Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests

This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of rent-seeking contests in terms of the amount and the timing of effort they elicit from the participants. The optimal contest structure—the one that maximizes the discounted sum of efforts—is found to hinge on the degree of impatience of the contest organizers, the more patient of whom prefer longer contests consisting of pairwise matches among the contestants. Heterogeneity of the contestants' quality also turns out to play an important role in the comparison.     

One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity

I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I show that values and costs heterogeneity are equally important in determining the level of connectedness and the architecture of equilibrium networks. I also show that when asymmetries are independent of the potential partner there are distributions of costs and values for which centrality is a distincitive feature of equilibrium networks. This sharply contrasts with the homogeneous case.I thank an anonymous referee for useful comments. The paper has benefited from discussion with Gabriella Conti, Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Sanjeev Goyal.     

The structure of bias in peer voting systems: lessons from the Eurovision Song Contest

This paper assesses whether and how common characteristics of jury members or peer voters affect the outcomes of voting systems. In particular, we analyze to what extent these common features result in voting bias. We take as a case study the Eurovision Song Contest for which an extensive amount of historical data is available. In contrast to earlier studies we analyze the impact of common factors on the bias individually for each country, which is necessary to substantiate the publicly debated accusations of regional block voting by certain groups of countries. We establish strong evidence for voting bias in the song contest on the basis of geography, even after correction for culture, language, religion and ethnicity. However, these effects do generally not correspond to the usual accusations. We believe that our findings extend to all instances where groups of jury members or peer voters share certain common factors, which may cause voting bias. It is important to identify such structures explicitly, as it can help avoiding bias in the first place. The authors are grateful to Marieke van Dijk for excellent research assistance and to Laurens Swinkels, Ieva Pudane, Gijsbert van Lomwel, Jelena Stefanovic, and Bas van den Heuvel for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Deterministic heterogeneity in tastes and product differentiation in the K-logit model

In this paper we use the K-deformed multinomial logit model to study product differentiation. The focus is on the economic interpretation of the deformation parameter which is the key parameter of this model. Then we establish the relationship between this parameter and probability choice, price elasticity and markup.     

Designing an optimal contest

The paper brings a mechanism design perspective to the study of contests. We consider the problem of selecting a contest success function when the contest designer may also value the prize. We show that any equilibrium outcome that can be achieved by a concave increasing contest success function can be replicated by a linear contest success function. An expected utility maximizing designer should employ a linear homogeneous contest success function. We explicitly derive the optimal contest for a risk-neutral designer and present comparative statics results. Tullock's contest is optimal only when the designer's valuation for the prize is low.     

Measuring heterogeneity in the returns to education using an education reform

In this paper, we explore the impact of a mandatory education reform as well as pre-reform availability of schools above the mandatory level, on educational attainment and returns to education in Norway. We contribute to the existing literature by focusing on the heterogeneity of the impact of reforms. Our results indicate that increased compulsory education from seven to nine years increased the general level of education beyond the compulsory education. We also find that the effect of family background on educational attainment was weaker after the reform. The average treatment effect on returns to education is surprisingly high for education of intermediate duration. This means that increasing the general level of education potentially generates high returns in the form of wages. We also find that the effect of treatment on the treated on the returns to education is 1-4 percentage points higher than the average treatment effect.     

Using a Simple Contest to Illustrate Mechanism Design

This article describes a simple classroom activity that illustrates how economic theory can be used for mechanism design. The rules for a set of contests are presented; the results typically obtained from these contests illustrate how the prize structure can be manipulated in order to produce a particular outcome. Specifically, this activity is designed to show how changing the prize structure can impact both the contestants’ average efforts and the effort level of the hardest-working contestant. The activity can be run in a 50-minute class, has instructions that fit on a single piece of paper, and, although it can be run in large classes, requires only six students.     

风险投资介入、投资策略与企业异质R&D创新——基于创业新兴指数样本公司的实证研究

利用创业新兴指数样本公司,实证考察了风险投资介入及其投资策略对企业异质研发创新的影响。结果表明:我国风险投资介入并未对企业异质研发创新产生显著影响;风险投资持股比重增大能显著促进公司常规式研发创新,而对探索式研发创新无显著促进效果;联合投资策略能够促进公司常规式研发创新,而对公司探索式研发创新的促进作用并不显著;单独投资策略对公司异质研发创新的促进作用不明显。这表明,我国风险投资对战略性新兴产业常规式创新具有一定的促进作用,但对探索式创新的促进效果不明显。     

New evidence on the effects of job creation schemes in Germany—a matching approach with threefold heterogeneity

This paper evaluates the effects of job creation schemes on the participating individuals in Germany. The very informative dataset at hand justifies the application of a matching estimator and allows to take account of threefold heterogeneity. The recently developed multiple treatment framework is used to evaluate the effects with respect to regional and individual heterogeneity as well as to differences in the programme sectors. The results show considerable differences with respect to these sources of heterogeneity, but the overall finding is very clear. At the end of our observation period, that is 2 years after the start of the programmes, participants in job creation schemes have a significantly lower success probability on the labour market in comparison to matched non-participants.     

Individual heterogeneity in the returns to schooling: instrumental variables quantile regression using twins data

Considerable effort has been exercised in estimating mean returns to education while carefully considering biases arising from unmeasured ability and measurement error. Recent work has investigated whether there are variations from the “mean” return to education across the population with mixed results. We use an instrumental variables estimator for quantile regression on a sample of twins to estimate an entire family of returns to education at different quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages while addressing simultaneity and measurement error biases. We test whether there is individual heterogeneity in returns to education and find that: more able individuals obtain more schooling perhaps due to lower marginal costs and/or higher marginal benefits of schooling and that higher ability individuals (those further to the right in the conditional distribution of wages) have higher returns to schooling consistent with a non-trivial interaction between schooling and unobserved abilities in the generation of earnings. The estimated returns are never lower than 9 percent and can be as high as 13 percent at the top of the conditional distribution of wages but they vary significantly only along the lower to middle quantiles. Our findings may have meaningful implications for the design of educational policies.     

Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort

Summary. We provide a characterization of participants' behavior in a contest or tournament where the marginal productivity of effort varies across contestants and individual productivity is private information. We then consider the optimal design of such a contest. We first analyze contestant behavior for the usual type of contest, where the highest output wins. Abilities need not be independently distributed. We demonstrate that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium output function, that output is increasing in ability, and that marginal effort is increasing in ability, while effort decreases when the cost of effort increases. Next we consider the case where the highest output need not win, with independently distributed abilities. We analyze the contest designer's decisions in choosing contest rules optimal from her perspective. We show that the output produced, probability of winning, and contest designer's expected revenue are generally increasing in contestants' ability. We examine the relationship between the marginal cost of producing output and marginal utility per dollar of the net award for winning. Received: July 30, 1998; revised version: August 7, 2000     

Total effort, competitive balance and the optimal contest success function

This paper shows that, in the constrained case, the value weighted contest success function (CSF) maximizes not only total effort, but every objective function which is increasing in total effort and competitive balance. In the unconstrained case, a first price all-pay auction with a reserve price is optimal only if the impact of competitive balance on the objective is small. Otherwise, a modified value weighted CSF is optimal.     

A modified yardstick competition mechanism

This paper expands Shleifer’s (Rand J Econ 16:319–327, 1985) theory of yardstick competition and develops a modified yardstick competition mechanism (MYC), where the yardstick employed consists of a tariff basket and total costs. This mechanism has a significant information advantage: the regulator “only” needs to observe total costs, prices and output of all firms. The MYC mechanism can ensure a socially optimal outcome when allowing for spatial and second degree price discrimination. We also introduce regulatory lags to the model. In addition, we compare the two approaches for the case of unobserved firm heterogeneity, and provide numerical estimations of the effects. The MYC mechanism fares better in the case of unobserved heterogeneity, and may thus be a useful extension of Shleifer’s yardstick mechanism.      

Doping and cheating in contest-like situations

Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping or cheating within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Besides the direct and indirect costs of doping, three major effects are identified which determine a player's decision to deviate from a no-doping situation — a cost effect, a likelihood effect and a base-salary effect. Moreover, the influence of heterogeneity and exogenous performance risk on a no-doping outcome, and the influence of ex-ante and ex-post doping tests on the players' investments are discussed.     

Leveraging resistance to change and the skunk works model of innovation

We study a situation in which an R&D department promotes the introduction of an innovation that results in costly re-adjustments for production workers. In response, the production department tries to resist change by improving the existing technology. Resistance to change triggers competition between departments, which, in turn, spurs effort. We show that firms balancing the strengths of the two departments perform better. As a negative effect, resistance to change might distort the R&D department's effort away from radical innovations. The firm can solve this problem by implementing the so-called skunk works model of innovation where the R&D department is isolated from the rest of the organization. Several implications for managing resistance to change and for the optimal design of R&D activities are derived.     

原木产品设计与质量管理

原木产品质量管理是指在原木产品的形成、检验、流通过程中的质量管理和控制。其任务就是通过介绍原木产品质量管理理论与方法,达到严格按照质量标准科学组织生产、提高原木产品质量的目的。原木是森工企业的主产品,是一种初级产品,并属于自愿约束性产品,主要作为其他产品的原产料使用没原木产品质量的高低,直接影响着森工企业的经济效益。如何速生、优质、丰产培育林木并使之得以有效利用,则显得尤为重要。