Structural instability of the core

Let σ be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is decisive. Let w(n,q)= 2q-n+1 and let W be a smooth ‘policy space’ of dimension w. Let U(W)^N be the space of all smooth profiles on W, endowed with the Whitney topology. It is shown that there exists an ‘instability dimension’ w^*(σ) with 2w^*(σ)w(n,q) such that:

1. (i) if ww^*(σ), and W has no boundary, then the core of σ is empty for a dense set of profiles in U(W)^N (i.e., almost always),

2. (ii) if ww^*(σ)+1, and W has a boundary, then the core of σ is empty, almost always,

3. (iii) if ww^*(σ)+1 then the cycle set is dense in W, almost always,

4. (iv) if ww^*(σ)+2 then the cycle set is also path connected, almost always.

The method of proof is first of all to show that if a point belongs to the core, then certain generalized symmetry conditions in terms of ‘pivotal’ coalitions of size 2q−n must be satisfied. Secondly, it is shown that these symmetry conditions can almost never be satisfied when either W has empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q) or when W has non-empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q)+1.     

A note on generalized wald’s method

Let {v _n(θ)} be a sequence of statistics such that whenθ =θ ₀,v _n(θ ₀) N _p(0,Σ), whereΣ is of rankp andθ εR ^d. Suppose that underθ =θ ₀, {Σ _n} is a sequence of consistent estimators ofΣ. Wald (1943) shows thatv _n ^T (θ ₀)Σ _n ⁻¹ v _n(θ ₀) x ²(p). It often happens thatv _n(θ ₀) N _p(0,Σ) holds butΣ is singular. Moore (1977) states that under certain assumptionsv _n ^T (θ ₀)Σ _n ⁻ v _n(θ ₀) x ²(k), wherek = rank (Σ) andΣ _n ⁻ is a generalized inverse ofΣ _n. However, Moore’s result as stated is incorrect. It needs the additional assumption that rank (Σ _n) =k forn sufficiently large. In this article, we show that Moore’s result (as corrected) holds under somewhat different, but easier to verify, assumptions. Research partly supported by the U.S. Army Research Office through the Mathematical Sciences Institute at Cornell University.     

A note on the decomposition (at a point) of aggregate excess demand on the Grassmannian

This paper analyzes the properties of aggregate excess demand functions for economies with an arbitrary finite set of N commodities where agents face trading restrictions of a general, abstract form: their budget set is defined by K-dimensional planes in ^N. It is shown that, if there are at least K agents in the economy, the only general property satisfied by the value of aggregate excess demand and its derivative, at any arbitrary point, is Walras Law. The result is established by considering an economy where agents' preferences are of a ‘generalized Leontief' type.     

Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies

We prove that, by the method of construction of a coalition production economy due to Sun et al. [Sun, N., Trockel, W., Yang, Z., 2008. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n$n$-person game. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, 853–860], every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Namely, for every TU game, we can construct a coalition production economy that generates the given game. We briefly discuss the relationship between the core of a given TU game and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors for the induced coalition production economy.     

A bound on the expected overshoot for some concave boundaries

LetX ₁,X ₂,… be i.i.d. with finite meanμ>0,S _n =X ₁+…+X _n . Forf(n)=n ^β ,c>0 we consider the stopping timesT _c =inf{n:S _n >c+f(n)} with overshootR _c =S _{T c} −(c+f(T _c )). For 0<β<1 we give a bound for sup _c≥0 ER _c in the spirit of Lorden’s well-known inequality forf=0.     

Solutions for cooperative games with r alternatives

We consider games with n players and r alternatives. In these games each player must choose one and only one alternative, reaching an ordered partition of the set of players. An extension of the Shapley value to this framework is studied. Received: 1 November 1997 / Accepted: 24 January 1999     

Partition ratios, Pareto optimal cake division, and related notions

We consider the problem of partitioning a ‘cake' C among n players. Various criteria have been considered for deciding whether a partition P₁,P₂,…,P_n of C, where piece P_i goes to player i, is a ‘good' partition. See, for example, Barbanel (1996) [Barbanel, J.B., 1996. Super envy-free cake division and independence of measures. J. Math. Anal. Appl. 197, 54–60] or Brams and Taylor (1996) [Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D., 1996. Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting To Dispute Resolution. Cambridge Univ. Press]. In this paper we study certain real numbers (the ‘partition ratios' of this paper's Section 2) which can be associated in a natural way with any partition. We show that various types of products of these numbers provide us with useful information about certain trades and transfers between players.     

ON THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF ORDER STATISTICS FOR A RANDOM SAMPLE SIZE*

The probability distribution of the i –th and j–th order statistics and of the range R of a sample of size n, taken from a population with probability density function f (x) have been obtained when the sample size n is a random variable N and has: (i) a generalized Poisson distribution; and (ii) a generalized negative bonimial distribution. Specific results are then obtained; (a) when f (x) is uniform over (0,1); and (b) when f(x) is exponential. All the results for N, being a Poisson, binomial and negative binomial rv follow as special cases.     

Spatial pillage game

A pillage game is a coalitional game as a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game. Players are located in regions and can travel from one region to another. The players can form a coalition and combine their power only within their destination regions, which limits the exertion of the power of each coalition. Under this spatial restriction, a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation that defines stable states in which powers among the players are endogenously balanced. With the spatial restriction, the set of stable states changes. However, if the players have forecasting ability, then the set of stable states does not change with the spatial restriction. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.     

Incorrect asymptotic size of subsampling procedures based on post-consistent model selection estimators

Subsampling and the m out of n bootstrap have been suggested in the literature as methods for carrying out inference based on post-model selection estimators and shrinkage estimators. In this paper we consider a subsampling confidence interval (CI) that is based on an estimator that can be viewed either as a post-model selection estimator that employs a consistent model selection procedure or as a super-efficient estimator. We show that the subsampling CI (of nominal level 1−α for any α(0,1)) has asymptotic confidence size (defined to be the limit of finite-sample size) equal to zero in a very simple regular model. The same result holds for the m out of n bootstrap provided m²/n→0 and the observations are i.i.d. Similar zero-asymptotic-confidence-size results hold in more complicated models that are covered by the general results given in the paper and for super-efficient and shrinkage estimators that are not post-model selection estimators. Based on these results, subsampling and the m out of n bootstrap are not recommended for obtaining inference based on post-consistent model selection or shrinkage estimators.     

Smooth preferences and the regularity of equilibria

To study equilibria we describe an economy by its distribution of consumers' preferences and endowments. All preferences are smooth and weakly convex. Demand of an economy need not be single valued, but there is an open dense set of economies for which demand is a C¹-function in a neighborhood of the equilibrium prices. We call an economy regular if its excess demand is transversal to zero. A regular economy has locally unique equilibria. It is shown that regular economies form an open dense set on which the equilibrium price correspondence varies continuously and the number of equilibria is locally constant.     

A theory of coalition formation in committees

Let G = (N,W) be a strong weighted majority game and let A be a set of alternatives. Denote by L the set of linear orders on A. A social choice function F:L^N → A is a representation of G if the simple game G¹(F) associated with F equals G. A coalition S is determining in G if it satisfies the following condition. Let F be a representation of G and let R^N ? L^N. Then, if a simple majority of the members of S consider an alternative x to be their best choice, then S can ‘enforce’ x to be a Nash equilibrium payoff in the resulting non-cooperative voting game g(F,R^N). In this paper we generalize the above notion of a determining coalition to committees (i.e., proper and monotonic simple games), and give a complete characterization of the set of determining coalitions of a committee. Furthermore, we discuss our notion of a determining coalition in the light of some real-life data on formation of coalitions in town councils in Israel.     

A generalized maximum likelihood characterization of the normal distribution

LetP be a probability measure on ℝ andI _x be the set of alln-dimensional rectangles containingx. If for allx ∈ ℝⁿ and θ ∈ ℝ the inequality holds,P is a normal distributioin with mean 0 or the unit mass at 0. The result generalizes Teicher’s (1961) maximum likelihood characterization of the normal density to a characterization ofN(0, σ²) amongall distributions (including those without density). The m.l. principle used is that of Scholz (1980).     

A note on strategies for bandit problems with infinitely many arms

A bandit problem consisting of a sequence of n choices (n) from a number of infinitely many Bernoulli arms is considered. The parameters of Bernoulli arms are independent and identically distributed random variables from a common distribution F on the interval [0,1] and F is continuous with F(0)=0 and F(1)=1. The goal is to investigate the asymptotic expected failure rates of k-failure strategies, and obtain a lower bound for the expected failure proportion over all strategies presented in Berry et al. (1997). We show that the asymptotic expected failure rates of k-failure strategies when 0<b1 and a lower bound can be evaluated if the limit of the ratio F(1)–F(t) versus (1–t)^b exists as t1^– for some b>0.     

Semiparametric estimation of a censored regression model with an unknown transformation of the dependent variable

This paper presents a method for estimating the model Λ(Y)=min(β′X+U, C), where Y is a scalar, Λ is an unknown increasing function, X is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of unknown parameters, U has unknown cumulative distribution function F, and C is a censoring threshold. It is not assumed that Λ and F belong to known parametric families; they are estimated nonparametrically. This model includes many widely used models as special cases, including the proportional hazards model with unobserved heterogeneity. The paper develops n^1/2-consistent, asymptotically normal estimators of Λ and F. Estimators of β that are n^1/2-consistent and asymptotically normal already exist. The results of Monte Carlo experiments illustrate the finite-sample behavior of the estimators.     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

Locally minimax test of independence in elliptically symmetrical distributions with additional observations

Summary LetX=(X _ij )=(X ₁, ...,X _n )’,X’ _i =(X _i1, ...,X _ip )’,i=1,2, ...,n be a matrix having a multivariate elliptical distribution depending on a convex functionq with parameters, 0,σ. Let ϱ²=ϱ ₂ ^-2 be the squared multiple correlation coefficient between the first and the remainingp ₂+p ₃=p−1 components of eachX _i . We have considered here the problem of testingH ₀:ϱ²=0 against the alternativesH ₁:ϱ ₁ ^-2 =0, ϱ ₂ ^-2 >0 on the basis ofX andn ₁ additional observationsY ₁ (n ₁×1) on the first component,n ₂ observationsY ₂(n ₂×p ₂) on the followingp ₂ components andn ₃ additional observationsY ₃(n ₃×p ₃) on the lastp ₃ components and we have derived here the locally minimax test ofH ₀ againstH ₁ when ϱ ₂ ^-2 →0 for a givenq. This test, in general, depends on the choice ofq of the familyQ of elliptically symmetrical distributions and it is not optimality robust forQ.     

A model of influence with a continuum of actions

We generalize a two-action (yes–no) model of influence to a framework in which every player has a continuum of actions, among which he has to choose one. We assume the set of actions to be an interval. Each player has an inclination to choose one of the actions. Due to the influence among players, the final decision of a player, i.e., his choice of one action, may be different from his original inclination. In particular, a coalition of players with the same inclination may influence another player with different inclination, and as a result of this influence, the decision of the player is closer to the inclination of the influencing coalition than his inclination was. We introduce a measure of such a positive influence of a coalition on a player. Several unanimous influence functions in this generalized framework are considered. Also the set of fixed points under a given influence function is analyzed. Furthermore, we study linear influence functions and discuss their convergence. For a linear unanimous function, we find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the positive influence of a coalition on a player, and we calculate the value of the influence index. We also introduce a measure of a negative influence of a coalition on a player.     

Contributions to nonparametric generalized failure rate function estimation

For a specified distribution functionG with densityg, and unknown distribution functionF with densityf, the generalized failure rate function (x)=f(x)/gG ^–1 F(x) may be estimated by replacingf andF byf _n and , wheref _n is an empirical density function based on a sample of sizen from the distribution functionF, and . Under regularity conditions we show and, under additional restrictions whereC is a subset ofR and _n. Moreover, asymptotic normality is derived and the Berry-Esséen type bound is shown to be related to a theorem which concerns the sum of i.i.d. random variables. The order boundO(n^–1/2+c _n ^1/2 ) is established under mild conditions, wherec _n is a sequence of positive constants related tof _n and tending to 0 asn.Research was supported in part by the Army, Navy and Air Force under Office of Naval Research contract No. N00014-76-C-0608. AMS 1970 subject classifications. Primary 62G05. Secondary 60F15.     

The non-existence of smooth demand in general banach spaces

We study the questions of existence and smoothness of demand functions with an infinite number of commodities. The main result obtained, under some hypothesis, is: if a C¹ demand exists in a commodity space B, then B can be given an inner product structure. For example, if B is L_p, 1p∞, and if there exists a C¹ demand function defined on B then p must be 2. Another result is: if a demand function exists, defined for all prices p and income, then the commodity space must be reflexive. For example, if B is L_p and a demand function exists on B, defined for all prices and incomes then 1<p<∞. We also study the cases L_∞ and L₁ with weaker assumptions. We finish the paper proving that the demand function is always defined for a dense set of prices and convenient incomes.