How they lost the presidency

For the second time in this century and the fifth time in US history, the 2016 presidential popular vote winner was not elected president. One day before the election, the author predicted (https://finpolicy.georgetown.edu) Secretary Hillary Clinton would receive between 50.49 and 51.78 percent of the two-party popular vote. She received 51.11 percent. The difference between the popular vote winner and Electoral College outcome inspired the author, ex ante, to develop a state-by-state, cross-section probit model to understand Donald Trump’s Electoral College victory, based on economic, racial and educational characteristics. Trump won the US presidency by winning some of the largest states (Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin with 17 percent of the necessary electoral votes) by small margins, particularly states with modest per capita incomes and economic growth, and losing the minority vote by less than expected.     

For they know not what they do: an analysis of monetary policy during the Great Moderation

In this article, we develop an empirical framework to show the importance of money during the Great Moderation, while accounting for the fact that monetary policy was exclusively conducted through interest rates. We estimate the impulse response functions and forecast error variance decomposition derived from a structural VAR with a least absolute shrinkage and selection operator–based lag selection. The variance decomposition suggests that a substantial component of macroeconomic variation has been driven by shocks to the money market, which were not only unintended by the Federal Reserve, but worse passed unnoticed allowing those shocks to accumulate over time.     

Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t

Summary. In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.Received: 14 October 2002, Revised: 1 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D43. Correspondence to: Hans-Theo Normann     

How corruption hits people when they are down

Using Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.     

How corruption hits people when they are down

Using Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.     

Fiscal stabilizations: When do they work and why

This paper studies the determinants and channels through which fiscal contractions influence the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth. Using data from a panel of OECD countries, the paper shows that the success of fiscal adjustments in decreasing the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the size of the fiscal contraction and less on its composition. The rate of growth of output matters too, but higher GDP growth does not drive the success of a fiscal stabilization. In contrast, whether a fiscal adjustment is expansionary depends largely on the composition of the fiscal maneuvre. In particular, stabilizations implemented by cutting public spending lead to higher GDP growth rates. The effects of the composition on growth work mostly through the labor market rather than through agents’ expectations of future fiscal policy. Finally, the evidence suggests that successful and expansionary fiscal contractions are not the result of accompanying expansionary monetary policy or exchange rate devaluations.     

Similar financial models： Are they free lunches？

In recent years, the academic and practical circles have paid so much attention to similar financial models because they generated a miracle in GOME （Gome Electrical Appliances Holding Limited） and SUNING （Suning Appliance Co., Ltd.） respectively. But what＇s the influence of such a model on corporate profitability and risk？ Are similar financial models free lunches？ To seek for the answers to the above questions, in this paper, we take Gree （GREE Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai）, Midea （Guangdong Midea Electric Appliances Co. Ltd. Stores） and GOME for examples to carry out a comprehensive and in depth financial analysis. The conclusions of this paper are： The company with similar financial characteristics has higher profitability and risk level; Only the companies which meet special requirements need or can implement such a model and the identification and control of hidden risk can guarantee its success.