Limits to government debt sustainability in OECD countries

The recent euro area sovereign debt crisis has shown the importance of market reactions for the sustainability of debt in advanced economies. This paper calculates endogenous government debt limits given the markets assessment of the probability to default. The estimated primary balance reaction function to growing debt has the “fiscal fatigue” property (a loosening fiscal effort makes the primary balance insufficient to support rising debt) at high debt levels. The combination of this feature of the primary balance reaction function with the market interest rate reaction to growing debt determines the government debt limit beyond which debt cannot be rolled over. An application to OECD countries over the period 1985 – 2013 with a model-based risk-premium shows that current debt limits are high for most of the OECD thanks to particularly low risk-free interest rates. It also shows for some countries that current debt levels are not sustainable without a change in government behaviour. Most importantly, the framework illustrates the state contingent nature of debt limits and therefore the vulnerability of governments to a change in macroeconomic conditions and to market reactions. Last, computations with an estimated interest rate reaction to public debt illustrate that debt limits are lower in the euro area than in other countries because of a sharper market interest rate reaction to rising debt.     

Country Default Risk: An Empirical Assessment

We provide benchmarks to evaluate what is an optimal foreign debt and a maximal foreign debt ( debt-max ), when risk is explicitly considered. When the actual debt exceeds debt-max , then the economy will default when a 'bad shock' occurs. This paper is an application of the stochastic optimal controls models of Fleming and Stein (2001), which gives empirical content to the question of how one should measure 'vulnerability' to shocks, when there is uncertainty concerning the productivity of capital. We consider two sets of high-risk countries during the period 1978–99: a subset of 21 countries that defaulted on the debt, and another set of 13 countries that did not default. Default is a situation where the firms or government of a country reschedule the interest/principal payments on the external debt. We thereby explain how our analysis can anticipate default risk, and add another dimension to the literature of early warning signals of default/credit risk.     

基于贷款偏好、企业规模和还贷行为的银企关系分析

中小企业融资难的一大原因是商业银行在选择授信对象时具有“授信给中小规模企业风险大”的贷款偏好．从而在信贷业务操作中表现出对中小企业的歧视。那么实际中小企业还贷履约行为如何？以商业银行和融资企业为对象,本文建立信贷交易博弈模型并实证检验融资企业的规模大小与其还贷履约行为的关系。结果表明：考虑到违约成本,相比较大规模企业的还贷履约情况,中小企业选择按时还贷履约的概率更大,还贷履约情况更好。     

Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

We consider a financing game where monitoring is costly, non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. The optimal contract, which is debt, induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults on the equilibrium path, consistent with empirical evidence on repayment and monitoring behavior in credit markets. Our paper is the first where the optimal contract is debt and default is not synonymous with bankruptcy.     

Financial Frictions and Risky Corporate Debt

We offer clarifications on Cooley and Quadrini (2001) regarding financial frictions and risky corporate debt pricing. Even in a frictionless world, the promised rate on corporate debt is not identical across firms and across capital structures and it is not equal to the risk-free rate. Frictions are unnecessary for credit spreads to arise. Only if the macroeconomy is in actuality risk free or risk neutral do interest rates on corporate debt reflect default probabilities. To the extent that the firm's entire financial structure is traded, a bias in credit spreads introduces an exploitable arbitrage opportunity. Re-establishing no-arbitrage, firm dynamics move in the opposite direction to Cooley and Quadrini's.     

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt

We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. We explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.     

PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.     

Household’s optimal mortgage and unsecured loan default decision

How do households make optimal borrowing and default decisions when they have the option to borrow in multiple ways? In this paper, I analyze households’ optimal mortgage and unsecured loan borrowing and default decisions in the context of the recent recession. I model households as able to default on mortgage debt to walk away from capital losses, at the price of foreclosure. However, a household can also default on unsecured debt to maintain its home, in exchange for a longer exclusion from credit markets following default. Depending on the costs of each alternative, financially constrained households exhibit heterogeneity in optimal default decisions.Next, I analyze how mortgage loan modification policies, after a sudden drop in house prices, affect household choices in the mortgage and unsecured loan markets. The quantitative exercise shows that the government-driven mortgage modification program, initiated in 2009, reduces the mortgage default rate by 0.27% points. However, this increases the unsecured loan charge-off rate by 0.66% points.     

Growth and crisis,unavoidable connection?

Periods of economic boom with rapid credit and GDP growth can be followed by sudden busts. In the presence of financial market imperfections, a simple modification of a neoclassical growth model can fully account for this behavior. I study a growth model for a small open economy where decreasing marginal returns to capital appear after the country has reached a threshold level of development, which is uncertain. Limited enforceability of contracts allows borrowers to default on their debt. Lenders optimally choose to suddenly restrict the supply of credit when the threshold is reached and decreasing marginal returns appear. Borrowers default, and a boom–bust cycle is generated.     

The democratic (dis)advantage: The conditional impact of democracy on credit risk and sovereign default

Many have argued that democracies are able to make credible commitments to repay their debts and consequently enjoy higher sovereign credit ratings. In contrast to this expectation, I argue that the advantage of democracies in credit ratings is conditional on the countries' level of financial vulnerability and adjustment needs. Because democracies have more diffuse decision-making and are more accountable to the public, they encounter greater difficulty than autocracies in passing unpopular economic adjustment measures. Thus, I argue that democracies with high debt levels and low foreign reserve assets experience worse credit outcomes, whereas democracies with low vulnerability experience more positive outcomes. In a sample of up to 96 developing countries, I show that democracies have worse credit ratings and CDS Spreads and are more likely to default than their autocratic counterparts when foreign reserves are low relative to external debt. Notably, I also show that large debt burdens increase credit risk mainly in more democratic countries. I further test the causal pathway of the democratic advantage by constructing democracy scores of “market-friendly” and “adjustment-difficulty” democracy, finding that democracy worsens debt outcomes due to adjustment difficulty. These findings help to revise and clarify the causal logic surrounding the democratic advantage hypothesis.     

State restrictions on local debt: Their role in preventing default

Default by a local government can impose a negative externality upon other localities within a state because the state's ability to enforce debt repayment depends upon the proportion of municipalities favoring repayment. Localities benefit from maintaining their state's reputation for enforcement. Hence, jurisdictions not wishing to default favor enforcement of repayment by other jurisdictions. A debt limit increases support for enforcement by reducing the proportion of municipalities preferring default. We characterize when such a limit is optimal. We also examine the role of ‘special districts’, which typically neither are subject to a debt ceiling nor fully backed by the jurisdiction.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

A Theory of Credit Ceilings in a Model of Debt and Renegotiation

A model is considered in which an entrepreneur uses debt to finance a risky investment project. He may in certain circumstances credibly threaten default on the loan, which is then renegotiated. However, lenders will never lend so much that default is credibly threatened in all states. There exists a 'credit ceiling' which, if binding, implies underinvestment. The paper discusses the determinants of the credit ceiling and derives some comparative statics results. For example, it is shown that the credit ceiling is raised by a mean-preserving spread of the firm's revenues. Also, a borrower may benefit from a reduction in his bargaining power.     

Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America

Between 1839 and 1842 the United States suffered through an acute debt crisis. Over this period, eight states and one territory defaulted, five of which outright repudiated all or parts of their outstanding debts. However, for many of those same states, reentry into capital markets occurred relatively rapidly and at rather favorable terms. The question then arises, how and why was this possible? This work attempts to explain this phenomenon by suggesting that soon after default or repudiation many states enacted constitutional amendments meant to significantly constrain and credibly commit future governments from overextending credit and simultaneously to pursue time-consistent public policy. I explore this by examining the impact that these newly imposed constitutional amendments, which limited both the type and amount of debt and created stronger procedural safeguards for issuing debt, had on average bond prices, gathered from New York market data. Overall, my results show that newly constrained states had higher average bond prices than states that did not impose constitutional limits on debt financing, suggesting that markets did, in fact, perceive these constitutional changes to be binding and credible.     

An endogenous structural credit risk model incorporating with moral hazard and rollover risk

In this paper, we embed optimal contracting between the manager and equity holders into Leland-Toft endogenous structural credit risk model to study the impact of moral hazard on the firm's credit risk with rollover debts. Our model quantitatively shows that the agency costs induced by the moral hazard can endogenously have significant impacts on credit spreads, besides the costs of rolling over the maturing debts of the firm. It originates from the conflicts that these two costs should be covered by equity holders while both the manager and maturing debt holders are still paid in full. The numerical results show that the credit spread with the agency costs of moral hazard is larger than the one without the agency costs. Thus, the moral hazard could be used to explain “credit spread puzzle” as an endogenous factor. The explicit formulae of the equity value, the debt value, and the endogenous default boundary are also given.     

BANKRUPTCY AND DELINQUENCY IN A MODEL OF UNSECURED DEBT

This article documents and interprets a fact central to the dynamics of informal consumer debt default. We observe that for individuals 60– 90 days late on payments, (i) 85% make payments during the next quarter, and (ii) 40% reduce their debt. To understand these facts, we develop a quantitative model of debt delinquency and bankruptcy. Our model reproduces the dynamics of delinquency and suggests an interpretation of the data in which lenders frequently reset loan terms for delinquent borrowers, typically offering partial debt forgiveness, instead of a blanket imposition of the “penalty rates” most unsecured credit contracts specify.     

Persistent gaps and default traps

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks. In such an environment, default signals the borrower's vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook. This translates into higher interest spreads and debt servicing costs relative to income, raising the cost of future repayments, thereby creating “default traps”. We build a long and broad cross-country dataset to show the existence of a history-dependent “default premium” and of significant effects of output persistence on sovereign creditworthiness, consistent with the model's predictions.     

Strategic debt service and investment decisions

Firms alter investing decisions when there is debt in the capital structure. Security design features can exacerbate the situation. This article studies how strategic debt service may affect investment distortions resulting from debt financing in a dynamic framework. When the production decision involves an expansion option, the shareholders’ option to strategically default on the outstanding debt eliminates bankruptcy costs but, in contrast to previous literature where production decisions are fixed, leads to suboptimal investing decisions. This is due to higher wealth transfers from shareholders to debt holders upon exercise of the growth option. Strategic debt service, therefore, may reduce the value of the firm. The setting of an endogenous production set offers a potential explanation for empirical observations of wide credit spreads and low leverage.     

企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。