Economic Implications of WTO Negotiations on Non‐agricultural Market Access

The economic implications of current WTO negotiations are likely to be far reaching. The World Bank and UNCTAD estimate annual global gains in agriculture and non‐agricultural products (including fish) of about $70−150 billion each under various scenarios and technical assumptions. Liberalising trade in services could be even more important, especially if agreement were reached to facilitate the temporary movement of labour (Mode 4 under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS). Some qualifications, however, are in order. First, gains are likely to be spread unevenly across countries and across sectors; and, second, short‐term adjustment costs might precede long‐term gains. Much depends on how ambitious liberalisation is and on policies to facilitate adjustment. This paper examines the Doha mandate in non‐agricultural market access (NAMA) and the current state of the WTO negotiations, in particular some key proposals being considered at the December 2005 Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong. We analyse various scenarios and their implications for trade, welfare, output, employment, revenues and preferences, as well as the distributional effects across countries and sectors. We note possible adjustment problems related to balance of payments and structural adjustment, as well as revenue and preference losses. These suggest the need for ‘aid for trade’ to help developing countries realise gains possible from WTO negotiations.     

Carbon,Trade Policy and Carbon Free Trade Areas

This paper discusses both the potential contribution that trade policy initiatives can make towards the achievement of significant global carbon emissions reduction and the potential impacts of proposals now circulating for carbon reduction motivated geographical trade arrangements, including carbon‐free trade areas. We first suggest that trade policy is likely to be a relatively minor consideration in climate change containment. The dominant influence on carbon emissions globally for the next several decades will be growth more than trade and its composition, and in turn, the size of trade seemingly matters more than its composition given differences in emission intensity between tradables and non‐tradables. We then note that differences in emissions intensity across countries are larger than across products or sectors and so issues of country discrimination in trade policy (and violations of MFN) arise. We next discuss both unilateral and regional carbon motivated trade policy arrangements, including three potential variants of carbon emission reduction based free trade area arrangements. One is regional trade agreements with varying types of trade preferences towards low carbon‐intensive products, low carbon new technologies and inputs to low carbon processes. A second is the use of joint border measures against third parties to counteract anti‐competitive effects from groups of countries taking on deeper emission reduction commitments. A third is third‐country trade barriers along with free trade or other regional trade agreements as penalty mechanisms to pressure other countries to join emission‐reducing environmental agreements. We differentiate among the objectives, forms and possible impacts of each variant. We also speculate as to how the world trading system may evolve in the next few decades as trade policy potentially becomes increasingly dominated by environmental concerns. We suggest that the future evolution of the trading system will likely be with environmentally motivated arrangements acting as an overlay on prevailing trade and financial arrangements in the WTO and IMF, and eventually movement to linked global trade and environmental policy bargaining.     

Canada's Anti‐dumping and Safeguard Policies: Overt and Subtle Forms of Discrimination

Like many countries in the international trading system, Canada repeatedly faces political pressure from industries seeking protection from import competition. I examine Canadian policymakers’ response to this pressure within the economic environment created by its participation in discriminatory trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In particular, I exploit new sources of data on Canada's use of potentially WTO‐consistent import‐restricting policies such as anti‐dumping, global safeguards and a China‐specific safeguard. I illustrate subtle ways in which Canadian policymakers may be structuring the application of such policies so as to reinforce the discrimination inherent in Canada's external trade policy because of the preferences granted to the United States and Mexico through NAFTA.     

2004 Trade Policy Review – The United States

Many of the findings of the seventh Trade Policy Review of the United States are similar to those reached in earlier reviews: the US is unanimously acknowledged as having an open and transparent system; the US economy has remained amongst the world's most competitive, and has continued to support global growth by keeping its import market largely open. This review finds, however, that the US has developed a disturbing pattern of non‐compliance with WTO rules. During the period of review the United States enacted policies, most notably the infamous Byrd Amendment and the 2001–02 steel safeguard action, that were found to be clear violations of its WTO obligations. Despite these and other such findings, the United States has obstinately refused to bring its domestic statutes in line with WTO rules. In addition, in recent years the United States’ aggressive pursuit of regional and bilateral initiatives has led many Members to question whether the United States is committed to the multilateral approach espoused by the WTO. Overall, despite the US's many virtues, Member countries expressed concern that the US's stated leadership of and commitment to the WTO is not matched by its actions.     

Privatisation and the unusual case of Belarusian accession to the WTO

The accession negotiations of Belarus to the WTO are unusual since, due to its obligations in the Eurasian Economic Union, WTO accession is not expected to impact its tariffs or formerly substantial trade‐distorting agricultural subsidies. Nonetheless, we estimate that WTO accession will increase welfare by 9.9% of consumption in Belarus. We show that inclusion of: (i) foreign direct investment; (ii) reduction in non‐discriminatory barriers against services providers; and (iii) our model with imperfect competition and endogenous productivity effects together produce estimated gains eleven times larger than a model of perfect competition with only cross‐border trade in services. Our analysis is enabled by our production of a data set on both discriminatory and non‐discriminatory barriers in services and their ad valorem equivalents. Based on a new data set on labour productivity by sector and type of ownership, in our central model, we estimate that privatisation will increase welfare by 35.8% of consumption. We find substantial variance in the estimated gains from privatisation depending on model assumptions, but all the estimates of the impacts of privatisation indicate substantial welfare gains.     

How do countries respond to anti‐dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti‐dumping

Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the anti‐dumping petition filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory anti‐dumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO ) dispute settlement understanding. Using a panel of global anti‐dumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyse under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an anti‐dumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory anti‐dumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.     

Non‐Tariff Measures,Specific Trade Concerns and Tariff Reduction

This paper studies the determinants of the recent proliferation of Specific Trade Concerns raised at the WTO on non‐tariff trade measures (NTMs), with a focus on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Even though NTMs are imposed de jure to protect consumers from unhealthy products, they increase trade costs de facto. So, when tariff protection lowers, NTMs become effective barriers to trade and the exporting countries can complain at the dedicated committee at the WTO (STCs). Therefore, we study whether STCs are raised by exporting countries as a consequence of tariff reductions in importing countries, that is when non‐tariff measures become barriers to trade. Using a recent database on STCs over the period 1996–2010, we find empirical evidence that SPS and TBT concerns are raised by exporting country as a consequence of importer's tariff cut.     

Empirical evidence on surrogate country method for non‐market economy: US anti‐dumping policy towards China

Whether the non‐market economy (NME) treatment on China can be maintained even after the expiry date under Section 15 of China's World Trade Organization (WTO) Accession Protocol is one of the most controversial issues in the WTO. In fact, the key issue of the NME status in the anti‐dumping (AD) proceedings turns out to be how surrogate countries are selected in relation to dumping margin calculation. This paper reviews the US practices concerning the application of the surrogate country method. Despite the general perception of capricious and random selection of surrogate countries, the Department of Commerce has maintained a consistent pattern for applying the criteria. This seemingly consistent practice, however, raised systematic problems—but not at a significant scale—in dumping margin calculation concerning Chinese products. This result sheds an interesting light on the current WTO disputes concerning the China's NME status. At least in terms of the US AD practices, the result of the WTO dispute settlement process may not have a significant impact on the China's exportation.     

Bilateral ‘WTO‐Plus’ Free Trade Agreements: The WTO Trade Policy Review of Singapore 2004

The World Trade Organisation's 2004 Trade Policy Review of Singapore (WTO‐TPR Singapore 2004) depicts the small and outward‐oriented economy as one of the most open countries to international trade and investment. The review highlights the benefits of the outward‐oriented strategy that has enabled the Singapore economy to weather recent external shocks such as the Asian financial crisis to the SARS and to the recent unfavourable conditions in the Middle East. In particular, the report commended Singapore's efforts on its liberalisation of the services sector and its economic benefits to consumers and global trade. However, the WTO‐TPR Singapore 2004 highlights several key areas of concerns: (a) the commitment to multilateral agreements with the rising number of bilateral free trade agreements signed by Singapore and (b) the lack of growth of total factor productivity, a key indicator for long‐run efficiency of the economy. The paper addresses the above key concerns raised in the WTO's TPR of Singapore in terms of its commitment to global trade in terms of WTO‐plus bilateral FTAs, which intends to support a multilateral trading system, and its overall industrial strategies to raise its competitiveness.     

Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements

It is often alleged that PTAs involving the EC and the US include a significant number of obligations in areas not currently covered by the WTO Agreement, such as investment protection, competition policy, labour standards and environmental protection. The primary purpose of this study is to highlight the extent to which these claims are true. The study divides the contents of all PTAs involving the EC and the US currently notified to the WTO, into 14 ‘WTO+’ and 38 ‘WTO‐X’ areas, where WTO+ provisions come under the current mandate of the WTO, and WTO‐X provisions deal with issues lying outside the current WTO mandate. As a second step, the legal enforceability of each obligation is evaluated, and judged on the extent to which the text specifies clear obligations. Among the findings are: (i) EC agreements contain almost four times as many instances of WTO‐X provisions as do US agreements; (ii) but EC agreements evidence a very significant amount of ‘legal inflation’ (i.e. non‐legally enforceable provisions) in the WTO‐X category, and US agreements actually contain more enforceable WTO‐X provisions than do the EC agreements; (iii) US agreements tend to emphasise regulatory areas more compared to EC agreements.     

Trade and Exchange Rate Policies in Formerly Centrally Planned Economies

This paper examines the international economic policies of the eastern European and Soviet Successes States in the early 1990s which provide one of those wide‐open windows of opportunity when powerful vested interests are not lobbying for retention of an existing tariff structure. Moreover, the simultaneous abandonment of central planning by over two dozen countries provided a natural experiment in which a range of differing policies might have been pursued. Policymakers in transition economies have generally ended up pursuing liberal non‐discriminatory trade and foreign exchange policies. There are exceptions and the majority may be wrong, but the presumption is that, perhaps after a learning or trial‐and‐error process, decision makers have found the rules of thumb suggested by economists to be their best guide to international economic policy. This paper notes that integration of transition economies into the global trading system has been surprisingly successful. Almost all the countries in transition from central planning have accepted the WTO rule‐based system in principle, even if there are variations in trade policies and performance, and have generally pursued multilateral non‐discriminatory trade policies. In particular, the potential danger of regionalism proving more attractive than multilateralism has not eventuated. The revealed behaviour of policymakers suggests that trade liberalisation is a good rule of thumb and regional groupings among transition economies have been insignificant. Despite a proliferation of new currencies, varying exchange rate regimes, and differing degrees of currency convertibility, the general pattern has been to accept convertibility for current account transdactions, and in many cases to extend this to a de jure commitment and to allow substantial capital account convertibility. A general policy conclusion in favour of more open and non‐discriminatory trade and exchange policies have passed the test of acceptability by policymakers in over two‐dozen countries in this category.     

Aid for trade and export diversification in recipient‐countries

The Aid‐for‐Trade (AfT) Initiative was launched by the Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) with a view to helping developing countries and the least‐developed countries (LDCs) expand their trade. The current paper contributes to the literature on AfT effectiveness by examining how AfT affects recipient‐countries' export product diversification. The analysis has been carried out on a sample of 104 AfT recipient‐countries over the period 2002–2015 and uses the two‐step system generalised methods of moments (GMM) approach. Results show that AfT flows are conducive to export product diversification in recipient‐countries. In addition, the analysis has shown a positive impact of the cumulative AfT flows on the export product diversification path of these countries. These results apply as well to the subsamples of LDCs and other developing countries. One policy implication of these results is that a scale‐up of AfT would help recipient‐countries to diversify their export products baskets and hence facilitate their greater integration into the global trading system.     

(When) Does Tit‐for‐tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy Pay Off?

In international relations, short‐run incentives for non‐cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of self‐enforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit‐for‐tat in trade policy. Highlighting various strategies in a partial equilibrium framework, we show that retaliation of non‐cooperative behaviour by limiting market access works as a disciplining device quite independently of supply and demand parameters. Our empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical results in that countries more frequently involved in WTO‐mediated disputes entailing tit‐for‐tat strategies pursue on average more liberal trade regimes.     

Modelling the Extensive Margin of World Trade: New Evidence on GATT and WTO Membership

Recent literature has argued that, contrary to the results of a seminal paper by Rose (2004), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) membership does promote bilateral trade, at least for developed economies and if membership includes non‐formal compliance. We review the literature to identify open issues. We then develop a simple extension of the gravity model that gives rise to an extensive country margin of trade separating positive trade from zero trade country pairs. The model is used to identify WTO membership effects at both the intensive and the extensive margins. Empirical estimation of this model, based on Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood methods with exporter and importer fixed effects, allows us to readdress the empirical issue of whether GATT/WTO membership does or does not promote trade. We find that GATT membership was successful on the extensive margin of world trade but not on the intensive margin. For the recent WTO episode (1995–2008), we find consistent and robust evidence for a substantial trade‐creating role of membership which is driven primarily by the intensive margin. WTO membership results in higher bilateral trade of about 40 per cent.     

Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the WTO: Moving Forward After Cancún

The issue of special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries in the WTO has become a source of tension in North‐South trade relations. The absence of an effective SDT regime clearly contributed to the failure of the Cancún Ministerial meeting of the WTO. This paper argues for a new approach that puts the emphasis on efforts to improve the development relevance of WTO rules and create mechanisms which allow greater differentiation across WTO members in determining the applicability of WTO disciplines; complemented by non‐discriminatory liberalisation of trade in goods and services in which developing countries have an export interest. The former is key in allowing the WTO to expand its reach to new ‘behind the border’ policies; and the latter is important to establishing a development dimension in multilateral trade negotiations.     

The Role of GATT/WTO as a Commitment Device in the Presence of a Time Lag: Free Trade,Time‐consistent Tariff Policy and Market Size

We consider whether a free trade policy is superior to tariff policies in the presence of a time lag between production and trade decisions. We show that the preferable choice between a free trade policy and a time‐consistent tariff policy depends on the market size of the importing country. However, because a free trade policy itself is not necessarily credible in the presence of a time lag, the importing country requires an international organisation such as GATT/WTO as a commitment device. Accordingly, employing a non‐cooperative game approach, we analyse under what conditions becoming a member of such an international organisation is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and show that free trade under the GATT/WTO regime is Pareto improving for the importing and exporting countries.     

China and the Trans‐Pacific Partnership: A Numerical Simulation Assessment of the Effects Involved

The Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a new negotiation on cross‐border liberalisation of goods and service flows going beyond WTO disciplines and focused on issues such as regulation and border controls. This paper uses numerical simulation methods to assess the potential effects of a TPP agreement on China and also China's inclusion or exclusion on other countries. We use a numerical 11‐country global general equilibrium model with trade costs and inside money. Trade costs are calculated using a method based on gravity equations. TPP barriers potentially removable are trade costs less tariffs. Simulation results reveal that China will be slightly hurt by TPP initiatives in welfare when China is out, but the total production and export will be increased. Other non‐TPP countries will be mostly hurt in welfare, but member countries will mostly gain. If China takes part in TPP, she will significantly gain and increase other TPP countries' gain as well. The comparison of TPP effects and global free trade effects show that the positive effects of global free trade are stronger than TPP effects. Japan's joining TPP would be beneficial to both herself and most of other TPP countries, but which negative effects on China's welfare when out of TPP will increase further.     

WTO Rules on Direct Taxation

The widely‐followed ruling by the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body against the United States concerning the latter's FSC/ETI scheme, which led to the largest retaliation award ever authorised in a dispute at the WTO, confirmed (if there were ever any doubt) that, generally speaking, direct taxes, like indirect taxes (including tariffs), are subject to the multilateral rules of the WTO, notwithstanding efforts by tax authorities to secure specific exemptions for certain direct tax measures in these agreements. This ruling reconfirmed the traditional distinction under international trade rules between direct and indirect taxes, particularly with respect to how such taxes should be treated under the subsidy and border tax adjustment rules of the WTO. It prompted the US Congress finally to pass legislation in late 2004 to repeal the FSC/ETI scheme as part of a larger overhaul of the US corporate tax system. The most recent disputes between the United States and the European Communities over assistance to large civil aircraft (allegedly amounting in each case to even more than the FSC/ETI) also encompass direct tax measures. It would not be surprising if other WTO‐inconsistent direct tax measures were identified in the future, leading to further disputes among WTO Members. Multilateral WTO rules, which are agreed by consensus, can therefore be expected to continue to be an important factor in determining how Members shape their tax policies, as they will undoubtedly want to avoid having their tax policies successfully challenged in the WTO.     

The Trade Effects of US Anti‐dumping Actions against China Post‐WTO Entry

Since China's entry into the WTO, US anti‐dumping (AD) actions against China have increased, particularly with respect to multiple petitions. Distinguishing between US single and multiple petitions, we examine the trade effects of US AD actions against China based on an unbalanced panel of quarterly trade data. The results show that a US single petition investigation greatly restrains US imports of the filed products from China but also causes more significant import diversion from non‐named countries. In the short run, a preliminary AD duty imposed on China via a US multiple petition not only restrains US imports of the filed products from China but also prevents trade diversion from non‐named countries. In the long run, a final AD duty on China resulting from a US multiple petition creates a larger destructive effect on China and causes US import diversion from non‐named countries. Thus, a final AD duty imposed on China following a US multiple petition not only harms China's exports but also fails to help the US achieve import substitution. Furthermore, we have been able to reveal the negative trade effect of a preliminary AD duty even in cases where the ultimate decision is not to impose a final duty.     

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: A Brief History and an Evaluation from Economic,Contractarian and Legal Perspectives

Any rule‐based system has to include a mechanism for the enforcement of its rules and a means for settlement of disputes about alleged violation of rules. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), concluded in 1947, and its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that subsumed it in 1995, embody rules governing the global trading system as specified in various agreements that their members have entered into over time. Naturally, both had a dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). It was a primarily political one in the GATT and was transformed into a largely legalistic one in the multilateral agreement that established the WTO. This paper reviews the history and evaluation of the two DSMs and examines their efficiency based on appropriate criteria. It views them from three alternative and overlapping perspectives: political‐diplomatic, legal‐economic and social. It concludes with a discussion of the unresolved problems in the operation of the WTO's DSM and the prospects of resolving them in the ongoing Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.