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1.
Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format. 相似文献
2.
We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants׳ expected highest effort. 相似文献
3.
We study simultaneous ascending auctions of two identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations
exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information,
and characterize noncollusive equilibria. Equilibrium behavior is affected by the exposure problem. Bidders with higher budgets
are more reluctant to bid, because opponents with lower budgets may end up pursuing a single object, thus preventing the realization
of complementarities. Therefore poor bidders may win both objects when they do not have the highest valuation.
We gratefully acknowledge comments by Marco Battaglini, Benny Moldovanu and participants at seminars held at Montreal, Yale,
Texas A&M, Washington St. Louis and at the Workshop on Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints held at SUNY - Stony Brook.
Sandro Brusco acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencias D.G.E.S., proyecto SEC2001-0445. 相似文献
4.
Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k=k1+k2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational effect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model's parameters. 相似文献
5.
I consider first-price auctions (FPA) and second-price auctions (SPA) with two asymmetric bidders. The FPA is known to be more profitable than the SPA if the strong bidder's distribution function is convex and the weak bidder's distribution is obtained by truncating or horizontally shifting the former. In this paper, I employ a new mechanism design result to show that the FPA remains optimal if the weak bidder's distribution falls between the two benchmarks in a natural way. The same conclusion holds if the strong bidder's distribution is concave, but with a vertical shift replacing the horizontal shift. A result with a similar flavor holds if the strong bidder's distribution is neither convex nor concave. The dispersive order and the star order prove useful in comparing the weak bidder's distribution to the benchmarks. A key step establishes a relationship between these orders and reverse hazard rate dominance. 相似文献
6.
Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Summary. We generalize the Vickrey auction to allow for reserve pricing in a multi-unit auction with interdependent values. In the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing, the seller determines the quantity to be made available as a function of the bidders' reports of private information, and then efficiently allocates this quantity among the bidders. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy with private values and an ex post equilibrium with interdependent values. If the auction is followed by resale, then truthful bidding remains an equilibrium in the auction-plus-resale game. In settings with perfect resale, the Vickrey auction with reserve pricing maximizes seller revenues.Received: 31 December 2002, Revised: 5 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
D44, C78, D82.Correspondence to: Lawrence M. AusubelThe authors gratefully acknowledge the generous support of National Science Foundation Grants SES-97-31025, SES-01-12906 and IIS-02-05489. We appreciate valuable comments from Ilya Segal. Special thanks go to Mordecai Kurz, who served as Larry's dissertation advisor and who introduced both authors to the economics profession back at IMSSS at Stanford. Congratulations and best wishes are extended to Mordecai and his family on the happy occasion of the publication of Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics: Essays in Honor of Mordecai Kurz, in which this article also appears. 相似文献
7.
Second chance offers in online marketplaces involve a seller conducting an auction for a single object and then using information
from the auction to offer a losing bidder a take-it-or-leave-it price for another unit. We theoretically and experimentally
investigate this practice and compare it to two sequential auctions. We show that the equilibrium bidding strategy in the
second chance offer mechanism only exists in mixed strategies, and we observe that this mechanism generates more profit for
the auctioneer than two sequential auctions. We also observe virtually no rejections of profitable offers in the ultimatum
bargaining stage.
相似文献
8.
Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We characterize the optimal selling mechanism for a seller who faces demand demarcated by a high and a low end and who can
access an (online) auction site (by paying an access cost) in addition to using his own store that can be used as a posted
price selling venue. We first solve for the optimal mechanism of a direct revelation game in which there is no venue-restriction
constraint. We find that the direct optimal mechanism must necessarily incorporate a certain kind of pooling. We then show
that even with the venue constraint, the seller can use a two stage indirect mechanism that implements the allocation rule
from the optimal direct mechanism, and uses the venues in an optimal fashion. The first stage of the indirect mechanism is
a posted price at the store. If the object is not sold, we move to stage two, which involves an auction at the auction site.
A feature of this auction is a buy-now option which is essential for implementing the pooling feature of the optimal direct
mechanism. We also show that the buy-now option in the optimal mechanism is of a “temporary” variety, and that a “permanent”
buy-now option, in contrast, cannot implement the optimal mechanism. Auctions with a temporary buy-now option are in widespread
use on eBay.
We thank the Associate Editor, George Deltas, for his insightful comments. We also thank seminar participants at the University
of Basel and the SAET conference 2007. 相似文献
9.
It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case
of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus
is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure
spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of
the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear
to be optimal from the consumers’ point of view.
相似文献
10.
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. Those last valuations are shown to form a zero-measure subset of the submodular valuations that have positive measure. While we show that the allocation problem among submodular valuations is NP-hard, we present an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm for this case and generalize it to the case of limited complementarities. No such approximation algorithm exists in a setting allowing for arbitrary complementarities. Some results about strategic aspects of combinatorial auctions among players with decreasing marginal utilities are also presented. 相似文献
11.
Using data on 17 industrial countries from 1982 to 2003 and controlling for a wide array of factors, this paper finds that higher exchange rate volatility increases the unemployment rate. The magnitude of the effect is small. The results are robust to variations in specification. 相似文献
12.
We analyze large symmetric auctions with conditionally i.i.d. common values and risk averse bidders. Our main result characterizes the asymptotic equilibrium price distribution for the first- and second-price auctions. As an implication, we show that with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the second-price auction raises significantly more revenue than the first-price auction. While this ranking seems robust in numerical analysis also outside the CARA specification, we show by counterexamples that the result does not generalize to all risk averse utility functions. 相似文献
13.
Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we fully characterize the optimal auction in this non standard environment and in a very general set-up. We find that when informed bidders reveal “bad news” about the value of the good, the seller optimally awards the object to the uninformed bidders. Secondly, we show that the seller is better off in presence of uninformed bidders because this allows to lower the informational rents paid to the informed bidders. Last, we find that, with bi-lateral risk neutrality, the seller always awards the good to the uninformed bidders thereby keeping all the surplus.Received: 22 October 2004, Revised: 21 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers:
D44, D82.We are very grateful to two anonymous referees, Jacques Crémer, Patrick François, Angel Hernando-Veciana and seminar participants at the 2004 SCSE conference (Quebec, Canada) for their valuable comments. Moez Bennouri acknowledges the financial support by the Initiative of the New Economy (INE) program of SSHRC (Canada). 相似文献
14.
We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed. 相似文献
15.
Subjects update prior information simultaneously versus sequentially. The mean prediction is remarkably close to the correct Bayesian estimate with simultaneous information, but differs significantly conditional on whether good news precedes bad news or vice versa. 相似文献
16.
Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
We investigate equilibria of sealed-bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs in the independent private values environment. We focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies (participate and bid the valuation iff it is greater than the cutoff), since if a bidder finds it optimal to participate, she cannot do better than bidding her valuation. When bidders are symmetric, concavity (strict convexity) of the cumulative distribution function from which the valuations are drawn is a sufficient condition for uniqueness (multiplicity) within this class. We also study a special case with asymmetric bidders and show that concavity/convexity plays a similar role. 相似文献
17.
Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggregates if and only if uncertainty about the fraction of winning bidders vanishes. It may be possible for the seller to impart this information by precommitting to a specified fraction of winning bidders, via a proportional selling policy. Intuitively, this could make the proportion of winners known, and thus provide all the information that bidders need to make winner's curse corrections. 相似文献
18.
Experimental research on first price sealed bid auctions has usually involved repeated settings with information feedback
on winning bids and payoffs after each auction round. Relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, significantly higher
bidding has been reported. The present paper reports the results of experimental first price auctions with n=7 where feedback on payoffs and winning bids is withheld. Under these conditions, average bidding is below the risk neutral
Nash equilibrium prediction but converges to it with repetition.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
19.
20.
We run an experiment where 97 subjects could retrieve records of completed past auctions before placing their bids in current
one-bid, two-bid, and auction-selection games. Each subject was asked to participate in 3 current auctions; but could retrieve
up to 60 records of completed (past) auctions. The results reveal a positive relation between the payoffs earned by the subjects
and their history-inspection effort. Subjects act as if responding to the average bidding-ratios of the winners in the samples
that they have retrieved. They apply intuitive signal-dependent stopping rules like “sample until observing a winner-value close to my won” or “find a close winner-value and try one more history” when sampling the databases. History-inspection directs bidders with relatively high private-valuations to moderate bidding
which increases their realized payoffs. (JEL C9 D4 D8)
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C93, D44, D83 相似文献