个人住房抵押贷款借款人产品选择行为

1998年至今，中国个人住房抵押贷款市场迅速成长，并呈现出持续增长趋势。从完善个贷服务、降低金融风险的角度出发，深入研究借款人个贷产品选择行为具有现实意义。本文以2001年北京个贷市场实际交易数据为基础．采用二元Logit选择模型，定量分析经济因素、借款人个体属性和个贷产品属性对借款人个贷期限和贷款价值比选择行为的影响。实证研究发现，借款人性别对其个贷产品选择的影响并不显著；高收入借款人相对于中低收入借款人更倾向高比例中短期贷款；购置高价住宅的借款人相对于购置中低价格住宅的借款人更倾向选择中低比例长期贷款：未婚借款人更倾向高比例贷款；年轻借款人和高等教育程度借款人更倾向长期贷款。此外，本文结合对特定人群房价收入比的分析，探讨造成借款人选择行为差异的可能原因。本文基本结论为．借款人个贷期限和贷款价值比选择行为相对合理，不存在绝对高风险人群。     

不同收入家庭住房抵押贷款LTV选择研究

本文利用1999年3月到2002年10月北京市个人住房抵押贷款市场的微观数据,应用平行数据模型,研究了不同收入家庭中请个人住房抵押贷款时,贷款利率、房价收入比和家庭收入特征属性对其贷款价值比率(LTV)选择行为的影响。研究结果表明：贷款利率和房价收入比对购房家庭选择贷款价值比率,分别有显著的逆向和正向效应;与房价收入比相比,贷款利率的变化对家庭贷款需求的影响更大;贷款利率和房价收入比对不同收入家庭贷款价值比率选择的影响无差异,但在房价收入比大致相同的情况下,随着家庭收入的提高,居民家庭选择的贷款价值比率会相应提高。     

美国次贷危机对我国商业银行信贷风险控制的启示

<正>一、美国次贷危机形成的原因美国房地产次贷危机,也叫房地产"次级抵押贷款"危机。所谓次级抵押贷款是相对于优质和次优级抵押贷款而言的,是为信用等级不高、收入较低、债务负担大的借款人提供的信贷服务,需要借款人以住房或其他财产作为抵押。由于借款人的违约风险比较大,因此次级抵押贷款要求的利率比优质抵押贷款高得多,是一种典型的高风险、高收益的业务。发放次级抵押贷款的金融机构为了转移风险和回收资金,往往将其进行证券化,在资本市场出售。这样,次级抵押贷款就变成了资产     

信贷市场的逆向选择风险与银行贷款策略的博弈分析

在信贷市场中企业比银行掌握了更多的投资项目信息,这种信息不对称性将会导致逆向选择风险,加大不良贷款产生的可能性。由于抵押贷款能降低企业的逆向选择行为,银行普遍将抵押贷款作为主要的信贷手段来保障信贷资金安全,提高银行预期利润。从博弈论的角度来讲,逆向选择是在既定的博弈规则安排下,借款人所做出的最佳选择。     

美国次贷危机对我国商业银行信贷风险控制的启示

一、美国次贷危机形成的原因美国房地产次贷危机,也叫房地产"次级抵押贷款"危机。所谓次级抵押贷款是相对于优质和次优级抵押贷款而言的,是为信用等级不高、收入较低、债务负担大的借款人提供的信贷服务,需要借款人以住房或其他财产作为抵押。由于借款人的违约风险比较大,因此次级抵押贷款要求的利率比优质抵押贷款高得多,是一种典型的高风险、高收益的业务。发放次级抵押贷款的金融机构为了转移风险和回收资金,往往将其进行证券化,在资本市场出售。这样,次级抵押贷款就变成了资产     

论我国个人住房抵押贷款担保体系的构建

个人住房抵押贷款担保的主要功能是为借款人申请高比例的个人住房抵押贷款提供信用支持,即降低购房借款人的首付款比例。在我国个人住房抵押贷款担保体系的建设过程中,政府应当发挥主导作用,适时建立政策性个人住房抵押贷款担保机构,为广大中低收入者申请高比例的个人住房抵押贷款提供担保,以保障其基本的居住需求。此外,政府还可根据住房市场发展的客观需要,鼓励、引导和扶持商业性个人住房抵押贷款担保的发展。     

基层行个人贷款还款来源的风险防范

目前个人贷款已成为各银行的主要贷款之一,贷款占比逐年增加,但是违约及不良贷款也在逐年增加。对某区域工行的个人不良贷款进行分析,发现违约及不良贷款的借款人大部分是个体工商户及民营工商企业的工作者,说明目前工行对非固定收入人群的贷款过程中,没有加强个贷风险防范,对应的防范措施不利。现就个人贷款还款来源的风险防范进行探讨。     

从次贷危机看市场繁荣与金融创新

次级按揭贷款及衍生产品的发展次级按揭贷款驶上快车道是在本世纪初,尤其是在"9·11"恐怖袭击之后。为刺激经济复苏,美联储采取了短期迅速减息的政策,短期利率水平在短短一年间由6.5%减至1.75%,降至40年来最低水平。低利率政策使即便定价较高的次级按揭贷款成本也相当低,大批信用级别不高的购房者利用次级按揭贷款购买住房。为满足低收入借款人群的需要,次级按揭市场出现了一些非传统按揭产品。以利率可调整按揭贷款(ARM)为例,借款人可以选择前期免息或低息、中后期高息的还款方式,也可以选择前期只偿还利息、不偿还本金的方式,这些创新产品的特点在于借款人前期只负担很低的偿还额,随后月供额迅速提高,适合未来现金流预期有较大增长的低收入借款人提早拥有住房。类似ARM的次级按揭产品放弃了信贷过程中始终强调的第一还款来源——借款人偿付能力,转而依靠房地产的抵押     

风险态度、合作行为与联保贷款契约:一个实验研究

本文应用实验室实验方法,研究了在不同贷款契约情况下,借款人风险态度等因素对合作水平(努力程度)的影响。研究发现:(1)联保贷款契约下参与者的努力水平之间存在正相关关系,且其努力水平显著高于个人责任契约下参与者的努力水平。说明联保贷款契约参与者存在较高的有条件合作行为;(2)在联保贷款契约下,风险喜好参与者的努力水平显著高于风险规避参与者。说明联保贷款契约对风险喜好参与者具有显著激励作用;(3)风险规避参与者的努力水平随实验期数增加而下降的速度比风险喜好参与者更快,风险规避参与者对联保贷款契约合作水平有较大危害。我们提出:小额贷款机构应当为风险喜好借款人提供联保贷款契约,并且避免风险规避的借款人与风险喜好的借款人组成联保贷款小组。对风险喜好借款人组成的联保贷款小组,联保贷款契约的期限可以较长。     

我国汽车消费贷款违约的实证分析——来自商业银行的微观证据

随着我国汽车消费信贷市场的发展,贷款违约问题越来越受到关注.本文将居民汽车消费贷款违约分为两类,利用银行消费贷款合约数据,运用Logit和Probit模型对影响汽车消费贷款违约的因素进行实证分析,揭示不同汽车价格区间内影响贷款违约的主要因素.研究结论是:对于购买普通汽车的借款人,贷款利率和借款人的收入负债比是导致违约的显著影响因素;对于购买豪华汽车的借款人,首付比例和汽车价格是导致违约的显著影响因素;违约率随汽车价格升高呈倒U型变化.     

Villains or scapegoats? The role of subprime borrowers in driving the U.S. housing boom

An expansion in mortgage credit to subprime borrowers is widely believed to have been a principal driver of the 2002-2006 U.S. house price boom. By contrast, this paper documents a robust, negative correlation between the growth in the share of purchase mortgages to subprime borrowers and house price appreciation at the county-level during this time. Using two different instrumental variables approaches, we also establish causal evidence that house price appreciation lowered the share of purchase loans to subprime borrowers. Further analysis using micro-level credit bureau data shows that higher house price appreciation reduced the transition rate into first-time homeownership for subprime individuals. Finally, the paper documents that subprime borrowers did not play a significant role in the increased speculative activity and underwriting fraud that the literature has linked directly to the housing boom. Taken together, these results are more consistent with subprime borrowers being priced out of housing boom markets rather than inflating prices in those markets.     

2014年二季度吉林省经济金融形势分析及预测

从二季度区域经济运行情况来看：我省工业生产总体增速放缓,全省多数市/州工业出现下滑,民营经济显著回落,工业用电和铁路货运持续低位运行;三大需求全面回落,消费需求回落至中低速增长区间,固定资产投资增速下降明显,净出口增速持续收窄,外贸形势较为严峻;劳动力市场低位运行,就业和用工整体形势不容乐观,但企业一线用工情况有所改善;财政收支压力持续加大,收入减速和支出加速并存;房地产市场下行压力加大,商品房销量下滑显著,库存压力不断加大,商品房价格环比持续下降;消费者价格指数小幅回升,工业生产者价格低位企稳。从金融运行情况来看：各项贷款增速略有回落,受临储粮贷款投放减少影响,短期贷款增势放缓,中长期贷款增幅回升,单位中长期贷款呈增长势头,单位固定资产贷款强势增长;二产贷款增速、增量占比均有所提升,但信贷集中投向三产的格局并未改变;分企业规模类型看,小型企业贷款同比显著增长;单位存款增速持续放缓,存款定期化趋势增强预示宏观经济偏冷;居民投资结构有所调整,理财产品发放导致储蓄存款分流明显。     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

Optimal Loan Interest Rate Contract Design

This paper analyzes optimal loan interest rate contracts under conditions of risky, symmetric information for one-period (static) and multi-period (dynamic) models. The optimal loan interest rate depends upon the volatility of, and co-variation among the market interest rate, borrower collateral, and borrower income, as well as the time horizon and the risk preferences of lenders and borrowers. For a risk-averse borrower with stochastic collateral, variable interest rate contracts are, in general, Pareto optimal. For plausible assumptions, the optimal loan interest rate for the multi-period model often exhibits muted responses to changes in market interest rates, making fixed rate loans a reasonable approximation for the optimal loan. Hence, in the absence of optimal contracts, long-term (short-term) borrowers tend to prefer fixed rate (variable) contracts.     

Price Discovery and Dissemination of Private Information by Loan Syndicate Participants

We delineate key channels through which flows of confidential information to loan syndicate participants impact the dynamics of information arrival in prices. We isolate the timing of private information flows by estimating the speed of price discovery over quarterly earnings cycles in both secondary syndicated loan and equity markets. We identify borrowers disseminating private information to lenders relatively early in the cycle with firms exhibiting relatively early price discovery in the secondary loan market, documenting that price discovery is faster for loans subject to financial covenants, particularly earnings‐based covenants; for borrowers who experience covenant violations; for borrowers with high credit risk; and for loans syndicated by relationship‐based lenders or highly reputable lead arrangers. We then ask whether early access to private information in the loan market accelerates the speed of information arrival in stock prices. We document that the stock returns of firms identified with earlier private information dissemination to lenders indeed exhibit faster price discovery in the stock market, but only when institutional investors are involved in the firm's syndicated loans. Further, the positive relation between institutional lending and the speed of stock price discovery is more pronounced in relatively weak public disclosure environments. These results are consistent with institutional lenders systematically exploiting confidential syndicate information via trading in the equity market.     

Credit rationing and non-price loan terms: A re-examination

This paper develops the implications of heterogeneous bank loans for borrower and lender behaviour in a competitive bank loan market by considering the own funds-loan ratio as the ‘non-price’ loan term. It is shown that in equilibrium each bank will ration its loan to borrowers by providing them with the smaller loan and requiring the higher own funds-loan ration than they would desire at the equilibrium loan rate. Moreover, restrictive monetary policy that raises the opportunity cost of granting loans decreases the loan size and increases the own funds-loan ratio, but its effect on the loan rate and credit rationing remains ambiguous. Thus credit rationing may decrease as a result of restrictive monetary policy.     

Bank and Nonbank Lenders and the Commercial Mortgage Market

This paper develops an equilibrium model of the commercial mortgage market that includes the sequence from commitment to origination and allows testing for differences by type of lender. From borrowers, loan demand is based on the income yield, capital gains, and expectations about return distributions. Lenders use prices such as mortgage rates and their distributions, and quantities in underwriting standards. There are separate equilibria in the markets for loan commitments and originations. Bank and nonbank lenders are not restricted to the same lending technology, nor to the weights placed on mortgage rates as opposed to underwriting standards. Empirical results for the United States commercial mortgage market indicate that banks use interest rates in allocating credit while nonbanks rely on underwriting standards, notably the loan-to-value ratio. A consequence is that nonbanks have a clientele incentive towards making low cap rate loans compensated by low loan-to-value ratios.     

Formulaic Transparency: The Hidden Enabler of Exceptional U.S. Securitization

Why does the securitization of residential mortgages, credit cards, auto loans, and other such consumer debt in the U.S. exceed the securitization of such debt in Europe by several trillion dollars? The author points out that lemon problems do not stop the sale of used cars but they do prevent the operation of a market in which buyers place sight‐unseen bids for used cars offered by unknown sellers. Buyers prefer to know who the seller is and test‐drive vehicles. Similarly until the 1980s, creditors were willing to forgo the information they could secure in private transactions to get tradability mainly in the case of bonds issued by governments or a few blue‐chip companies. U.S. government policy encouraged the securitization of trillions of dollars of loans made to millions of borrowers. U.S. rules—rather than new financial or information technologies—have strongly encouraged originators of mortgages and other consumer loans to rely on credit scores (commonly referred to as FICO scores) produced by credit bureaus. And reliance on scores that loan originators use but don’t produce helps overcome the information asymmetry problems that would otherwise constrain securitization. The argument turns the usual concern about securitization on its head: transferring risks to investors is normally expected to discourage careful screening of borrowers, but the author’s analysis suggests that formulaic, FICO‐based screening actually enables risk transfer by reducing information asymmetry problems. Moreover, while limiting screening reduces the upfront costs of lending, it also increases loans made to uncreditworthy borrowers. And because increasing loans made to bad borrowers raises the rates good borrowers have to pay (to compensate investors for higher defaults), U.S. rules that sacrifice information for more “complete” markets may be a bad bargain.     

Legal Restrictions in Personal Loan Markets

This study examines the pricing of personal loans in the form of second mortgages to determine whether state-specific default laws have an effect on the availability and cost of that debt. We examine the pricing of loans to higher risk borrowers and whether borrowers in states that limit lender ability to seek default remedies pay higher credit costs. Our results indicate that, for the most part, lenders rationally price loans to higher risk borrowers. However, when we focus on borrowers with low credit scores, the results indicate that mean actual loan rates are higher than those predicted by our model. The results also indicate that state-specific default laws have an effect on the price of credit. Finally, the results show that there is a greater degree of error in the pricing of second mortgage loans to borrowers with low credit scores than to borrowers with high credit scores.     

The income elasticity of mortgage loan demand

One explanation for the emergence of the housing market bubble and the subprime crisis is that increases in individuals’ income led to higher increases in the amount of mortgage loans demanded, especially for the middle class. This hypothesis translates to an increase in the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand before 2007. Using applicant‐level data, we test this hypothesis and find that the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand in fact declines in the years before 2007, especially for the mid‐ and lower‐middle income groups. Our finding implies that increases in house prices were not matched by increases in loan applicants’ income.