Who should bear the administrative costs of an emissions tax?

All environmental policies involve costs of implementation and management that are distinct from pollution sources’ abatement costs. In practice, regulators and sources usually share these administrative costs. We examine theoretically an optimal policy consisting of an emissions tax and the distribution of administrative costs between the government and regulated sources of pollution. Our focus is on the optimal distribution of administrative costs between polluters and the government and the optimal level of the emissions tax in relation to marginal pollution damage. We demonstrate how the policy variables affect aggregate equilibrium administrative costs and show that these effects are generally indeterminate, as is the effect of the distribution of administrative costs on aggregate emissions. Consequently, the optimal sharing of administrative costs and whether the optimal emissions tax is higher or lower than marginal damage depend on specific contexts.     

Externalities in a spatial context: The case of air pollution

In this paper air pollution externalities are analyzed in an explicit spatial setting that recognizes the spatial interdependence of polluters and their victims. Optimal environmental policies are shown to consist not only of Pigouvian taxes but of two other policies. First, regulations controlling the allocation of land between polluters and victims are needed. Secondly, if pollution taxes are imposed by local governments, in general it will be necessary for the federal government to take some of the tax proceeds and redistribute them amongst localities. For example, some of the proceeds in heavily taxed and polluted communities may have to be redistributed to lightly taxed and polluted communities.     

Stock externalities and the diffusion of less polluting capital: an option approach

In this paper, the diffusion of less polluting capital in response to a stock externality is investigated. An economy is considered with identical polluted agents and a continuum of polluters who have the ability to invest in less polluting capital units. The option approach of investment decisions is used to justify environmental policies based on pollution thresholds and emission standards. The dynamics of optimal diffusion is first examined. The design of a suitable emission tax is then considered and some cases of tax inefficiency are detailed in the context of a game between symmetric polluters. The model is finally applied to greenhouse gas accumulation.     

雾霾污染对外商直接投资的影响研究

基于中国271个地级以上城市2007—2016年的PM_2.5浓度数据,实证分析了雾霾污染对外商直接投资的影响,创新性地使用年均降水量作为缓解雾霾污染内生性的工具变量,在2SLS的统一框架内估计雾霾污染对外商直接投资的影响。主要结论有:雾霾污染与外商直接投资之间存在正相关关系,地方政府进行大力的环境治理可以减少环境污染,能够缓解外商直接投资压力;2012—2016年间雾霾污染对外商直接投资的影响要显著高于2007—2011年间的,可以预见未来治霾能够更加有效地缓解外商直接投资压力;大中城市雾霾污染对于外商直接投资的影响要显著小于小城市,内陆城市对于雾霾污染治理的难度要大于沿海城市。政策启示在于,雾霾减排将不可避免地深刻影响地方政府的行为,雾霾减排可以缓解外商直接投资压力,地方政府应该积极地投入到环境治理之中,促进环境治理和地方经济增长良性循环。     

IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ARE MARKETS THE SOLUTION?

While market approaches are clearly valuable for improving U.S. environmental policy, they cannot solve all of the problems, and not necessarily the most difficult ones. They can ensure that a given total abatement is achieved at minimum cost. But, if pollution damages depend on how abatement effort is allocated among polluters, this is not necessarily the most desirable outcome. One also needs to be sure that the potential gains from trade implicit in market solutions will actually be realized within some given time; the empirical evidence here is not necessarily promising. Rather than how aggregate abatement should be distributed among polluters, the chief difficulty often lies in determining how much overall abatement is required. A key factor that economists tend to overlook is the difficulty of ascertaining just how benefits vary with abatement effort. Uncertainty and risk aversion in connection with the marginal benefit curve may explain regulatory actions that are otherwise hard to justify.     

Free trade and the burden of domestic policy

Abstract. Consider a small economy facing accession to a exogenously defined trade agreement. Before accession, the government controls trade and pollution policy. After accession, it retains control over pollution policy, but must allow free trade in all goods. This is a choice many governments face while joining trade agreements today. They decide whether greater market access to other members is more valuable than control over trade policy. I ask two questions. All else being equal what happens to environmental policy after accession? Second, what affects the choice of accession and how does this choice impact aggregate welfare? I show that a loss in control over trade policy alters the political incentives determining environmental policy. Before accession, producers can transfer a portion of their burden of environmental regulation to consumers through price increases. After accession the same regulation is borne entirely by producers. Owing to the change in burden, there exist plausible conditions under which the adoption of free trade can lead to more stringent environmental regulation, a reduction in the preferential treatment of special interest groups, and an increase in aggregate welfare.     

Maxium Victim Benefit: A Fair Division Process in Transboundary Pollution Problems

We introduce a side-payment scheme, maximum victim benefit, that promotes stable international environmental agreements. In developing this scheme, we incorporate the equity position that victims of pollution should benefit from pollution control. The result is a scheme which picks a unique element in the core; it maximizes the benefits to the victims of pollution and ensures that polluters are willing to join the scheme.     

Community-Based Tradable Permits for Localized Pollution

This paper considers the assignment of tradable permits—representing property rights of an environmental good—to community members who are harmed by pollution generated by firms. These community members can in turn sell permits to polluters according to their personal preferences. For a special case with a sole household, market transactions between the household and polluters achieve an efficient pollution level. However, for a group of households, the decentralized market solution fails to yield social efficiency because of competitive consumption of the environmental goods. We design a revenue-sharing mechanism akin to unitization, under which market transactions also achieve efficient resource allocation. Importantly, in some cases, efficiency can be achieved even when regulators are ignorant of the private valuation of the environmental good.     

Static and dynamic efficiency of pollution control strategies

A great deal of the economic literature on pollution control strategies concentrates on the efficiency of environmental policy instruments. Most analytical studies in this field show that market instruments are more efficient with respect to the cost of pollution abatement of a given number of polluters than non-market instruments. According to several analytical studies, market instruments should also be more efficient with respect to innovation in pollution abatement equipment than non-market instruments. In the empirical literature a great number of case studies exist with estimations of the savings of abatement costs of market instruments in a situation without technological progress. Empirical studies about the impact of environmental policy market instruments on the abatement costs in situations with technological progress are lacking.The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. The paper deals with an empirical estimation of abatement costs for the emission of SO₂ of coal-fired electricity units in the Netherlands from 1985 to 2000. First, the working of market instruments and non-market instruments (the existing environmental policy of the Dutch government) is simulated in a static situation. Second, we analyse the learning effects of flue gas desulphurization. The efficiency advantage of market instruments turns out to be larger in a situation of technological progress than in a static situation.     

Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance

In this paper, we analyze whether it is socially desirable that fines for exceeding pollution standards depend not only on the degree of non-compliance but also on technology investment efforts by the polluting firms. For that purpose, we consider a partial equilibrium framework where a representative firm chooses the investment effort and the pollution level in response to an environmental policy composed of a pollution standard, an inspection probability and a fine for non-compliance. We find that the fine should strictly decrease with the investment effort when (i) there are administrative costs of sanctioning; (ii) the optimal policy induces non-compliance; and (iii) either the fine is sufficiently convex in the degree of non-compliance or the investment effort decreases marginal abatement costs significantly.     

Endogenous market power in an emissions trading scheme with auctioning

This paper contributes to the literature on market power in emissions permits markets, modeling an emissions trading scheme in which polluters differ with respect to their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions. The polluters play a two-stage static complete information game in which their market power arises endogenously from their characteristics. In the first stage all polluters bid in an auction for the distribution of the fixed supply of permits issued by the regulator, and in the second stage they trade these permits in a secondary market. For compliance, they can also engage in abatement activity at a quadratic cost. Under the assumptions of the model, in equilibrium all polluters are successful in the auction. In the secondary market the low-cost emitters are net sellers and the high-cost emitters are net buyers. Moreover, the high-cost emitters are worse off as a result of the strategic behavior. In addition, the secondary market price is unambiguously above the auction clearing price. I find that the aggregate compliance cost when polluters act strategically increases in the heterogeneity of their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions, but there exists a threshold of the fixed supply of permits above which strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters. Finally, for a low enough variance of the marginal abatement cost at the business-as-usual emissions, strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters, regardless of the level of the available supply of permits.     

Segmented Work and Divided Workers: A Review Article

The Coase theorem is often interpreted as demonstrating why private negotiations between polluters and victims can yield efficient levels of pollution without government interference. It is considered by many to provide the theoretical underpinnings for "free-market" solutions to environmental problems. This article explains why misinterpreting Coasian negotiations as a market driven process leads to erroneous conclusions. More importantly, this article demonstrates why negotiations between polluters and victims would fail to yield efficient outcomes even if property rights were well-defined, even if there were only a single victim, even if negotiations entailed no transaction costs, and even if negotiators behaved rationally and reached a successful agreement. Unlike other critiques of the Coase theorem that focus on irrational behavior and transaction costs, our critique identifies perverse incentives that arise even under conditions most favorable to the theorem. By accepting, rather than challenging, the premises of the theorem, our analysis provides an "internal" critique that strengthens well-known "external" criticisms.     

Inspections,pollution prices,and environmental performance: evidence from China

In environmental economics, monitoring and enforcement issues have attracted relatively little research effort. Moreover, the bulk of the literature on these issues has been of a theoretical nature. Few have empirically analysed the impact of monitoring and enforcement activities on the environmental performance of polluters. Moreover, all existing studies have been performed in the context of developed countries. A purpose of the current paper is to partially fill this important gap by exploring the impact of both inspections and pollution charges on the environmental performance of polluters in China. While pollution charges represent an important pillar of the Chinese environmental regulatory system, our results indicate that inspections dominate and better explain the environmental performance of industrial polluters.     

Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective

The conventional wisdom suggests that a stricter enforcement policy can reduce pollution emissions. Nevertheless, this present paper argues that this assertion does not necessarily hold if the stringency of environmental regulation is subject to the influence of lobbying. A stricter enforcement policy increases the polluters’ expected financial burden, and induces them to exert greater political pressure on reducing the stringency of environmental regulation, thereby resulting in a larger amount of pollution emissions. We also show that tightening the enforcement policy can reduce efficiency. We highlight the possibility of policymaking being misguided due to overlooking the political effect of enforcement policy.     

Regulating Multiple Polluters: Deterrence and Liability Allocation

We consider regulation of multiple polluters when individual emissions are unobservable. The tension between pollution deterrence and funding of remediation is examined under two constraints: that penalty revenues fully fund remediation costs and that the regulator cannot make positive transfers to firms. To isolate the effect of increasing the number of polluters, we compare an industry consisting of a single large firm with one in which many small firms in aggregate mimic the large firm. Contrary to previous findings, both the number of firms and the ability to monitor individual firms affect the welfare of a large class of regulators.     

Intertemporal Emission Permits Trading Under Uncertainty and Irreversibility

This paper analyzes the effect of emission permit banking on clean technology investment and abatement under conditions where the stringency of the future cap is uncertain. We examine the problem of heterogeneous firms minimizing the cost of intertemporal emission control in the presence of stochastic future pollution standards and emission permits that are tradable across firms and through time. A firm can invest in clean capital (an improved pollution abatement technology) to reduce its abatement cost. We consider two possibilities: that investment is reversible or irreversible. Uncertainty is captured within a two period model: only the current period cap is known. We show that if banking is positive and marginal abatement costs are sufficiently convex, there will be more abatement and investment in clean technology under uncertainty than there would be under certainty and no banking. These results are at odds with the common belief that uncertainty on future environmental policy is a barrier to investment in clean capital. Moreover, under uncertainty and irreversibility, we find that there are cases where banking enables firms to invest more in clean capital.     

Recursive equilibrium in endogenous growth models with incomplete markets

This paper analyzes the existence of recursive equilibria in a class of convex growth models with incomplete markets. Households have identical CRRA-preferences, production displays constant returns to scale with respect to physical and human capital, and all markets are competitive. There are aggregate productivity shocks that affect aggregate returns to physical and human capital investment (stock returns and wages), and there are idiosyncratic shocks to human capital (idiosyncratic depreciation shocks) that only affect individual human capital returns. Aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks follow a joint Markov process. Conditional on the aggregate state, idiosyncratic shocks are independently distributed over time and identically distributed across households. Finally, households have the opportunity to trade assets in zero net supply with payoffs that depend on the aggregate shock, but markets are incomplete in the sense that there are no assets with payoffs depending on idiosyncratic shocks. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium for which equilibrium prices (returns) only depend on the exogenous aggregate shock variable (the wealth distribution is not a relevant state variable). Moreover, the allocation associated with this recursive equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium allocation of an economy in which households live in autarky and face both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.I would like to thank for helpful comments Peter Howitt, Bob Lucas, Michael Magill, Tomo Nakajima, Herakles Polemarchakis, Martine Quinzii, Kevin Reffett, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at various universities and conferences.     

A theory of mutual migration of polluting firms

Abstract.  Suppose that governments care about their tax revenue and local firms have some say in environmental regulations. Then, the level of employment and environmental compliance may be negotiated. We find that firms located in different countries can improve their threat‐point payoffs by mutual migration. This in turn affects the negotiated output/employment and environmental regulations, which causes profits to increase if the firm's threat‐point payoff is higher than that of the local government. The model predicts that pollution‐intensive firms or firms with highly inelastic demands are more likely to move out. Increases in the government's valuation of the environment, or in the degree of globalization also cause mutual migration of dirty firms. The effect of a government caring about consumer surplus leads to a lower pollution tax, reducing firms' incentives to move out. JEL classification: F2, Q0     

International production chains and the pollution offshoring hypothesis: An empirical investigation

Most analyses of the impact of heterogeneous environmental policy stringency on the location of industrial firms have considered the relocation of entire activities – the well-known pollution haven hypothesis. Yet international enterprises may decide to only offshore a subset of their production chain – the so-called pollution offshoring hypothesis (POH). We introduce a simple empirical approach to test the POH combining a comprehensive industrial mergers and acquisitions dataset, a measure of sectoral linkages based on input-output tables and an index score of environmental policy stringency. Our results confirm the impact of relative environmental policy stringency on firms’ decisions to engage in cross-country M&As. Our findings also indicate that environmental taxation have a stronger impact on international investment decisions than standards-based policies. Further, we find that transactions involving a target firm operating in a sector upstream of the acquirer are more sensitive to environmental policy stringency, especially when that sector is highly pollution-intensive. This empirical evidence is consistent with the pollution offshoring hypothesis.     

Pollution control with variable production processes

This paper compares the input and output effects of pricing and regulation instruments for pollution control. It is shown that a pricing policy could have adverse output effects which should be weighed in the balance against its abatement-cost-minimisation advantage over regulation. It is also demonstrated that pricing need not lead polluters to select known processes which are less polluting than those chosen under regulation.