公司治理、资本监管与银行风险承担

选取2007-2017年中国25家上市银行数据,采用面板回归模型对公司治理与资本监管对银行风险承担的影响进行实证分析。研究表明：股权集中度与银行风险承担之间呈正U型关系,较低的股权集中度会降低银行风险资产配置权重,股权集中度的提升会加大银行风险承担。董事会规模会促进银行风险承担,董事会规模过大将平滑单个董事表决权,导致董事会控制效率下降而引发银行经营决策频繁变动,由此加大银行风险承担。资本监管会抑制银行风险承担,资本监管的趋严促使银行减持风险资产进行资本补充;资本监管对股份制银行、国有大型银行与城农商银行风险承担的影响力度依次递减。货币供给增速的放缓将降低银行存款吸收能力,由此加大银行流动性风险,货币供给对银行信贷存在制约效应;经济增速的下调将降低企业盈利能力,由此加大银行风险承担,银行存在顺周期放贷倾向。     

创新影响了银行风险承担吗?——基于中国上市银行的实证检验

本文将银行内部创新因素和外部创新环境引入银行风险承担研究框架,从理论和实证两个方面分析创新对银行风险承担的影响。研究结果发现,创新与银行风险承担之间呈现"U型"的关系,适度创新能够弱化银行风险承担,过度创新会加剧银行风险承担。进一步研究发现,内部创新对非五大行具有当期和滞后的双重影响,而对五大行仅具有当期效应。外部创新对五大行具有当期和滞后的双重影响,而对非五大行的当期影响不显著。企业还款能力、银行贷款质量和创新资产规模是创新影响银行风险承担的重要中介机制。此外,五大行对创新的敏感性小于非五大行,五大行可接受的创新区间大于非五大行。     

存款保险制度能否抑制银行个体风险承担?

基于2008-2019年我国30家上市银行的财务数据,研究了存款保险制度实施对银行风险承担行为的影响.对选取的经济变量进行单位根检验发现,变量均为平稳变量.利用固定效应模型进行实证回归分析,结果表明:总体上看,存款保险制度的推出增加了银行的风险承担行为;在将银行进行分类后,存款保险制度的实施对大型商业银行的风险承担影响...     

互联网金融、存款竞争与银行风险承担

本文通过构建纳入互联网金融的银行环形城市模型,推演了“互联网金融→存款结构/付息成本→银行风险承担”的传导机制。在此基础上,以2003-2016年我国83家商业银行为样本,建立多重中介效应模型进行实证检验。研究结果表明:(1)互联网金融发展经由恶化存款结构和抬高付息成本两种渠道显著加重了银行风险承担水平,其中,恶化存款结构效应的相对贡献为50%左右,抬高付息成本效应的相对贡献为35%左右;(2)相较于互联网渠道构筑业态,互联网支付结算、互联网资源配置和互联网财富管理业态对银行存款结构和付息成本的不利影响更为强烈;(3)相对于国有、大规模、低流动性和低资本充足率商业银行,面对互联网金融的冲击,非国有、小规模、高流动性和高资本充足率商业银行的客户存款流失更快,平均付息成本上涨更多。     

Does the ownership structure matter for banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking behavior? Empirical evidence from a developing country

This paper applies the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to examine the bi-directional relationship between banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking behavior concerning the impact of ownership structure. We have used a balanced panel dataset of banks from a developing country over the most recent period between 2006 and 2014. The empirical findings of this study suggest that higher capital regulation enhances banks’ stability when it combats with credit risk but higher credit risk often persuades abating capital ratio. Particularly, the key results are as follows: (i) the higher association of minority active shareholding in stability issues is positive; (ii) the higher contribution of active share holding promotes banks’ capital ratio; (iii) the lower ownership concentration prevents credit risk; (iv) private commercial banks are more risk averse and stable than state-owned banks and other type of banks; and (v) notably, Islamic banks show their superiority through overall performance despite their lower capital stability than conventional banks. Besides, no models show significant non-linear relationship between capital regulation and risk-taking except models of stability show a U-shaped relation in capital equation, indicating that when regulatory pressure works in a country then bank lose solvency at the initial stage. Finally, it also provides some imperative policy implications which will be very useful for a wide range of stakeholders.     

The Determinants of Bank Capital Ratios in a Developing Economy

This paper reports new findings on the determinants of bank capital ratios. The results are from an unbalanced panel data set spanning eight years around the period of the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. Test results suggest a strong positive link between regulatory capital and bank management’s risk-taking behaviour. The risk-based capital standards of the regulators did not have an influence on how regulatory capital is adjusted by low-capitalized banks, perhaps due to the well-documented banking fragility during the test period. Finally, bank capital decisions seem not to be driven by bank profitability, which finding is inconsistent with developed country literature that has for long stressed the importance of banks’ earnings as driving capital ratios. Although the study focuses only on one developing economy, these findings may help to identify the correlates of bank capital ratios in both developed and developing economies since this topic has received scant attention of researchers. These findings are somewhat consistent with how banks engaging in risky lending across the world could have brought on the 2007–2008 banking liquidity and capital erosion crisis.     

货币政策与银行风险承担

文章基于2013-2017年24家银行的微观数据,实证检验了货币政策银行风险承担渠 道的存在性与贷款损失准备金的调节作用,以及银行异质性特征对商业银行风险承担的异质 性影响。实证结果表明：（1）数量型和价格型货币政策风险承担效应存在,而结构型货币政策 风险承担效应不存在。（2）银行的贷款损失准备可以削弱货币政策对银行风险承担的影响。 因此,本文给出了央行应将银行风险承担状况纳入货币政策目标、实施不同的货币政策组合以 降低风险、监管当局应将贷款损失准备金率指标纳入监管框架的政策建议。     

A Top-down Approach to Stress-testing Banks

We propose a simple, parsimonious, and easily implementable method for stress-testing banks using a top-down approach that captures the heterogeneous impact of shocks to macroeconomic variables on banks’ capitalization. Our approach relies on a variable selection method to identify the macroeconomic drivers of banking variables as well as the balance sheet and income statement factors that are key in explaining bank heterogeneity in response to macroeconomic shocks. We perform a principal component analysis on the selected variables and show how the principal component factors can be used to make projections, conditional on exogenous paths of macroeconomic variables. We apply our approach, using alternative estimation strategies and assumptions, to the 2013 and 2014 stress tests of medium- and large-size U.S. banks mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, and obtain stress projections for capitalization measures at the bank-by-bank and industry-wide levels. Our results suggest that accounting for bank heterogeneity yields expected capital shortfalls that can be over 30 percent larger than in the case where heterogeneity is ignored. Furthermore, we find that while capitalization of the U.S. banking industry has improved in recent years, under reasonable assumptions regarding growth in assets and loans, the stress scenarios continue to imply sizable deterioration in banks’ capital positions.     

The Impact of Capital-Based Regulation on Bank Risk-Taking

In this paper we model the dynamic portfolio choice problem facing banks, calibrate the model using empirical data from the banking industry for 1984–1993, and assess quantitatively the impact of recent regulatory developments related to bank capital. The model implies a U-shaped relationship between capital and risk-taking: As a bank's capital increases it first takes less risk, then more risk. A deposit insurance premium surcharge on undercapitalized banks induces them to take more risk. An increased capital requirement, whether flat or risk-based, tends to induce more risk-taking by ex-ante well-capitalized banks that comply with the new standard. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G20, G28.     

Fintech,macroprudential policies and bank risk: Evidence from China

We explore the relationship between fintech, macroprudential policies, and commercial bank risk-taking. Based on system generalized method of moment modeling on a panel data of 114 commercial banks in China from 2013 to 2020, results show that there are functional differences in the impact of fintech on bank risk-taking. Payment and settlement technology (PST), capital raising technology (CRT) and investment management technology (IMT) are positively correlated with bank risk-taking. In contrast, market facility technology (MFT) negatively correlates with bank risk-taking. We also find that macroprudential policies weaken the promotion effect of CRT on bank risk-taking and strengthen the inhibition effect of MFT on bank risk-taking while having no significant moderating effect on PST and bank risk, IMT and bank risk. Further, the micro characteristics of banks (capital adequacy ratio, asset scale, liquidity level) affects the moderating strength of macroprudential policies. Various robustness tests confirm our conclusions.     

货币政策、银行资本与风险承担

考虑存款准备金率作为我国货币政策的重要工具,本文在D-L-M模型中引入了法定存款准备金,分析了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响,发现货币政策对银行风险承担的影响取决于银行资本状况。接着利用我国14家上市银行的季度数据,采用门限面板回归模型实证分析了货币政策对银行风险承担的影响。实证结果表明紧缩的货币政策对银行风险承担     

Are scale economies in banking elusive or illusive?: Evidence obtained by incorporating capital structure and risk-taking into models of bank production

This paper explores how to incorporate banks' capital structure and risk-taking into models of production. In doing so, the paper bridges the gulf between (1) the banking literature that studies moral hazard effects of bank regulation without considering the underlying microeconomics of production and (2) the literature that uses dual profit and cost functions to study the microeconomics of bank production without explicitly considering how banks' production decisions influence their riskiness.Various production models that differ in how they account for capital structure and in the objectives they impute to bank managers – cost minimization versus value maximization – are estimated using U.S. data on highest-level bank holding companies. Modeling the bank's objective as value maximization conveniently incorporates both market-priced risk and expected cash flow into managers' ranking and choice of production plans.Estimated scale economies are found to depend critically on how banks' capital structure and risk-taking are modeled. In particular, when equity capital, in addition to debt, is included in the production model and cost is computed from the value-maximizing expansion path rather than the cost-minimizing path, banks are found to have large scale economies that increase with size. Moreover, better diversification is associated with larger scale economies while increased risk-taking and inefficient risk-taking are associated with smaller scale economies.     

货币政策对流动性风险的影响——基于银行信贷行为视角

本文基于我国现实背景和《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》,利用2008年至2017年间194家商业银行的相关数据,对我国银行净稳定资金率进行了度量,并在此基础上,检验了货币政策对我国商业银行流动性风险的影响,探究了其影响机理和传导渠道。研究表明:扩张型货币政策会提高商业银行的流动性风险;不同经济环境下,货币政策对流动性风险的影响存在差异但不具备异质性;不同类型的商业银行中,货币政策对流动性风险的影响不具有异质性;在货币政策对流动性风险的影响中,银行信贷行为是重要的传导渠道。因此,央行可基于货币政策对流动性风险的影响差异进行相机抉择;商业银行则要加强信贷规模和质量的管理,优化资产结构,通过弱化信贷渠道作用来降低货币政策对银行流动性风险的不良影响。     

金融科技布局、银行信贷风险与经营绩效——来自商业银行与科技企业战略合作的证据

商业银行通过布局金融科技进行的金融服务创新,已成为深化金融供给侧结构性改革的重要举措。本文通过手工搜集2005—2019年323家商业银行与科技企业战略合作的数据,研究银行布局金融科技如何影响其信贷风险与经营绩效。结果表明：(1)银行布局金融科技战略能降低银行信贷风险,提高银行经营绩效;(2)银行布局金融科技通过提高其自身创新能力与竞争力从而降低银行的信贷风险水平;(3)银行布局金融科技,通过降低信贷风险、提升普惠金融服务、提高运营管理能力与拓展中间业务这四个渠道提高了银行经营绩效;(4)全国性银行发展金融科技使其信贷风险水平得到降低,资本充足率低的银行通过布局金融科技降低信贷风险的效果更强。同时,信用贷款比重越高的银行通过发展金融科技降低信贷风险、提高经营绩效的效果更加明显。本文研究有助于理解商业银行顺势而为所进行的金融科技布局的微观经济后果,也为进一步完善金融服务实体经济相关政策提供参考。     

极端气候对商业银行风险承担的影响——来自中国地方性商业银行的经验证据

深化对气候相关金融风险的认识,对于促进绿色低碳发展,防范系统性金融风险具有重要意义。本文以2004—2018年期间281家中国地方性商业银行为样本,实证检验了极端气候对银行风险承担的影响及其机制。研究发现,极端强降水气候显著提升了银行风险承担,极端高温和极端低温气候对银行风险承担不存在明显影响。极端强降水主要通过给银行信贷主体带来经济损失,影响违约概率和银行信贷资产质量,进而影响银行风险承担水平;提高灾前的保险保障水平、强化碳减排机制以及确保银行资本的充足性均有利于弱化极端气候对银行风险承担的影响;相较于以地级和省会城市工商业和居民为主要服务对象的地方性商业银行,极端强降水对以“三农”为主要服务对象的县域地方性商业银行风险承担的影响更大。因此,提升商业银行应对极端气候风险意识,提高气候灾害保险保障水平,强化碳减排机制和银行资本充足管理,均有利于降低极端气候对银行风险的影响。     

The Effects of the Sharing Economy: How Does Internet Finance Influence Commercial Bank Risk Preferences?

In this article, we provide an evidence on the effects of the sharing economy by studying internet finance. It aims to explore how internet finance affects the relationship between commercial bank risk preferences and monetary policy, and discusses whether this impact varies across heterogeneous banks. The results suggest that having a loose monetary policy encourages a preference for risk. In addition, internet finance alters the sensitivity of bank risk behavior to monetary policy. Internet finance has a heterogeneous influence, depending on a bank’s ownership (i.e., state or private) and size. At privately owned banks, internet finance has only a moderate impact on the bank risk-taking transmission channel of monetary policy, unlike the subsample of large banks.     

The regulations–risk taking nexus under competitive pressure: What about the Islamic banking system?

Does market power condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank risk taking? We focus on three regulatory tools: capital requirements, the restriction of activities, and official supervisory powers. Employing 10 years of unbalanced panel data on 123 Islamic and conventional banks operating in the Middle East and Asia, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, banking market power strengthens the negative impact of capital regulation on bank risk taking. Second, our empirical results suggest that the negative effect of activity restrictions on stability is diminished when banks have greater market power. Finally, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on banks’ risk taking is conditioned by their competitive behavior. In further analysis, we differentiate between Islamic and conventional banks regarding their competition, as well as their risk behavior. The results differ according to the banking business model. These findings could be useful for bank regulators in light of the accomplishment of Islamic banks’ regulatory framework. Indeed, the adoption of Basel III represents a significant regulatory challenge, given that it does not take into account the specificities of Islamic banks.     

结售汇如何影响银行风险承担水平?——基于银行资产负债表的视角

本文构建了一个基于银行资产负债表的理论模型,研究了结售汇对银行风险承担水平的影响机制,并采用结售汇报表数据进行实证检验。结果表明,为实现利润最大化,银行会将外汇流入创造的流动性用于投放较高风险的贷款,导致净结汇对银行风险承担水平有正向影响,异质性分析结果显示大型银行受影响程度高于中小银行。本文结论意味着,当考虑结售汇波动可能进一步加剧时,有必要出台更多结构性政策,补足外汇流入减少带来的货币缺口,优化存款市场结构,稳定金融机构流动性预期,以缓冲外需冲击可能带来的影响,并激励银行服务重心进一步下沉,为小微企业提供更多信贷支持,完成好金融服务实体经济的重要使命。     

Interest rates and bank risk-taking

A recent line of research views the low interest-rate environment of the early to mid 2000s as an element that triggered increased risk-taking appetite of banks in search for yield. This paper uses approximately 18000 annual observations on euro area banks over the period 2001-2008 and presents strong empirical evidence that low-interest rates indeed increase bank risk-taking substantially. This result is robust across a number of different specifications that account, inter alia, for the potential endogeneity of interest rates and/or the dynamics of bank risk. Notably, among the banks of the large euro area countries this effect is less pronounced for French institutions, which held on average a relatively low level of risk assets. Finally, the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk-taking due to individual bank characteristics reveal that the impact of interest rates on risk assets is diminished for banks with higher equity capital and is amplified for banks with higher off-balance sheet items.     

Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.