Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers

We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers the first-score auction.     

Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used.     

The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.     

A general equilibrium analysis of software development: Implications of copyright protection and contract enforcement

We develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development. We obtain some testable results: when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be developed; environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market.     

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than that announced. We compute equilibrium corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: (i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, and (ii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence equilibrium corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.     

Subsidizing (and taxing) business procurement

This paper studies the effect of a subsidy (or tax) on a market where a downstream manufacturer uses a competitive tender to procure inputs from upstream suppliers. Subsidizing input production can result in input price decreases that are greater than the effective decrease in marginal costs. That is, overshifting occurs. When the size of the subsidy is not too large, the downstream firm can enjoy an increase in profits greater than the government expenditure on the subsidy. A relatively weak sufficient condition for these results to hold is that suppliers earn a positive profit margin on the marginal unit sold, before taking into account any subsidy payment. Stronger sufficient conditions, tailored to each result, are provided.     

Temporary partnership and subcontracting: Pre- vs. post- award outsourcing in public procurement

We empirically compare bids (i.e. prices) from temporary partnerships (TPs), that outsource part of the contract before the auction, and firms that outsource afterwards. Using a comprehensive dataset on procurement auctions for public works in Valle d’Aosta (Italy), we find that the timing of outsourcing affects the bids and the probability of winning the auction. Specifically, TPs bid closer to the payoff maximizing offer and are more likely to win. Hence, the price paid by the public buyer is lower. These results are supported by a simple theoretical setting showing that, by pre-committing to a TP, suppliers have a lower risk of being “held up” by subcontractors than firms that outsource part of the work after the bidding phase. Our results show the advantage for TPs of freely choosing partners, size and boundaries before the auction, highlighting their potential in fostering the effective participation in public procurement procedures of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs).     

Autocratic governors in public procurement

The personal role of sub-national rulers is crucial for regional development in countries with weak institutions. This paper studies the impact of regional governors’ tenure in office and their local ties on procurement performance in Russia. To identify the causal effect, we construct instruments for governor’s tenure by exploiting the regional vote share of ruling party in past parliament elections. We find the evidence that governors who do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared to governors with local ties (insiders). Namely, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at awarding stage significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, for governors-outsiders this restriction becomes stronger with tenure in office, while governors-insiders do not demonstrate such negative tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition by governors-outsiders cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution: the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination either increase or keep stable with tenure for governors-outsiders and these outcomes decrease with tenure for governors-insiders.     

Nonprofits and public good provision: A contest based on compromises

Two competing nonprofits with ideologically distinct missions compete for donor funding to provide an indivisible public good in a population with heterogeneous preferences. This paper examines the extent to which (average) public values are undermined and nonprofits’ ideology compromised in a contractual game in which the right to provide the public good is the outcome of competition between nonprofits. We also scrutinize the roles of (i) cooperative versus competitive contracting, (ii) multiple public goods, (iii) enforceability of actions and (iv) observability of nonprofit costs in determining the equilibrium terms of the contract. In each case, the intensity of the ideological divide between the donor and the nonprofits jointly impact the degree to which compromises are made in terms of both the public's and nonprofit's missions, and the ability on the part of the donor to reap double (cost-saving and strategic) financial gains.     

Restructuring hospital industry to control public health care expenditure: The role of input substitutability

In this paper we investigate the economic rationality of the bed downsizing process, characterising the hospital industry worldwide in the last decades, as a measure to control public health care expenditure. Considering a sample of Italian hospitals, we provide fresh evidence on the factor substitutability in the production of hospital services. Differently from other studies, based on North-American data and limited to pre-determined cost function models, we estimate a general specification (the Generalised Composite), and test it against traditional nested models (e.g. the Translog). For all the specifications we derive Allen, Morishima and Shadow elasticities of substitution between input pairs, obtaining a fairly consistent picture across all models and elasticity concepts. In particular, our results highlight a very limited degree of substitutability between factors in the production of hospital services, especially between beds and medical staff. These findings suggest that a restructuring policy of the hospital industry, which is confined to reducing the number of beds without involving workforce management, could not be a viable strategy for controlling public health care expenditure.     

Infrastructure privatization and changes in corruption patterns: The roots of public discontent

This paper offers a theory of how the degree of corruption that prevails in a society responds to changes in the ownership structure of major public service providers. We show that there are cases in which privatization, even though it fosters investments in infrastructure, also opens the door to more corruption. The public dissatisfaction towards privatization is then crucially affected by the changes in the degree and pattern of corruption. Our model thus helps understand the seemingly paradoxical situation prevailing in Latin America, where most studies find that privatizations have been efficiency-enhancing and have fostered investments and, at the same time, popular dissatisfaction with the process is extremely high, especially among the middle class. We show that this line of explanation is consistent with the evidence from surveys in the region.     

Health care expenditure and income in the OECD reconsidered: Evidence from panel data

This paper reconsiders the long-run economic relationship between health care expenditure and income using a panel of 20 OECD countries observed over the period 1971–2004. In particular, the paper studies the non-stationarity and cointegration properties between health care spending and income. This is done in a panel data context controlling for both cross-section dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. Cross-section dependence is modelled through a common factor model and through spatial dependence. Heterogeneity is handled through fixed effects in a panel homogeneous model and through a panel heterogeneous model. Our findings suggest that health care is a necessity rather than a luxury, with an elasticity much smaller than that estimated in previous studies.     

Cointegration analysis for cross-sectionally dependent panels: The case of regional production functions

This paper employs recently developed non-stationary panel methodologies that assume cross-section dependence to estimate a production function for Italian regions over the 1970–2003 period. The analysis consists of three steps. First, unit root tests for cross-sectionally dependent panels are applied. Second, the existence of a cointegrating relationship among value added, physical capital and human capital-augmented labour is investigated, fully allowing for cross-section dependence. Then, the appropriate Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square estimators developed by Bai and Kao [Bai, J., Kao, C. 2006. On the Estimation and Inference of a Panel Cointegration Model with Cross-Sectional Dependence. In: B.H. Baltagi (Ed) Panel Data Econometrics: Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Applications, Elsevier Science: Amsterdam; 2006, pp.3–30.] are used to estimate the long-run relationship. We find that neglecting cross-section dependence can have a strong impact on the estimated long-run input elasticities, generally imparting them an upward bias.     

Efficiency in Crime Prevention: A Case Study of the Lisbon Precincts

This paper analyzes the technical efficiency of the Lisbon police precincts in order to investigate its performance. A stochastic cost frontier model is used to generate efficiency scores, assuming that efficiency is time varying. It investigates its efficiency and finds that the results are, at best, mixed since the efficient scores are low and not time varying. Therefore, an alteration of management procedures is proposed in order to enable efficiency to be increased based on a governance–environment framework.Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia/MCT under FCT/POCTI partially funded by FEDER is gratefully appreciated. The authors also thank the participants at the International Atlantic Economic Conference in Lisbon, Portugal, March 10–13, 2004 for helpful comments. For our mistakes, the usual disclaimer applies.     

Policy reform and productivity change in Chinese agriculture: A distance function approach

Agricultural policy reform has been an important source of change in the Chinese agricultural sector. The reforms led to productivity growth and helped China to pursue its self-sufficiency goal especially in the grain sector. In order to analyze whether observable productivity growth stems from technologically induced components or from the market induced parts, a multi-input–multi-output model is derived by using an econometric distance function framework. A decomposition allows to distinguish allocative effects, scale effects, technological change, and technical efficiency change. Data on farms in Zhejiang from 1986 to 2000 are used to analyze the impact of policy reform.     

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PLANT DYNAMICS BY SIZE: KOREAN MANUFACTURING

A comparative analysis on Korean manufacturing plants is performed by size of plants and sources of TFP growth are decomposed into entry, exit, and survival effects of plants, focusing on the pre- and post-crisis periods. Additional survival analyses investigate internal and external determinants of the survival of plants. The results indicate that the exit of small- and medium-sized establishments (SMEs) with higher productivity is becoming problematic in the post-crisis period. The improvements in large-scale establishments (LSEs) after the crisis appeared to occur generally in high-technology industrial sectors; SMEs in low-technology industries are suffering from a sluggish market selection process.     

The choice of ownership structure: Evidence from Russian mass privatization

We use a large data set of Russian manufacturing firms to describe the ownership structure in the Russian industry at the end of the mass privatization program in 1994 and its subsequent evolution. The data shows a high, but gradually decreasing ownership stakes of firm insiders (managers and workers). We estimate the effect of a wide range of firm characteristics on the decision to privatize, the initial ownership structure after privatization, and on subsequent changes of ownership stakes. We test and find support for several predictions of the model by Aghion and Blanchard (1998). For example, collusion among workers makes them more reluctant to sell shares to outsiders. Firms in financial distress show a higher incidence of insiders selecting the option of privatization leading to high insider ownership. This can be explained by their desire to insure against unemployment in the case of restructuring by outsiders. No evidence is found of a sequencing in privatization according to the performance of firms before privatization. A methodological novelty of this paper is the application of a tobit model with sample selection to the choice of ownership stakes.     

Productivity in a Distorted Market: The Case of Brazil's Retail Sector

In a model of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms, distortions in prices drive a wedge between the marginal revenue products of factor inputs across firms. We use census data for Brazil's retail sector to study implications for aggregate productivity and relate distortions to regional variation in regulation using a differences‐in‐differences approach. Taxes, entry regulation, and access to credit may create distortions to output and capital that varies by firm size. Potential gains from reallocation have not diminished despite the process of services liberalization in the 1990s.     

The Entry‐Deterring Effects of Inflexible Regulation

This paper investigates the signalling role of tax policy in promoting, or hindering, the ability of a monopolist to practise entry deterrence. We show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm's concealment of information from potential entrants, thus deterring entry, and yet entail welfare improvements. Furthermore, we demonstrate that entry deterrence is more likely to arise when environmental regulation cannot be rapidly revised across time if market conditions change (inflexible regimes) than when regulatory agencies can adjust environmental policy over time.