风险投资交易契约设计研究

在我国风险投资发展中,风险投资交易设计与发达国家相比十分不完善,减弱了投资者信心,并且很大程度上阻碍了风险投资资金进入。交易设计其本质是多阶段不完美信息双方博弈,本文以信息不对称为切入点从风险投资交易设计的意义、内容、途径、及外部环境建设几方面进行分析,从中提出问题的解决办法。     

风险投资参与对上市公司内部控制信息披露的影响

基于信号传递理论,以需求和机会两个视角,本文就我国风险投资参与对上市公司内部控制信息披露的影响进行了理论分析。进一步地,将风险投资机构持股比例与持股期限刻画为风险投资参与度,将企业内部控制信息披露质量（ICIDQ）界定为及时性、真实性、完整性维度,在利用主观与客观赋值相结合的方法对ICIDQ进行了测度的基础上,论文实证考察了风险投资参与度对企业内部控制信息披露质量的影响。结果表明：相对于无风险投资背景的上市公司,有风险投资背景的上市公司的内部控制信息披露质量更高;并且,参与度越高其相关性越显著。     

信息不对称与风险投资

<正> 1997年以来,我国新一轮的风险投资热开始兴起,产业界(特别是高新技术产业)和理论界对此极为关注。本文拟从信息不对称的角度对风险投资进行理论分析。全文共分三部分。第一部分讨论风险投资的由来以及对风险投资的几点认识;第二部分讨论信息不对称如何阻碍风险投资的顺利进行;第三部分对发展我国风险投资事业过程中的几个问题进行讨论。一、风险投资的由来     

风险投资网络、投资经验与绩效

近年来,我国风险投资行业高速发展,风险投资机构之间进行联合投资的行为越来越频繁,从而形成了风险投资网络。风险投资机构网络属性特征已成为影响风险投资成功的关键因素,同时风险投资机构的投资经验也是影响风险投资绩效的重要因素。基于社会网络视角,构建了风险投资机构网络位置、投资经验与投资绩效之间逻辑关系的理论分析框架,探索了网络中心位置、投资经验对投资绩效的直接影响,并考察投资经验对网络位置与投资绩效的调节作用。研究发现,风险投资机构的网络位置中心性对投资绩效有显著的影响,且投资经验在风险投资网络与投资绩效之间起了显著的正向调节作用。研究结果是对现有风险投资网络研究文献的一个有益补充,对于创业企业和风险投资机构相互选择有一定的参考指导作用。     

如何防范信息不对称所带来的道德风险

<正>风险投资项目评价中,风险投资公司会面临一个非常棘手的问题就是信息不对称,被投资企业会由于急需资金,迫切需要风险投资公司风险资金的注入以发展风险投资项目,从而对风险投资公司隐瞒一些对企业不利的因素,甚至向风险投资公司提供一些虚假信息,来骗取风险投资资金。这样,对风险投资公司而言,如何防范风险投资中由信息不对称所带来的道德风险就成了风险投资公司必须解决的课题。     

风险投资异质性对IPO抑价的影响——基于科创板的研究

本文主要从信息不对称角度分析风险投资异质性对IPO抑价的影响。本文选取2019—2022年科创板上市公司作为样本,通过实证研究发现：科创板上市公司中有风险投资机构参与的企业IPO抑价水平会提高;风险投资机构资本背景的差异对IPO抑价率有不同的影响。其中,对IPO抑价水平影响最明显的是政府背景的风险投资机构,公司背景的风险投资机构影响程度中等,独立背景的风险投资机构影响程度最低。基于此,本文认为在解决信息不对称问题上,不同背景风险投资机构的处理能力存在差异。     

风险投资内部差异性对认证作用的影响——基于信息不对称的角度

文章深入探讨风险投资内部的差异性,把活跃于我国风险投资行业的风险投资分为政府背景风险投资、公司背景风险投资以及独立风险投资,分析其在出现动机、参与企业的发展阶段、参与企业经营管理的程度、对风险投资管理人员的激励程度以及投资决策效率等方面的不同.结合不同背景风险投资所具有的差异性并基于信息不对称原理,对不同背景风险投资的特征影响风险投资发挥认证作用进行了分析,并得到结论:独立风险投资认证能力最强,企业背景风险投资次之,政府背景风险投资的认证能力最弱.     

风险投资中的多任务委托——代理模型分析

在风险投资中,各方信息不对称会产生委托——代理的风险问题。加上激励不相容、监督乏力、风险企业家追求自身利益的最大化等,很容易引发风险投资运作过程中委托——代理关系的失灵,从而导致风险投资的失败。多任务委托——代理模型,即是对风险投资运作过程中的代理问题进行分析,探讨如何在委托——代理关系中设计有效的激励约束机制来提高风险投资效率。     

发展我国风险投资基金的思考

首先概述了我国风险投资基金的现状,然后论述了风险投资存在的三个主要问题:信息不对称,缺乏退出机制和不完善的外部环境,最后针对这三方面问题提出了相应对策。     

风险投资、真实盈余管理与审计收费

本文以2009—2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,分析了风险投资、真实盈余管理与审计收费之间的关系.研究表明:与无风险投资持股的企业相比,有风险投资持股的企业真实盈余管理水平更低,同时审计收费也更低.进一步研究发现,风险投资通过抑制企业的真实盈余管理行为,进而降低审计收费,真实盈余管理在风险投资与审计收费之间存在部分中介效应.此外,风险投资的持股比例越高,被投资企业的审计收费越低;相比单一风险投资,联合投资支持的企业审计收费更低.     

WHAT DO ECONOMISTS TELL US ABOUT VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS?

Abstract.  Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into contracts that influence their behaviour and mitigate the agency costs. In particular, they select an appropriate kind and structure of financing and specify the rights as well as the duties of both parties. The typical features of venture capital investments are an intensive screening and evaluation process, active involvement of venture capitalists in their portfolio companies, staging of capital infusions, use of special financing instruments such as convertible debt or convertible preferred stock, syndication among venture capitalists or limited investment horizon.     

The impact of venture capital financing method on SME performance and internationalization

One of the basic premises of venture capital is leverage, which often means adding money and other resources to speed up growth. As a result, small- to medium-sized venture funded firms are expected to show significant growth at an early stage. Our research examines how equity based-venture funding methods affect SME performance and internationalization. We divide venture capital financing into several categories: incremental financing where firms receive their venture capital funding in portions, lump-sum funding where firms receive their funding in one lump-sum, syndication where two or more external investors participate in a single financing round and non-syndicated financing where one investor participates in a single financing round. The results show that type of equity-based venture capital financing affect performance and internationalization. Annual sales growth rate and annual turnover are used as proxies for performance. Export ratio is used as a proxy for internationalization. Staged financing and financing through a syndicate has a positive effect on performance and internationalization when used separately. We observe a negative effect when syndication and staged financing are used in combination.     

The Structure and Management of Alliances: Syndication in the Venture Capital Industry*

abstract Syndicates are a form of inter‐firm alliance in which two or more venture capital firms co‐invest in an investee firm and share a joint pay‐off. Syndication is a significant part of the venture capital market yet little research has been conducted into the process of structuring syndicate deals and the management of syndicates following deal completion. This paper analyses the neglected issues concerning the structuring and management of syndicated venture capital investments from the perspectives of both lead and non‐lead syndicate members using two surveys of venture capital firms and examination of syndication documents. Lead investors typically have larger equity stakes and the syndicated investment agreement is a document that enshrines the rights of participants rather than specifying behaviour. Contractual arrangements typically serve as a back drop to relationships as non‐legal sanctions are important and decisions are typically reached following discussion and consensus, but lead venture capital investors’ residual and specific powers are important in ensuring timely decision‐making. The findings extend previous work on alliances by emphasizing the importance of non‐legal sanctions, especially reputation effects, in mitigating opportunistic behaviour by dominant equity holders. The paper also adds to the limited research on the dynamics of alliances by highlighting the role of repeat syndicates.     

Internal Knowledge Development and External Knowledge Access in Venture Capital Investment Performance

abstract    We examine the performance effects of two knowledge-driven strategies – internal knowledge development and external knowledge access through inter-firm relationships – in the context of venture capital investing. Using longitudinal data on the investments, syndication, and performance of 200 US-based venture capital firms, we find that investing in industries in which a firm has more knowledge and investing with more or familiar external partners enhances investment performance. In addition, we reveal important interactions between the two strategies, such that access to external knowledge is particularly beneficial when the investment exposes gaps in the firm's own expertise. Thus, access to external knowledge is more effective when an incongruity exists between what the firm knows and what it intends to do. We discuss the study's implications for organizational knowledge and learning, strategic alliance, and venture capital literature.     

Venture-Capital Syndication: Improved Venture Selection vs. The Value-Added Hypothesis

Syndication arises when venture capitalists jointly invest in projects. We model and test two possible reasons for syndication: project selection, as an additional venture capitalist provides an informative second opinion; and complementary management skills of additional venture capitalists. The central question is whether venture capitalists are engaged primarily in selection or in managerial value added. These alternatives imply contrasting predictions about comparative returns to syndicated and standalone investments. Our empirical analysis, using Canadian data, finds that syndicated investments have higher returns, favoring the value-added interpretation. We also discuss risk sharing and project scale as possible reasons for syndication.     

Founders' Characteristics,Venture Capital Syndication and Governance in Entrepreneurial IPOs

Using a unique sample of 444 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France this paper examines links between founders' characteristics, venture capital (VC) syndication and the development of effective boards in entrepreneurial firms. It argues that VC-backed IPOs suffer from two sets of agency problems which are related to principal-agent and principal-principal relationships between the founders and members of the VC syndicate. The empirical evidence shows that there is a curvilinear relationship between the intensity of founders' external ties and VC syndication. Founders' retained share ownership is negatively associated with VC syndication. We also find that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher involvement of passive private equity firms and “business angels” investing alongside VC firms, both in terms of their number and equity presence. VC-syndicated IPOs have more independent boards than IPOs with no VC involvement. Board independence is negatively associated with founders' retained equity. These results are consistent with the assumption that board independence is used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement in IPO firms. Our findings also identify significant differences in governance characteristics between the UK and France. While French IPOs have less independent boards, they involve more VC backing in general and syndicated VC funding in particular, than UK IPOs.     

Screening and valuing venture capital investments: evidence from Hungary,Poland and Slovakia

This paper examines the screening and valuation approaches used by venture capital firms in emerging markets using evidence from surveys of venture capital firms in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The results show notable differences in the state of development and operation of the venture capital markets both between the three countries and in comparison with the developed UK venture capital market, especially in relation to the degree of equity ownership sought by venture capitalists, the information used in deal screening and valuation methods.     

Venture capital firms’ lead orientation,network position,and selection of familiar syndicate partners

This study explores how a venture capital (VC) firm’s lead orientation (i.e., acting more as a lead investor rather than a follower investor in past syndication investments) influences its selection of familiar syndicate partners. By conducting empirical research that uses detailed information of 11,219 investment deals in China from January 1999 to June 2016, we find that a VC firm’s lead orientation has an inverted U-shaped relationship with its propensity to select familiar syndicate partners. In other words, as a VC firm’s lead orientation increases, its familiarity degree with the partners in the subsequent syndicated investment will first increase and then decrease. In addition, a VC firm’s network centrality and network constraint imposed by the VC network structure both weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between its lead orientation and the selection of familiar partners. Robustness checks with different measures and samples, together with the instrumental variable approach and the Heckman selection model that address potential endogeneity problems, show the reliability of our findings.     

Venture Capital Investments in Europe and Portfolio Firms' Economic Performance: Independent Versus Corporate Investors

Using a new European Commission‐sponsored longitudinal dataset—the VICO dataset—we assess the impact of independent (IVC) and corporate venture capital (CVC) investments on the economic performance of European high‐tech entrepreneurial firms during the period 1992–2010. After controlling for potential sources of endogeneity and selection bias, our results indicate that both IVC and CVC investments boost portfolio firms' economic performance. These effects are mostly due to an increase in real sales value. Moreover, the dynamics of the impact of VC investments on firms’ overall economic performance and its components—real sales value, real fixed assets, and real labor costs—differs depending on the type of investor. Finally, we do not detect any impact related to the syndication of investments by both IVC and CVC investors.     

风险投资中人因失误因素的识别研究

本文首先基于实证研究,建立了风险投资的人因失误因素结构图,然后利用AMOS4．0建立了结构方程模型并对其进行了检验。分析结果表明,领导者的道德风险、基本素质、决策失误、冒险与侥幸心理,政府的干预,团队协调能力及信息反馈机制等是导致风险投资失败的关键人因失误因素。因此,加强这些人因失误因素的控制是减少投资风险发生的有效途径。