Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty

I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable.     

The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice

We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal–agent problem with multiple agents. Models of ambiguity aversion suggest that, under ambiguity, comparative compensation schemes may become more attractive than independent wage contracts. We test this by presenting agents with a choice between comparative reward schemes and independent contracts, which are designed such that under uncertainty about output distributions (that is, under ambiguity), ambiguity averse agents should typically prefer comparative reward schemes, independent of their degree of risk aversion. We indeed find that the share of agents who choose the comparative scheme is higher under ambiguity.     

The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments

The first-order approach in rank-order tournaments is addressed. It is demonstrated that the conditions given in the literature are not sufficient to guarantee concavity of agents' objective functions. Additional conditions are provided that ensure validity of the first-order approach.     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

Loss aversion and market crashes

This study proposes a rational expectation equilibrium model of stock market crashes with information asymmetry and loss averse speculators. We obtain a state-dependent linear optimal trading strategy, which makes the equilibrium price tractable. The model predicts nonlinear market depth and the result that small shocks to fundamentals (e.g., supply or informational shocks) can cause abrupt price movements. We demonstrate that short-sale constraints intensify asset price collapses relative to upward movements. The model also generates contagion between uncorrelated assets. These results are consistent with the main puzzling features observed during market crashes, namely abrupt and asymmetric price movements that are not driven by major news events but coupled with a spillover effect between unrelated markets.     

Measuring lying aversion

We introduce a new method for measuring the decision to lie in experiments. In the game, the decision to lie increases own payment independent of the counterpart's decision, but potentially at a cost for the counterpart. We identify at the individual level the decision to lie, and measure how individuals react to different incentives to lie. Furthermore we investigate how lying behavior changes over time. Our method allows us to classify people into types, including those who never lie, those who always lie, and those who react to incentives to lie. We suggest this method as a useful instrument for examining factors that influence the decision to lie.     

An index of loss aversion

To a considerable extent, risk aversion as it is commonly observed is caused by loss aversion. Several indexes of loss aversion have been proposed in the literature. The one proposed in this paper leads to a clear decomposition of risk attitude into three distinct components: basic utility, probability weighting, and loss aversion. The index is independent of the unit of payment. The main theorem shows how the indexes of different decision makers can be compared through observed choices.     

MORAL HAZARD,RISK AVERSION AND EFFICIENCY

This note revisits the classic moral‐hazard model, but assumes that the output distribution has moving support and punishments are limited. The results show that the principal can implement an efficient solution if the agent is sufficiently risk averse.     

Perceived inflation under loss aversion

Building on prospect theory, we apply the concept of loss aversion to the formation of inflation perceptions and test empirically for nonlinearities in the inflation-perceptions relation for a panel of 10 Euro area countries. Specifically, under the assumption of loss aversion, inflation changes above a certain reference rate will be perceived more strongly. Rejecting rationality of inflation perceptions in general under symmetric loss and in a majority of cases under flexible loss functions, panel smooth transition models give evidence of nonlinearities in the inflation-perceptions relation regarding both actual inflation and time. This result is confirmed by dynamic fixed effects estimates, where the slope of the estimated value function is significantly steeper in the loss region and the implied average reference inflation rate is found close to 2%.     

Production and insurance under regret aversion

This paper examines the behavior of a regret-averse producer facing revenue risk. To insure against the revenue risk, the producer can purchase a coinsurance contract with an endogenously chosen coinsurance rate. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives. We show that the regret-averse producer never fully insures against the revenue risk even though the coinsurance contract is actuarially fair. When the producer is sufficiently regret averse and the loss probability is high, we further show that the regret-averse producer chooses not to purchase the actuarially fair coinsurance contract. Even when purchasing the actuarially fair coinsurance contract is optimal, we derive sufficient conditions under which the regret-averse producer reduces the optimal output level as compared to that without the coinsurance contract. These results are distinct from those under pure risk aversion, thereby making the consideration of regret aversion crucial.     

Risk-taking for others under accountability

We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations.     

Multiplicity in general financial equilibrium with portfolio constraints

This paper explores the role of portfolio constraints in generating multiplicity of equilibrium. We present a simple financial market economy with two goods and two households, households who face constraints on their ability to take unbounded positions in risky stocks. Absent such constraints, equilibrium allocation is unique and is Pareto efficient. With one portfolio constraint in place, the efficient equilibrium is still possible; however, additional inefficient equilibria in which the constraint is binding may emerge. We show further that with portfolio constraints cum incomplete markets, there may be a continuum of equilibria; adding incomplete markets may lead to real indeterminacy.     

General equilibrium, wariness and efficient bubbles

Wary consumers overlook gains but not losses in remote sets of dates or states. As preferences are upper but not lower Mackey semi-continuous, Bewley?s (1972) [4] result on existence of equilibrium whose prices are not necessarily countably additive holds. Wariness is related to lack of myopia and to ambiguity aversion (and, therefore, to Bewley?s (1986) [6] work on Knightian uncertainty). Wary infinite lived agents have weaker transversality conditions allowing them to be creditors at infinity and for bubbles to occur in positive net supply assets completing the markets. There are efficient allocations that can only be implemented with asset bubbles.     

Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules

We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship between the curvature of an individual consumer's individual risk sharing rule and his absolute cautiousness, the first derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Furthermore, we discuss some consequences of these results and refinements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions.     

Herding effects in order driven markets: The rise and fall of gurus

We introduce an order driver market model with heterogeneous traders that imitate each other on a dynamic network structure. The communication structure evolves endogenously via a fitness mechanism based on agents performance. We assess under which assumptions imitation, among noise traders, can give rise to the emergence of gurus and their rise and fall in popularity over time. We study the wealth distribution of gurus, followers and non followers and show that traders have an incentive to imitate and a desire to be imitated since herding turns out to be profitable. The model is then used to study the effect that different competitive strategies (i.e. chartist & fundamentalist) have on agents performance. Our findings show that positive intelligence agents cannot invade a market populated by noise traders when herding is high.     

Dynamic modeling under linear-exponential loss

We develop a methodology of parametric modeling of time series dynamics when the underlying loss function is linear-exponential (Linex). We propose to directly model the dynamics of the conditional expectation that determines the optimal predictor. The procedure hinges on the exponential quasi-maximum likelihood interpretation of the Linex loss and nicely fits the multiplicative error modeling framework. Many conclusions relating to estimation, inference and forecasting follow from results already available in the econometric literature. The methodology is illustrated using data on United States GNP growth and Treasury bill returns.     

Public goods and optimal paternalism under present-biased preferences

This paper concerns the provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model under present-biased consumer preferences. The preference for immediate gratification facing the high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.     

Inverse demand systems and choice of functional form

Barten (Empirical Economics 18 (1993) 129) recently advocated estimation of a synthetic demand system that mechanically nests four other popular differential demand models. This paper follows a similar strategy, but in the context of four inverse share-equation demand systems: The Inverse Translog Demand System (ITLDS); the Inverse Almost Ideal Demand System (IAIDS); the Inverse Lewbel Demand System (ILDS); and the Inverse Non-Separable Linear Expenditure System (INLES). Each of these specifications is artificially nested in a Hybrid Inverse Demand System (HIDS). An empirical application to three categories of quarterly U.S. meat demand data over the period 1961-1996 indicates the HIDS is a preferred specification.     

Financial constraints and occupational choice in Thai villages

Financial constraints and entrepreneurship are key factors affecting economic performance in developing countries. I formulate and solve a model of occupational choice with moral hazard under three alternative financial market environments: savings only, borrowing and lending with default and moral hazard constrained insurance. I use computationally efficient techniques based on mechanism design, genetic algorithms and maximum likelihood to estimate and statistically test these models of financial constraints. Using occupational choice data from Thai villages I find evidence that the saving only regime is rejected in favor of regimes allowing for borrowing and/or insurance, especially in higher-wealth data stratifications. A direct test between the borrowing and insurance regimes reveals that neither can be rejected in favor of the other. Allowing ex-ante lotteries over wealth improves the explanatory power of the model. I also find evidence for differences in the best fitting regimes by region, wealth, and access to formal credit.     

Dynamic Equilibrium with Overpriced Put Options

It is a well-known anomaly that prices of put options are too high when options are out-of-the-money. This paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of the market where European put options become substantially overpriced when they are out-of-the-money. Overpricing is due to the presence of short-sale constraints on trading stocks and derivatives, as well as the heterogeneity between investors. We confirm the predicting power of the model by comparing its implications with existing empirical results.