Determinants of Swap Spreads in a Developing Financial Market: Evidence from Finland

This paper presents empirical evidence on the determinants of swap spreads in Finland using four years of data. Spreads exhibit a significant negative relationship with the amount of fixed rate deposits with banks, which reflects the importance of banks in the Finnish capital markets. Spreads are positively linked to business cycle and market risk factors such as the slope of the yield curve and the volatility of interest rates. The influence of hedging costs has become increasingly important over time, especially in longer dated swaps. A relationship is also observed between swap spreads and the external value of the currency.     

Characteristics of banks that are more active in the swap market

The impact of swap-related risks on the safety and soundness of the banking system has been a topic of concern. This article provides evidence that some banks may have engaged in swaps as a means to generate income when their loan activities were constrained by the fixed capital requirements. However, the results also suggest that creditworthiness plays an important role. All money center banks (too-big-to-fail) and those nonmoney center banks that are highly rated by S&P experience higher swap demand and achieve higher swap market shares. This implies some market discipline for nonmoney center banks, which may compensate for risk-measurement inadequacies in the current risk-based capital requirements. On the other hand, the results suggest that greater oversight may be required for money center banks.This article was adapted from the dissertation the author completed at the Stern School of Business, New York University. Part of the work was completed while the author was an assistant professor at the School of Management, Syracuse University.Baruch College, City University of New York     

An empirical analysis of bank interest rate swaps

Considering the characteristics of banks that do and do not report interest rate swaps, the long-term interest rate exposure of a bank and the likelihood and extent of swap market participation are found to be positively related. Key to the finding is the inclusion of variables related to the provision of swap market intermediary services, which significantly explain both the likelihood of swap market participation and the notional value of outstanding swaps. The results suggest that the likelihood and extent of swap market participation by low-capitalized banks is less than for other banks.     

Regulatory and “economic” solvency standards for internationally active banks

One of the most important policy issues for financial authorities is to decide at what level average capital charges should be set. The decision may alternatively be expressed as the choice of an appropriate survival probability for representative banks over a horizon such as a year, often termed a “solvency standard”. This article sheds light on the solvency standards implied by current and possible future G10 bank regulation and on the “economic solvency standard” that banks choose themselves by their own capital setting decisions. In particular, we employ a credit risk model to show that the survival probability implied by the 1988 Basel Accord is between 99.0% and 99.9%. We then demonstrate that if a new Basel Accord were calibrated to such a standard, it would not represent a binding constraint on banks' current operations since most banks employ a solvency standard higher than 99.9%. To show this, we employ a statistical analysis of bank ratings adjusted for the impact of official or other support as well as credit risk model calculations. Lastly, we advance a possible explanation for the conservative capital choices made by banks by showing that swap volumes are highly correlated with credit quality for given bank size. This suggests that banks' access to important credit markets like the swaps markets may provide a significant discipline in the choice of solvency standard.     

Exploring the components of credit risk in credit default swaps

In this paper, we test the influence of various fundamental variables on the pricing of credit default swaps. The theoretical determinants that are important for pricing credit default swaps include the risk-free rate, industry sector, credit rating, and liquidity factors. We suggest a linear regression model containing these different variables, especially focusing on liquidity factors. Unlike bond spreads which have been shown to be inversely related to liquidity (i.e., the greater the liquidity, the lower the spread), there is no a priori reason that the credit default swap spread should exhibit the same relationship. This is due to the economic characteristics of a credit default swap compared to a bond. Our empirical result shows that all the fundamental variables investigated have a significant effect on the credit default swap spread. Moreover, our findings suggest that credit default swaps that trade with greater liquidity have a wider credit default swap spread.     

Interest rate swaps

This instructional case is intended to introduce graduate and undergraduate financial accounting and finance students to derivatives using interest rate swaps. The major learning objective is to understand derivative accounting methods, using interest rate swaps, as proposed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's recent Exposure Draft. A secondary learning objective is to understand key features of a management control system for derivatives' activities. Both matched and unmatched interest rate swap examples are used in this case. The matched swap is based on an actual swap done by a bank for one of its customers. The case is written from the perspective of an audit partner writing a report summarizing interest rate swap accounting and related management controls for a client who wanted to recognize all gains and losses related to its interest rate swaps immediately in current earnings.     

On the Term Structure of Default Premia in the Swap and LIBOR Markets

Existing theories of the term structure of swap rates provide an analysis of the Treasury–swap spread based on either a liquidity convenience yield in the Treasury market, or default risk in the swap market. Although these models do not focus on the relation between corporate yields and swap rates (the LIBOR–swap spread), they imply that the term structure of corporate yields and swap rates should be identical. As documented previously (e.g., in Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang (1993)) this is counterfactual. Here, we propose a model of the default risk imbedded in the swap term structure that is able to explain the LIBOR–swap spread. Whereas corporate bonds carry default risk, we argue that swap contracts are free of default risk. Because swaps are indexed on "refreshed"-credit-quality LIBOR rates, the spread between corporate yields and swap rates should capture the market's expectations of the probability of deterioration in credit quality of a corporate bond issuer. We model this feature and use our model to estimate the likelihood of future deterioration in credit quality from the LIBOR–swap spread. The analysis is important because it shows that the term structure of swap rates does not reflect the borrowing cost of a standard LIBOR credit quality issuer. It also has implications for modeling the dynamics of the swap term structure.     

Swaps: Plain and Fanciful

The outstanding face amount of plain vanilla interest rate swaps exceeds two trillion dollars. While pricing and hedging of such swaps appear to be quite simple, many existing theories are based on the incorrect characterization of a swap as a simple exchange of a fixed for a floating rate note. This characterization is not consistent with standarized swap contracts and the treatment of swaps in bankruptcy. This paper provides an alternative perspective on swaps.     

The pricing of interest rate swaps

Interest rate swaps have become an important tool for financial institutions because they provide a convenient way to reduce interest rate risk. Swaps allow financial institutions to obtain short-term deposits in the local deposit market and then transform these into longer-term liabilities. The growth of swaps has been explosive, with the swap market growing from nothing in 1981 to an estimated $889 billion in 1987. In addition to their role in managing interest rate risk, swaps have become important to financial managers for other reasons, and as a result the swap market is monitored by financial managers as are money and capital markets. Because of its growing importance, an empirical perspective on how swaps are priced is needed. This article develops a simple market model and then estimates the model using data provided by three major swap market participants.     

The dynamics of sovereign yields over swap rates in the Eurozone market

We explore the dynamics of the adjusted swap spread (calculated as the difference between the swap rate and sovereign yields over the credit default swap premium) in the Eurozone market by studying three markets simultaneously: 1) sovereign bonds, 2) credit default swaps (CDS), and 3) swap rates. We find a strong relationship between the markets. Specifically, based on the no-arbitrage argument, we show that the difference between the Euribor and Repo rates is a key driver of the adjusted swap spread. However, illiquidity premiums and systemic risk also play an essential role in times of economic stress and for less creditworthy countries. The findings also shed light on the recent negative swap spreads puzzle in the United States.     

Determinants of interest rate swap spreads

This study argues that an interest rate swap, as a non-redundant security, creates surplus which will be shared by swap counterparties to compensate their risks in swaps. This action in turns affects swap spreads. Analyzing the time series impacts of the changes of risks of swap counterparties on swap spreads, we conclude that both lower and higher rating bond spreads have positive impacts on swap spreads. We also derive a risk–spread relation to test if swap counterparties are firms with differential credit ratings. Since the risk allocation between swap counterparties varies over business cycles, hence this factor needs to be controlled. We conclude that (1) similar results hold if the business cycle factor is controlled and (2) swap spreads contain procyclical element and are less cyclical than lower credit rating bond spreads.     

Volatility as an Asset Class: European Evidence

Abstract

Volatility movements are known to be negatively correlated with stock index returns. Hence, investing in volatility appears to be attractive for investors seeking risk diversification. The most common instruments for investing in pure volatility are variance swaps, which now enjoy an active over-the-counter (OTC) market. This paper investigates the risk-return tradeoff of variance swaps on the Deutscher Aktienindex and Euro STOXX 50 index over the time period from 1995 to 2004. We synthetically derive variance swap rates from the smile in option prices. Using quotes from two large investment banks over two months, we validate that the synthetic values are close to OTC market prices. We find that variance swap returns exhibit an option-like profile compared to returns of the underlying index. Given this pattern, it is crucial to account for the non-normality of returns in measuring the performance of variance swap investments. As in the US, the average returns of selling variance swaps are found to be strongly positive and too large to be compatible with standard equilibrium models. The magnitude of the estimated risk premium is related to variance uncertainty and past index returns. This indicates that the variance swap rate does not seem to incorporate all past information relevant for forecasting future realized variance.     

Modeling volatility and changes in the swap spread

We investigate the determinants of changes in U.S. interest rate swap spreads using a model that explicitly allows for volatility interactions between swaps of different terms to maturity. Changes in the swap spread are found to be positively related to interest rate volatility, to changes in the default risk premium in the corporate bond market, and to changes in the liquidity premium for government securities. Swap spread changes are negatively related to changes in the level of interest rates and changes in the slope of the term structure. We also find that there is a strong and significant volatility interaction among spreads for swaps of different maturities and that the process for the conditional variance of the spread is highly persistent across all maturities.     

央行间货币互换在金融安全网建设中的作用

近几年来,货币互换在双边金融合作中扮演越来越重要的角色。文章对此次金融危机后美联储与其他央行的货币互换、“10＋3”框架下的货币互换以及人民银行与其他货币当局进行的货币互换情况进行了回顾,并对央行间货币互换在金融安全网建设中的作用和风险进行了分析,认为在发挥货币互换传统功能的基础上,应更加突出其在构建全球金融安全网建设中的作用。     

互换利差特征与影响因素——基于人民币利率互换市场的研究

互换利差（Swap spread）是利率互换研究中最重要的问题之一。在国内相关研究仍属空白的情况下,本文首次对人民币利率互换市场的互换利差的变动特征和影响因素进行了统计和计量分析。结果表明,我国互换利差的影响因素较多,包括融资成本、流动性、违约风险因素、利率预期、曲线期限特征因素等。不同基准的利率互换利差影响因素不同,且短期和中长期互换利差影响因素也不相同。另外还发现,不同基准的互换之间、互换与现券之间的定价经常存在扭曲现象,实务中存在较大的套利机会。     

The effect of private investments on banks' capital requirements

A simple leverage ratio restriction is not efficient because it does not discriminate between risky and safe banks. We use a structural and comprehensive model of the firm's asset growth to describe the equity buy-out portfolios' stylized facts for two types of banks. We derive a leverage ratio that depends on the level of risky investments, and balances between the spread on such investments, the cost of capital and the overall power of the supervisor to enforce the capital requirements. This method is more transparent and requires fewer parameters than other commonly used methods. We obtain an incentive-compatible constraint on banks to carry the minimal adequate amount of capital. This constraint enhances the supervisors' ability to enforce the rules ex post, and provide banks with a further incentive to reveal their risk type truthfully.     

Pricing Property Index Linked Swaps with Counterparty Default Risk

This paper extends Bjork and Clapham (Journal of Housing Economics 11:418–432, 2002) model for pricing real estate index total return swaps. Our extension considers counterparty default risk within a first passage contingent claims model. We price total return swaps on property indices with different levels of default risk. We develop this model under same assumptions as Bjork and Clapham (Journal of Housing Economics 11:418–432, 2002) and find that total return swap price is no longer zero. Total return swap payer must charge a spread over the market interest rate that compensates him for the exposure to this additional risk. Based on commercial property indices in the UK, we observe that computed spreads are much lower than a sample of quotes obtained from one of the traders in the market.     

The effect of stock-for-debt swaps on bank holding companies

Twenty-two of the numerous stock-for-debt swaps that have taken place since August 1981 have been by bank holding companies. Although the most oft-quoted reason for making the swap is its positive effect on reported earnings, we argue that the effects of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 on the tax treatment of early retirement of discount debt often makes stock-for-debt swaps a preferable alternative to cash repurchases of discount debt for sinking fund obligations. Furthermore, for bank holding companies, the swaps allow them to adjust their capital positions to new optimal levels ad dictated by the more stringent capital standards promulgated by the regulatory authorities in 1981. For 99 non-banking firms we found a significant and negative abnormal average return on the swap announcement date of ?0.49 percent. For the 22 bank holding companies, however, we found no significant abnormal average return on the announcement date of the swaps. The results suggest that swaps may be reducing the potential costs of regulatory interference for bank holding companies if they are overlevered, which offsets whatever other force is driving down stock prices on new issue announcement dates.     

The search for relative value in bonds

Comparing asset swap spreads across bonds is a widely used tool for measuring relative value. This approach leads portfolio managers to increase their risk exposure in ways that are not transparent. Credit default swaps are utilized to demonstrate that viewing wide asset swaps as an indicator of relative value is a mirage. The paper documents the empirical regularities in the term structure of credit spreads and spread volatilities that make this result possible. In addition, we present empirical evidence of the imprint made on corporate bond returns by the widespread use of the asset swaps data.     

The impact of bank regulation on the cost of credit: Evidence from a discontinuity in capital requirements

We study the effect on credit relationships of the Small and Medium Enterprises Supporting Factor (SME-SF), a regulatory risk weight reduction on small loans to SMEs. Employing a regression discontinuity design and matched bank-firm data from Italy, we find that a 1 percent drop in capital requirements causes an average 13 basis points reduction in the cost of credit. Moreover, with a novel measure of bank regulatory capital scarcity, we show that the drop is larger for banks facing tighter constraints. Furthermore, the drop is larger for firms with low switching costs, while the sharp assignment rule may have led to the rationing of marginal borrowers. Such findings indicate that the entire distribution of firms and banks’ characteristics plays a crucial role in determining the impact of regulatory capital changes.