银行危机与货币危机共生性关系的实证研究

1 997— 1 998年的亚洲金融风暴中 ,银行危机与货币危机的同时爆发 ,即共生性危机的发生引发国际社会与学术界对这种现象的重新思考 :这种共生性现象是否确实具有普遍性 ?从理论的角度来看 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着一定的联系 ,但到目前为止 ,很少有研究从实证的角度来证明这种联系的确存在。正是基于此 ,本文从实证的角度出发 ,旨在揭示出银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着相互影响 ,换言之 ,共生性危机的发生是具有显著性的。具体来说 ,本文以 1 975— 2 0 0 0年期间 53个国家危机的发生情况为研究对象 ,分别运用频率分布、信号法 ,以及概率回归模型来分析两种危机的共生性 ,并得到非常一致的结论 :在新兴市场国家中 ,银行危机与货币危机之间的确存在着明显的相互关系 ,同时银行危机更趋向于作为货币危机即将发生的同步或预警指标 ,而反之则不然。     

Banking,currency, stock market and debt crises in Spain, 1850–1995

What type of crisis is generated when debt increases? We extend the literature by framework by introducing currency and stock market crises in the analysis. We apply our proposal to the case of Spain, since this is a country that has experienced a very important amount of financial crises from the nineteenth century onwards. We find the same results as the previous literature for the determinants of banking and debt crises but substituting external and public debt with perpetual debt and where perpetual debt has a less important role than crises in the private sector. Moreover, we find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that currency crises depend strongly and positively on financial centre crises and negatively and mildly on perpetual debt. We justify the negative relalionship due to an inflation tax. We also find evidence in favour of the hypothesis that stock market crises depend only positively and strongly on financial centre crises.     

基于信息的双重危机模型及其在东亚危机中的应用

由于近来在新兴市场国家发生的一系列货币危机都同时伴随着银行危机的发生,要全面地理解这些货币危机,我们需要将具有微观基础的银行部门明确地纳入到货币危机的分析模型中去.该文通过应用基于信息的银行挤兑模型,建立了一个双重危机模型,并对诸如经济基本面的脆弱如何导致双重危机,以及银行危机和货币危机如何相互作用等问题,做出了内生化的解释.模型抓住了最近新兴市场货币危机的本质特征,并与最近东亚危机的经验事实非常符合.     

货币危机与银行危机共生因子实证分析——国别比较的视角

共生危机的事实表明,货币危机与银行危机共生的现象在不同类型的国家均可能出现,而非某一类国家所特有的现象.基于对共生性货币银行危机触发机制国别差异的考察,文章在对1980～2006年间60个国家共生危机发生情况识别的基础上,分别构建了工业化国家和发展中国家共生危机生成的逐步Logistic回归模型.研究表明,工业化国家的共生危机主要是经济中各类矛盾累积的结果,发展中国家则主要源于本国制度缺陷,而采用滞后一期的变量来解释工业化国家共生危机时,效果不显著.     

A Tribute to Hyman P. Minsky

In this article, we examine financial crises after the Bretton Woods period using a new virulence index. After summarizing financial crises after Bretton Woods, we analyze aspects of four separate crises in a virulence index. The index includes measures of contagion, as well as impacts on economic, financial and social indicators. We find that financial crises have increased in virulence over time.     

防治货币危机的政策措施

本文对预防与应对货币危机的各种政策措施进行探讨。货币危机发生的原因是多方面的 ,其对经济的发展具有诸多不利的影响。要预防货币危机 ,良好的经济基础是根本的保障 ,市场参与者的信心同样是重要的。应急性政策措施必须与基础性政策措施相结合 ,才能消除危机。     

Trade Integration as a Mechanism of Financial Crisis Prevention

We have created an eclectic model that synthesizes the different versions of the third generation exchange rate crises models. This eclectic model takes current existing schemes beyond the traditional analyses—based on causes and consequences of external financial crises in emerging markets—and raises trade openness as an effective mechanism to prevent and avoid foreign debt crises and exchange rate crises. Our findings give theoretical support to empirical economic literature about this topic because, at the present time, most of the studies connecting international trade and financial crises are basically empirical.     

Debt and Currency Crises—Complements or Substitutes?*

Debt and currency crises are closely interlinked through the government's intertemporal budget constraint. The default tax and the inflation/devaluation tax can be considered as alternative means of financing. Our empirical analysis finds that high‐debt countries choose default rather than inflation/devaluation for financing, while a high money stock reduces the probability of debt crises. Further, we find strong evidence that debt and currency crises share common fundamental causes. Finally, there is a Granger causality running from debt crises to currency crises, but only weakly in the other direction.     

Transparency and currency crises

The role transparency plays in the prevention of currency crises is widely acknowledged. Nevertheless, the relationship between transparency and currency crises has rarely been subjected to systematic cross‐national scrutiny. This paper attempts to explore the effect of transparency on currency crises by focusing on a specific dimension of transparency: the public dissemination of aggregate economic data by governments. My analysis provides strong evidence that greater transparency is associated with a lower likelihood of currency crises, regardless of economic conditions. When I add economic and political determinants of currency crises, the estimate of transparency remains unaltered in magnitude or statistical significance.     

国际金融体系的构造缺陷与亚洲金融危机的内在联系

近年来国际金融危机频发,这些危机的原因除了发生危机的国家的内在因素之外,更主要的还与其外在的整个国际货币金融体系存在着的巨大构造性缺陷息息相关。     

Twin Crises in Emerging Markets: The Role of Liability Dollarization and Imperfect Competition in Banking

Currency crises in emerging markets have been accompanied by banking crises, with concentration in the market for bank credit increasing after large devaluations. This paper examines how the presence of imperfect competition and liability dollarization in banking shapes the real effects of the just mentioned twin crises. An important gap in the theoretical literature is filled, by being the first paper to provide a model of twin crises in the presence of imperfect competition in banking, and the changes in market structure that occur in the aftermath of crises. Doing so, the analysis is able to reveal that currency devaluations generate more severe twin crises in economies with less competitive banking sectors. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence on the concentration‐fragility view, and it unveils the importance of prudential regulation that focuses on the market structure in banking.     

Stability periods between financial crises: The role of macroeconomic fundamentals and crises management policies

This study aims to identify which factors explain why some countries enjoy long durations of stability, while others experience crises in shorter intervals. We analyze the duration of stability periods between currency, debt, and banking crises by employing an innovative econometric strategy, the Finite Mixture Model (FMM). Real and financial variables show high predictive power for stability spells between currency crises. Regarding debt crises, the real interest rate is observed to be the best predictor. The time between systemic financial crises appears to be prolonged through government interventions and through IMF program participation, while bank recapitalization has a negative impact.     

The exploration of economic crises: parameter uncertainty and predictive ability

Over a long horizon, this paper examines joint economic crises and determines the power of 49 variables in predicting such episodes. While incorporating dynamism in the prediction, we generate the predictive power of various specifications and model the uncertainty in the parameters of interest. The results reveal that growth of real gross domestic product per capita, regulation, bank non‐performing loans, interest rate and inflation rate are the most significant variables in predicting the joint economic crises. These variables predict economic crises with about 93% accuracy and can predict joint economic crises in developing countries and recent joint crises.     

What Caused the Asian Crises: An Early Warning System Approach

We estimate a simple probit model of the probability of balance-of-payments crises over a panel of developing countries through 1995. We then forecast crisis probabilities for 1997. We find that a simple model composed of four traditional macroeconomic variables and one 'second generation' variable performs well in predicting the Asia crises. The Thai and Malaysian crises had predominantly first-generation features, while the crises in Korea and Indonesia are, to some extent, predictable largely on the basis of our second-generation variable.
(J.E.L.: F31, F47).     

Political booms and currency crises

This paper shows evidence that political booms, defined as the rise in governments’ popularity, are associated with a higher likelihood of currency crises. The reasoning behind this finding is that prudent economic policies to address underlying weaknesses in the economy may be political costly for incumbent governments in the short-term. Hence, popularity-concerned governments may not have enough incentives to take such corrective actions in a timely manner. This approach, in turn, can deteriorate economic fundamentals and increase related risks in the economy which can eventually lead to crises. This paper sheds light on this phenomenon in the case of currency crises, suggesting that currency crises can be viewed as “political booms gone bust” events. Moreover, it finds that higher international reserves, higher exports, and a higher degree of financial openness alleviate the effect of political booms on currency crises.     

Capital Controls,Public Debt and Currency Crises

This paper examines the possibility that, contrary to conventional wisdom, capital controls accelerate currency crises. Theoretical analysis shows that capital controls can constitute an additional burden on government budget and so bring forward the onset of crises. Since perfect capital mobility does not occur, domestic interest rates may deviate from world interest rates. High interest rates under capital controls create an additional cost of servicing outstanding domestic public debt, precipitating crises. Even though the government can delay crises with capital controls, welfare may be less than in a situation with perfect capital mobility.     

Capital account openness and early warning system for banking crises in G20 countries

This paper develops an early warning system for banking crises in the G20 countries, with the inclusion of capital account openness indicators. Results suggest that the capital account openness demonstrates a significant predictive power on systemic banking crises, and the impact is related with the level of the economic development. For low-income countries, increased capital account openness has a significantly negative impact on the banking crises likelihoods, while for high-income countries it imposes a positive impact. For middle-income countries, however, the occurrence of banking crises is more indifferent to capital account liberalization.     

Political regimes and financial crises

This study investigates how democratic or autocratic regimes, their transitions, and durations, affect the probability of experiencing financial crises. The empirical strategy employs novel instruments and Lewbel's method to address potential endogeneity concerns. The results reveal that democratic transition reduces the probability of crises by around seven percent, whereas autocratic switchovers enhance the crises likelihood by twelve percent. The findings remain robust in presence of a number of heterogeneity checks, with alternative measures of crises indicators, and employing different proxy for democratic transition. Thus, institutions in transition countries could play important role in managing such financial upheavals.     

COSTS OF HOUSING CRISES: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

This paper analyses the costs of housing crises in terms of GDP growth and the economic conditions under which crises are particularly costly. Housing crises are often followed by recessions that are longer than other recessions. According to empirical estimates, a housing crisis reduces the GDP growth rate in the following year on average by two percentage points and has still a considerable negative impact in the second year. One important channel through which the effect of housing crises is passed on seems to be the banking sector. In addition, our results suggest that negative wealth effects possibly cause further reductions in GDP growth.     

Crises and the International System

This paper reviews the recent experience of financial crises since 2007, including the continuing crisis in the euro zone. I seek to answer three main questions: In what respects (if any) is the recent experience of crises novel? How special is the euro crisis? And what changes in the international financial architecture can reduce the chances of future crises?