转型经济中信任对创业融资的影响研究

Timmons创业学模型指出创业机会、创业团队和创业资源是创业的三大要素,其中资金是创业资源的重要组成部分;创业管理学者鲁西耶（Lussier）总结出影响创业成败的15个关键要素,资金取得排在首位。信息不对称和创业计划未来的高度不确定性,造成了创业融资活动中资金供需双方的交易困难。     

转型经济背景下信任对新创企业资源获取的影响

转型经济背景下,新创企业需要面对复杂的不确定性和机会主义行为,这使得企业获取资源更加困难。信任是一种理想的非正式的市场治理机制,有助于新创企业在法律、法规等正式制度不能完全发挥作用的转型经济环境下,减少不确定性和机会主义行为的影响,获取更多关键性资源。     

转型经济中我国中小企业融资问题研究--以吉林省为例

目前我国经济处于转型期,中小企业的发展对我国经济能否成功转型尤为重要,融资问题一直是中小企业发展的瓶颈,因此探讨转型期中小企业融资问题有一定的现实意义。文章以吉林省调研数据为基础,从几个方面分析转型期中小企业融资问题,并提出相应的对策和建议。     

经济转型与融资制度变迁动力分析

中国的融资制度经过了20多年的改革,由原来的不涉及既有主体利益的增量改革、边际改革逐步向涉及既有集团利益的存量改革深化,融资制度的改革已经进入利益调整阶段。这一阶段,各主体在融资制度变迁问题上,动力并不完全一致：国家作为融资制度变迁的主导者,改革动力的大小取决于政府对融资制度改革的收益与风险的判断;地方政府、其他微观主体和各级代理人的动力存在不足现象。多种力量博弈所达到的均衡状态影响着融资制度变迁。     

分析经济转型期我国私营企业融资问题的制度

我国的经济转型采用的是渐进式的改革方式,这种改革方式的主要特点是以暂时不改变原有经济体制为前提,发展新的体制,之后伴随着经济结构的改变,逐步摒弃旧的体制,采用新的体制。而私营企业就是在这种转型方式的推动下,在"夹缝中"发展起来的。并且随着我国经济的发展,私营企业对于我国经济的增长贡献的比例越来越大,其重要性也日益凸显。但是目前私营企业所面临的融资困难的问题严重阻碍了其发展,纠其根本还是有关的政策和制度不完善造成的。所以本文将分析目前我国私营企业的融资现状,指出有关私营企业的制度存在的缺陷,进而提出完善和创新制度的对策。     

中国转型经济中银行主导型融资制度模式选择的内生性

融资制度模式选择有其内在逻辑,既不全是自发的随意的,又不全是受制于政府意图;既有历史继承性(受现存的融资制度的影响),又深受经济结构、经济发展水平筹内在因素对融资制度需求的影响;既是静态的均衡又是动态的均衡.中国转型经济中之所以依然将融资制度的模式选定为银行主导型融资制度安排,有两个原因;历史继承和实体经济发展对融资制度的要求.     

中国转型经济中银行主导型融资制度模式选择的内生性

融资制度模式选择有其内在逻辑,既不全是自发的随意的,又不全是受制于政府意图;既有历史继承性(受现存的融资制度的影响),又深受经济结构、经济发展水平等内在因素对融资制度需求的影响;既是静态的均衡又是动态的均衡。中国转型经济中之所以依然将融资制度的模式选定为银行主导型融资制度安排,有两个原因:历史继承和实体经济发展对融资制度的要求。     

经济转型视域下中小企业融资问题探究

本文首先对中小企业地位及其融资行为属性进行了分析,指出政府有责任和义务解决中小企业融资问题,然后结合目前经济形势分析了中小企业融资现状以及融资困难的原因,最后从建立企业信用体系、建立中小金融机构、拓宽融资渠道、加大政府支持以及加快企业转型等方面提出了解决中小企业融资困难的具体措施。     

经济转型背景下我国高校创新创业教育深化改革研究

转型经济的国情对我国高校创新创业教育提出了更高要求。深入分析我国高校创新创业教育的现状,发现存在创新创业教育与专业教育融合度不高,创新创业教育师资力量薄弱,创业孵化基地全方位孵化服务能力欠缺问题,针对以上问题提出创新创业教育深化改革建议,即促进专创融合、加强师资队伍建设和推进全方位孵化能力建设,以期促进创新创业教育的健康开展,更好的服务于转型经济。     

我国创业投资引导基金运作模式研究

本文通过借鉴以色列、芬兰、美国等国家创业投资引导基金的发展经验,对比分析了国内主要城市的创投引导基金,指出我国引导基金存在政府干预较强、资金杠杆作用低、评价考核体系不健全等问题,并提出强化引导基金市场化运作、广泛引入社会资本等发展对策,以期为地方政府选择何种引导基金运作模式提供决策依据。     

Monitoring Role of Venture Capital in the Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Korea

Because the government has initiated the development of venture capital firms in Korea, independent venture capital firms have been significantly influenced by government regulations and interventions; in contrast, corporations have made venture investments internally to avoid the regulations. This study investigates whether the Korean institutional environment harms the monitoring role of independent venture capital firms, while it does not significantly impact corporate venture capital firms. In an IPO setting, we find that earnings management (long-term performance) significantly decreases (increases) with the ownership of corporate venture capital firms. However, we do not find a significant relation between the ownership of independent venture capital firms and earnings management or long-term performance. The results suggest that Korean independent venture capital firms do not play a role in monitoring their investee companies; in contrast, corporate venture capital firms play a monitoring role.     

吸收风险投资对企业投资效率的影响研究--基于创业板的数据研究

以创业板上市公司为研究对象,就初创公司上市后是否吸收风险投资、吸收风险投资的比例以及是否存在风险投资机构的联合投资展开实证研究。结果表明:公司上市后风险投资参与仍可以显著提高企业的投资效率,风险投资比例越高,越有利于提高投资效率,联合投资也对此有正向促进作用。     

地区制度环境与跨境风险资本进入：社会嵌入机制研究

以1990—2020年风险资本投资事件为样本,考察跨境风险资本进入制度不完善地区的社会嵌入机制。结果发现：在制度不完善地区,跨境风险资本倾向通过与本土风险资本联合投资来嵌入本土社会网络。跨境风险资本借此获取联合伙伴的本土信息和资源,提高从本次投资成功退出的概率,并与网络中其他本土风险资本建立间接联系,未来可以从有直接或间接联系的本土风险资本那里得到交易机会。     

The First Step of the Capital Flow from Institutions to Entrepreneurs: the Criteria for Sorting Venture Capital Funds

We contribute to the knowledge of the capital flow from institutional investors via venture capital (VC) funds as intermediaries to their final destination, entrepreneurial ventures. To this end, we conduct a world‐wide survey among limited partners to determine the importance of several criteria when they select VC funds. We find the top criteria to be the expected deal flow and access to transactions, a VC fund's historic track record, his local market experience, the match of the experience of team members with the proposed investment strategy, the team's reputation, and the mechanisms proposed to align interest between the investors and the VC funds. A principal component analysis reveals three latent drivers in the selection process: ‘Local Expertise and Incentive Structure’, ‘Investment Strategy and Expected Implementation’, and ‘Prestige/Standing vs. Cost’. It becomes evident that limited partners search for teams which are able to implement a certain strategy at a given cost. Thereby, they focus on an incentive structure that limits agency costs.     

略论风险投资及在我国的状况

本文的目的在于研究和分析风险投资机制，特别是其独特的融资和投资机制，并结合我国风险投资发展的实际和我国风险投资的典型案例，分析在我国建立风险投资机制的对策。     

风险投资领域“对赌协议”的可执行性研究

对赌协议在我国风险投资领域已有较多表现,实践中因对赌失败所引发的执行困境时有发生。本文阐明了本土背景下的对赌协议产生基础在于企业的股权融资偏好行为,分析了对赌协议在不完全契约状态下表现出的射幸性特点,论证了基于企业估值调整所进行的条款安排并不违背法律所追求的公平和效率目标。在此基础上,文章认为,对赌协议的可执行问题最终需回归到对其效力的认定上。合法性、契约自由以及公司自治等原则是审视此类协议效力的重要标准。     

Adverse Selection,Investor Experience and Security Choice in Venture Capital Finance: Evidence from Germany

This article analyses 336 German venture capital transactions from 1990 to 2005 and seeks to determine why selected financial securities differ across deals. We find that a broad array of financial instruments is used, covering straight equity, mezzanine and debt‐like securities. Based on the chosen financial securities’ upside potential and downside protection characteristics, we provide an explanation for the differing use of these securities. Our results show that investors’ deal experience, adverse selection risks and economic prospects in the public equity market influence the selection of financial securities.     

The Effects of Public Venture Capital Investments on Corporate Governance: Evidence From IPO Firms in Emerging Markets

This study examines the impact of public venture capital (hereafter PVC) investments on corporate governance of initial public offering (hereafter IPO) firms in emerging markets. Using data collected from Taiwan PVC investments during 1996–2005, we analyse three corporate governance features in IPO firms: earnings management, board characteristics, and excess control by controlling shareholders. We find that PVC‐backed firms use fewer accounting accruals in their IPO financial statements than non‐PVC‐backed firms. This result suggests that PVC‐backed IPO firms engage in less earnings management than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. We also find PVC‐backed firms tend to set up their boards with fewer non‐independent directors and supervisors at IPO. This result indicates that PVC‐backed IPO firms have better board structures than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. Finally, we find that controlling shareholders are less likely to exert excess control in PVC‐backed firms than in non‐PVC‐backed firms. Overall, our results indicate that PVC investments add value to new IPO firms not only in financing their capital needs but also in creating better corporate governance structures in emerging markets.