Competitive equilibria in Shapley–Scarf markets with couples

We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley–Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and non-transferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these properties define a maximal preference domain.     

General existence of competitive equilibrium in the growth model with an endogenous labor–leisure choice

We prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in the canonical optimal growth model with elastic labor supply under general conditions. In this model, strong conditions to rule out corner solutions are often not well justified. We show using a separation argument that there exist Lagrange multipliers that can be viewed as a system of competitive prices. Neither Inada conditions, nor strict concavity, nor homogeneity, nor differentiability are required for existence of a competitive equilibrium. Thus, we cover important specifications used in the macroeconomics literature for which existence of a competitive equilibrium is not well understood. We give examples to illustrate the violation of the conditions used in earlier existence results but where a competitive equilibrium can be shown to exist following the approach in this paper.     

Purification of Bayesian–Nash equilibria in large games with compact type and action spaces

We present a purification result for incomplete information games with a large but finite number of players that allows compact metric spaces for both actions and types. We then compare our framework and findings to the early purification theorems of Rashid (1983. Equilibrium points of non-atomic games: asymptotic results. Economics Letters 12, 7–10), Cartwright and Wooders (2002 On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players. University of Warwick Working Paper 686 (revised 2005)), Kalai (2004. Large robust games. Econometrica 72, 1631–1665) and Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2006. Behavioral conformity in games with many players. Games and Economic Behavior 57, 347–360). Our proofs are elementary and rely on the Shapley–Folkman theorem.     

Cournot outcomes under Bertrand–Edgeworth competition with demand uncertainty

We provide new results for two-stage games in which firms make capacity investments when demand is uncertain, then, when demand is realized, compete in prices. We consider games with demand rationing schemes ranging from efficient to proportional rationing. In all cases, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome coinciding with the outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty if and only if (i) the fluctuation in absolute market size is small relative to the cost of capacity, or (ii) uncertainty is such that with high probability the market demand is very large and with the remaining probability the market demand is extremely small. Otherwise, equilibria involve mixed strategies. Further, we show under efficient rationing that condition (i) is sufficient for the unique equilibrium outcome to be an equilibrium outcome of the Cournot game with demand uncertainty.     

Environmental degradation,self-protection choices and coordination failures in a North–South evolutionary model

Environmental degradation may lead agents to increase their work effort to replace the consumption of depleted free access environmental goods with that of private substitute goods. The rise in the activity level that follows may further deplete the environment, which in turn increases the production and consumption of substitute goods. Using a North–South evolutionary model, we show that the existence of a coordination failure among interacting heterogeneous agents may lead the economy towards Pareto-dominated attracting stationary states where individuals work and produce “too much” (i.e. more than socially optimal). Finally, we analyse possible welfare effects of transferring the environmental impact of Northern production to the South and show that such a policy may decrease welfare in both hemispheres.     

Delay two-sector economic growth model with a Cobb–Douglas production function

Decisions in Economics and Finance - This study demonstrates the possibility of cyclic capital accumulation in the case in which there are delays in capital implementation and estimation of capital...     

An evolutionary model of industry dynamics and firms’ institutional behavior with job search, bargaining and matching

By combining features from distinct theoretical approaches, namely the evolutionary and the job search, matching and bargaining literatures, we propose a model that captures the main dynamics of a world where heterogeneous firms and workers interact and co-evolve. Within a micro-meso framework, the model focuses on the influence of firms’ labour choices (“institutional settings”) on industry dynamics, taking into account the existence of employment adjustment costs. The consideration of endogenous matching and bargaining processes in the labour market results in significant frictions, such as the simultaneous coexistence of unfilled job vacancies and unemployment. In a setting where technological progress is not biased a stylized fact of industrialized world economies in the last few decades emerges, the increasing wage inequality. Additionally, turbulence in the industry increases after a negative demand shock. As expected, the negative demand shock causes a decrease in the number of vacancies and, consequently, unemployment rates increase considerably. Interestingly, and mimicking the recent experiences of countries such as US, Spain, Greece and Portugal, the rise in unemployment is matched by a rise in contractual wages. This outcome is explained by the lower ability of the firms to fill their posted vacancies, which results from friction in the interactions among agents.     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

It’s worth a shot: urban density,endogenous vaccination decisions,and dynamics of infectious disease

Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination - We develop an agent-based model of vaccine decisions across a heterogeneous network model with urban and rural regions. In the model, agents make...     

The Holmström–Milgrom model: a simplified and illustrated version

In principal-agent theory, Holmström (1979, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74–91) offers the canonical model including a hidden one-shot action taken by an agent contracted to provide effort. Holmström's classical investigation led to an important body of applied literature. In investigating a specification in which effort is a sequence of actions, Holmström and Milgrom (1987, Econometrica, 55, 303–328) were able to provide a proof of the optimality of linear reward schemes (in the one-shot model, reward schemes are never linear). The sequence-of-actions model has a corresponding (static), very tractable companion. In this paper a simplified and illustrated version of this model is presented.     

Job characteristics,work–home interference and burnout: testing a structural model in the South African context

The aim of this study was to test a structural model that included job demands and job resources, negative work–home interference (WHI) and burnout (exhaustion, cognitive weariness and cynicism). A cross-sectional survey design was used. Random samples (n = 330) were taken of workers employed in the earthmoving industry in eight provinces of South Africa. Job characteristics (including job pressure, job control and job support) were measured by items that were adapted from the Job Content Questionnaire and a validated questionnaire on experience and evaluation of work. The Survey Work–Home Interaction – Nijmegen was used to measure negative WHI, while the Maslach Burnout Inventory-General Survey and cognitive weariness scale were administered to measure exhaustion, cognitive weariness and cynicism. Structural equation modelling with Amos showed that job demands (e.g. job pressure) and job resources (job control, supervisor support and colleague support) contributed to negative WHI. Negative WHI mediated the relationship between job demands and burnout and partially mediated between job resources and burnout.     

A low quality–high cost–low satisfaction trap in public health care: a model and an efficiency-quality-welfare improving stochastic resolution

This paper develops an applied stochastic model of public health care and shows that the public health care sector in Turkey is plagued by a low quality–high cost–low satisfaction trap which has been persistent over time. The values in question are shown to be stochastically stable. We formulate an efficiency-quality-welfare improving stochastic policy rule, which helps the sector to reach a selected target and which stabilizes quality, cost and welfare around that target.     

Person–organization fit and employee outcomes: test of a social exchange model

Data obtained from subordinate–supervisor dyads (N = 314) of a large manufacturing company in South Korea were used to test a moderated mediation model of the processes linking person–organization (P–O) fit and employee work attitudes and behaviors. The results revealed that the influence of P–O fit on work attitudes and behaviors was indirect through perceived social exchange with organization. In addition, the relationship between P–O fit and perceived social exchange with organization was moderated by leader–member exchange (LMX) quality. Specifically, a high-quality LMX enhanced the positive effects of P–O fit on perceived social exchange with organization.     

Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.     

Adaptive dynamic Nelson–Siegel term structure model with applications

We propose an Adaptive Dynamic Nelson–Siegel (ADNS) model to adaptively detect parameter changes and forecast the yield curve. The model is simple yet flexible and can be safely applied to both stationary and nonstationary situations with different sources of parameter changes. For the 3- to 12-months ahead out-of-sample forecasts of the US yield curve from 1998:1 to 2010:9, the ADNS model dominates both the popular reduced-form and affine term structure models; compared to random walk prediction, the ADNS steadily reduces the forecast error measurements by between 20% and 60%. The locally estimated coefficients and the identified stable subsamples over time align with policy changes and the timing of the recent financial crisis.     

Airlines’ strategic interactions and airport pricing in a dynamic bottleneck model of congestion

This paper analyzes efficient pricing at a congested airport dominated by a single firm. Unlike much of the previous literature, we combine a dynamic bottleneck model of congestion and a vertical structure model that explicitly considers the role of airlines and passengers. We show that a Stackelberg leader interacting with a competitive fringe partially internalizes congestion, and that there are various toll regimes that induce the welfare maximizing outcome, widening the set of choices for regulators. In particular, charging the congestion toll that would apply for fully competitive carriers and that ignores any internalization, to both the leader and the fringe, yields the first-best outcome.     

Factors driving embodied carbon in international trade: a multiregional input–output gravity model

ABSTRACT

Concerns about the effects and consequences of climate change have notably increased in recent decades. Despite large advances in the understanding of this phenomenon, further research into the determinants of gas emissions is necessary, to shed light on the responsibilities of producers and consumers, and their potential contribution to mitigation strategies. This paper studies the trajectories and determinants of carbon embodied in world trade during a period of 15 years. Our methodology relies on a multiregional input–output model, environmentally extended. Drawing on data from the World Input–Output Database, we estimate embodied emissions in bilateral flows. Then, we assess the determinants of CO₂ emissions embodied in trade, combining input–output modelling with trade gravity panel data analysis. This paper offers a methodological approach that explains and quantifies the underlying factors of carbon trade, integrating the production and consumption perspectives and considering the geographical, structural and institutional context of countries.