确保“国有资本退出”的公正和效益

在当前的国有资产管理体制改革中，国有资产从竞争性经济领域退出是改革的重要举措。特别是随着地方政府对国有企业的关系，由原来的“分级管理权”变为了现在的“分级产权”，地方政府主要对竞争性领域的国有中小型企业行使产权，其“退出”的需求更为迫切。     

国企改革:历史、现实与未来

从搞活整个国民经济与参与国际经济竞争的角度来考虑国有企业的改革和发展问题是20年国有企业改革的基本经验，以此来看，目前我国国有经济存在的根本问题并非是人们常说的政企不分，机制不灵，管理不善，负债率高，社会负担重等浅层次的体制和具体政策问题，而是总规模偏大和内生的制度缺陷，因而未来国有经济改革的政策应当是，通过部分国有企业的非国有化，适度降低国有经济的比重，进一步完善我国的气有制结构，改革长期实行的“一级所有，分级管理”的旧的国有制模式，建立分级所有，一级管理的新模式。     

确保“国有资本退出”的公正和利益

<正>在当前的国有资产管理体制改革中,国有资产从竞争性经济领域退出是改革的重要举措。特别是随着地方政府对国有企业的关系,由原来的“分级管理权”变为了现在的“分级产权”,地方政府主要对竞争性领域的国有中小型企业行使产权,其“退出”的需求更为迫切。     

国资产权"统一所有与分级所有"的比较分析

本文从国资产权改革要解决的问题和中央政府在改革中的主体作用入手，对现行国资“国家统一所有，中央与地方政府分级管理”和“中央与地方政府分级所有，分级管理”的设想进行利弊对比分析，提出实现“分级所有，分级管理”体制的路径选择。     

认真贯彻十六大精神 深化国有资产体制改革

在上世纪 80年代 ,我国就开始了国有企业及国有资产管理体制的改革。党的十四届三中全会提出国有资产实行“国家统一所有、政府分级监管、企业自主经营”的原则 ;党的十五届四中全会进一步提出“国家所有、分级管理、分工监督、授权经营”的国有资产管理体制的十六字方针 ,给地方政府在国有资产管理体制和国有企业改革方面更大的权限。党的十五大以后 ,结合政府机构改革 ,“政资分开”的改革获得了重大进展 ,同时国有资本所有权行使机构的职能有所归并。但是从基本方向到具体政策管理 ,国有资产管理体制的许多重大问题 ,特别是产权关系不清…     

从制度经济学的角度探讨国有资产管理的基本框架

现行的“国家统一所有,政府分级管理”国有资产管理体制,是由中央直接管理部分国有企业,大部分国有企业由省、市、县三级政府管理。我们认为,我国的国有资产管理应该由分级管理改为“分级所有”,每一级政府对其所拥有的国有资产具有完整的所有权,包括收益、处置等各项权利。在分级管理的基础上,构建国有资产管理体制的基本框架。     

国有企业改革中的“道德风险”和“内部人控制”问题

长期以来国有企业改革引用的思路是：在国家与企业之间引入多级代理关系，用现代企业制度改造国有企业，但这一思路在实践过程中出现了若干问题。其中，“代理人的道德风险”和“内部人控制”尤为突出。其主要成因在于制度的不完善，而导致责、权、利的不统一。     

浅论对国有资产实行的"分级所有、分级管理"模式

积极探索国有资产管理体制从“统一所有、分级管理”模式向“分级所有、分级管理”模式转变,有利于进一步理顺中央和地方在国有资产管理方面的各种关系,缩短委托代理链条;有利于每一级政府对其所管理的国有资产具有完整的所有权,进一步调动地方的积极性和主动性,优化国有资产的配置,在一定程度上解决“所有者虚置”的问题。确立中央政府和地方对国有资产所有权在不同领域的划分标准,成功实现国有资产的“分级所有、分级管理”。     

我国国企雇佣关系的合法性特征及其改革路径

企业在经营过程中面临技术环境和制度环境。技术环境要求企业提高生产效率,获取更多利润;制度环境要求组织采取社会认可的组织和制度,提高合法性。合法性是国有企业雇佣关系的基础。从合法性角度出发,我们不难理解国有企业雇佣目标多样化、封闭性、平均性等特征。合法性特征妨碍了国有企业雇佣关系市场化改革的进程。基于以上分析,本文提出了国有企业雇佣关系应该实现从封闭式向开放式,从合法性向效率化进行转变的建议。     

论东北老工业基地国有企业“三项制度”改革

东北老工业基地国有企业的人事制度、劳动制度和分配制度改革相对落后,仍然延续着“高官”任命“高管”、企业排斥职工、分配偏离效率的运行模式,暴露出的矛盾十分突出。推进三项制度改革,是深化国企改革的需要,也是振兴东北老工业基地的重要抉择。根据东北地区国有企业实际情况,三项制度改革可分别概括为:市场化的人事制度改革、一体化的劳动制度改革和多元化的分配制度改革。     

Regulation by prices and by command

Standard economic theory states that regulation by price is more efficient than regulation by command and control. Exceptions may arise if regulators have good knowledge of the supply curve. In practice, though, governments usually regulate by command and control and do so when there is uncertainty about the technology of supply. We show that government may prefer to regulate by command and control when it cares about the investment decisions of a firm.We are grateful for comments by Kenneth Small, the editor, and two anonymous referees.     

Working part time: by choice or by constraint

The selection of workers into part-time jobs and the wages they earn are analysed using the 1989 Labour Market Activity Survey. We focus on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary part-time workers, since involuntary part-time workers earn substantially lower wages than other workers. We find that the selection of individuals into involuntary part-time work is more closely tied to job characteristics than personal or human capital characteristics. The lower wage earned by involuntary part-time workers is largely due to differences in returns and selection effects, rather than differences in endowments. JEL Classification: J22, J23, J31     

Search by committee

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient.     

Learning by investing

We test for learning among heterogeneous individuals who are engaged in bidding and who possess limited information about the auctioned assets. We use an extensive dataset taken from an auction through which state‐owned enterprises were privatized in the Czech Republic in 1993–94. To test for learning, we develop new measures of individual performance to accommodate the varying prices of assets available in six successive stages of bidding. We present evidence that learning took place among heterogeneous agents during a large‐scale multi‐stage auction that is unique in terms of its size, incentives and variation. The auction’s design, with multiple market periods, allowed agents to learn based on accumulated experience. As individuals had to pay a fee to participate, and as the potential gain was in the magnitude of several months’ salary, we conclude that large incentives were driving our results.     

Voting by veto

This paper describes a voting procedure for revealing preferences for public goods. The procedure consists of two steps: a proposal by each committee member to be added along with the status quo to form the issue set, and then, subsequent to a random determination of voting order, the elimination of one proposal from the issue set by each committee member. For any set of proposals and a given order of voting the procedure determines a unique, winning proposal. Under the procedure's incentives, the winning proposal tends to contain an equal sharing of the potential gains from collective action among the committee members.