Human capital and optimal positive taxation of capital income

This paper analyzes optimal linear and non-linear taxes on capital and labor incomes in a life-cycle model of human capital investment, financial savings, and labor supply with heterogenous individuals. A dual income tax with a positive marginal tax rate on not only labor income but also capital income is optimal. The positive tax on capital income serves to alleviate the distortions of the labor tax on human capital accumulation. The optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is lower than that on labor income if savings are elastic compared to investment in human capital, substitution between verifiable and non-verifiable inputs in human capital formation is difficult, and most investments in human capital are verifiable so that education subsidies can directly reduce the tax wedge on learning. Numerical calculations suggest that the optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is substantial.     

Reduced Tax Progressivity in Norway in the Nineties: The Effect from Tax Changes

The inequality in pre-tax income increased in Norway in the 1990s, while the concentration of taxes remained largely unaltered. This means that tax progressivity has decreased in the period, as measured by summary indices of tax progressivity. In this paper I analyze individual income data to ascertain whether tax changes in the period can explain the observed decrease in tax progressivity. As marginal tax rates at high income levels have been substantially reduced in the period, for instance through the tax reform of 1992, it is expected that tax changes may have influenced the degree of inequality in pre-tax incomes. This behavioral effect is examined by deriving estimates of the elasticity of gross income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, obtained from various panel data regressions. The tax changes may also have shifted the distributional burden of taxes for unaltered level of pre-tax income inequality. In order to identify this (direct) effect of tax-law alterations, the same fixed distribution of pre-tax income is exposed to various tax-laws in the period.     

Political Sustainability and the Design of Environmental Taxes

This paper studies the issue of political support for environmental taxes. The environmental tax is determined by majority voting, given a refund rule that specifies the allocation of tax proceeds. The refund rule is chosen by a welfare-maximizing constitutional planner. We show that: (i) The equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the proportion of tax reductions based on wage incomes. (ii) If labor and capital income taxes are reduced in the same proportion, to keep the government's budget balanced, majority voting yields a rate of environmental taxation that is lower than the optimal (Pigouvian) level. (iii) To mitigate this negative bias, the government reduces wage taxes by a higher proportion than capital income taxes. (iv) The final outcome will either be the Pigouvian tax or else all reductions will be given in wage taxes. This depends on individuals' preferences for the polluting good as well as wage and capital income distributions.     

海峡两岸餐饮业税收比较

中国大陆与中国台湾地区(以下简称"两岸")均对餐饮业的经营收入征收流转税、对其经营所得征收所得税、对其拥有的财产征收财产税,对其发生的某种行为征收行为税。由于两岸情况不同,所征税种也有着各自不同的特点。本文首先比较了两岸餐饮业税收的相同与不同之处,最后提出了完善大陆餐饮业税收的对策。     

Survey Under‐Coverage of Top Incomes and Estimation of Inequality: What is the Role of the UK's SPI Adjustment?

Survey under‐coverage of top incomes leads to bias in survey‐based estimates of overall income inequality. Using income tax record data in combination with survey data is a potential approach to address the problem; we consider here the UK's pioneering ‘SPI adjustment’ method that implements this idea. Since 1992, the principal income distribution series (reported annually in Households Below Average Income) has been based on household survey data in which the incomes of a small number of ‘very rich’ individuals are adjusted using information from ‘very rich’ individuals in personal income tax return data. We explain what the procedure involves, reveal the extent to which it addresses survey under‐coverage of top incomes and show how it affects estimates of overall income inequality. More generally, we assess whether the SPI adjustment is fit for purpose and consider whether variants of it could be employed by other countries.     

National income taxation and the geographic distribution of population

We study how different national taxation schemes interact with geographic variation in productivity and consumption amenities in determining regional populations. A neoclassical migration equilibrium model is used to analyze the current nominal income tax system in Norway. The analysis is based on estimated regional income differences accounting for both observable and unobservable individual characteristics and the value of experience. Given regional differences in incomes and housing prices, quality of life and productivity are calibrated to model equilibrium. Compared to an undistorted equilibrium with lump-sum taxation, nominal income taxation creates a disincentive to locate in productive high-income regions. The deadweight loss due to locational inefficiencies is 0.18% of gross domestic product (GDP). We study real income taxation and equal real taxes as alternative tax systems. Both alternatives generate a geographic distribution of the population closer to the undistorted equilibrium, and hence with lower deadweight loss. In an extension of the analysis, we take into account payroll taxes. The existing regionally differentiated payroll taxes to the disadvantage of cities generate a deadweight loss of 0.22% of GDP in an economy with lump-sum income taxation. The two distortionary taxes interact and strengthen each other and the combined distortionary effect of income and payroll taxation in the Norwegian system is 0.46% of GDP.     

When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information,Peer Effects and Tax Compliance

In this paper, we suggest that individuals’ tax compliance behaviours are affected by the behaviour of their ‘neighbours’, or those about whom they may have information, whom they may know, or with whom they may interact on a regular basis. Individuals are more likely to file and to report their taxes when they believe that other individuals are also filing and reporting their taxes; conversely, when individuals believe that others are cheating on their taxes, they may well become cheaters themselves. We use experimental methods to test the role of such information about peer effects on compliance behaviour. In one treatment setting, we inform individuals about the frequency that their neighbours submit a tax return. In a second treatment setting, we inform them about the number of their neighbours who are audited, together with the penalties that they pay. In both cases, we examine the impact of information on filing behaviour and also on subsequent reporting behaviour. We find that providing information on whether one's neighbours are filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, this ‘neighbour’ information does not always improve compliance, depending on the exact content of the information.     

The Distributional Implications of Income Under‐Reporting in Hungary*

The ability and inclination of specific social groups to evade tax vary widely, and this leads to considerable variation in the actual tax burden on individuals with similar levels of income. Thus, ignoring tax evasion can be seriously misleading in terms of the distributive and fiscal effects of the tax system. This paper estimates the distributional implications of income tax evasion in Hungary, based on a random sample of the administrative tax records of nearly 230,000 individuals. Gross incomes declared in the administrative tax returns are compared with incomes stated in a nationally representative household budget survey. Our estimates show that the average rate of underreporting is 9–13 per cent, though this conceals a big difference between the self‐employed (who hide the greater part of their income) and employees. The estimates are likely to be lower bounds. These rates are used in a tax– benefit microsimulation model to calculate the fiscal and distributional implications of under‐reporting. Tax evasion reduces households' personal income tax payments by about 16–20 per cent. While the poverty rate increases only slightly, income inequality rises significantly, suggesting that high‐income households tend to evade tax proportionately more. Finally, we find that tax evasion largely reduces the progressivity of the tax system.     

The Stability of Tax Elasticities over the Business Cycle in European Countries

We estimate short‐ and long‐run tax elasticities that capture the relationship between changes in national income and tax revenue. We show that the short‐run tax elasticity changes according to the business cycle. We estimate a two‐state Markov‐switching regression on a novel data set of tax policy reforms in 15 European countries from 1980 to 2013, showing that the elasticities during booms and recessions are statistically (and often economically) different. The elasticities of personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions tend to be larger during recessions. Estimates of long‐run elasticities are in line with existing literature.     

On taxing capital income with income shifting

We examine a linear capital income tax and a nonlinear labor income tax in a two-type model where individuals live for two periods. We assume that taxes are paid only in the second period in which the agents receive both labor and capital income and may shift income from labor to capital. The two types of individuals may differ with respect to wage rate and initial resource endowments. In the absence of income shifting, endowment variation motivates a capital income tax which would not exist where there is pure wage rate variation. In the latter circumstance, income shifting would indeed establish a case for a capital income tax while adding variation in resource endowments would ambiguously affect the case. The asymmetric information case for a capital income tax must be traded off against distortionary effects not only on savings, but also on labor as an agent may earn labor income which is reported and taxed as capital income.      

我国间接税与收入分配公平关系的实证分析

税收理论认为间接税具有累退性,有利于征管效率但不利于社会公平。采用1994～2009年时间序列数据,计算出库兹涅茨比率以衡量居民收入分配差距,通过对增值税、消费税、营业税、资源税、城建税、全部间接税对库兹涅茨比率影响的实证研究表明,目前我国以增值税为代表的间接税占税收总收入的比重过高,不利于发挥税收调节收入分配差距的作用,需要在今后逐步加以调整;同时间接税中的消费税有一定的缩小我国居民收入分配差距的作用,可以适当加以规范,以发挥其促进社会公平的作用。     

影响纳税人税款支付意愿的个体因素研究

新修订的个人所得税法规定年所得12万元以上的纳税义务人,应在年度终了后3个月内到主管税务机关办理纳税申报。在此背景下,个人所得税稽查中如何选择税收稽查的重点人群是税收稽查部门面临的一个新课题。本文以公众价值观调查的数据为基础对纳税人的税款支付意愿进行了研究。结果表明性别、年龄及婚姻状况对税收道德有显著影响,而收入水平和接受教育的程度对公民的税收道德没有显著影响。     

Second-best income taxation and education policy with endogenous human capital and borrowing constraints

We formulate a two-period life cycle model of saving, labor supply, and human capital investment when individuals differ in their ability and initial wealth. Borrowing constraints result in sub-optimal choices for consumption and investments in human capital. We analyze optimal linear income taxes and education subsidies. The optimal income tax is shown to be positive—even in the absence of any redistributional concerns. A redistributive income tax relaxes borrowing constraints by redistributing resources from the unconstrained to the borrowing constrained stages of the life cycle. The income tax thus alleviates preexisting non-tax distortions in the capital market. Human capital is subsidized on a net basis in the absence of redistributional concerns. Education subsidies help to relax credit constraints and to reduce distortions from explicit and implicit taxes on human capital formation. When redistributional concerns are present, education is subsidized more if this helps to alleviate distortions on labor supply, but is subsidized less if education subsidies have a very regressive incidence. Simulations demonstrate that optimal income taxes are substantially higher when credit constraints are present. Education is generally subsidized on a net basis, and the more so if credit constraints are more severe.     

A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation

This paper generalizes the standard model of how taxes affect the labor-leisure choice by allowing individuals to change both their labor supply and avoidance effort in response to tax changes. Doing so reveals that the income and substitution effect of taxes depend on both preferences and the avoidance technology. Econometric analysis will not in general allow one to separately identify the two influences, unless one can specify observable determinants of the cost of avoidance. The effective marginal tax rate on working must be modified by the addition of an avoidance-facilitating effect, which measures how the cost of avoidance changes with higher income. This model provides a conceptual structure for evaluating to what extent, and in what situations, the opportunities for tax avoidance mitigate the real substitution response to taxation.     

Simplifying the personal income tax system: lessons from the 1998 Spanish reform

Governments often try to reduce the complexity of personal income tax systems by decreasing the number of tax filings. The 1998 reform of the Spanish income tax system has followed this approach by adjusting withholding on earned income to the income tax liability. In this paper, we assess to what extent the reform has fulfilled its purposes, making use of a micro‐simulation tax‐benefit model for Spain, ESPASIM. The number of individuals exempt from filing a tax return has been reduced to around half of the total number of taxpayers. However, the quantity of tax returns sent to the tax administration has not changed so much because the new withholding system adjusts taxes for only 29 per cent of those exempt. Moreover, the new system increases the overall excess of tax withholding by 1.5 billion euro. We also study alternative reforms that could achieve better results than the one implemented.     

Effective labor taxation and the international location of headquarters

Profit taxes are widely acknowledged to influence the location of firms’ headquarters. This paper sheds light on the role of aspects of labor taxation for the international location of headquarters. While profit taxes can be avoided in various ways, it is much harder for firms to manipulate the firm-specific labor tax base so that labor taxes may be relatively important for firm location. We construct a unique data set of effective labor taxes in 120 countries and use data on the location of 35,206 firms to analyze the impact of labor income tax rates, the progressivity of the income tax schedule, and social security contributions on firms’ decisions where to locate their headquarters. The findings suggest that both a higher progressivity of the tax system and higher (employee- and employer-borne) social security contributions negatively influence a country’s attractiveness for headquarters location. Hence, a one percentage point increase in these payroll taxes, reduces the probability of a country to attract headquarters by 6.1 %. The results prove robust in various empirical model specifications and subsets of the data.     

Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?

Optimal-tax theory forecasts that small open economies should not tax capital income. Yet, countries do tax capital income. Why the inconsistency? This paper shows that use of the double-taxation convention, whereby governments credit taxes paid abroad against domestic taxes, helps explain this inconsistency. In particular, capital income will be taxed if a dominant capital exporter acts as a Stackelberg leader when setting its tax policy. Due to the convention, other countries will then tax capital imports, making it attractive for the dominant capital exporter to tax capital income. Without a dominant capital exporter, however, the model still forecasts no capital-income taxes.     

Taxes

This is a compendium of notes on taxes. Section 2 presents a general tax scheme. It is a tax on value added by labour and capital that does not favour one or the other. Section 3 contrasts taxation of business income for pass-through entities and corporations. Section 4 discusses property taxes as taxes on housing services and so a form of income tax. Section 5 turns to wealth taxes. The closing Section 6 attempts to explain why people donate to nonprofits but minimise tax payments to governments, even though governments and nonprofits engage in many of the same activities.     

Personal taxation of capital income and the financial leverage of firms

Tax competition for capital has led to a trend where many countries levy lower taxes on interest income, often introducing differential taxation between interest and business income. This study analyzes the effect on firm debt usage. We exploit Germany’s 2009 tax reform, which introduced a final withholding tax on interest income with a flat rate 18 percentage points below the unchanged tax rate on income from unincorporated businesses, as a quasi-experiment. The results, based on firm-level panel data, indicate that firms increase their leverage when the tax rate on interest income decreases, albeit to a small degree.