The stability and growth pact, fiscal policy institutions and stabilization in Europe

Ever since its inception, the EMU has been subject to controversy. The fiscal policy rules embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, and clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are probably the most contentious. The SGP has constantly been accused of being too rigid and of forcing procyclicality in fiscal policy. However, in an influential paper Galí and Perotti (2003) concluded that discretionary fiscal policy has actually become more countercyclical in EMU countries since the Maastricht Treaty. This paper argues that this conclusion stands up to several robustness tests using ex-post data, including the use of institutional variables, but not to the use of real-time data. Using ex-post data, there is some evidence pointing to a more countercyclical use of discretionary fiscal policy (or at least to less use of procyclical discretionary fiscal policy). However, the use of real-time data for the period 1999–2006 reveals that discretionary fiscal policy has been designed to be procyclical. Hence, the actual acyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy in the period after 1999 seems to be simply the result of errors in forecasting the output gap, and not the result of a change in the intentions of policy-makers. As a result, there is no evidence to support the view that Maastricht rules have forced euro-area policy-makers to change their behaviour and design countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies.     

Macroeconomic Policy Interaction under EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach

In this article, we study macroeconomic stabilization in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) using a dynamic game approach. With the aid of a stylized macroeconomic model, this article analyzes the transmission and interaction of national fiscal policies and monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the EMU. A special focus is on the effects of labor market institutions in the participating countries and of the introduction of fiscal stringency criteria like those imposed in the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Real exchange rate, agglomerations, and irreversibilities: macroeconomic policy and FDI in EMU

Fiscal policy in EMU has to be evaluated in the light of thechanging nature of capital mobility in Europe and its effectson growth. Most arguments about the effects of fiscal policyin EMU assume that we live in a perfect competition world witha unique natural rate of output for each country. The removalof barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI) accompanied bythe prevalence of imperfect competition mean that the naturalrate of output is to be determined by locational competition.We show that FDI is influenced by relative costs and is attractedby agglomerations, and that the level of technology dependson the stock of FDI. Sustained expansionary fiscal policieswill raise costs and make locations less attractive. Agglomerationscould be destroyed by these higher costs, and the size of thenation will shrink. These effects will constrain policy-makersmuch more than the Stability Pact.     

Fiscal discipline and flexibility in EMU: the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact

Fiscal discipline to safeguard the credibility of the singlemonetary authority and fiscal flexibility to respond to country-specificshocks are two core principles governing budgetary policy inEMU. The Stability and Growth Pact aims at ensuring the firstobjective. To comply with the requirements of the pact, EU membersneed to achieve a 'close to balance or surplus' position andchange their budgetary behaviour in periods of cyclical upturnsby refraining from spending the 'growth dividend'. Past experienceshows that fiscal laxity does not buy more effective stabilization.Once EMU countries have achieved their medium-term target, theirautomatic stabilizers will be able to operate fully, thus helpingin smoothing out cyclical fluctuations. The main potential problemsin the implementation of the pact may arise in the early yearsof EMU, during the transition to a balanced budget, in the eventof a slow-down in economic activity.     

Stability and Growth Pact: issues and lessons from political economy

The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. Following a literature survey, the paper stresses the importance of appropriate incentives for rule compliance in an environment where national fiscal sovereignty precludes the option of centralised enforcement. In addition, the paper stresses the importance of clear and simple rules and in particular the 3% deficit limit in anchoring expectations of fiscal discipline and facilitating public and market monitoring of public finances. This, in turn, strengthens incentive for rule compliance. Moreover, the paper discusses the interests of the most important players in European fiscal rule formation and the importance of choosing the appropriate time for initiating a reform debate.Non-technical summary The EU fiscal framework as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, the Pact) aims to preserve fiscal sustainability while allowing room for automatic fiscal stabilisation. These two objectives are also at the heart of the ECB’s interest in the EU fiscal framework because their attainment facilitates monetary policy making in the short and long run.The paper analyses the EU fiscal rules from a political economy perspective and derives some policy lessons. The literature review of the first part reveals that fiscal rules can help solve deficit/debt biases and time inconsistency problems by constraining the behavior of policy makers. But rules can also mitigate biases if they facilitate financial market and public scrutiny of fiscal policies.Thereafter, the paper analyses the institutional environment in which EU fiscal rules are applied. It argues that EU rules reflect a “contract” amongst countries that retain sovereignty on fiscal policies. Enforcement, therefore, ultimately has to be undertaken by the contracting parties. Due to this constraint, the rules can also be characterised as “soft” law (with the 3% limit being nevertheless a much “harder” constraint than the other elements). But this does not necessarily imply that the rules are ineffective (or “dead”). Soft law reduces political transaction costs (by improving transparency and providing a forum for peer pressure). Moreover, if well-designed, such law can boost incentives towards making the rules “self-enforcing”. Evidence speaks in favour of this view: while EU fiscal rules were bent in a number of cases and compliance is undeniably of concern, major and rapid fiscal balance deteriorations have been largely prevented since the start of EMU.The paper also looks at potential trade-offs between “complex” rules where a “fine-tuned” economic rationale may boost acceptance of the rules versus simple and clear rules that allow easy monitoring. It is argued that clarity and simplicity of rules are important especially when formal enforcement is limited (“soft law”) and public monitoring becomes more important. By facilitating public and market monitoring of compliance, clear and simple rules are also more costly to breach.The benefits of “complexity”, and in particular the use of administrative discretion to fine tune the rules to country situations have limits, in particular when it comes to the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). It is argued that the 3% deficit limit and the time frame for correcting excessive deficits already provide some room to accommodate economic circumstances. The 3% limit must be clear, simple and strictly implemented to anchor expectations of fiscal discipline and to facilitate public and market monitoring. Further discretion and relaxation would conflict with this need. From this angle, other risks (e.g., efforts not materializing, structural reforms producing surprise costs etc) are hard to justify as a reason for extending deadlines to correct excessive deficits.The preventive arm of the Pact with its requirement of close-to-balance-or-in-surplus budgetary positions defines sound medium term budget positions and adjustment paths. This may be appropriately fine-tuned to address concerns about the Pact’s underlying economic rationale. For example, a symmetric application in good and bad times and less time inconsistency would be desirable.Finally, the timing of a debate on fiscal rules needs to be carefully chosen. In the EU context (and perhaps in other contexts as well), there seems to be much inherent pressure to make the rules more “complex”. Moreover, for the debate initiated in summer 2004, there was also no willingness by countries to give up sovereignty nor was there a sense of urgency to strengthen public finances via tighter rule implementation and enforcement. In such an environment, it is likely that changes to fiscal rules make them more complicated, discretionary and, thereby, potentially less enforceable.The views expressed are those of the author and not of the ECB. Comments by Vitor Gaspar, Mark Hallerberg, Steven Keuning, Jose Marin, Richard Morris, Gilles Noblet, Hedwig Ongena, Luca Onorante, Rolf Strauch, Juergen von Hagen, an anonymous referee and valuable assistance by Anna Foden are much appreciated.     

Dominant Currencies and the Future of the Euro

The paper's thesis is that the US dollar, despite the inevitable erosion of market share that it will suffer at the hands of the euro, will remain the most important international currency. The transaction domain of an international currency depends on its ability to lower transaction costs relative to alternative currencies. The EMU financial markets will not be as integrated, and thus as liquid, as the US financial markets for quite some time, thus favoring the use of the dollar as a medium of exchange. Inertia and reputational considerations further favor the dollar. The future value of the exchange rate dollar-euro will depend on economic fundamentals more than on portfolio shifts. Portfolio shifts argue for an appreciation of the euro; but fundamentals can swamp the effects of portfolio shifts. Should the EMU fundamentals reflect the spirit of the Maastricht Treaty and the Growth and Stability Pact, the chances for a euro appreciation will increase. Some caution, however, is in order because the ECB is a new and untested central bank where consensus for a conservative policy may be harder to achieve than can be gleaned from a literal reading of the Maastricht Treaty.     

The end of the Stability and Growth Pact?

Fiscal policy is the incomplete chapter in the macroeconomic arrangements agreed at Maastricht. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was an attempt to patch it up, but it failed. We need to understand: why? When the Ecofin Council in November 2003 voted against proceeding with the Excessive Deficit Procedure regarding Germany and France, many observers concluded that the Pact was dead or at least “suspended”. No doubt the decision violated the spirit of the SGP. Yet, it was nothing else but the application of the rules: contrary to the original idea of automaticity of sanctions proposed by the German finance minister Theo Waigel in 1995, the Pact stipulated the need for a vote by the Council and therefore implied the possibility that the Commission might be overruled. The Commission requested Germany to reduce its structural deficit by 0.8% of the GDP, and France by 0.4%. This recommendation was blocked and thereby also the consequence of imposing sanctions if these countries would not comply. What appeared so shocking about the events in 2003 was the fact that the decision to not follow the Excessive Deficit Procedure was taken so early in the Pact’s life and as a consequence of bullying by the two largest member states and without genuine economic reasons. In other words, the procedures of the Pact have never been fully applied. Together with the serious policy divergences over the Iraq war and the failure of agreeing a European constitution, the SGP is the third major issue in less than one year that undermines the political credibility of European integration. I believe that this fact is not just to be blamed on incompetent or unwilling politicians; rather it is intrinsic to the issue of fiscal policy coordination in an incomplete federation. It is a constitutional issue.     

Ten Commandments for a Fiscal Rule in the E(M)U

Fiscal rules in a monetary union should (1) be simple; (2) ensurethe solvency of the state; (3) relate to the consolidated generalgovernment and central bank; (4) be neutral as regards the sizeof the public sector; (5) avoid pro-cyclical behaviour of thefiscal policy instruments; (6) also make sense in the long run;(7) allow for important differences in economic structure andinitial conditions; (8) aggregate into behaviour that makessense at the level of the union as a whole; (9) be credible;and (10) be enforced impartially and consistently. The paperreviews the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, the UK'sgolden rule and sustainable-investment rule, and Buiter andGrafe's permanent-balance rule from the perspective of how wellthey meet these ten criteria.     

Enlargement, the Lisbon Agenda, and the Economic Development of Member States

The issues of enlargement, the Lisbon Agenda, and economic development are important not only to new European Union (EU) member states but impact all 25 countries. EU membership may help the new members to foster long-term economic growth through increased credibility, effective use of structural funds, a better framework for economic growth, and entry into the European Monetary Union (EMU). The economic growth of all member states can be strengthened if the reforms related to the main goals of the Lisbon Agenda are completed. Action must be taken both at the member-state level and at the Community level. At the member-state level it is necessary to assure fiscal consolidation and deregulation. At the Community level the preservation of the Stability and Growth Pact, completion of the single market, especially in the service sector, and enforcement of limits on public aid are of the greatest importance.The 2006 Robert A. Mundell Distinguished Address presented at the Sixty-First International Atlantic Economic Conference. Berlin, Germany, 15–19 March 2006. In preparing this paper, I was assisted by Pawel Opala and Andrzej Rzońca. The usual caveats apply.     

Multiple wage-bargaining systems in the single European currency area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to theinteraction between central bank monetary rules and systemsof collective wage bargaining. Analytically and empirically,coordinated wage-bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determinationis dominated by collective bargaining in all the EMU memberstates and wage coordination within the member states has grownsince 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular,the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting Germaninflation, by a European Central Bank (ECB) targeting Europeaninflation will remove a major institutional support of wagerestraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are workedout under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will begenerated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflectGerman inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developmentsare discussed including government union bargains. The Bundesbankalso played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude: forunderlying structural reasons, therefore, it is possible thatGermany will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraintand low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Over-optimistic official forecasts and fiscal rules in the eurozone

Eurozone members are supposedly constrained by the fiscal caps of the Stability and Growth Pact. Yet ever since the birth of the euro, members have postponed painful adjustment. Wishful thinking has played an important role in this failure. We find that governments’ forecasts are biased in the optimistic direction, especially during booms. Eurozone governments are especially over-optimistic when the budget deficit is over the 3 % of GDP ceiling at the time the forecasts are made. Those exceeding this cap systematically but falsely forecast a rapid future improvement. The new fiscal compact among the euro countries is supposed to make budget rules more binding by putting them into laws and constitutions at the national level. But biased forecasts can defeat budget rules. What is the record in Europe with national rules? The bias is less among eurozone countries that have adopted certain rules at the national level, particularly creating an independent fiscal institution that provides independent forecasts.     

Fiscal Policy in Emu: Towards a Sustainability and Growth Pact?

This paper takes stock of the academic and policy discussionson the fiscal institutions of EMU, confronts the framework inplace with what is known of the desirable properties of fiscalpolicy in a monetary union, and discusses possible improvements.We start with a discussion of three requirements for the fiscalframework of a monetary union: it should be conducive to publicfinance sustainability, leave room for stabilization at thenational level, and encourage structural reform. We then examinehow the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) measures up to theserequirements and find that it has mostly failed on all threeaccounts. Whether the 2005 reform of the SGP fixes those deficienciesremains an open issue. To this end, we propose five buildingblocks towards an effective SGP: a better concept of sustainability;harmonized general government balance sheets; appropriate targets;refined procedures; and better institutions. Footnotes ¹ E-mail addresses: benoit.coeure{at}free.fr; jpf{at}bruegel.org     

Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro

This paper looks at what economic theory and empirical evidence have to offer about the institutional conditions that are most likely to lead to a stable currency. Both theory and evidence suggest that an independent central bank with the explicit mandate to pursue price stability provides an effective solution to the time-inconsistency problem. The EMU institutional set-up is well-equipped to support a stability-oriented monetary policy. The ECB appears to be the most independent central bank in the world. An added protection of monetary policy from the influence of unsound budgetary policies enhances the prospects of price stability. The Maastricht Treaty and the Pact for Stability and Growth provide effective constraints against excessive deficits and encourage an environment of balanced budgets. The argument that both strong institutional arrangements and sound economic policy-making stem from a conservative attitude of the public is not dismissed altogether in this paper. We note, however, that this hypothesis is not formulated in a testable form and has ambiguous practical consequences. The hypothesis, nonetheless, serves as a useful reminder that the ECB should endeavor to draw its legitimacy not only from the text of the Treaty, but also from society as a whole.     

Macroeconomic policy, wage setting, and employment - what difference does the EMU make?

The likely impact of the EMU on the variability and level ofemployment is analysed. The major conclusions are as follows.(i) Although an inflation-target regime will constrain monetarypolicy of a non-participant in the EMU, it still leaves considerablescope for exchange-rate changes in the case of country-specificdemand shocks, provided that there is some nominal price andwage flexibility. (ii) Variations in payroll taxes can be usedas a substitute for exchange-rate changes in the EMU, but itwill be an imperfect substitute. (iii) Money-wage flexibilityis likely to be larger inside than outside the EMU, but probablynot by much. (iv) There are various mechanisms through whichthe EMU may affect the incentives for labour-market reform toreduce equilibrium unemployment, but the net impact is highlyuncertain.     

The euro and the monetary union

The Eurosystem established a single monetary policy and has the three guiding principles of independence, transparency, and decentralization. These three principles helped to successfully formulate and implement the euro on 1 January 2002. Major criticisms against establishment of the euro failed to come true and, in fact, the euro has quickly become a major currency in the world. Challenges facing continued success of the euro include structural reforms, financial stability, and the accession of new members to the EU and EMU. TheRobert A. Mundell Distinguished Address presented at the Fifty-Third International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 13–17, 2002, Paris, France.     

审计监督、公众参与和预算透明度——基于跨国数据的实证研究

以在2012年、2015年连续两次参加国际预算合作组织（IBP）开展的《开放预算调查》的201个国家为样本,运用混合OLS回归,研究审计监督、公众参与以及两者互动对预算透明度的影响。实证结果表明,国家审计通过加强独立性、提高审计结果公告能力,可以提高预算透明度;社会公众通过提升参与预算的层次性和实质性,也可以有效提高预算透明度;审计监督与公众参与的互动机制主要表现为审计立项对公众建议的接受度、审计结果对公众阅读的方便度,它们对政府预算透明度的提高都具有显著的正向作用。研究结论对于加强审计机关自身能力建设,完善审计监督和公众参与的互动机制,不断提高政府预算透明度,推进国家治理现代化具有一定的启示意义。     

Stable and enforceable: a new fiscal framework for the Euro area

Since the great financial crash, the need for new fiscal rules to prevent unsustainable fiscal policies is universally recognised. In practice such rules, including those in the Stability and Growth Pact, have proved to be impossible to enforce. Thus, to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies reappearing, and to prevent monetary policy from being undermined by undisciplined governments, there is a need for a framework capable of imposing fiscal discipline. This paper considers an intertemporal assignment, where fiscal policy focuses on long-term objectives and monetary policy on short-term stabilisation. We argue for public sector debt targets as a practical way to achieve such a set up, and an excess debt protocol is constructed to give enforceable form to those targets. The ideas of “fiscal space” and optimal debt levels are used to provide a mechanism for identifying a stable region within which the debt targeting regime should operate. Making these factors explicit would both improve the credibility of planned fiscal policies and reduce risk premia on borrowing costs. We finally show how Europe’s competitiveness pact, and debt restructuring operations, can be used to maximise the available fiscal space.     

对EMU启动前后欧盟国家贸易状况的实证研究

EMU的启动对EMU成员国、欧盟其他国家甚至全世界都有着很大的影响。但是在EMU启动至今已十年,它是否真的发挥了它应有的作用?为了研究这个问题本文选取了对EMU成员国贸易情况进行实证研究的角度来透视EMU启动所带来的影响。本文选取了1992～2007年的面板数据,并通过扩展引力模型实证检验了EMU对其成员国贸易的影响情况。本文研究结果表明:从整体上而言,EMU对其成员国的贸易影响是正面的,即:EMU的实施增加了EMU成员国与其它国家的双边贸易,但对于不同国家EMU的影响具有差异性。     

The European exchange rate mechanism and the European monetary union

Summary This article addresses two central questions related to the prospects of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe: first, is the current exchange rate mechanism viable in the transition stage to EMU or in the period to come if the EMU should be postponed? Second, is a monetary union necessary in an economically fully integrated European Union or would the current or an alternative exchange rate mechanism suffice an integrating Europe? The article reviews the arguments for and against monetary union, the history of European monetary integration, the theoretical and empirical insights into the functioning of targets zones, and the likely developments and prospects for the EMU.The author wishes to thank Martin M.G. Fase and Simon K. Kuipers for their most helpful comments on a previous version of this article.     

Real wage rigidities, accommodative demand policies, and the functioning of EMU

Real Wage Rigidities, Accommodative Demand Policies, and the Functioning of EMU. — The paper shows that the primacy of politics over economics in the decision to start EMU with eleven countries on January 1, 1999 could have serious consequences concerning the functioning and stability of EMU, in particular during the transition phase. The paper demonstrates empirically that real wages in EMU member countries are highly rigid by international comparison and that demand policies played a considerable role in absorbing adverse shocks in the past. Considering that real wages are unlikely to become much more flexible soon, and taking also into account that the use of demand policies in EMU is severely curtailed, it becomes clear that EMU will face a severe crisis if large asymmetric shocks do in fact occur.