Public initiatives to support entrepreneurs: Credit guarantees versus co-funding

We analyze financial support for the entrepreneurial sector. State support can raise welfare by relaxing financial constraints, but it can also reduce lending standards if entrepreneurs substitute public sources of collateral for their own assets, if it encourages excessive entrepreneurial entry, or if it undermines bank monitoring incentives. We derive a “pecking order” for support schemes: support funds should be channeled first to credit guarantee schemes and then, when entrepreneurs start to substitute public for private collateral, to co-funding entrepreneurial projects. The optimal level of credit guarantee is diminishing in the costs of incentivising bank monitoring. We show in an extension that the long-term effect of public subsidies may be to impair the private sector’s initiative to uncover cost savings.     

Reputational contagion and optimal regulatory forbearance

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank's failure may undermine confidence in the banking regulator's competence, and, hence, in other banks chartered by the same regulator. As a result, depositors withdraw funds from otherwise unconnected banks. The optimal regulatory response to this behavior can be privately to exhibit forbearance to a failing bank. We show that regulatory transparency improves confidence ex ante but impedes regulators' ability to stem panics ex post.     

Incorporating Collateral Value Uncertainty in Loss Given Default Estimates and Loan-to-value Ratios

We present a model of risky debt in which collateral value is correlated with the possibility of default. The model is then used to study the expected loss given default, primarily as a function of collateral. The results obtained could prove useful for estimating losses given default in many popular models of credit risk which assume them constant. We also examine the problem of determining sufficient collateral to secure a loan to a desired extent. In addition to bank practitioners, regulators might find our analysis useful in reviewing banks’ lending standards relative to current collateral values. In particular, the current proposals for The New (Basel) Capital Accord involve options for the use of banks’ own loss given default estimates which might benefit from the analysis in this paper.     

Does collateral fuel moral hazard in banking?

This paper presents two models in which the fluctuating value of loan collateral (real estate) generates the problem of moral hazard between a bank and a deposit insurance agent. The bank finances risky projects against collateral and relies on the rising collateral value. If the collateral value later appreciates, the bank enjoys handsome profits; otherwise, the bank fails. The findings are rather consistent with the characteristics of the topical subprime mortgage crisis.     

Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's SME Loan Market

This paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in Japan's SME loan market. We find that firms' riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used. We find, however, that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively and that borrowers who have a long-term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral. These findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank's seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring. This incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees.     

Real estate prices and bank stability

Real estate prices can deviate from their fundamental value due to rigid supply, heterogeneity in quality, and various market imperfections, which have two contrasting effects on bank stability. Higher prices increase the value of collateral and net wealth of borrowers and thus reduce the likelihood of credit defaults. In contrast, persistent deviations from fundamentals may foster the adverse selection of increasingly risky creditors by banks seeking to expand their loan portfolios, which increases bank distress probabilities. We test these hypotheses using unique data on real estate markets and banks in Germany. House price deviations contribute to bank instability, but nominal house price developments do not. This finding corroborates the importance of deviations from the fundamental value of real estate, rather than just price levels or changes alone, when assessing bank stability.     

(In)Efficient Interbank Networks

We study the efficiency properties of the formation of an interbank network. Banks face a trade-off by establishing connections in the interbank market. On the one hand, banks improve the diversification of their liquidity risk and therefore can obtain a higher expected payoff. On the other hand, banks not sufficiently capitalized have risk-shifting incentives that expose them to the risk of bankruptcy. Connecting to such risky banks negatively affects expected payoff. We show that both the optimal and the decentralized networks are characterized by a core-periphery structure. The core is made of the safe banks, whereas the periphery is populated by the risky banks. Nevertheless, the two network structures coincide only if counterparty risk is sufficiently low. Otherwise, the decentralized network is underconnected as compared to the optimal one. Finally, we analyze mechanisms that can avoid the formation of inefficient interbank networks.     

Banks' Use of Accounting Discretion and Regulatory Intervention: The Case of European Banks' Impairments on Greek Government Bonds

This paper analyzes troubled banks' use of accounting discretion and its interaction with regulatory intervention in a time of financial distress. We analyze impairment losses that Europe's largest banks recognized on Greek Government Bonds (GGB) during 2011, the time during which GGB were considered impaired. Our findings reveal considerable variation in the impairment ratios across banks. Banks with larger GGB exposures, for which a full impairment would deplete a large share of regulatory capital, recognize significantly lower impairment ratios. Furthermore, we find that troubled banks delay full impairments until state aid is provided. Troubled banks recognize significantly lower impairment ratios in the quarter before they are provided with state aid, but substantially increase their impairment ratios afterwards. This pattern is consistent with the notion that troubled banks initially understate impairments to conceal the full extent of their financial difficulties from less sophisticated non-regulator outsiders (e.g., depositors and the general public), which increases regulators' ability to practice forbearance by not intervening immediately.     

Institutions and Bank Behavior: Legal Environment,Legal Perception,and the Composition of Bank Lending

This paper explores how the legal environment affects bank behavior in 20 transition economies. Based on a newly constructed data set we find that banks’ loan portfolio composition depends on the legal environment. If banks operate in a well‐functioning legal environment they lend relatively more to SMEs and provide more mortgages. On the other hand, banks lend more to large enterprises and to the government if the legal system is unsound. As a transmission channel we identify the banks’ willingness to accept collateral which depends on the bankers’ perceptions of the prevailing laws regarding collateral.     

Corporate leverage and the collateral channel

We investigate whether and how corporate leverage depends on the structure of corporate assets. Based on a large panel dataset of US firms from 1990 to 2010, we show that property, plant and equipment are important drivers of the collateral channel, while inventories and receivables are less important. The collateral channel is more pronounced for firms that have to rely on banks and trade creditors to raise debt finance, but it has become weaker for these firms after the start of the financial crisis. Our study provides new evidence on the cross-sectional and time-varying importance of the collateral channel for corporate leverage.     

Commitment, banks and markets

We examine how banks and financial markets interact with one another to provide liquidity to investors. The critical assumption is that financial markets are characterized by limited enforcement of contracts, and in the event of default only a fraction of borrowers’ assets can be seized. Limited enforcement reduces the fraction of assets that can be used as collateral and thus individuals subject to liquidity shocks face borrowing constraints. We show how banks endogenously overcome these borrowing constraints by pooling resources across several depositors, and increase the liquidity provided by financial markets.     

Charter value,minimum bank capital requirement and deposit insurance pricing in equilibrium

This paper shows that leaving insolvent banks with large enough charter values open can be optimal and derives normative bank closure/reorganization policies based on the liquidation value of assets and the charter value. The charter value of a bank is broadly defined as the value that would be foregone due to a closure. Our simulations of risk taking show that an optimal forbearance for an insolvent bank with a large enough charter value alleviates the moral hazard problem. This is because increasing the risk raises the probability of losing the charter value, although it generates a moral hazard gain.     

Regulating a model

We study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them. A bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator. The regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank, but in equilibrium, monitoring induces the bank to produce less information. We show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank’s private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. When public models are more precise, banks produce more information, but the regulator may end up monitoring more.     

Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads

Deteriorating public finances around the world raise doubts about countries’ abilities to bail out their largest banks. For an international sample of banks, this paper investigates the impact of bank size and government deficits on bank stock prices and CDS spreads. We find that a bank’s market-to-book value is negatively related to the size of its liabilities-to-GDP ratio, especially in countries running large public deficits. CDS spreads appear to decrease with stronger public finances. These results suggest that systemically important banks can increase their value by downsizing or splitting up, especially if they are located in countries with weak public finances. We document that banks’ average liabilities-to-GDP ratio reached a peak in 2007 before a significant drop in 2008, which could reflect these private incentives to downsize.     

Effect of collateral characteristics on bank performance: Evidence from collateralized stocks in Taiwan

Taiwanese law requires directors of listed firms to disclose their stocks collateralized at banks creating the possibility of examining the characteristics of collateralized stocks and their influence on bank performance. This study demonstrates that the risk (value) attributes of collateralized stocks increase (reduce) bank efficiency yet reduce (increase) bank profits. Government-owned banks but not private banks require sufficiently high margins to prevent stock loans from non-performing. Furthermore, banks charge higher interest to cover the non-performing risk. Directors who lack funds, hold high turnover stocks, and/or have weak relationships with their banks prefer to collateralize their stocks at private banks.     

Bank size, lending technologies, and small business finance

Under the current paradigm in small business lending research, large banks tend to specialize in lending to relatively large, informationally transparent firms using “hard” information, while small banks have advantages in lending to smaller, less transparent firms using “soft” information. We go beyond this paradigm to analyze the comparative advantages of large and small banks in specific lending technologies. Our analysis begins with the identification of fixed-asset lending technologies used to make small business loans. Our results suggest that large banks do not have equal advantages in all of these hard lending technologies and these advantages are not all increasing monotonically in firm size, contrary to the predictions of the current paradigm. We also analyze lines of credit without fixed-asset collateral to focus on relationship lending. We confirm that small banks have a comparative advantage in relationship lending, but this appears to be strongest for lending to the largest firms.     

Forbearance: An empirical analysis

Several recent articles have analyzed conditions under which allowing capital-deficient banks to continue to operate may be optimal policy. This article examines the performance of banks admitted into the FDIC's Capital Forbearance Program between 1986 and 1989 and finds that, for the majority of these banks, there was no substantial improvement in their capital ratios. We use a logit regression analysis to attempt to identify those banks whose financial condition improved with forbearance and find that banks which did improve are not clearly identifiable from pre-forbearance financial data. Instead, the banks which improved did so due to infusions of new capital, extraordinary income, and improvements in the local economies, factors which are not easily identifiable ex ante by regulators. The conclusion is that, while some grants of forbearance may result in large saving to the FDIC, in the majority of cases granting forbearance to troubled banks is unlikely to reduce the expected loss to the deposit insurer.University of HoustonUniversity of HoustonCooperative Bank of Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan     

Banks’ intraday liquidity management during operational outages: Theory and evidence from the UK payment system

We investigate how settlement banks in the United Kingdom’s large-value payment system deal with intraday liquidity and operational risk. In particular, we are interested in payments behaviour towards a bank that is, for operational reasons, unable to make but able to receive payments. If other banks did not sufficiently monitor their outgoing payments, these operational shocks could impact the entire payment system because the affected bank could absorb liquidity from the system. Our game-theoretic model predicts that only early in the day, when they are uncertain about the payment instructions they might have to execute, banks stop sending payments to a counterparty which is unable to make payments. Using a non-parametric method, we find that this prediction is supported by the data, implying that banks effectively contain the disruption caused by the operational outage: payment flows between healthy banks remain unaffected.