试述债转股动作中的问题与政策建议

文章指出债转股运作中存在着道德风险，企业对股权回购压力大把握小，分离企业办社会职能和安置富余人员困难大，债转股不能解决企业和银行的所有问题，针对所存在的问题提出了明确主体目标，完善资产管理公司的职能建立有效的激励约束机制，积极拓宽股权退出通道及大力发展中介机构并加强信息披露等政策建议。     

Predictive regressions with time-varying coefficients

We evaluate predictive regressions that explicitly consider the time-variation of coefficients in a comprehensive Bayesian framework. For monthly returns of the S&P 500 index, we demonstrate statistical as well as economic evidence of out-of-sample predictability: relative to an investor using the historic mean, an investor using our methodology could have earned consistently positive utility gains (between 1.8% and 5.8% per year over different time periods). We also find that predictive models with constant coefficients are dominated by models with time-varying coefficients. Finally, we show a strong link between out-of-sample predictability and the business cycle.     

我国股票型开放式基金赎回风险研究

本文根据我国资本市场的变化,创造性地将我国股票型基金的发展区分为两个不同阶段,通过建立平行数据模型对其赎回风险影响因素及其效果进行对比研究。实证研究发现：（1）投资者更偏好成立时间短的基金;（2）基金的“赎回异象”更容易发生在证券市场行情好的时候;（3）分红确实起到了阻止投资者赎回的目的。     

银行外源增资、资产负债表调整与风险承担行为*

本文构建了一个简洁的资本动态核算框架,并对中国543家商业银行各年外源增资规模进行了系统测算。在此基础上,通过检验银行外源资本补充后的资产负债表动态调整过程,发现银行增资背景下的资产负债表扩张路径符合调整成本约束下的价值最大化行为特征。由于贷款业务调整成本的存在,银行增资所带来的资产负债扩张空间短期内难以由新增贷款完全填补,金融与同业业务发挥了“资金蓄水池”功能,在中长期逐步释放资金以支持银行扩张贷款业务和进行主动风险承担。本文的分析提供的启示如下：银行补充资本后,金融及同业业务扮演了流动性蓄积的角色,短期内其规模的增加并不单纯意味着“资金空转”;银行资产负债表的扩张最终会反映在贷款业务规模及主动风险承担水平的增加上,政策着力点应聚焦于缩短银行调整时滞。     

利率互换能否成为企业借贷的工具?——以法律分析为视角

随着利率互换市场的不断发展,通过对标准利率互换协议中的条款进行变化,市场创造出了非标准的利率互换交易模式。一些市场参与者尝试通过非标准利率互换交易组合用于企业间资金借贷,偏离了利率互换交易的基本功能,有违监管要求,同时违反了法律强制性规定,应当否定其法律效力。资金借贷有资金借贷的合法途径,利率互换不能成为借贷工具。     

Simple formulas for standard errors that cluster by both firm and time

When estimating finance panel regressions, it is common practice to adjust standard errors for correlation either across firms or across time. These procedures are valid only if the residuals are correlated either across time or across firms, but not across both. This paper shows that it is very easy to calculate standard errors that are robust to simultaneous correlation along two dimensions, such as firms and time. The covariance estimator is equal to the estimator that clusters by firm, plus the estimator that clusters by time, minus the usual heteroskedasticity-robust ordinary least squares (OLS) covariance matrix. Any statistical package with a clustering command can be used to easily calculate these standard errors.     

外商直接投资后向关联效应的经验分析——基于我国制造业的研究

测定外商直接投资对东道国经济(尤其是发展中国家经济)的影响,一直以来都是一个重要的研究方向,但从行业和企业角度进行分析的国内文献很少。本文以我国外资相对集中的制造业为例,对我国制造业1996至2005年15部门的面板数据进行回归分析,对比外商直接投资进入我国制造业所产生的竞争效应和后向关联效应,得出外商直接投资的竞争效应并不明显,然而其通过后向关联效应促进我国制造业的发展。     

基于Klein资本开放模型的实证研究及其对中国的启示

对于资本项目开放这一热点问题,Klein(2003)所建立的模型为研究指明了方向,该模型强调了资本开放对经济增长的影响受本国国情因素的制约。本文在原模型思想的基础上,采用面板数据分析方法研究了资本开放的动态过程,并以和中国国情相似的拉美和亚洲一些发展中国家为样本,使结果对我国的资本项目开放更有意义。最后针对我国目前的国情,结合实证分析结果,给出对我国资本项目开放的一点建议。     

Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts

We present a possible explanation for the lack of permanenceof the very high levels of concentration of ownership that accompanyleveraged buyouts. We first argue that some diffusion of ownershipcan be beneficial to the shareholders of a firm by encouragingthe employees of the firm to enter into implicit contracts withthe firm. The level of concentration of ownership that maximizesfirm value is therefore that which trades off the well-knowngains from monitoring with the gains from implicit contracting.We then argue that, in the process of concentrating the ownershipof a firm that has excessively diffuse ownership to a levelthat maximizes firm value, investors in leveraged buyouts willchoose an initial level of concentration of ownership that isvery high. They will do so in order to put pressure on managersto breach existing implicit contracts. Following the breachof these contracts, investors will decrease the level of concentrationof ownership to the level that maximizes firm value. There willbe no further breach of implicit contracts, for such breachis incidental to the transformation of the firm from one thathas excessively diffuse ownership to one that has the optimallevel of diffusion of ownership. No change in the concentrationof ownership therefore occurs once the level of diffusion ofownership that maximizes firm value has been attained. JEL Classification:G30.     

Monitoring, Implicit Contracting, and the Lack of Permanence of Leveraged Buyouts

We present a possible explanation for the lack ofpermanence of the very high levels ofconcentration of ownership that accompany leveraged buyouts. Wefirst argue that some diffusion of ownership can be beneficial to theshareholders of a firm by encouraging the employees of the firm toenter into implicit contracts with the firm. The level of concentrationof ownership that maximizes firm value is therefore that whichtrades off the well-known gains from monitoring with the gains fromimplicit contracting. We then argue that, in the process ofconcentrating the ownership of a firm that has excessively diffuseownership to a level that maximizes firm value, investors inleveraged buyouts will choose an initial level of concentration ofownership that is very high. They will do so in order to put pressureon managers to breach existing implicit contracts. Following thebreach of these contracts, investors will decrease the level ofconcentration of ownership to the level that maximizes firm value.There will be no further breach of implicit contracts, for such breachis incidental to the transformation of the firm from one that hasexcessively diffuse ownership to one that has the optimal level ofdiffusion of ownership. No change in the concentration of ownershiptherefore occurs once the level of diffusion of ownership thatmaximizes firm value has been attained.     

小额信贷缓减农村贫困的效用研究——基于面板模型的分析

缓减贫困一直是政府面临的重要问题,也是政府经济发展的重要目标。基于2003~2011年中国26个省市的统计数据,运用面板模型定量研究农村小额信贷缓解农村贫困的效应。结果表明：小额信贷具有显著的减贫效应,其降低农村绝对贫困的程度效应要大于降低农村贫困人口相对收入短缺和收入不平等程度的效应。为了更好地发挥小额信贷缓减贫困的效应,应进一步放开小额信贷发展的约束成分,改进贫困农户贷款评级授信的方式,提高小额信贷缓减贫困的精确度。     

Is competition beneficial? The case of exchange traded funds

New ETF creation has surged in recent years, giving investors the option to choose from a wide range of similar ETFs within each group of competitors. We identify groups of ETFs that can be considered direct competitors and examine the impact of competition on their market quality. Results show improved market quality measures when competition increases. A change equivalent to going from a monopoly to a highly competitive market results in a 29% decrease in bid–ask spreads, a 72% decrease in illiquidity, and a 52% increase in turnover. However, we find that competition has a differential impact on ETFs according to their market depth. Market quality improves with competition for large or well-performing ETFs, while it worsens for small or under-performing ETFs. A case study on ETFs banned by the SEC in March 2010 further highlights our results in the artificially controlled competitive environment of the moratorium.     

中国区域宏观税负收敛性分析

利用面板数据方法研究了分税制以来中国区域宏观税负收敛性问题,结果发现在1994—2004年整个时期,我国地区之间宏观税负呈现收敛,但在2000年以后,地区宏观税负趋于发散;西部地区存在所谓的俱乐部收敛。在条件收敛回归中,城乡差距、轻工业比重和第一产业构成对区域宏观税负增长产生负面影响,而国有经济比重、城市化、经济绩效和对外贸易等则对宏观税负增长产生正向推动作用。     

金融危机背景下基金家族绩效与风险关系研究——基于面板数据模型的实证分析

以中国基金市场32家基金管理公司旗下的103只开放式偏股型基金作为样本,选择恰当的面板数据模型形式,分别建立金融危机之前、危机期间和危机之后三个时期基金家族绩效与风险关系模型,以剖析不同经济形势下两者之间的关系。结果表明,金融危机之前和危机期间基金家族绩效与风险显著负相关,而危机之后两者关系不显著,在金融危机期间和危机之后基金业绩效状况持续恶化,危机之后基金业整体风险水平降低;金融危机后,为弥补金融危机中造成的损失,各基金家族倾向于采取\"打造明星基金\"的投资策略以充分利用有限资源、提升家族整体绩效。