Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

Incentive Effects of Rate-of-Return Regulation in Hong Kong

A recent paper published by this journal (Peles and Whittred 1996) discussed the regulatory arrangement of the Scheme of Control in Hong Kong. Instead of encouraging electric utilities to finance their assets proportionately more by equity as argued by the authors, the Scheme has in fact given them an incentive to rely on debt financing. A major incentive aspect of the Scheme lies in the formation of a development fund for making internal transfers. This development fund arrangement has provided an incentive for the two electric utilities to improve efficiency and has facilitated the expansion of the electric power industry.     

Incentive Effects of Rate-of-Return Regulation in Hong Kong: Reply

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

Competitive Neutrality in Access Pricing

This article examines the notion of competitive neutrality when setting access prices for vertically integrated bottleneck networks. In contrast to the claims of regulated firms (for example, Telstra), it is not possible to argue that access charges that involve unit prices in excess of short‐run marginal cost reflect competitive neutrality. That is, we demonstrate that in general models of downstream oligopoly, upstream prices that differ from marginal cost are not competitively neutral in the sense of placing integrated and non‐integrated firms on an equal basis.     

互联网接入价格机制研究

互联网“俱乐部”产品、外部性的两面性等特征导致了网络拥塞出现的可能性。在互联网基础设施巨额固定投资的压力下,利用价格手段来实现有限网络资源的有效配置,成为目前比较可行的方法。文章通过提出基于差别产品的两部定价机制为解决网络拥塞问题构建一种简单和有效的价格体系。在垄断竞争市场下,这种定价体系不但可以实现网络外部效用的内部化,同时也能够增进社会福利。     

Priority Network Access Pricing for Electric Power

We propose a priority-pricing scheme for zonal access to the electric power grid that is uniform across all buses in a zone. The independent system operator (ISO) charges bulk power traders a per unit ex ante transmission access fee. The zonal access fee serves as an access insurance premium that entitles a bulk power trader to either physical injection of one unit of energy or a compensation payment. The access fee per MWh depends on the injection zone and a self-selected strike price that serves as an insurance deductible that determines the scheduling priority of the insured transaction and the compensation level in case of curtailment. Inter-zonal transactions are charged (or credited) with an additional ex post congestion fee equal to the differences in zonal spot prices. The compensation for curtailed transactions equals the difference between the realized zonal spot price and the selected strike price (deductible level). The ISO manages congestion so as to minimize net compensation payments and thus, curtailment probabilities increase with strike price and for any particular strike price may vary from bus to bus. We calculate the rational expectations equilibrium for three-, four- and six-node systems and demonstrate that the efficiency losses of the proposed second best scheme relative to the efficient dispatch solutions are modest.     

Incentive Regulation and Efficient Pricing

Abstract ** :  One objective of introducing incentive regulation to the newly privatized UK utilities over the past 20 years was to encourage efficient pricing structures. Caps have been imposed on average price levels, giving firms freedom to rebalance amongst prices within the basket. We test how firms have responded to the incentives within such discretion through an extensive review of the relative prices charged within UK price capped industries. We find surprisingly little response to these incentives, suggesting that strategic behaviour dominates short‐term profit incentives even after the introduction or threat of competition .     

Ramsey Pricing and Environmental Regulation

The optimal pricing rule for public enterprises maximizing welfare under a profit constraint is well known. The paper extends the analysis to the case of production externalities and considers price regulation under various forms of environmental regulation which is assumed to be performed by a separate environmental agency. The modified Ramsey prices depend on the institutional setting. If the enterprise is liable for the damages it causes the externality is fully internalized. If an environmental tax is imposed the way its revenue is spent turns out to be crucial. The connection to Pigouvian taxes under imperfect competition is illuminated.     

有限理性监管、初步询价和IPO定价效率

在询价机制中加入初步询价阶段是我国累计投标询价机制区别于国际通行做法的主要特征。作为定价源头,初步询价为定价提供了最重要信息。本文从询价规则本身合理性出发,研究了初步询价在定价程序中的关键作用。研究发现,监管者的有限理性导致询价规则本身存在缺陷;由初步询价得到的初始价格区间主要受到询价家数、筹资额和市场整体回报影响,研究结果不同于成熟市场的结论;由于询价规则存在歧视性分配机制缺失、发行价受到控制和初步询价报价无有效约束等缺陷,初步询价没有改善定价效率。     

Pricing and Access under National Competition Policy: The Case of the Natural Gas Pipeline Sector

This paper reviews the development of open access and deregulation of trunk pipeline natural gas transportation in Australia and the United States. It investigates Australian policy developments in the setting of reference tariffs for firm service, but argues that the institutional arrangements for granting third party access, and the pricing of that access on a spot or interruptible basis, are at least as important as tariffs for firm service. The paper concludes that, in the absence of an established pipeline network, pipelines may have little incentive to price their excess capacity efficiently. In this case, attempts to promote an efficient allocative outcome through privatisation and open access in Australia are unlikely to be as successful as they have been in North America.     

供应商规模、产品差异与通道费定价策略

传统理论对通道费的解释是大型零售商相对于供应商所具有的市场势力,本文借助双边市场的分析框架,将大型零售商视为一个为供应商和消费者提供交易服务的平台厂商,通过向双方分别收取通道费和零售加价来获得利润。用户数量和交叉网络外部性是影响大型零售商利润和通道费定价策略的重要因素,产品差异对交叉网络外部性的强弱有重要影响,通道费的高低则与供应商的规模与市场份额密切关系。     

Price-Cap Regulation and Inefficiency in Relative Pricing

The allocative efficiency properties of three price-cap schemes are compared. The scheme that uses lagged quantities in the price index and has a fixed cap works well when the firm is myopic but generates inefficient relative prices otherwise. With myopia prices are efficient and welfare is higher than with equal pricing, but the gain to the firm comes at the expense of lower consumer surplus. When the firm is not myopic pricing can be so inefficient that steady-state welfare is below the no-regulation level.     

Pricing incentives under price-cap regulation

In many price-cap regulation plans, such as those of AT&T and British Telecom, a weighted average of the prices for multiple services (baskets) must not exceed a specified level. This analysis demonstrates that the weighting scheme most commonly employed is subject to intertemporal manipulation. This investigation provides specific demand conditions under which weight manipulation can arise, shows the manipulation to reduce social welfare, and proposes a simple alternative weighting scheme that is less prone to manipulation. The alternative weighting scheme can help in designing more effective price-cap plans, especially if new plans have longer terms than current ones.     

网络产业Ramsey接入定价方法研究

网络产业放松规制、引入竞争的改革使得上游"瓶颈"环节和下游竞争性环节出现了"业务分离",催生了接入问题,并成为网络产业规制改革能否成功和有效竞争的关键.通过对用于指导网络产业单向接入定价的Ramsey接入定价方法的研究,得出结论:短期内,将接入服务和最终产品无差别对待的做法可能遭受到较大的实阻碍,从而整体最高价格上限规制的实施显得不太可能.因此,比较现实的做法是,在接入服务市场上,允许在位企业实施两部制(或多部制)接入定价方法.     

Pricing Discretion and Price Regulation in Competitive Industries

Price capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative) constrains the captive prices relatively to the competitive ones. Under the Relative regime, captive prices are only weakly lower and competitive prices are always higher than under the Absolute regime. However, the number of competitors and/or their output may be higher under the Relative regime. While the effects on aggregate welfare are ambiguous, there is some evidence that the Relative regime is more likely to increase consumers’ surplus and social welfare the more efficient are the competitors.     

论瓶颈垄断下的接入规制

自然垄断产业引入竞争后,瓶颈垄断厂商的拒绝接入是一种典型的策略性行为,它意在维护纵向一体化垄断、限制下游市场竞争.而行政垄断势力对瓶颈垄断的支持,则会使拒绝接入进一步固化.理论分析表明,拒绝接入会导致自然垄断产业下游竞争性市场关闭和市场化改革倒退,因此需要以接入规制来促进竞争.由于转型期的瓶颈垄断还具有深厚的行政垄断体制基础,因此接入规制的有效性还仰仗于打破政企不分式的行政垄断.     

Access charges under two-tier pricing

This article analyzes the regulation of access charges in a liberalized postal market where operators use two-tier pricing. It develops a model of vertical product differentiation that allows determination of the demand for First and Second Class mail from an incumbent postal operator and a group of entrants. The optimal access charges for First and Second Class letters are determined as well as the optimal quality for these services.      

Optimal Pricing and Price-Cap Regulation in the Postal Sector

This paper studies the optimal price structure in the postal sector when worksharing is available (e.g., for collection, sorting and transportation) and when the operator faces a break-even constraint. Users differ in opportunity and cost to engage in worksharing. We determine the optimal worksharing discount and provide sufficient conditions (on demand functions) under which it exceeds the ECPR level. Furthermore, we show that the optimal prices can be implemented through a global price cap imposed on a weighted average of the prices of all products. The appropriate weights are proportional to the market demand (evaluated at optimal prices) of the corresponding products.