wide discretion. Moreover, rent appropriation by insiders was shown to vary with the levels of institutional development in which a firm operates. Managerial summary : Investing in knowledge‐based intangible assets (e.g., R&D) is an important value‐creation activity for the firm. Such value creation process can be facilitated by large shareholders and powerful managers, who can then take an advantageous position with critical insider information on these valuable intangible assets and therefore enjoy more opportunities to appropriate more value from them, leaving less value for other minority shareholders. The value distribution becomes increasingly skewed against minority shareholders when the institutional protection for them is weak. Indeed, in a large sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, we found that R&D investment becomes less positively associated with firm financial performance with the presence of large shareholders, high managerial equity, or CEO/Chairman duality, especially in Chinese provinces with weak institutional development. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Winning us with trifles: Adverse selection in the use of philanthropy as insurance

Research Summary: We study the use of corporate philanthropy as a form of reputation insurance, developing a formal model of such insurance to examine how the terms of insurance in equilibrium change under different assumptions about the firm and its stakeholders. We then test the predictions from this model in the U.S. petroleum industry and find that philanthropic donations offer insurance‐like benefits, but are also positively associated with subsequent oil spills—firms that give more, spill more—with this association being stronger for spills that are under firms’ control and in states with low civic capacity. These results are consistent with an adverse selection/moral hazard equilibrium and suggest that the use of philanthropy as reputation insurance may benefit firms at the cost of society. Managerial Summary: Firms that donate to social causes develop a reputation for being socially responsible, and are often given the benefit of doubt when negative information about them comes to light. But are philanthropic firms truly more responsible? We argue that firms that donate more may be more likely to do harm—those that expect to do harm later are likely to give more now, and those that know their reputation protects them may become less careful. Evidence from the U.S. petroleum industry is consistent with this argument, with firms that give more having more subsequent oil spills, but only the type of spills that are under the firm's control, and only in states where the firm faces weaker scrutiny.     

Is doing good good for you? how corporate charitable contributions enhance revenue growth

This study examines the impact of corporate philanthropy growth on sales growth using a large sample of charitable contributions made by U.S. public companies from 1989 through 2000. Applying Granger causality tests, we find that charitable contributions are significantly associated with future revenue, whereas the association between revenue and future contributions is marginally significant at best. We then identify the mechanism underlying our findings. Our results are particularly pronounced for firms that are highly sensitive to consumer perception, where individual consumers are the predominant customers. In addition, we document a positive relationship between contributions and customer satisfaction. Overall, our evidence suggests that corporate philanthropy, under certain circumstances, furthers firms' economic objectives. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于大股东控制的并购财富效应研究

本文研究了存在大股东代理问题下的并购财富效应及其形成机理，通过理论分析发现，大股东发起的收购行为通常导致并购方及其关联企业的总利润减少，竞争对手的利润增加，消费者剩余减少。尽管收购活动对并购方而言没有创造价值，但并购事件依然发生。这是因为收购后控制性股东将偏袒他拥有现金流权相对较多的企业。而侵害其他企业小股东利益。本文的研究成果对制定收购监管规则及小股东保护制度有一定的参考意义。