Coordination cycles

Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today's payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game.     

Sunspot cycles

Summary. This paper shows new properties about the equilibria of a stationary OG economy by establishing a connection between its stationary equilibria and those of a finite economy, with and without extrinsic uncertainty. Specifically, it shows the countability and local uniqueness with respect to the sup metric of the so-called sunspot cycles introduced here, that encompass both the deterministic cycles and the usual finite Markovian stationary sunspot equilibria. These sunspot cycles are, moreover, able to generate, at a lower cost in terms of assumptions than other sunspot equilibria, time series with the recurrent but irregular fluctuations typical of economic time series. Received: July 26, 2001; revised version: March 5, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I want to thank an anonymous referee for comments that have helped greatly to improve this paper, as well as the comments about its contents received from several audiences in different seminars and conferences (the Economic Theory seminar of the University of Pennsylvania, the 2001 Meeting of the Econometric Society held at New Orleans, the 2000 Econometric Society World Congress, the 2000 Society for Economic Design Conference) and from comments to a previous paper, Dávila [10], specially from Jim Peck at the 1997 Workshop on General Equilibrium held at the University of Venice, that eventually lead to this one.     

Sectoral trends and cycles in Germany

We examine the comovements between the output indexes of three German sectors (manufacturing, mining, and agriculture) and the three corresponding sectoral stock market indexes. It is found that data with and without seasonal adjustment give mixed results on the long-run interaction between the sectoral indexes. Compared with data that are non-seasonally adjusted, the adjusted data offer weaker evidence on the cointegration relationship between a) the sectoral output indexes, b) sectoral stock indexes, and c) individual pairs of real and financial indexes. On short-run comovement, seasonally adjusted data offer stronger evidence on the presence of common synchronized and non-synchronized cyclical components. First version received: March 2000/Final version received: September 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  We would like to thank Michael Dooley, Juergen von Hagen, Kenneth Kletzer, Peter Kugler, Jacky So and two anonymous referees, as well as the participants of the Fifth Global Finance Conference in Mexico City, the seminars at the University of California at Santa Cruz, University of Munich, and University of Basel for their helpful comments and suggestions. This research was supported by CGES at UC Berkeley and UC Santa Cruz faculty research funds.     

Agency costs and business cycles

Summary. This paper develops a model with endogenous agency costs that is otherwise quite similar to the canonical real business cycle model. The traditional assumption in the literature is that these agency costs arise in the production of investment goods. In contrast, this paper assumes that these costs are all encompassing in the sense that they arise in the production of aggregate output. The paper explores both the importance of the investment vs. output assumption for business cycle dynamics, and the conditions under which these agency models can deliver amplification and/or persistence. The paper has two principal conclusions. First, in terms of amplification and propagation, the output model performs worse than does the investment model. This arises because a variable distortion in the investment market has more of an impact than a comparable distortion in the output market. Second, in this model with optimal consumption choice by entrepreneurs, there is a clear tension between amplification and persistence. Received: December 30, 1997; revised version: April 1, 1998     

“Very Nice” trivial equilibria in strategic market games

Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or “legitimately” inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162–169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1–20], and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not “very nice,” in the sense that it is not “legitimately” trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Dubey and Shubik's assumptions, a Shapley NE may fail to exist.     

Learning of cycles and sunspot equilibria by Genetic Algorithms

We analyze the learning behaviour of a Simple Genetic Algorithm in an overlapping generations model with one consumption good and fiat money. It is shown by simulations, that in cases where periodic equilibria exist the equilibrium of period two is learned by a Genetic Algorithm and not the monetary steady state. We further show that proper coding leads to convergence of the GA towards the sunspot equilibrium. If individuals who believe in the impact of sunspots are brought together with individuals who ignore the sunspots, the sunspot believes will in most cases drive the other individuals out of the population.     

Indeterminacy and cycles in two-sector discrete-time model

Summary. We consider a discrete-time two-sector Cobb-Douglas economy with positive sector specific external effects. We show that indeterminacy of steady states and cycles can easily arise with constant or decreasing social returns to scale, and very small market imperfections. This is in sharp contrast with most of the contributions in the literature in which increasing social returns are required to generate indeterminacy. Received: July 31, 2000; revised version: June 5, 2001     

Testing Goodwin: growth cycles in ten OECD countries

Following Desai (Desai, M. 1984. An econometric model of theshare of wages in national income: UK 1855-1965, pp. 253-77in Goodwin, R. M. et al. (eds), Nonlinear Models of FluctuatingGrowth, Berlin, Springer), Goodwin's simple 'predator-prey'growth cycle model of the economy (Goodwin, R. M. 1967. A growthcycle, pp. 54-8 in Feinstein, C. H. (ed), Socialism, Capitalism,and Economic Growth, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;reprinted in Goodwin, R. M. 1982. Essays in Economic Dynamics,Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp. 165-70) is tested, using post-wardata for ten OECD countries - Australia, Canada, Finland, France,Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the UK and the US. At a quantitativelevel, Goodwin's model is found not to be adequate: (i) estimatedparameter values poorly predict the cycles' centres; and (ii)Goodwin's restrictive assumptions are not justified. However,at a qualitative level, the evidence presented here for theexistence of Goodwin-type cycles is extremely encouraging, justifyingboth existing theoretical extensions of Goodwin's model andfurther empirical work in this area.     

Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria

We provide a theoretical foundation for the use of Markov strategies in repeated games with asynchronous moves. If admissible strategies must display finite (arbitrarily long) memory and each player incurs a “complexity cost” which depends on the memory length required by her strategy, then every Nash equilibrium must be in Markovian strategies. If, in addition, admissible strategies have uniformly bounded memory, every rationalizable strategy must be Markovian. These results are robust to considerations of perfection and also yield interesting implications for equilibrium selection in simple contexts. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

Unemployment equilibrium and economic policy in mixed markets

This paper features a simple static Cournot-Nash model of an exchange economy with two productive sectors at flexible prices and wages. The traders in the atomless sector are price-takers, while the atoms behave strategically. We focus on the consequences of strategic interactions on the market outcome. Firstly, strategic interactions create underemployment on the labor market. Secondly, when the number of atoms increases without limit, the CWE coincides with the competitive equilibrium. Thirdly, we compare the welfare reached by traders at both equilibria. Fourthly, we consider the implementation of a tax levied on strategic supplies. Finally, we compare the approach retained with the monopolistic competition framework.     

Bequests, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Wealth Distribution

This paper constructs a heterogeneous agent overlapping generations model with bequests and inter vivos transfers. In the model, households in the same family line behave strategically to determine their consumption, working hours, gifts, and savings. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, the paper measures time preference and parental altruism consistent with the economy's capital-output ratio and the size of intergenerational transfers. The model with intergenerational transfers better explains, although not fully, the wealth distribution of the United States. The paper also analyzes the effects of government policy changes on wealth accumulation, distribution, and social welfare. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D31, D64, D91, H31.     

Conjectural variations, symmetric equilibria and economic policy

In this paper, we consider conjectural variations in a simple static general equilibrium model under oligopolistic competition. The modeling of conjectures captures the role played by beliefs in a micro-founded model. So, the economy may have three kinds of symmetric general equilibria. Furthermore, these equilibria can be Pareto-ranked by the conjectural variation parameter. Finally, we consider the implementation of a tax on the strategic behaviors in case of balanced-budget rule. The comparative statics illustrates the idea according to which the effectiveness of the multiplier mechanism to mitigate the market distortions depends on the symmetric equilibrium considered. Therefore, the effect of the tax on the prices and economic activity depends on the degree of market power which is conjectured by the agents.     

On the endogeneity of an exogenous OCA-criterion: specialisation and the correlation of regional business cycles in Europe

This paper examines whether changes in the degree of correlation of employment cycles across regions (of Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain) can be explained by changing patterns of specialisation. The empirical method adopted carries out pooled regressions for all possible region-pairs which relate moving correlations between the residuals of HP-filtered regional employment to their own past and an index of specialisation. As a test of robustness, the benchmark estimations which originally include dummies for common borders, German unification and relative differences between regional incomes are systematically tested down. The empirical results again highlight the problem of a common monetary policy for uncommon regions within the euro zone.

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The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee and the participants in the annual NOEG conference in Innsbruck for helpful comments.     

On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols

We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the frequently studied rejector-becomes-proposer protocol. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies which are shown to exist and to be efficient. Equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose conditional on the rejection by another player. We consider the limit, as the bargaining friction vanishes. In case no player has a positive probability to propose conditional on his rejection, each player receives his utopia payoff conditional on being recognized. Otherwise, equilibrium proposals of all players converge to a weighted Nash bargaining solution, where the weights are determined by the probability to propose conditional on one's own rejection.     

On Shapley–Shubik equilibria with financial markets

In this paper, we extend the Shapley–Shubik model to a two period financial economy, and essentially address the question of the existence of an equilibrium. More precisely, we show the existence of nice equilibria, i.e. situations in which prices for both assets and commodities are strictly positive. Even if the general lines of the proof are largely influenced by the paper of Dubey and Shubik (J Econ Theory 17:1–20, 1978), most of the arguments are new because of the financial nature of the economy. It forces us to deal with a generalized Nash equilibrium, and to proscribe the use of arguments which only work with a single cash-in-advance constraint.      

Strategic technology choice in regulated markets with demand uncertainty

This paper presents a simple model of a non-competitive market with demand uncertainty in which firms can choose their technology of production. Technology is characterised by two parameters: capacity and flexibility. The first has a strong commitment value while flexibility is needed to face uncertainty. Lack of competition requires active regulation to ensure that the price is not set at excessive level. When choosing their technology, firms take into account not only the effects of this choice on the opponent(s) but also the effect on the regulated price. In this framework, and because of regulation, firms have an incentive to strategically manipulate their cost (cost padding). This causes monopoly regulation aiming at improving allocative efficiency to be ineffective. In fact, by “tying its hand” to a low level of capacity, the monopolistic firm is able to get round the constraint imposed by the regulator. Increasing the number of firms in the market may restore regulation effectiveness. The reason is that if demand is sufficiently volatile, then firms strategically choose flexible techniques and this effect dominates over the incentive to manipulate costs in order to escape regulation. In this case, regulation is effective precisely because cost padding is hampered by firms’ non-cooperative behaviour.

Monetary policy effectiveness and stock market cycles in ASEAN-5

This article examines the asymmetric effects of monetary policy on real output in bull and bear phases of stock market in five ASEAN economies (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) using the recently developed pooled mean group (PMG) technique. Stock market cycles are identified by employing Markov switching models and the rule-based nonparametric approach. Estimating the models using monthly data from 1991:1 to 2011:12, the results show that monetary policy (measured by short-term interest rate) has a negative and statistically significant long-run effect on real output in bull and bear market periods while the effects are stronger in bear periods than bulls. In the short run, there is no statistically significant relationship between monetary policy and real output. These results are consistent with finance constraints (capital market imperfection) models that predict that monetary policy is more effective during bear periods than bulls.     

Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

Summary. The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play. Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: March 7, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am very grateful to Robert Anderson, David Blackwell, Aaron Edlin, Peter De Marzo, Ted O'Donoghue, Matthew Rabin, Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Clara Wang and Federico Weinschelbaum for comments and advise.     

Markov perfect equilibria in industries with complementarities

Summary.   This paper considers the existence and computation of Markov perfect equilibria in games with a “monotone” structure. Specifically, it provides a constructive proof of the existence of Markov perfect equilibria for a class of games in which a) there is a continuum of players, b) each player has the same per period payoff function and c) these per period payoff functions are supermodular in the player's current and past action and have increasing differences in the player's current action and the entire distribution of actions chosen by other players. The Markov perfect equilibria that are analyzed are symmetric, not in the sense that each player adopts the same action in any period, but rather in the sense that each player uses the same policy function. Since agents are typically distributed across many states they will typically take different actions. The formal environment considered has particular application to models of industries (or economies) in which firms face costs of price adjustment. It is in this context that the results are developed. Received: November 9, 1999; revised version: February 10, 2000