Cross‐border Lobbying in Preferential Trading Agreements: Implications for External Tariffs and Welfare

This paper examines the effect of cross‐border lobbying on domestic lobbying and on external tariffs in both Customs Union (CU) and Free Trade Area (FTA). We do so by developing a two‐stage game which endogenizes the tariff formation function in a political economic model of the directly unproductive rent‐seeking activities type. We find that cross‐border lobbying un‐ambiguously increases both domestic lobbying and the equilibrium common external tariffs in a CU. The same result also holds for FTA provided tariffs for the member governments are strategic complements. We also develop a specific oligopolistic model of FTA and show that tariffs are indeed strategic complements in such a model.     

Quality of Governance and the Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements

This paper investigates economic and political factors which explain the presence or absence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). A model of three countries with imperfect competition markets is employed for theoretical analysis of political economy. The validity of theoretical results is tested by econometric analysis with a logit model. It is shown that countries with similar incomes are more likely to form PTAs, and that governments with low quality of governance have little incentive to form PTAs.     

Preferential Trade and Welfare with Differentiated Products

We consider analytically and numerically the welfare tradeoffs inherent in a preferential trade area (PTA) with products differentiated by region of origin. For a small open economy in such a setting, welfare gains are associated with higher trade volumes within the PTA. However, welfare losses are induced by declining tariff revenues on trade with non‐member countries. We show that both effects are concave, while one is a non‐monotonic and the other a potentially non‐monotonic function of pre‐PTA partner trade shares. Therefore, the relationship between initial partner import shares and direct static welfare impacts of a PTA are theoretically ambiguous. This finding contrasts with conventional results in the homogeneous‐goods case, whereby the smaller is the pre‐agreement trade volume with a potential partner the more beneficial is a PTA.     

Bilateral versus Multilateral Free Trade Agreements: A Welfare Analysis

Why is a proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain types of countries observed instead of progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA? This paper answers this question by exploring the enforceability of different types of FTAs through comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an infinitely repeated game framework. The authors search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under different conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, differences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which is shown to be the first‐best solution to the maximization problem of global welfare.     

The Welfare Synergy of Bundling International Environmental Agreements with International Trade Treaties

This paper examines whether linking environmental cooperation with international trade agreements improves the welfare of the participating countries and allows countries to move closer to free trade compared with trade‐only agreements. The model is an infinitely repeated game with the threat of reversion to Nash equilibrium if an economy deviates from the cooperative agreement. It is found that such a synergy exists in a symmetric two‐country model with two goods, both emitting pollutants even when the externalities have local impact. A combination of analytic and numerical simulation analysis is used to derive the conclusions.     

Oligopsony Distortions and Welfare Implications of Trade*

While imperfect competition in the output market has garnered extensive focus in the new trade theory literature, input market imperfection has received considerably less attention. Since market power in input purchase has been growing in recent years, it is worth examining the welfare implications of trade arising from oligopsony power. We develop a model consisting of two final goods, one intermediate good, and two primary factors (capital and labor). One final good and the intermediate good employ primary factors, whereas the other final good uses labor and the intermediate input. All markets operate under perfect competition except for the intermediate input, which is oligopsonistic. Using this model, we show that oligopsony can lead to some anomalies such as an increase in the oligopsony output, reward to the intensive‐factor in the oligopsony sector, national welfare, and deterioration of terms of trade, but it always decreases the reward to the intermediate input.     

Partial Free Trade Agreements and Economic Welfare: Reconsidering GATT Article 24

This paper generalizes the Kemp–Wan theorem on the customs union to cover partial and incomplete free trade agreements emerging all over the world and elucidates the conditions which ensure that they are potentially conducive to the economic welfare of member countries without harming the rest of the world. In the light of this generalization, it also reconsiders two well‐known conditions stipulated in Article 24 of the GATT required for the formation of FTAs.     

Small Countries and Preferential Trade Agreements: How Severe is the Innocent Bystander Problem?

In this paper the welfare implications of preferential trade agreements (PTA) are examined from the perspective of small countries in the context of a multi-country general equilibrium model. We calibrate our model to represent one relatively small country and two symmetric big countries. We consider two cases. In one case, the small country is an 'innocent bystander', that is, it is left out of a PTA between the two large countries. In the second case, the small country signs a PTA with one of the large countries. We simulate the model and calculate consumption allocations, prices, trade volume, and tariffs in these two cases considering three different equilibria: free trade (FT), free trade association (FTA) and customs union (CU). We find that free trade is the best outcome for the small country. If the large country PTA takes the form of a CU then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is very large. If it is an FTA then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is relatively modest. In fact, the small country prefers to be an 'innocent bystander' to being a member of an FTA with one of the large countries.     

Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?

In many preferential trade agreements (PTAs), countries exchange not only reductions in trade barriers but also cooperation in non-trade issues such as labour and environmental standards, intellectual property, etc. We provide a model of PTAs motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues and analyse its implications for global free trade and welfare. We find that such PTAs increase the cost of multilateral tariff reductions and thus cause a stumbling block to global free trade. This occurs because multilateral tariff reductions decrease the threat that can be used in PTAs and thus the surplus that can be extracted from them. By explicitly modelling the interaction between preferential and multilateral negotiations, we derive a testable prediction and provide novel econometric evidence that supports the model's key prediction. The welfare analysis shows that the current World Trade Organization rules allowing this type of PTAs may be optimal for economically large countries, thus the model can predict the rules we observe. We also analyse alternative rules that constitute a Pareto improvement.     

Tax Policies,Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment: A Welfare Analysis

In this paper, we develop a partial equilibrium three‐country model to examine the relationship between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in an environment with double taxation. Our analysis shows that FDI is welfare‐improving for at least one or both of the two regional countries if wage asymmetry is significantly large. FDI and an RTA are also welfare‐improving for the high‐wage country and the region if the wage differential is not small. We also examine the role of repatriation taxes in affecting the determination of firm location under an RTA. Our results suggest that the signing of an RTA may induce relocation from the high‐wage country to the low‐wage country unless an increase in the repatriation tax rate also occurs.     

Trade Agreements as Self-Protection

Risks that are associated with an uncertain trading world have been dealt with using two different techniques in the literature: defensive, or insurance approaches, and preventive, or self‐protection approaches. Much of the earlier work centered on security issues but with the end of the Cold War attention turned toward preventive approaches. This paper argues that the incentive for loss prevention leads to some form of cooperative regional integration. Inclusion of uncertainty positively contributes to the overall customs union literature. The optimal level of integration, political or economic, is found and then simple comparative statics are used to discern the effects of some changes in the underlying parameters of the economy on that optimal level of integration. Multilateralism and regionalism are concluded to be complements.     

Trade Agreements in the Shadow of Lobbying

This paper presents a model of international trade agreements in which the executive branches of each government negotiate agreements while the legislative branches, subject to political pressure from firms, can disrupt them. Lobbying is in the style of Grossman and Helpman's ‘Protection for Sale’ model with a new feature: all actors face uncertainty arising from the complexity of the legislative process. I demonstrate that the higher the executives set tariffs in a trade agreement, the less effort lobbies put forth to prevent its ratification. Thus trade agreements act as a domestic political commitment device: executives set relatively high tariffs to discourage lobbying and increase the chance that the agreement will be ratified. The model sheds light on the empirical puzzle surrounding governments’ welfare weights in the Grossman and Helpman model and provides a new explanation for failures to ratify trade agreements.     

Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade

We studied how the pursuit of bilateral free‐trade agreements (FTAs) affects the likelihood of achieving multilateral free trade. We derive and compare the stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization: in the FTA game, each country can either form an FTA with one of its trading partners or both of them or none of them, whereas in the (restricted) No FTA game, purely bilateral FTAs are not permitted. The major result is that there exist circumstances under which the freedom to pursue (discriminatory) bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving multilateral free trade.     

移民网络、国际贸易与区域贸易协定

本文从移民网络的角度探讨了区域贸易协定(FTA)缔结的动因问题,提出并证明了"移民网络促进FTA缔结"这一假说,并发现移民网络因素的加入可以将既有FTA缔结动因相关研究的模型预测准确率提升约4%,具有重要的意义。进一步的机制检验发现,移民网络主要通过促进双边贸易流来提升两国FTA的签订概率,表现为"移民网络—国际贸易—FTA缔结"这一核心发生机制。本文拓展性的细化研究还发现,无论从时间趋势或FTA缔结数量而言,移民网络对FTA缔结所起到的促进作用都呈现出边际递减规律;"移民网络—国际贸易—FTA缔结"机制在"南-北"国家对组合中会得到增强,但在"北-北"国家对组合中的表现较弱。本文的结论意味着,移民网络是发展中国家参与区域经济合作的重要资源,在当前贸易自由化多边进程受阻、逆全球化思潮涌动、国际秩序和规则面临重塑的背景下,充分发挥和利用"移民红利",对我国FTA战略的推进及世界FTA领域"中国范本"的探索有重要意义。     

Why are Trade Agreements Regional?

This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries a familiar problem of coordination failure occurs, giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, regional trade agreements generate larger rent‐shifting effects than nonregional agreements. Countries use these effects to coordinate on a unique equilibrium.     

Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying

This paper assesses the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. The assessment is based on a model in which external tariffs and the decision to form an FTA are endogenously determined. The findings demonstrate that, in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country, an FTA may initiate an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non‐member countries. Further, this study finds that a foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare‐reducing trade‐diverting FTA. Finally, this paper shows that an FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare‐improving multilateral trade liberalization.     

Gradualism in Trade Agreements with Asymmetric Countries

This paper uses recursive methods to characterize the payoff frontier of self–enforcing trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size. We show that at points on the frontier where only one country&'s incentive constraint binds, the efficient agreement will be a non–stationary one that starts with a positive trade distortion but eventually reaches free trade. Our analysis illustrates how (i) relative country size, (ii) consumption smoothing incentives, and (iii) sunk investments affect the form of efficient trade agreements. In contrast to previous work on gradualism, our results are obtained from a model in which the economic environment is stationary.     

Networks of Free Trade Agreements among Heterogeneous Countries

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements as a network formation game. We consider an n‐country model in which international trade occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. In each country, the labor market is either unionized or non‐unionized. We show that, if all countries are non‐unionized, the global free trade network is both the unique pairwise stable network and the unique efficient network. If all countries are unionized, the global free trade network is pairwise stable and the unique efficient network among the class of symmetric networks. If some countries are unionized while others are non‐unionized, other networks apart from the global free trade network may be pairwise stable. However, the efficient network is still the global free trade network. Thus, a conflict between stability and efficiency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously profitable deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.     

International Trade, Regional Free Trade Agreements, and Economic Development

In 1991, Krugman illustrated that natural (regional) free trade agreements (FTAs) are likely to be welfare-enhancing if intercontinental costs are prohibitively high, but are likely to be welfare-reducing if such costs are zero. In 1995, Frankel, Stein and Wei extended the analysis to consider positive but nonprohibitive transport costs. This paper extends these models to allow for countries of different economic size. Large countries will tend to have higher relative wages, influencing the relative gains and losses from natural FTAs. For even modest differences in size, intracontinental FTAs are welfare-enhancing for larger countries, regardless of strong preferences for diversity or low intercontinental transport costs.