On the relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance: The case of Canada

This paper uses an Autoregressive Distributed Lag model to examine the long run and short run relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance, as well as other determinants, using Canadian quarterly data from 1981 to 2018. The results indicate that there is a long-run cointegrating relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance, investment, and private credit. Moreover, the relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance is positive in the long-run, thus providing support for the Keynesian Hypothesis of the fiscal balance driving the current account. Specifically, a one percentage point rise in the fiscal balance to GDP ratio yields a 0.43 percentage point rise in the current account as a percent of GDP. This positive relationship is present in the short-run as well. Finally, the findings from the error correction model yield a speed of adjustment of 0.225, hence 22.5% of the long-run adjustment in the current account occurs next period.     

Growth,deficits and uncertainty: Theoretical aspects and empirical evidence from a panel of 27 countries

We examine the relationship between fiscal deficits and per-capita income growth in a panel of 27 European countries, allowing for perceived risks, in terms of fiscal sustainability, associated with additional government spending. Such risks are proxied by the conditional variability of manufacturing production and stock market returns and by the unconditional variability of two survey-based economic-sentiment indicators. To help clarifying how fiscal variables impact on growth and to provide a point of reference for the interpretation of the empirical results a structural growth model is first identified. We find evidence of an asymmetric relationship, in that fiscal deficits give rise to adverse growth effects if they coincide with high uncertainty regarding the prospects of the economy and no significant negative growth effects in the low-uncertainty case.     

Trade and the Balance of Payments

National accounts data for Q4 2013 revealed that exports surged by 2.8% on the quarter, though while this suggests that the economy has started to rebalance, it did come on the back of a very poor Q3. Services exports came roaring back in the final quarter, after a sustained period of weakness, and goods exports also increased. This contributed to the UK trade deficit almost halving in Q4 compared to the previous three months. But a deterioration in net investment income meant that the UK continued to run a very wide current account deficit…     

A nonlinear investigation of the twin deficits hypothesis over the business cycle: Evidence from Turkey

In this paper, we analyze the twin deficits hypothesis covering the period from 1994 to 2012 in Turkey. In contrast to previous studies on Turkey, the existence of twin deficits is investigated by regime-dependent impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions based on a multivariate two-regime threshold VAR (TVAR) model. Our results suggest that the dynamics between the current account and budget account variables are affected by macroeconomic activity: twin deficits are only the case in the upper regime, when the economy operates above its potential level. When the economy is in the lower regime, budget and trade deficits show divergent movements. The results are consistent with Kim and Roubini (2008), indicating that the divergence of fiscal balance and current account might be explained by the cyclical fluctuations of output.     

Fiscal policy options ahead of the Autumn Statement

• In our view the case for a fiscal stimulus is incontrovertible. The vote to leave the EU has dampened the outlook for growth, while there is limited scope for monetary policy to offer more support. The existing fiscal plans will exert a sizeable drag on growth and with borrowing costs so low, there is a strong case for relaxing the squeeze.
• Scenarios run on the Oxford Global Model suggest that raising capital spending by 1% of GDP in each of the next two fiscal years could boost GDP growth by 0.7% a year over that period. We also find that the package would, in some respects, pay for itself, with the public sector net debt‐to‐GDP ratio peaking at a lower level. The main bar to this package would be whether there are sufficient ‘shovel ready’ projects available.
• Political considerations might encourage the government to opt instead for packages geared towards boosting current spending – perhaps on the NHS – or cutting taxes. But our modelling suggests that this would offer a smaller boost to activity and would also generate poorer fiscal outcomes than an infrastructure‐led package.
• While the case for a stimulus package is very strong, our expectations for delivery are fairly low. The Conservatives have enjoyed electoral success on the back of a strong austerity message and suggestions that they might loosen fiscal policy appear to be aimed at averting a worst‐case scenario, rather than a conviction that this would be a positive policy to boost both short‐ and long‐term growth prospects. So if the economic data remains firm, the prospects of a sizeable stimulus package will recede. And if a package is implemented, the temptation to favour crowd‐pleasing tax cuts over higher investment may prove to be irresistible. Therefore, we view a large, infrastructure‐focused, stimulus package as an upside risk to our forecast, not a core assumption.

     

The role of fiscal policies for external imbalances: Evidence from the European Union

We revisit the relation between budget deficits and current account deficits for 28 European Union countries from 1996 to 2019. We find that an increase in budget deficit of 1 pp of GDP results in a deterioration of the current account deficit of 0.318 pp of GDP, which supports the Twin Deficits Hypothesis. On the other hand, dynamic panel estimates partially corroborate the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis in the presence of a fiscal rules index. In addition: i) the relation between the two deficits is asymmetric and the negative impact of the recent Eurozone banking and sovereign debt crisis on the current account balance is observed; ii) with right-wing governments, the impact of the budget balance on the current account balance is mitigated; if the government is on the left, the impact of the budget balance on the current account balance is amplified; iii) after 2010, the budget balance positively affects the current account balance; and iv) the positive impact of the budget balance on the current account balance is higher in the cases of non-Eurozone countries, high budget deficit countries, and low exports countries, whereas it is lower in the cases of Eurozone countries, low budget deficit countries, and high exports countries.     

Budget deficits and the current account balance: New evidence from panel data

This study examines two distinguishing predictions of the finite-horizon open-economy macroeconomic models regarding the effect of fiscal policy on the current account balance: (1) Given the path of government expenditures, a fall in public savings has an adverse effect on the current account balance, and (2) a bond-financed increase in government expenditures exerts a larger adverse effect on the current account balance than a tax-financed alternative. These predictions are vastly different from those of the Ricardian theory. According to this view, (1) lower public savings are met by equal increases in desired private savings, and thus the current account balance does not change, and (2) the response of current account balance to a change in government spending is independent of its financing methods. Empirical analysis of 63 countries is consistent with the conventional theory.     

Why big fiscal deficits and low inflation can coexist

• ▀ The surge in government debt caused by ballooning fiscal deficits is a necessary response to the coronavirus crisis. But we doubt this will lead to a burst of inflation in the advanced economies (AEs), let alone a debt crisis.
• ▀ Our fiscal forecasts assume AEs’ budget deficits averaged 20% of GDP or so in Q2. However, our deficit forecasts point to a sharp narrowing thereafter and for public debt as a share of GDP to peak in 2021.
• ▀ The risks around this forecast skew firmly towards deficits remaining wide, reflecting the balance of risks around our GDP forecasts and the possibility that governments allow some fiscal slippage.
• ▀ A slower narrowing of fiscal deficits than we forecast wouldn't automatically lead to a period of above-target inflation. Indeed, we wouldn't be surprised if larger-than-expected deficits were associated with weak inflation.
• ▀ High levels of corporate debt and weak labour markets raise the risk of private sector retrenchment ahead. In that case, large and sustained fiscal deficits may be needed to fill the vacuum and prevent GDP and inflation from falling. As has been the case in Japan over the past 25 years, large deficits over coming years could be associated with weak GDP growth and below-target inflation.
• ▀ If economies begin to overheat but governments keep fiscal policy loose, inflation could, of course, pick up. But central bank tightening would offset it. We believe the risk of sustained inflation overshoots is limited unless monetary policy were made subservient to governments’ own objectives. And we think the risk of central banks losing independence remains slim.

     

Prudence and Pragmatism in the Fiscal Stance

In this article, Simon Price argues that the government is pursuing a remarkably conservative fiscal policy. Not only has demand management been left almost entirely to the MPC, but since 1997 spending has been held down while the overall tax burden has been raised. Consequently, the relative size of the national debt is declining at a rapid rate. There are rules that are intended to govern debt policy, but they are based on less sound principles than the government argues, and may be inconsistent. Oddly, despite the emphasis on these rules, the government has announced a path for spending that makes it clear that it is in fact planning not to follow them. The government may be planning to reduce the national debt at an excessive rate. This may make sense in the short run, but is more problematic in the medium to long term. This is not to say fiscal policy should be immediately relaxed; the current low levels of private sector saving may well justify a temporarily tight fiscal stance.     

LETTING THE GOOD TIMES ROLL

Kenneth Clarke must wonder what is so difficult about being Chancellor of the Exchequer. Since he took over at the Treasury in May 1993, the UK economy has grown at an annual rate of 3.5-4.0% and unemployment has continued to fall. Underlying inflation has remained around the middle of the government's 1–4% target band. And the current account deficit on the balance of payments has shrunk. True, the Chancellor had to bring in a tax-raising Budget in November, though even here much of the hard work had been done by his predecessor. The policy decisions over the next year or so will prove much more tricky, however. The Chancellor faces pressure to relax fiscal policy in the Budget. And he will almost certainly have to raise interest rates - possibly before the end of this year. In this Forecast Release we look at what the outlook for the economy now implies for the policy judgements that the Chancellor must make over the remainder of this year.     

Deficits,expected deficits,financial markets,and the economy

This paper assesses the implications of U.S. budget and current account deficits for financial and economic stability. The primary focus is on the behavior of interest rates in response to deficits, then effects on the economy through the financial system. The paper argues, and shows with empirical evidence, including from a large-scale econometric model, that expected, but not realized, budget deficits affect interest rates. Under certain circumstances, particularly near full employment, sustained budget and current account deficits can lead to financial disarray and a severely constrained economy.     

The impact of credit and fiscal policy under a liquidity trap

This study examines the interaction of non-conventional credit policy and fiscal policy when adverse financial conditions drive the economy to a deep contraction and conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective as the policy interest rate reaches its effective lower bound. Consistent with other studies, under counter-cyclical financial intermediation costs, credit easing policies aimed at reducing credit spread ameliorate the response of the economy and lead to a faster recovery. More importantly, I find that expansionary fiscal policy during an episode of liquidity trap is associated with a large multiplier effect that prevents an otherwise deeper and longer recession. Moreover, the large impact of expansionary fiscal policy is maintained even if credit policy is already in place.     

Fiscal Policy in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics and Prospects for Fiscal Policy Coordination

Abstract.  This paper reviews the literature on the effects of fiscal policy in new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) models, complementing it with additional results that attempt to clarify the importance of the exchange rate regime (fixed or flexible) and of the type of policy (balanced budget or debt‐financed). Fixed exchange rates only seem to postpone the costs from the short to the long run, but the type of policy is crucial in determining the welfare impact of fiscal expansions. The paper also reviews the recent literature on fiscal policy coordination and shows that there is already some evidence that the gains from coordination in this area can be potentially large but draw attention to the need for reflecting more on the role of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool and on possible interactions between fiscal and monetary policy.     

Restoring Credible Economic Governance to the Eurozone

This paper discusses new institutional rules for a stable and lasting European Monetary Union (EMU). We propose a return to a strict and sustainable economic governance framework, which is mainly driven by market forces within a smart rule‐based environment. Our recommendations are: (a) ex ante conditionalities with a tough monitoring process to avoid moral hazard in the future; (b) further enhancement of the Stability and Growth Pact; and (c) ultimo ratio punishment to be able to respond to the unique constellation of fiscal–monetary interaction and new rescue facilities. Countries violating fiscal rules for more than four years in a row will thus lose their fiscal sovereignty or will have to resign from the Eurozone. After fulfilling the ex ante conditionalities as well as all required criteria, the country either will recover its fiscal sovereignty, or, in case of exclusion, will be given the option to rejoin EMU under certain conditions.     

Current account and real effective exchange rate misalignments in Central Eastern EU countries: An update using the macroeconomic balance approach

We make an assessment of the current account and price competitiveness of the Central Eastern European countries that joined the EU, using data up to 2016. Foreign capital flows, fiscal balance and relative output growth seem to play a crucial role in explaining the current account balance. The real effective exchange rate gaps behave in accord with the current account misalignments, which clearly display cyclical behaviour. When foreign direct investments are introduced as a determinant, the misalignments are larger in boom periods (positive misalignments), whereas the negative misalignments are smaller in magnitude. Overall, the countries have moved closer to their equilibria since 2010.     

Liquidity traps and expectation dynamics: Fiscal stimulus or fiscal austerity?

We examine global dynamics under infinite-horizon learning in New Keynesian models where the interest-rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound. The intended steady state is locally but not globally stable. Unstable deflationary paths emerge after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. For large expectation shocks that push interest rates to the zero bound, a temporary fiscal stimulus, or in some cases a policy of fiscal austerity, will insulate the economy from deflation traps if the policy is appropriately tailored in magnitude and duration. A fiscal stimulus “switching rule,” which automatically kicks in without discretionary fine-tuning, can be equally effective.     

Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth

This paper surveys the literature on fiscal policy and economic growth. We present a unifying framework for the analysis of long run growth implications of government expenditures and revenues. We find that several tax rates and expenditure categories exhibit a direct impact on the growth rate of the economy. In a creative synthesis we have assigned the relevant literature to the twelve introduced policy variables. Due to the equivalence of some policy variables we are left with six degrees of freedom, where we need four to internalize the model's intrinsic externalities, leaving two instruments to conduct short run fiscal policy.     

Brexit and FDI

• The potential for a departure from the EU to undermine the UK's attractiveness as a location for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is often cited as one of the key risks were the UK to leave the EU. In weighing up the threat to FDI posed by ‘Brexit’ we assess the net gain from inward investment and the role played by EU membership in attracting FDI.
• In theory, FDI benefits the economy via lower interest rates, higher wages for workers and ‘spillover’ benefits boosting economy‐wide productivity. But the evidence for these benefits is ambiguous. And FDI has potential drawbacks. These include an adverse effect on the tradeable sector, reflected in a wider current account deficit, the potential to ‘crowd out’ investment by domestic firms and the fiscal cost of subsidies paid to inward investors.
• That almost half of FDI in the UK comes from other EU countries suggests that EU membership is not the only driver of foreign investment in the UK. Other factors include the UK's business friendly environment, as reflected in global competitiveness surveys, and a relatively deregulated labour market. Of perhaps most importance is the lure provided by the UK's large domestic economy. 80% of FDI in the UK is in sectors where sales to the EU account for less than 10% of total demand.
• However, FDI in manufacturing does look vulnerable to Brexit, given the importance of the EU market. Granted, manufacturing accounts for a modest share of UK FDI. But to the extent that FDI boosts productivity, a loss of inward investment in this sector is likely to come at a disproportionate cost.
• Our modelling suggests that in a worst case Brexit scenario, the stock of FDI could ultimately be 7% lower relative to the UK remaining in the EU, potentially knocking around ½% off the level of GDP.

     

THE EFFECTS OF DISCRETIONARY FISCAL POLICY ON MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES: A REAPPRAISAL

Abstract Fiscal stimuli to recover? A cascade of academic and layman articles debate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating the economy backed up by different economic models and empirical support. This paper surveys the theoretical predictions and recent empirical vector autoregression evidence on the short‐run effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates.     

Fiscal decentralization under free mobility

In this paper it is shown that, under the proper convexity assumption, any efficient allocation of an economy subdivided into locationally separated regions can be sustained by means of fiscal decentralization with profit maximizing local governments. For that to be true, however, a system of intergovernmental grants is needed. Without such grants, fiscal decentralization and Tiebout equilibria are closely related concepts. Since a Tiebout equilibrium generally fails to exist [Bewley (1981)], these grants play an important role not only for redistribution but, in the first place, to make fiscal decentralization a feasible allocation mechanism.