Tariff‐tax Reforms in Large Economies

This paper studies tariff‐tax reforms in a two‐region global New Keynesian model composed of a developing and an advanced region. In our baseline calibration, a revenue‐neutral reform that lowers tariffs in developing countries can reduce domestic welfare. The reason is that the increase in developing countries welfare due to higher output is dominated by the welfare losses stemming from the deterioration of the terms of trade. On the other hand, the reform increases output and welfare in the advanced countries and in the world as a whole. The effects that we highlight have not been studied in previous contributions to the literature, which looks at tariff‐tax reforms using a small open economy framework. Nominal rigidities have important implications for adjustment dynamics in our model. In the case of a ‘point‐for‐point’ reform, for example, price stickiness implies that the international dynamics of output is reversed compared to a revenue‐neutral reform.     

US–China rivalry: The macro policy choices

Stylised representations of recent US and Chinese tax reforms, tariffs against imports and alternative Chinese monetary targeting are examined using a calibrated global macro model that embodies both trade and financial interdependencies. For both countries, unilateral capital tax relief and bilateral tariffs are shown to be ‘beggar thy neighbor’ policies. As large economies, both enjoy ‘optimal tariffs’, even bilaterally, though net outcomes are shown to depend on the allocation of revenues. Bilateral tariffs are most advantageous for the US if the additional revenue finances indirect tax relief. Once US bilateral tariffs are imposed, China is a net loser irrespective of its policy response, though a currency float is shown to cushion the effects on its GDP in the short run. Equilibria in normal form non-cooperative tariff games have the US imposing tariffs while China liberalises.     

Trade openness,tax reform and tax revenue in developing countries

This article investigates empirically whether the effect of tax reform (involving the progressive replacement of trade tax revenue with domestic tax revenue) in developing countries' tax revenue performance (measured by tax revenue‐to‐GDP ratio) depends on the degree of trade openness of these countries. The analysis has used an unbalanced panel data set of 95 developing countries over the period 1981–2015 and the two‐system GMM approach. Results suggest that tax reform is positively and significantly associated with tax revenue performance in developing countries, with the magnitude of this positive effect increasing as countries experience a higher development level. Additionally, and more importantly, countries that further open up their economies to international trade enjoy a higher positive effect of tax reform on tax revenue than countries that experience a lower degree of trade openness. Therefore, these findings should help dissipate the concerns of policymakers in developing countries that greater openness to international trade would further erode their tax revenue, including by lowering their international trade tax revenue. In fact, the implementation of an appropriate tax reform in the context of greater trade openness would generate higher tax revenue, while concurrently allowing countries to reap the well‐known benefits of international trade.     

The economics of taxes with equivalent effects to tariffs

Developing countries are faced with the issue of tariff replacement at an early stage of their development, due to their increased commitments through Free Trade Arrangements with developed countries. As tariff replacement through VAT, or more sophisticated tools such as income tax, is neither practically nor economically desirable in these economies, this paper investigates the effects of an alternative replacement tax that only affects categories of goods not produced locally. This tax, denominated tax with equivalent effects to tariffs (TEET), is indeed a consumption tax as it concerns all goods, whether imported or potentially produced in the country. Based on a simple diagrammatic approach, the study shows that this tool tends to generate more welfare than tariffs if final prices of goods are left unchanged. It shows that a government can continue to maintain its revenues and increase the welfare of consumers through this fiscal replacement. Additionally, the political and economic reserves associated with this tool are discussed. The TEET are therefore useful mainly for small and non-diversified economies. It also remains that the use of this tool is, in practice, conditioned by the level of tolerance of developed countries, which tend to prohibit it in bilateral agreements with developing countries.     

Trick or Treat? Development Opportunities and Challenges in the WTO Negotiations on Industrial Tariffs

Negotiations on industrial tariffs in the current WTO work programme have turned out to be surprisingly difficult. On the one hand, developing countries, particularly in Africa, are concerned about the potential negative effect on their industrial development of developed country efforts to push them into deep cuts in applied tariffs: after the disillusion of the Uruguay Round, promises of welfare gains seem unconvincing. On the other hand, a number of the more complex formula proposals for tariff‐cutting make it difficult for participants to evaluate what they have to do compared with what they hope to receive. The developing countries may achieve greater exports and welfare gains from the more ambitious proposals, but computations show that these also imply greater imports, lower tariff revenues, some labour market adjustments and reduced output in some politically sensitive sectors. Some way of assisting the developing countries in coping with these adjustments is required to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the negotiations.     

Third‐country Effects of Regional Trade Agreements

Does regionalism negatively impact non‐members? To answer this question, we examine the effect of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on imports from non‐members and the tariffs that they face. Using data from six RTAs in Latin America and Europe, we do not find evidence that implementation of the regional agreements is associated with trade diversion from third countries to regional members. Using detailed industry data on preference margins and most‐favoured nation (MFN) tariffs for three trade agreements in Latin America over 12 years, we find that greater preference margins do not significantly reduce imports from third countries. We also look at the effect of preferences on external tariffs. We find evidence that preferential tariff reduction tends to precede the reduction of external MFN tariffs in a given sector, offering evidence of tariff complementarity. Overall, the results suggest that regionalism does not significantly harm non‐members.     

Declining Protection in Developing Countries: Fact or Fiction?

This paper explores whether and to what extent evident trade reform, falling average tariffs and rising exports in recent decades overstate the extent to which protectionism has declined in developing countries, especially low‐income developing countries. It identifies remaining significant protection, especially of final manufactured goods; this being associated with the presence of peak tariffs, escalating tariff structures by stage of production and replacement of old forms of non‐tariff protection with new instruments of non‐tariff protection. It also identifies significant protection arising from high international trade costs induced by inefficiencies in transportation, ports and customs, and from the growth of exports to preference‐receiving, export markets.     

Product-level estimation of import demand: Simulating the effects of tariff harmonisation

Developing countries have traditionally used import tariffs to protect infant industries and raise revenues to finance government expenditure plans. This approach, however, has tended to protect inefficient industries and to some extent hindered economic development. A disaggregated import demand model is estimated using monthly observations on 91 of the most frequently imported product items in Barbados. The results are then employed to evaluate the feasibility of harmonising tariff rates to some single rate across product categories. The results suggest that the estimation of aggregate import demand equations is not accepted by the data and therefore could result in misleading inferences. The policy simulation exercise indicates that a single applied tariff at the 30% level would essentially be revenue neutral, while rates above this level would lead to reductions in tax receipts.     

Economic Implications of WTO Negotiations on Non‐agricultural Market Access

The economic implications of current WTO negotiations are likely to be far reaching. The World Bank and UNCTAD estimate annual global gains in agriculture and non‐agricultural products (including fish) of about $70−150 billion each under various scenarios and technical assumptions. Liberalising trade in services could be even more important, especially if agreement were reached to facilitate the temporary movement of labour (Mode 4 under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS). Some qualifications, however, are in order. First, gains are likely to be spread unevenly across countries and across sectors; and, second, short‐term adjustment costs might precede long‐term gains. Much depends on how ambitious liberalisation is and on policies to facilitate adjustment. This paper examines the Doha mandate in non‐agricultural market access (NAMA) and the current state of the WTO negotiations, in particular some key proposals being considered at the December 2005 Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong. We analyse various scenarios and their implications for trade, welfare, output, employment, revenues and preferences, as well as the distributional effects across countries and sectors. We note possible adjustment problems related to balance of payments and structural adjustment, as well as revenue and preference losses. These suggest the need for ‘aid for trade’ to help developing countries realise gains possible from WTO negotiations.     

Rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions

This paper is about the determination of common external tariffs (CETs) in customs unions (CUs). We first examine how the relationship between preferences over CET levels, technology and the distribution of factor ownership in a CU is conditioned by the rule that determines the disposition of tariff revenues. We then explore how majority voting at the country level translates these preferences into an equilibrium CET. Among other things, we find that, when revenues are partitioned in proportion to members’ imports, tariff preferences may be polarized, the trade patterns of some CU members may be endogenous, and, as a result, their payoff functions may not be single-peaked. This leads to voting outcomes that dramatically differ from those arising under other sharing rules (e.g., the ‘population’ and ‘consumption’ rules) and raises the possibility of a Condorcet paradox.     

Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of Regional Trade Agreements: A Product‐level Analysis

This paper examines the impacts of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on trade flows at product level, with a particular focus on trade creation and diversion. Based on estimation of the gravity equation, dealing with the zero trade flows and endogeneity bias problems, we analyse the impacts of various types of RTAs involving 67 countries for 20 products during the 1980–2006 period. We find that RTAs among developing countries tend to cause trade diversion compared with RTAs among developed countries. Taking the higher external tariff rates of developing countries compared with developed countries into consideration, our results suggest trade diversion is likely to be caused by remaining high tariffs on imports from non‐members. In addition, we find the trade creation effect for many products in the cases of Customs Unions and plurilateral RTAs. These results imply that trade creation would be caused by various factors besides the reduction in tariff rates. Based on these results, we draw a policy implication that external tariff rate reduction is an important factor in avoiding trade diversion in the formation of RTAs, in particular for RTAs among developing countries, while a large number of members and the common external tariff appear to be important for generating the trade creation effect.     

Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements

Why do governments employ inefficient policies when more efficient ones are available for the same purpose? We address this puzzle in the context of redistribution toward special interest groups (SIGs) by focusing on a set of important policies: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In our policy choice model a government can gain by committing to constrain tariffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of less efficient NTBs; commitment has political value because it improves the bargaining position of a government that is weak relative to domestic SIGs. Using detailed data we find support for several of the model's predictions including: (i) tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of NTBs but not enough to offset the original tariff reductions; (ii) tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted and more stringent when the government is weaker relative to a SIG. Thus, the results can explain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution and suggest that the bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commitment in international agreements.     

Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?

Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non‐traditional protection such as anti‐dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti‐dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti‐dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti‐dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti‐dumping protection but also the total number of anti‐dumping petitions filed by countries.     

Welfare implications of trade liberalization and fiscal reform: A quantitative experiment

This paper studies the welfare implications of revenue-neutral trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs for developing economies using a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy. We analyze how different combinations of tariffs – on imported consumption goods, intermediate inputs, and capital goods – and taxes – on consumption, labor income and capital income – affect the transitional and long-run welfare. We report three main findings. First, trade liberalization programs financed by consumption and labor income taxes tend to result in substantial welfare gains, but financing the lost tariff revenue through capital income taxes can have an adverse impact on welfare. Second, a significant fraction of welfare changes is due to transitional effects stemming from the allocation of resources in response to changes in tariffs and taxes. Third, trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs often translate into much larger welfare gains in countries that are more open to international financial markets.     

Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods

This paper describes strategic tariff choices within the Ricardian framework of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) using CES preferences. The optimum tariff schedule is uniform across goods and inversely related to the import demand elasticity of the other country. In the Nash equilibrium of tariffs, larger economies apply higher tariff rates. Productivity adjusted relative size (≈ GDP ratio) is a sufficient statistic for absolute productivity advantage and the size of the labor force. Both countries apply higher tariff rates if specialization gains from comparative advantage are high and transportation cost is low. A sufficiently large economy prefers the inefficient Nash equilibrium in tariffs over free trade due to its quasi-monopolistic power on world markets. The required threshold size is increasing in comparative advantage and decreasing in transportation cost. I discuss the implications of the static Nash-equilibrium analysis for the sustainability and structure of trade agreements.     

Preference Utilisation and Tariff Reduction in EU Imports from ACP Countries

Despite the long relationship between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries aimed at encouraging their exports while stimulating growth and investment, the ACP states still face difficulties in integrating into the world economy. This paper examines the non‐least developed ACP countries preferential trade with the EU using data on EU member states’ imports eligible for preferences under the Cotonou agreement for the period 2001 at the 8‐digit level. Using data on tariffs and preferential quota applicable on each 8‐digit product for the year 2001 ad‐valorem tariff rates were calculated. The paper also investigates the existence of a threshold in the offered duty reduction under which traders have no incentives to ask for preferences since the costs of obtaining these exceeds their benefits. Our results showed that the higher the value of preferences offered, the higher the probability that preferences are requested. Using endogenous threshold estimation techniques we also provided evidence that there exists a minimum value of preferences needed for traders to request preferences. More specifically, if the difference between preferential and third country tariff rates are lower than 4 per cent, there are no incentives for traders to request preferences since the costs of obtaining the preferences are expected to be higher than the benefits from obtaining the preferences. Our results additionally indicate that country specificities also play an important role in the decision whether requesting preferences or not and how much to import.     

Economic development and the WTO: Back to basics?

Conclusion  An effective WTO is critical for developing countries —the alternatives, bilateral and regional agreements, will give rise to trade diversion and discrimination, and most likely exclude sectors such as agriculture and policies such as antidumping. Developing countries have a strong incentive to put together an agenda that offers potential benefits to OECD countries as well as themselves. The Singapore issues are arguably not necessary to move forward on the market access agenda. There is huge scope to trade “concessions” on tariffs — both applied rates and tariff binding. The same is true for access to service markets. A refocused effort centered on market access, complemented by an emphasis on transparency predictability and reciprocity, could help realize the development promise of the Doha round. The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements: A network formation approach

We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multicountry settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that a multilateral trade agreement governing the rules and norms of tariff setting, that is the WTO/GATT regime itself, together with a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) is multilaterally stable. We also find that the existence of the WTO is necessary for the stability of the trading system. We further analyse the impact of PTAs on multilateral tariffs within the WTO. We find that the formation of PTAs increases countries' incentives for multilateral tariff reduction.     

Non‐Tariff Measures,Specific Trade Concerns and Tariff Reduction

This paper studies the determinants of the recent proliferation of Specific Trade Concerns raised at the WTO on non‐tariff trade measures (NTMs), with a focus on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Even though NTMs are imposed de jure to protect consumers from unhealthy products, they increase trade costs de facto. So, when tariff protection lowers, NTMs become effective barriers to trade and the exporting countries can complain at the dedicated committee at the WTO (STCs). Therefore, we study whether STCs are raised by exporting countries as a consequence of tariff reductions in importing countries, that is when non‐tariff measures become barriers to trade. Using a recent database on STCs over the period 1996–2010, we find empirical evidence that SPS and TBT concerns are raised by exporting country as a consequence of importer's tariff cut.