Do Unexpected Land Auction Outcomes Bring New Information to the Real Estate Market?

Land and real estate are intrinsically related but generally traded in two different markets. Vacant land, being a major “raw material” for development of real estate, is traded by developers who actively manage development risk for profit. Real estate, being a long lived final product, is traded by end-users or investors for use or investment in the secondary market. This study examines price discovery between the two markets. The key question is whether land transactions, in the form of public auctions, convey any new information to the secondary real estate market. Our results suggest unexpected land auction outcomes have both market-wide and local effects on real estate prices. However, the impacts are asymmetric. We found that lower than expected land auction prices have a significant negative market-wide and local impact on real estate prices while higher than expect land auction prices have little or no impact.     

The impact of auctions on residential property prices

This study assesses whether the sale method in residential real estate markets – auction versus private treaty – is a determinant of sale price. Utilising a larger and richer dataset than previous research, we test for a price effect in auction sales in Sydney and Christchurch. When self‐selection biases are corrected for, using two‐stage hedonic regression analysis and a matched sampling procedure, we find no significant difference between prices of properties sold at auction to those sold by private treaty. This conflicts with the conclusions of previous research in the Australian and New Zealand housing markets, which have documented a price premium associated with auction sales.     

Foreclosure,REO, and Market Sales in Residential Real Estate

Assessment of lender and third-party bidder acquired properties at foreclosure auction is provided. Properties acquired at foreclosure auction by third-party bidders transact at a discount to lender dispositions of real estate owned (REO) properties. The discount reflects a reduction in costs associated with lender owned (REO) dispositions and uncertainty faced by third-party bidders. Moreover, there is a ranking in transaction prices among initial purchases by third-party bidders at foreclosure auction, REO sales, non-distressed property sales and the subsequent sales of third-party bidder acquired properties. Third-party bidder auction prices are below REO sale prices, which are below non-distressed property sale prices, which are below the subsequent sale prices of third-party bidder acquired properties. The price spacing by cohort is logical, intuitive and economically justified in a market with rational participants. Implications are also apparent for the measurement of price changes, net sale proceeds and returns to residential real estate.     

Does Joint Bidding Reduce Competition? Evidence from Hong Kong Land Auctions

This paper analyses firms’ bidding behavior in auctions for development land in Hong Kong. The real estate market in Hong Kong is considered to be oligopolistic as it is dominated by a few top real estate firms, which have strong financial strength/development capacity and large land banks. Joint bidding is used by other real estate firms (“large” firms) to pool resources/capital in order to compete with the top firms. We test whether joint bidding increases or decreases the level of competition in land auctions, using land auction data in Hong Kong from 1991 to 2011. We find that large real estate firms are more likely to be successful than top firms at auctions when bidding jointly. However, joint bidding/winning does not harm competition as reflected by the number of bids, bids per bidder and number of bidders. Land prices also increase significantly in auctions won by joint bidders or alliances of large developers. Our results suggest that joint bidding enhances competition by allowing large firms to act strategically by pooling their resources and act aggressively to compete with the top firms.

     

中国艺术品投资收益:离岸与在岸市场的特征和互动

文物艺术品既是一个国家的历史印记和文化瑰宝,也是情感资产和动产。本文基于2000-2017年全球艺术品核心市场——北京、香港、纽约和伦敦核心拍卖行中国书画的微观数据,使用特征价格法构建全球中国艺术品市场价格指数,展示全球中国艺术品拍卖市场发展的全貌,同时创新性地使用重复交易数据探讨离岸和在岸中国艺术品市场投资特征和互动关系。研究表明:北京和香港市场作为中国艺术品最大的在岸和离岸拍卖市场价格相互联动,走势基本一致;艺术品财务收益和精神回报是艺术品投资收藏和消费的主要原因,不同市场间财务收益和风险分散的差异是艺术品市场资产配置和资金流动的动力;纽约和伦敦市场中国艺术品投资收益率低于北京和香港,香港是全球中国艺术品投资收益率最高的地区,重复交易中的北京-香港交易策略占优,离岸香港市场得天独厚的环境优势使香港中国艺术品市场未来发展前景可期。     

An analysis of FDIC failed bank auctions

This paper examines whether the sales mechanism used by the FDIC in failed bank auctions results in wealth transfers from the FDIC to the acquiring banks. We test this hypothesis by examining the returns to winning bidders in FDIC auctions. We find positive abnormal returns to these bidders. More importantly, we find a negative and significant relation between the returns to winning bidders and the number of bidders participating in the auction. This evidence suggests that the FDIC's auction procedures do generate wealth transfers.     

Automatic bankruptcy auctions and fire-sales

We test for fire-sale tendencies in automatic bankruptcy auctions. We find evidence consistent with fire-sale discounts when the auction leads to piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern. Neither industry-wide distress nor the industry affiliation of the buyer affect prices in going-concern sales. Bids are often structured as leveraged buyouts, which relaxes liquidity constraints and reduces bidder underinvestment incentives in the presence of debt overhang. Prices in “prepack” auctions (sales agreements negotiated prior to bankruptcy filing) are on average lower than for in-auction going-concern sales, suggesting that prepacks may help preempt excessive liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. Prepack targets have a greater industry-adjusted probability of refiling for bankruptcy, indicating that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.     

China's land market auctions: evidence of corruption?

In China, urban land is allocated by leasehold sales by local officials. Attempting to end widespread corruption, the government now requires sales to be conducted publicly, by either English or “two‐stage” auctions. However, corruption persists through the choice of auction format and preauction side deals between favored bidders and local officials. Two‐stage auctions have a first stage where favored developers signal that auctions are “taken,” deterring entry of other bidders. Empirics show that both sales prices and competition are significantly less for two‐stage than English auctions. Selection on unobserved property characteristics is positive: officials divert hotter properties to two‐stage auctions.     

Is There One Best Way to Sell a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales1

For managements and boards that have decided that the value‐maximizing choice is to sell their companies, the board must then address another important question: what is the best way to sell the company? Should they use a wide‐ranging auction that seeks to attract the largest number of bidders, exclusive negotiation with a single bidder, or a “controlled sale” with a limited group of potential buyers? In a much cited 1996 article in the American Economic Review called “Auctions Versus Negotiations,” economists Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer argued that there is “no merit in arguments that negotiation should be restricted to one or a few bidders to allow the seller to maintain control of the negotiating process.” But in their series of studies of the corporate M&A sales process over the past five years, the authors of this article have come to a very different conclusion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, wide‐ranging auctions that seek the greatest number of bidders are far from the dominant approach. Roughly half of the large M&A deals investigated by the authors were accomplished through negotiations with single bidders. At the same time, full‐fledged auctions accounted for only about half of the deals involving multiple bidders, while the other half were classified as controlled sales aimed at a small number of carefully selected potential buyers. In their attempt to explain this preference for negotiations and controlled sales over auctions in M&A sales, the authors draw extensive parallels with the market for initial public offerings. As in the “bookbuilding” approach that now dominates the IPO process in virtually all global capital markets, the decision to limit the number of bidders through either negotiations or controlled sales appears to have the advantage of eliciting more aggressive bids from the “most qualified” buyers. Or, to put this another way, auctions appear to have the effect of discouraging such buyers from participating in the process.     

“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?

Of primary importance in auction design is the set of strategies available to the seller at the auction stage. We first formalize hold‐up regarding entry costs that preys on second‐price auctions when the seller may engage in a costly shill‐bidding activity. We derive the optimal reserve and show how shill bidding can make posted prices outperforming auctions. Second, we advocate for a new regulation where shills would be banned but with the possibility of canceling sales ex post, which offers some valuable flexibility: the English auction with jump bids implements, then, the first best in general environments.     

从供给视角看我国房地产市场的“两难困境”

本文通过理论模型解释我国房地产市场两难困境的内在机制,提出各参与主体的博弈行为与房地产泡沫的制度逻辑:一方面地方政府土地出让和开发商的垄断造成房价过高;另一方面地方政府投资又依赖于土地出让收入。中央政府面临两者之间的权衡。本文提出,地方政府的利益是地价和房价上涨的根本原因,开发商垄断是高地价和高房价的直接原因。我们认为,大力建设保障性住房,并发展高端房市场是解决房地产市场两难处境的有效手段。     

Green Design and the Market for Commercial Office Space

This paper considers the relationship between energy-efficient design and the leasing/sales markets for commercial real estate. An economic model is provided that considers lease rates and occupancy in simultaneous equilibrium. The behavior of both is predicted to be influenced by efficient design attributes. Selling price is determined by both rents and occupancy; therefore the impact of efficient design on commercial sales activity should be distributed through the leasing market. The model is tested empirically using a national sample of sales and leasing data for class A office buildings. The evidence indicates that “green” buildings achieve superior rents and sustain significantly higher occupancy. The improved performance in the rental market is reflected in a significant premium for the selling price of Energy Star-labeled and LEED-certified properties.     

Transaction Volume and Price Dispersion in the Presale and Spot Real Estate Markets

Noise trading has been intensively studied in finance, but rarely in real estate. Theories of price dispersion have also been well established in retailing research, but less so in real estate. This paper is the first attempt to study the effect of noise trading on price dispersion in the real estate spot and presale (forward) markets. Quality-controlled price dispersion data series are estimated using a sample of transaction data in the housing presale and spot markets in Hong Kong. Our results show that transaction volume has a negative and significant effect on price dispersion in the spot market, but a positive and significant effect in the presale market. These support our conjecture that there are more noise traders in the presale market due to lower transaction costs. The volume effects also provide support for the use of a volume weighted least squares model when constructing a repeat sales index.     

Market Sentiments,Winner’s Curse and Bidding Outcome in Land Auctions

This paper empirically tests auction theory by examining how the stock market evaluates the outcome of open-bid English auctions of rights to develop residential real estate projects in Hong Kong. To do so, we deconstruct the complexity surrounding actual auction events, and empirically isolate the influence of conflicting auction theory predictions using data from expert opinion around auction events, actual auction event and outcome data, and stock market data. The empirical findings include (1) with increasing uncertainty bidders reduce bids, thus confirming predictions following the winner’s curse thesis; (2) joint bidding does not lead to increased bids based on pooled (“better”) information, but instead leads to reduced competition; while increased competition leads to increased prices at auction, as expected; (3) the market interprets auction outcomes as information events which function to signal developers’ expectations about future market prospects; but if the winning bid is considered too high, this interpretation is revised to that of the winner’s curse; (4) with joint bidding and winning, the market’s response to joint winners is better explained by concern for winner’s curse (despite supposed better informed bids) than the acquisition of a below cost development project following reduced competition at auction; and (5) the market interprets increased competition at auction as indicator of the future direction of property price movements in the secondary market—the more intense the competition, the more positive the future prospect of the property market are seen to be.     

中国房地产市场价格泡沫与空间传染效应

本文使用对数周期性幂律(Log Period Power Law, LPPL)模型对房地产市场价格泡沫进行测度,运用空间计量模型对我国房地产市场价格泡沫和空间传染效应进行研究。LPPL模型认为由价格泡沫产生并最终破裂的金融市场与地震系统具有很多相似之处,即金融资产的价格呈周期性变化规律,价格持续上涨到临界状态直至反转。本文采用2010年6月至2017年11月间我国100个城市的房地产市场数据对各城市房地产价格泡沫进行测度和物理/经济空间传染效应研究。研究发现,LPPL模型能够对我国100个城市房地产价格泡沫进行甄别且主要存在两种泡沫状态:正向泡沫(房价持续上升)和反转泡沫(房价整体下降却存在反转点)。各个城市(地区)房地产价格具有较强的空间传染性;存在正向泡沫区域的空间传染性相较反转泡沫区域更为明显,在考虑经济空间测度而不是物理空间测度的情况下,各城市间的空间传染性更强。与现有文献不同,我们发现反转泡沫区域的新房价格指数特别是二手房价格指数的上升对周边城市的房地产价格指数存在强烈的正向推高影响。最后,本文发现城市的房地产调控政策在一定程度上抑制了房价传统影响(比如信贷、新房、二手房价等)因素的推高影响,但各城市房地产价格之间的联动变化特征应该引起监管部门的注意。     

Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden

The traditional U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy process in which financial claims are renegotiated under court protection and the firm continues to operate under existing management has long been criticized by economists as an inefficient way of dealing with financially distressed companies. In this paper, the authors make the case for a mandatory auction bankruptcy system of the kind now used in Sweden—one that requires all companies filing for Chapter 11 to be sold in open auctions soon after the filing. After discussing the notable features of and differences between the U.S. and Swedish bankruptcy systems, the authors summarize recent research (much of it their own) on the benefits and possible drawbacks of the Swedish system. Among the most notable findings of this research, there is no evidence that mandatory bankruptcy auctions in Sweden lead to “fire‐sale” discounts in auction premiums. Moreover, the fact that three‐quarters of the Swedish companies that filed for bankruptcy survived as going concerns should allay concerns that an auction system will produce excessive liquidations. At the same time, the post‐bankruptcy operating profitability of the companies that emerge from Swedish auctions as going concerns tends to be on a par with that of their (non‐bankrupt) industry peers. Such post‐operating performance, when combined with a 75% rate of reorganization (versus liquidation), suggests that allowing auction investors—instead of the bankruptcy court—decide which companies survive and how they get capitalized and restructured has been quite effective in accomplishing the two aims of a bankruptcy system: (1) preserving intact all economically viable enterprises while (2) eliminating the excess capacity that results from prolonging the existence of companies that are never expected to earn high enough returns on capital to attract private investment. Consistent with these findings, the U.S. in recent years has seen a sharp increase in the use of auctions in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, though on a voluntary rather than a mandatory basis. Such a change reflects the growing recognition of the role of auction processes in reducing bankruptcy costs and preserving going‐concern values as U.S. capital market participants push harder for private workouts, “prepackaged” Chapter 11 filings, and auction sales in Chapter 11.     

Impact of the introduction of call auction on price discovery: Evidence from the Indian stock market using high-frequency data

Call markets are claimed to aggregate information and facilitate price discovery where continuous markets may fail. The impact of the introduction of call auction has not been found uniformly beneficial, possibly due to poor design or due to ‘thick market externalities’. This paper examines the reintroduction of opening call auction at the National Stock Exchange of India in 2010. The results suggest that the auctions attract very little volume, the intraday pattern of volume and volatility in the continuous market remains unchanged and a large fraction of price discovery, measured by the Weighted Price Contribution, still takes place in the first 15 min of continuous market. However, the market synchronicity has improved after the introduction of the auction. Our findings suggest that the ability to attract volume in the call auction for effective price discovery depends on the institutional settings and the characteristics of liquidity supply in the market.     

Opening and closing behavior following the introduction of call auctions in Singapore

The Singapore Exchange introduced opening and closing call auctions in August 2000. We find that the frequency of call trades is lower than on other markets. However, when auctions are used, the percentage of daily volume traded in the auction is high. Many days without call trades have quotes during the pre-call periods so that there is an opportunity for learning about equilibrium prices even when there are no call trades. Consistent with prior research, the introduction of call auctions enhances market quality at the open and the close. The call auctions also helped to address the issues that motivated their introduction in Singapore. That is, they increased the volume traded at the opening in initial public offerings and reduced the incidence of closing price manipulation.     

Liquidity dynamics across public and private markets

In this paper we investigate cross-asset liquidity between equity markets and REITs and between REITs and private real estate markets. While many studies have investigated REIT liquidity, and there is an emerging interest in liquidity in the private real estate markets, there appears to be little knowledge of the dynamics of cross-market liquidity. We find lower levels of liquidity for REITs compared to a set of control firms matched on size and book-to-market ratios. Commonality in liquidity is also lower for REITs than the controls and the overall market. However, we do find an important difference in share turnover for REITs, which appears to have a higher level of commonality than found in other studies. We suggest that this may be due to the financial crisis. Additionally we find evidence of similar time-series variation in liquidity for public and private real estate markets. We also find significant directional causality for most liquidity proxies from the public to private real estate markets. Finally our results show that there is strong contemporaneous correlation between both public and private real estate market liquidity and the term spread and real investment and consumption spending. REIT liquidity measures based on intraday data also appear to contain important information not found in measures constructed from daily returns.     

Common factors in international securitized real estate markets

This study investigates the presence of common factors in the securitized real estate markets of the Untied States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Hong Kong (HK), and Singapore (SG). Using a combination of factor analysis and canonical correlation analysis on 10-year monthly return data for 142 real estate securities in the four markets, more common risk factors among real estate securities within a country than across countries are detected. In addition, there is at least one common securitized real estate market factor that is moderately correlated with the world real estate market, and to a lesser extent, with the world stock market. However, the degree of linkage across the four securitized real estate markets is much weaker than the strong linkages present across the four economies. It further appears that the extent to which correlations are found in international securitized real estate markets might largely be due to the increasing integrated nature of the world real economy, rather than a result of the globalization of financial markets. The results are preliminary, but indicative, and suggest that more studies exploring how common factors, together with the local market portfolio, could help explain the return-generating process of securitized real estate.