消费者谈判能力与厂商标价策略——模型及基于实验经济学的检验

本文建立的理论模型研究了消费者谈判能力、谈判成本和对商品的偏好程度等几方面对厂商最优标价决策的影响。当消费者谈判能力较弱时,厂商可能策略性地不对商品标价,以获取更大利润,利润大小与消费者的谈判能力呈倒U形关系;而当消费者谈判能力较强时,厂商会选择对商品进行标价以最大化利润;但若消费者谈判能力很弱,消费者很可能因无利可图而放弃购买,这时厂商就会选择标价销售。通过对模型进行模拟实验,模型的结果得到了进一步验证。本文同时证明,在一定条件下,厂商选择策略性不标价可能不是社会最优的,因此需要通过政府强制标价来实现市场有效性。     

消费者谈判能力与厂商标价策略-模型及基于实验经济学的检验

本文建立的理论模型研究了消费者谈判能力、谈判成本和对商品的偏好程度等几方面对厂商最优标价决策的影响。当消费者谈判能力较弱时,厂商可能策略性地不对商品标价,以获取更大利润,利润大小与消费者的谈判能力呈倒U形关系;而当消费者谈判能力较强时,厂商会选择对商品进行标价以最大化利润;但若消费者谈判能力很弱,消费者很可能因无利可图而放弃购买,这时厂商就会选择标价销售。通过对模型进行模拟实验,模型的结果得到了进一步验证。本文同时证明,在一定条件下,厂商选择策略性不标价可能不是社会最优的,因此需要通过政府强制标价来实现市场有效性。     

可谈判条件下技术许可契约问题研究——一个纳什讨价还价模型的应用

目前大部分文献都集中于分析不可谈判条件下的最优技术许可契约设计问题,即通常前提假定许可契约是"要么接受要么走人"的。分析可谈判条件下的技术许可契约问题,在此基础上构建基于纳什的讨价还价模型,并给出一些初步的分析。     

契约安排、谈判过程与讨价还价

在契约安排的讨价还价过程中,威胁点、风险态度、谈判实力起着重要作用;但契约安排的内容不仅包括讨价还价理论所讨论的作为结果的合作剩余分配,还包括作为过程的权利分配;而且,规则系统中的契约安排应遵循最优完全程度;而最优完全程度和契约调整问题,则要求我们考察契约背后的价值链、业务流程、资产配置和利益分配,并寻求四者与契约安排之间的匹配关系。     

高新技术产品进出口价格谈判的风险规避与策略

高新技术产品的对外贸易已经成为我国国际贸易的重要组成部分。由于高新技术产品不同于一般商品的定价特性，使其在对外贸易的价格谈判中面临很大的风险。     

基于纳什谈判推广模型的国际气候谈判研究

多哈气候大会已经结束,此次多哈气候谈判将《京都议定书》承诺期延长到2020年,俄罗斯、日本、新西兰和加拿大退出了《京都议定书》,美国仍未加入。国际气候谈判经历了相当漫长的时间,至今仍未取得突破性进展。文章首次借助纳什谈判推广模型从谈判力、担心谈判破裂程度与谈判破裂后的效用水平三方面对国际气候谈判进行分析,并据此以气候谈判现状为例进行了说明,得出谈判方的效用水平与谈判力成正比,可以通过提高谈判力水平来提高效用水平,谈判方对谈判破裂的担心程度对谈判有很大影响,并且可以通过惩罚机制来改变其担心程度影响谈判结果。所以我国应努力提高谈判力,通过对其他国家担心谈判破裂程度的分析,预测其谈判动机及立场做出相应对策,另外指出了会议增设惩罚措施的必要性。     

对外贸易谈判的报价策略

随着中国加入世界贸易组织以及全球经济一体化的发展趋势,使得中国涉外经贸业务活动频繁,而每一笔业务洽谈都离不开报价问题,报价是整个洽谈的重要环节,文章依据谈判的基本原则,论述了涉外谈判的报价策略。     

临海市在招商引资谈判中的策略技巧

临海市作为浙江省欠发达地区 ,无论是城市管理、人口规模、基础设施、工业化程度及市民的思想观念、素质等等与发达地区相比差距很大 ,是一个典型的农业大市、工业小市、财政小市 ,为加快推进临海市城市化、现代化进程 ,必须加大招商引资力度 ,只有招商引资才能解决临海市经济发展遇到的突出矛盾和问题。笔者就临海市在招商引资谈判中如何赢得先机 ,提出几点务实性的策略技巧。一、在谈判前做好充分准备1 .突出招商对象。在招商引资对象上 ,主攻我国台湾、香港及东南亚地区 ,兼顾其他 ,近期重点研究广东、福建、苏南和省内发达地区 ,尤其是…     

Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories

Only a limited number of papers haveempirically examined the determinants of themonitoring and enforcement activities performedby the environmental regulator. Moreover, mostof these studies have taken place in thecontext of developed countries. In this paper,we empirically examine the determinants of theenforcement of pollution charges in China.More precisely, we seek to identify thecharacteristics which may give firms more orless bargaining power with local environmentalauthorities pertaining to the enforcement(collection) of pollution charges. Firms fromthe private sector appear to have lessbargaining power than state-owned enterprises.Firms facing an adverse financial situationalso appear to have more bargaining power.Finally, we also show that the higher thesocial impact of a firm's emissions (asmeasured by the presence of complaints), thesmaller the bargaining power of the firms withlocal environmental authorities.     

Offshoring and Reshoring: The Roles of Incomplete Contracts and Relative Bargaining Power

This paper demonstrates that an increase in bargaining power of Northern firms relative to that of their Southern contractors can trigger reshoring if the North-South wage differential is moderate, such that only industries with a high share of unskilled labor find outsourcing profitable. However, such an increase in Northern bargaining power can increase offshoring if the wage differential is so high that even industries with a low share of unskilled labor also offshore.     

考虑买方议价能力的双寡头供应商技术创新决策

在大型零售商的买方议价能力不断增强的背景下,研究了竞争供应商的技术创新决策问题。构建了由异质双寡头供应商、大型零售商组成的纵向市场结构模型,并将大型零售商的议价能力引入模型,考察了大型零售商议价能力条件下供应商的最优技术创新决策,分析了零售商议价能力的变化对不同供应商的技术创新决策的影响。研究发现:大型零售商议价能力的增强促进了小型供应商的技术创新、抑制了大型供应商的技术创新;当零售商的议价能力大于某一临界值时,小型供应商的技术创新水平会高于大型供应商。最后通过具体算例验证了研究结论,分析了参数变化对研究结论的影响。     

策略性采购联盟、集体谈判与最优贸易政策选择——基于广义Cournot-Nash谈判函数的分析

文章发展了一个关于由本国企业组成的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的模型一—该模型以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易实践为基础,其中,中间品的采购价格与数量通过有效的Nash谈判过程同时决定。当采购联盟的效用函数的数量弹性高于（低于）价格弹性,则该联盟的偏好为数量（价格）导向的。文章证明：（1）当本国与外国的中间品与最终产品贸易具有互补性时,政府贸易政策调整的价格、数量以及福利效应是不确定的,它们依存于本国采购联盟的偏好、最终产品需求曲线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度;（2）政府贸易政策的干预功能与企业策略性联盟的自主调整功能存在重叠与冲突。     

供应商和客户参与对企业技术创新绩效的影响——考虑供应商和客户的议价能力

利用2009—2012年中国134家上市公司的面板数据进行回归分析,对拥有不同议价能力的供应商和客户如何影响企业技术创新绩效问题进行了研究。结果表明:客户议价能力的不断提高导致企业的技术创新绩效呈U型变化,且有助于减弱供应商议价能力的负向影响;与小企业相比,供应商的议价能力对大企业技术创新绩效的负向影响更大;与其他所有权性质的企业相比,国有企业的技术创新绩效受供应商议价能力的负向影响更小。     

Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl

We compare two cooperation mechanisms for consumer/producers of a public good: the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) and the Exchange-Matching-Lindahl (EML) solution, where each agent specifies her demand for and supply of the public good according to her personal exchange rate. Both mechanisms are Pareto-efficient. EML is equivalent to matching. In our specific model with linear or quadratic benefits and quadratic costs, EML and NBS are equivalent when there are two agents. With more than two agents, the high-benefit/low-cost agents are better off under EML. We also analyze outsourcing, where agent i can pay agent j to produce the amount that agent i promised to contribute. In our specific model, payments from high-cost to low-cost agents (and from high-benefit to low-benefit agents) are (usually) lower in EML than in NBS.     

不对称雇主学习、外部选择与雇员谈判力

本文在非合作博弈（策略式）单边不对称信息讨价还价框架下,按照外部约束（而不是威胁点）的思路来模型化外部雇主的竞争,以分析不对称雇主学习的程度对处于信息劣势的通用性雇员谈判力的决定作用。本文提出的框架弥补了已有文献的一些不足,同时为不对称雇主学习这一劳动经济学概念提供了一个讨价还价理论基础。     

The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

In this paper, the strategy method's impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example, second movers punished significantly more often in the hot version of the low cost game. Furthermore, first mover behavior was significantly different in the hot and cold versions of both games. In the hot games, first mover behavior suggests an expectation of decreased rewards and/or punishments from second movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first movers that the decision procedure used by second movers has changed. Therefore, first mover behavior must be shaped by their perceived assessment concerning how second movers make decisions. We argue that first mover behavior can be explained by the interaction of two well-known psychological effects: the consensus and positive self-image effects.     

A Note on Franchising and Wage Bargaining

A franchising contract relocates distributable rent between franchisor and franchisee. With decentralized wage bargaining relocation modifies the position of the union in the wage bargaining. If the rent is relocated to the franchisor completely, then even a strong union is not able to raise wage above reservation level in the franchisee's firm. If franchisor and franchisee negotiate on rent division, there is an incentive to increase the franchise fee at the expense of the union. Therefore the overall rent assigned to labor depends on the differences of labor intensity in the franchisor's and franchisee's firms. Firm owners may be able to transfer distributable rents from a firm with a strong union to one with a weak union. Furthermore, a franchising contract shows a first mover advantage. A franchising contract is placed before wage bargaining, benefiting the franchisor.