The case for comparable worth

Traditional nondiscrimination efforts focus on women’s access to jobs and on equal pay for the same work. Comparable worth adds a third strategy-policies that ensure that jobs do not pay less because they are filled by women. I review evidence of this discrimination. I describe job evaluation, which can be used to correct it, while preserving a large role for market forces. U.S. workers have no protection from this type of discrimination. I consider arguments raised against comparable worth. The claim that antidiscrimination policies are unnecessary because discrimination is eroded by competitive forces fails to recognize the sluggishness of this response. The argument that barriers to entry are the real problem ignores evidence that cultural devaluation affects wage-setting even absent hiring discrimination. Arguments about undesirable side effects apply with equal force to most regulation. I conclude that comparable worth deserves support.     

Sex discrimination in selection and compensation in Taiwan

This article describes the current status of women in the workplace in Taiwan. Statistical evidence shows sex segregation in the labour market. Discriminatory practices in the hiring process are documented via a content analysis of 7,037 classified ads. Overtly discriminatory actions, such as blatantly stated gender requirements in the classified ads, are shown to be still common in hiring practices. Census data on a gender gap in compensation shows that women in Taiwan evidently get less pay than men do for the same work. The ratio of female to male employees is significantly and negatively correlated with the ratio of female to male in pay. The higher the percentages of women in an industry, the lower the pay women get compared to men. Also, the ratio of female to male in pay is negatively related to the turnover rate. Companies that pay women fairly tend to enjoy lower turnover rates. The implications of these women's issues in human resource management in Taiwan are presented.     

Pensions, non-discrimination policies, and the employment of older workers

This paper analyzes firms' decisions to hire older workers. We model, the role of pensions in back-loading pay for specifically trained workers. We then evaluate the effects, of imposing age discrimination rules and non-discriminatory fringe benefit rules, and analyze the consequences for the firm's decision to hire older versus younger individuals. The model predicts that defined benefit pension plans deter the hiring of older workers, but only if hired for entry level position. The reason is f hat the wages of this group cannot be lowered enough to pay for the benefits. Data from a new survey of employers are used to test this hypothesis. The findings show that a more generous defined benefit pension plan reduces employment prospects for older, entry level workers. Employers offering defined benefit pension, plans employ older workers, but tend not to hire them into entry level jobs.     

Gerrymandering in personnel selection: A review of practice

Gerrymandering personnel selection systems is defined as those practices explicitly intended to improve the outcomes of individual applicants or groups of applicants to the detriment of other individuals and groups. Gerrymandering can serve a variety of purposes, such as enhancing demographic diversity, rewarding political allies, or giving hiring preference to specific individuals. This paper reviews eleven strategies for gerrymandering personnel selection systems. The strategies fall into three categories of decisions: decisions in choosing or designing personnel selection tools; decisions in scoring personnel selection tools; decisions in selecting among passing applicants. Perspectives on the appropriateness and ethics of gerrymandering are then reviewed.     

Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction

We present a model in which workers with greater ability and greater risk tolerance move into performance pay jobs to capture rents and contrast it with the classic agency model. Estimates from the German Socio-Economic Panel confirm testable implications drawn from our model. First, before controlling for earnings, workers in performance pay jobs have higher job satisfaction, a proxy for on-the-job utility. Second, after controlling for earnings, workers in jobs with performance pay have the same job satisfaction as those not in such jobs. Third, those workers in performance pay jobs who have greater risk tolerance routinely report greater job satisfaction. While these findings support models in which workers capture rent, they would not be suggested by the classic agency model.     

The determination of wages of newly hired employees: Survey evidence on internal versus external factors

This paper reports findings on the relative importance of internal versus external factors in the setting of wages of newly hired workers. The evidence, from a rich firm-level survey on wage and price-setting procedures in 15 European Union countries, suggests that external labour market conditions are less important than internal pay structures in determining hiring pay, with internal pay structures binding even more often when there is labour market slack. When explaining their choice firms allude to fairness considerations and the need to prevent a potential negative impact on effort. Cross-country differences are found to depend on institutional factors: countries in which collective agreements are more prevalent and collective agreement coverage is higher report more often internal pay structures as the main determinant of hiring pay. Within-country differences are found to depend on firm and workforce characteristics: there is a strong association between the use of external factors in hiring pay, on the one hand, and skills (positive) and tenure (negative) on the other.     

Performance, seniority, and wages: formal salary systems and individual earnings profiles

This paper replicates studies by Medoff and Abraham [Quart. J. Eco. 95 1980 703; J. Hum. Res. 16 1981 186] and Flabbi and Ichino [Lab. Eco. 8 2001 359] using personnel data from the Dutch national aircraft manufacturer Fokker. It shows how a formal salary system, as is widely used by large firms, brings about that seniority-wage profiles are largely independent of controls for reported performance in cross-sectional wage regressions even though supervisors' evaluations shape life-cycle earnings profiles. Performance ratings determine how fast a worker climbs the firm's career and wage ladder. The paper also reveals that real wage growth depends on the employer's prosperity, and it demonstrates that formal salary systems cause serial correlation in wage growth and “Green Card” effects.     

Externalities, Indivisibility, Nonreplicability, and Agglomeration

In this paper we argue that the impact of external scale economies and diseconomies on city size is not nearly as clear-cut as it is tacitly believed in urban economics. Similarly, city-size distortions are not caused by externalities alone. Indivisibility and nonreplicability, which prevent establishing the “right” number of cities, may represent a source for city-size distortions which can be stronger than the standard resource misallocation resulting from external scale economies and diseconomies. It follows that a direct population dispersion policy is not just an inferior substitute to Pigouvian taxes and subsidies but rather a useful complement.     

薪酬福利对中小企业人力资源的影响研究

为响应大众创业的号召,我国中小企业不断发展,为社会提供就业岗位也为经济发展添砖加瓦。然而,在市场竞争压力不断增强的当下,中小企业要重视推进人力资源管理质量提升。通过薪酬福利的有效应用来激发工作人员的工作积极性和创造力,以此为中小企业的发展贡献出更高水平的价值。本文在分析中小企业薪酬福利现状的同时,提出相关对策思考。     

Designing employment subsidies

The paper examines the relative effectiveness of two policy proposals in reducing unemployment and working poverty: hiring subsidies and wage subsidies. The hiring subsidies are targeted exclusively at the unemployed and are provided only for a limited period of time. The wage subsidies, on the other hand, are granted to all low-wage earners regardless of their employment history and are of limitless duration. Our analysis indicates that the relative effectiveness of the two policies depends on workers' prospective wage growth. The more upwardly mobile workers are (i.e. the more their wages rise with employment duration), the more effective will unemployment vouchers be relative to low-wage subsidies. Conversely, the greater the danger that workers come to be trapped in dead-end jobs with flat wage profiles, the more effective will low-wage subsidies be relative to unemployment vouchers.     

Labour market recruiting with intermediaries

We consider a Rothschild–Stiglitz–Spence labour market model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submit wage-bids for each job and are assigned stable jobs as equilibrium outcome. We compare this outcome to independent, sequential hiring by firms and conclude that, in general, a stable assignment can only be implemented if firms coordinate to some extent.      

Marketplace matching in Britain: Evidence from individual unemployment spells

This paper investigates job matching patterns in Great Britain. Evidence from individual transitions out of unemployment demonstrates that recently unemployed workers are likely to find jobs in the existing stock of vacancies. If, however, they are unlucky and fail to match early on, job seekers cease matching with existing vacancies. Workers with longer unemployment spells instead form matches with the flow of new vacancies. This pattern is more pronounced for workers who experienced only short spells of employment prior to their current job search. This evidence provides robust support for stock-flow matching but is difficult to reconcile with random matching.     

人事激励的契约选择——一个基于委托代理的分析框架

随着人事经济学的发展,激励机制设计理论为人力资源管理提供了重要和有力的分析工具。本文采用人事经济学的分析方法,以一个基本的委托代理模型为基础,研究在人力资源管理中绩效激励和晋升激励的契约特征及其局限性,探讨激励契约的发展趋势。     

Women’s position in the household

Women’s labor market position has changed dramatically during the past century, while changes in the home have followed at a slower pace. Marriage and motherhood and responsibilities for most household labor still affect women’s choices about whether and under what conditions to work for pay. The U.S. government does not have a coherent set of policies about work/family life, lagging far behind Canada and western Europe. Employer policies can be helpful but are more available to workers at higher income levels and are more likely to be used by women than men. Thus, women continue to make “choices” under seriously constrained conditions.     

Does pay affect productivity or react to it?: Examination of U.S. manufacturing

There may be a bi-directional relationship between wages and labor productivity. According to conventional theory, employers reward improvements in productivity by raising pay. It also has been argued that wage increases can provide an incentive to improve productivity. This study applies a technique by Geweke to identify the feedback between pay and productivity in U.S. manufacturing. For the 1949–1998 period, measures of directional feedback indicate that both “pay as reward” and “pay as incentive” behaviors have occurred, but the results vary across manufacturing subsectors.     

A typology of de-coupling strategies in mixed services

A typology of a class of service systems is proposed. The typology links strategic operational objectives to the decision to de-couple work between the front and back offices of a service system. Four specific ideal types of a strategy/de-coupling mix are described; each of which has distinct operational, marketing and human resource ramifications. A type that has had significant representation in traditional literature is the “Cost Leader” type, where back-office activities are de-coupled from the front office for the purpose of lowering costs. Another traditional type representative of the craftsman legacy is the “Personal Service” type, which retains back-office tasks in the front office to pursue non-cost-oriented strategic goals. Theoretical and empirical evidence is also given for two non-traditional types: the “Kiosk” type, where all tasks remain in the front office to achieve lower costs, and the “Focused Professional” type, which de-couples front- and back-office activities to enable front-office workers to provide higher service, rather than to reduce costs. Empirically, retail bank lending systems are analyzed to support the typology.     

The determinants of hiring older workers: UK evidence

This is the first research using UK establishment data to examine the relationship between back loading of compensation, training and the hiring of older workers. Recognizing that many firms employ older workers but do not hire older workers, we argue this may reflect strategic deferred compensation or the role of specific human capital. Using the combined establishment and employee data of the 1998 WERS, we identify that firms which defer compensation hire a smaller share of older workers and present somewhat weaker evidence that firms which require greater specific human capital also hire a smaller share of older workers.     

The effect of human resource practices on perceived organizational support in the People’s Republic of China

Using a sample of workers and managers employed by a hotel located in Southeastern People’s Republic of China, we investigated the relationship between various human resource management practices and the perceived organizational support (POS) experienced by the employees. We then investigated the effects of POS on employee satisfaction. Our data suggest that hiring practices, training, and compensation practices predict POS. These results are consistent with previous research. We also found that POS influences worker satisfaction and acts as a mediator between select HR practices and satisfaction. This study contributes to the literature by replicating Western-based findings with a Chinese sample and illustrating that the attitudes of Chinese employees can be influenced through the use of HR practices.     

An approach to evaluate incentive policies for energy development

The federal energy agencies are continuously seeking new energy resources to make the U.S. self-sufficient in its energy requirements. Geopressured resources have been identified for quite some time as possible candidates. However, the fundamental barriers to commercializing this source of energy are the excessive capital investments necessary and high uncertainty. This study proposes a methodology for exploring the use of economic incentives as instruments to stimulate the growth of geopressured resource development in the United States. It also identifies how incentive policy options are related to the fundamental barriers against a U.S. geopressured gas capability. The study models the geopressured development project as a Monte Carlo simulation. The geopressured system model simulates the production from a known geopressured resource. The profitability of the geopressured resource development project under alternate incentive policy options is evaluated as to their impact on two base case scenarios of potential investors in such development projects. The evaluations concern the policy impacts on improving project economics and risks. Results indicate that economic incentive policies are effective tools for improving the profitability of geopressured resource development projects. Each incentive serves different purposes with regard to inherent economics, project risks, marketplace uncertainties, and developers' access to capital. The effectiveness of the incentive policies depends on the developer's attitudes and attributes.     

Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.