Relative accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts over time: a Markov chain analysis

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze the time patterns of individual analysts’ relative accuracy ranking in earnings forecasts using a Markov chain model. Two levels of stochastic persistence are found in analysts’ relative accuracy over time. Factors underlying analysts’ performance persistence are identified and they include analyst’s length of experience, workload, and the size and growth rate of firms followed by the analyst. The strength and the composition of these factors are found to vary markedly in different industries. The findings support the general notion that analysts are heterogeneous in their accuracy in earnings forecasts and that their superior/inferior performance tends to persist over time. An analysis based on a refined measure of analysts’ forecast accuracy ranking that strips off firm-specific factors further enhances the empirical validity of the findings. These findings provide a concrete basis for researchers to further explore why and how analysts perform differently in the competitive market of investment information services.     

Chaebol-affiliated analysts: Conflicts of interest and market responses

Some Korean business groups, or chaebols, have a large stake in securities firms that issue analysts’ reports on their member companies. This structure is unique in that industrial companies and securities firms are affiliated and operate within the same group. We investigate the informational content of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices made by the chaebol-affiliated analysts, using data collected between 2000 and 2008. The chaebol analysts tend to make more optimistic earnings forecasts for the member companies. The mean EPS forecast error (5.36%) of the affiliated analysts for the same chaebol company are significantly larger than that (3.23%) of other chaebol and independent analysts. The chaebol analysts also assign better recommendations by almost one level and set target prices 2.5% higher to the member companies after controlling for company and analyst characteristics. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that chaebol analysts’ reports are biased by conflicts of interest. Stock market reactions do not differ in response to announcements of stock recommendations issued by affiliated vs. non-affiliated analysts. This suggests that capital markets do not recognize the conflicts of interest inherent in chaebol analysts’ reports.     

Tagging the triggers: an empirical analysis of information events prompting sell-side analyst reports

In order to fulfill their function as information intermediaries in capital markets, sell-side equity analysts regularly issue updated forecasts on the stocks they cover. Quite often, the publication of (revised) analysts’ reports is subject to certain trigger events such as the publication of annual figures or the announcement of an upcoming merger. In this exploratory study, we develop a two-step procedure to identify the core events that trigger the release of analysts’ reports on companies that constitute the Dow Jones EuroSTOXX50 index during the three-year period from 2004 to 2006. These can be grouped into Financial Disclosures, Corporate Management, Corporate Strategy, Business Activity, Operating Environment and Share. The results suggest that sell-side analysts attach great importance to non-financial information events when transforming their earnings estimates into valuation forecasts and stock recommendations. Additionally, we link the information events identified as reasons of issuance to the summary measures disclosed in the reports in order to investigate the relationship between the report trigger and associated analyst reaction. Our findings indicate that the forecasting activity of sell-side analysts is greatly influenced by forward-looking statements made by management, strategy-related news flow, and non-company-specific information relating to the covered firm’s operating environment.     

The effect of repeat restructuring charges on analysts’ forecast revisions and accuracy

The primary objective of this study is to examine the effect of prior restructuring charges on analyst forecast revisions and accuracy. We find evidence that analysts respond differently to first-time restructuring firms than to repeat restructuring firms. Analysts revise their forecasts of both one-year-ahead earnings and five-year long-term growth in earnings more negatively for first-time restructuring firms than for firms with prior charges. When we examine forecast errors in the year subsequent to the restructuring, we find that current charges complicate analysts’ earnings forecast task. We further find that the decline in analyst forecast accuracy is mitigated by prior charges within past two years.     

A discussion of “Do managers use earnings guidance to influence street earnings exclusions?”

It is well known that both managers and analysts frequently define earnings by excluding various amounts from GAAP earnings. Christensen et al. (Rev Account Stud, 2011) make a prediction of causality whereby managers actively influence how analysts define earnings. They argue that the mechanism through which managers accomplish this is guidance of analysts’ earnings forecasts within a fiscal period. Using a large sample of firms actively followed by analysts, the authors examine whether the existence of earnings guidance is associated with higher levels of total exclusions in analysts’ definition of earnings. The study provides suggestive evidence that managers actively influence analysts’ definition of earnings that they forecast. However, the indirect nature of the research design calls for additional work to specifically link directed guidance of GAAP earnings exclusions to amounts actually excluded by analysts.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and analysts’ reliance on earnings announcements

Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibits corporations from selectively disclosing material information to groups of favored analysts and institutional investors. If information previously provided is excluded by the new regulation from analysts’ information set, it is plausible that the relative importance of the other information, such as earnings announcements, which remains could increase (Arya et al., 2005). The purpose of this study is to investigate whether analysts become more reliant on firm earnings announcements in revising their forecasts after implementation of the regulation. Our empirical results show that, after the regulation, more analysts issue forecasts immediately after earnings announcements. In addition, analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to converge more after observing earnings announcements in the post-regulation period. These results, in conjunction with the finding of higher overall level of forecast errors and dispersion, indicate that earnings announcements become more important information sources in the post regulation period. These findings suggest that analysts are more reliant on earnings announcements and there is an increase in analyst herding as a result of Regulation Fair Disclosure.     

Analyst forecast characteristics and the cost of debt

We examine the relation between analyst forecast characteristics and the cost of debt financing. Consistent with the view that the information contained in analysts’ forecasts is economically significant across asset classes, we find that analyst activity reduces bond yield spreads. We also find that the economic impact of analysts is most pronounced when uncertainty about firm value is highest (that is, when firms have high idiosyncratic risk). Our findings are robust to controls for private information in equity prices and level of corporate disclosures. Overall, the results indicate that the information contained in analyst forecasts is valued outside the equity market and provide an additional channel in which better information is associated with a lower cost of capital.     

Financial analysts' forecasts of earnings: A better surrogate for market expectations

The specification of the market expectation of accounting numbers is a common feature of many empirical studies in accounting and finance. Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) found that financial analysts' forecasts have information content. This study evaluates the quality of analysts' forecasts as surrogates for the market expectation of earnings and compares it with that of prediction models commonly used in research. Results indicate that prediction errors of analysts are more closely associated with security price movements, suggesting that analysts' forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts generated by time-series models. The study also identifies factors that might contribute to the performance of the financial analysts'forecasts. The broadness of the information set employed by analysts and, to a lesser extent, their reliance on information released after the end of the fiscal year appear to be important contributors to their performance.     

CEO stock options and analysts’ forecast accuracy and bias

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO stock options and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and bias. A higher level of stock options may induce managers to undertake riskier projects, to change and/or reallocate their effort, and to possibly engage in gaming (such as opportunistic earnings and disclosure management). These managerial behaviors result in an increase in the complexity of forecasting and hence, less accurate analysts’ forecasts. Analysts’ optimistic forecast bias may also increase as the level of stock options pay increases. Because forecast complexity increases with stock options pay, analysts, needing greater access to management’s information to produce accurate forecasts, have incentives to increase the optimistic bias in their forecasts. Alternatively, a higher level of stock options pay may lead to improved disclosure because it better aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests. The improved disclosure, in turn, may result in more accurate and less biased analysts’ forecasts. Our empirical evidence indicates that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy decreases and forecast optimism increases as the level of CEO stock options increases. This evidence suggests that the incentive alignment effects of stock options are more than offset by the investment, effort allocation and gaming incentives induced by stock options grants to CEOs.     

Analysts’ forecast revisions and firms’ research and development expenses

This study examines whether reported values for firms’ research and development (R&D) affect analysts’ annual earnings forecast revisions following quarterly earnings announcements. Because R&D introduces uncertainty into earnings forecasts, analysts may benefit from additional information searches in an effort to increase forecast accuracy. Also, accounting standards mandate an immediate expensing of R&D, in essence projecting a zero value for the R&D. To the extent that R&D will produce future payoffs, the expense treatment reduces the informativeness of reported earnings for forecasting future earnings. Thus, the marginal benefit of analysts’ efforts to produce more information may increase with the magnitude of the R&D component of earnings announcements and trigger additional forecast revisions. Alternatively, if the cost of information searches exceeds the benefit, analysts’ forecast revisions may decrease. Our results show a positive relation between R&D expenses and analysts’ forecast revision activity. We also find a positive and significant association between the level of R&D expenses and the magnitude of analysts’ forecast revisions following quarterly announcements. These results point to a greater amount of analyst scrutiny when reported earnings are accompanied by high levels of R&D expenses.

高铁能提升分析师盈余预测的准确度吗?——来自上市公司的证据

本文搜集了2006-2016年中国201个地级市高铁开通的情况,并匹配了A股1,244家上市公司的面板数据,利用双重差分(DID)模型,研究了高铁开通对证券分析师盈余预测的影响。研究结果显示:高铁通车之后,分析师盈余预测的精准度显著提升,分歧度和乐观度显著下降。进一步考察高铁发挥作用的内在机制,发现高铁开通显著增加了对沿线公司进行实地调研的分析师数量及人均调研次数。高铁开通对分析师盈余预测的影响存在异质性,影响主要体现在信息处理成本较低的企业、公司治理水平较好的企业以及分析师面临买方压力较小的企业中。动态地来看,高铁开通对分析师盈余预测的影响主要体现在通车两年以后。此外,在利用工具变量法、控制飞机出行以减少内生性问题之后,上述结论仍稳健。这说明高铁的开通改善了资本市场的信息环境,使得分析师能够更好地扮演信息中介的角色。文章较早研究了高铁开通对分析师盈余预测的影响,揭示了高铁在金融市场的信息传导效应。     

Does earnings acceleration convey information?

Valuation theory, investment managers, financial analysts, and textbooks advocating horizontal financial statement analysis suggest that the change in earnings growth (earnings acceleration) conveys value relevant information. We test this assertion using a large sample of U.S. firms. Results from cross-sectional short-window (around earnings announcements) and long-window (annual) returns-earnings regressions reveal a strong association between contemporaneous returns and earnings acceleration after controlling for earnings levels and changes. Moreover, earnings acceleration is useful in predicting future earnings, and financial analysts appear to use the information in earnings acceleration in addition to earnings levels and changes in revising their forecasts. Furthermore, earnings acceleration conveys information incremental to that provided by changes in analysts’ forecasts of long-term earnings growth. This study extends the empirical returns-earnings model that includes only earnings levels and changes and shows that more useful information can be extracted from reported earnings numbers than has been previously documented.     

The implications of ineffective internal control and SOX 404 reporting for financial analysts

The mandatory reporting of firms’ internal control effectiveness continues to be debated by equity market participants, U.S. regulatory agencies and oversight committees. We investigate the implications of material weaknesses in internal control and SOX 404 required reporting of such for financial analysts because analysts are important intermediaries in the U.S. capital market and it is not known whether analysts’ forecasts or coverage decisions are affected by firms’ internal control problems or reporting, respectively. Results of our empirical tests indicate that analysts provide less accurate forecasts and there is greater forecast dispersion for firms with ineffective internal control. We also find that firms that disclose internal control problems have less analyst coverage and that analyst following declines after the material weakness in internal control is disclosed. The results are robust to controlling for potential self-selection bias and management earnings guidance. Our study documents the consequences of ineffective internal control for an important class of financial statement users and suggests the required reporting on the effectiveness of internal control is beneficial to understanding the properties of analysts’ forecasts.     

Do star analysts know more firm-specific information? Evidence from China

Using a unique database in China, we extend the literature to further distinguish the information production role of star vs. non-star analysts. We confirm the general conclusion of a positive association between analyst coverage and stock return synchronicity measured by a firm’s R² in China. The findings from star analysts, however, show that star analyst coverage actually decreases stock return synchronicity. We contend that the firm-specific human capital in star analysts helps the analysts overcome the challenges of information production in an emerging market. The superior firm-specific human capital argument of star analysts is further supported by the negative association of star analysts’ firm-specific experiences and stock return synchronicity. Our conclusions are robust to different specifications of star analyst presence and different definitions of analysts’ firm-specific experiences. We also find that star analysts exhibit a more accurate earnings forecast than non-star analysts.     

Never judge a book by its cover: what security analysts have to say beyond recommendations

Our study analyzes market reaction to the entire content of a large sample of analysts’ reports from the period 2002 to 2004 for the German market. In particular, we explore whether the three summary measures in the reports, i.e., recommendation revisions, earnings forecast revisions, and target price forecast revisions are acknowledged by the market. Additionally, we investigate if stated justifications in the written text of analysts’ reports contain information value beyond the three summary measures. We find that earnings forecast revisions and target price forecast revisions contain valuable information, both unconditionally and conditional on the rest of the information in the report. Our findings also reveal that justifications made by analysts are of high salience to market participants. These justifications provide valuable information, both unconditionally and conditional on all other types of information in a report. Our findings also suggest that business ties between banks and the analyzed companies do not affect market reaction to dissemination of an analysts’ report.

Learning and incentive: A study on analyst response to pension underfunding

There is a long-standing debate on whether sell-side analysts learn from their experience to improve earnings forecast skills. This study shows that incentive is an important factor for understanding the “learning by doing” effect by analysts. We examine analysts’ response to a complex type of information – corporate pension underfunding. Pension underfunding negatively impacts future earnings and analysts on average underreact to such information in their earnings forecasts. More importantly, when there is a strong incentive for analysts to deliver accurate forecasts, analyst learning effectively reduces their underreaction to pension underfunding information. On the other hand, when such an incentive is absent, the analyst learning effect is not discernible in the data. Further evidence suggests that analyst learning and incentive jointly reduce stock market mispricing associated with corporate pension underfunding.     

Value relevance of analyst earnings forecasts in emerging markets

Even though research in accounting and finance has extensively examined the role of financial analysts in developed economies, this issue has not been thoroughly examined in an emerging market setting. In this paper, I examine whether, following a market opening, analyst forecast accuracy and the market's reliance on analyst forecasts increase with time. Accuracy is expected to increase over time as analysts exert more effort and gain valuable forecasting experience. Results indicate that time is positively related to analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for a number of other firm and country characteristics. Second, I posit that time should also be related to the market's propensity to use analyst forecasts to form earnings expectations. As markets open and investors become more sophisticated, the reliance on analyst forecasts should also increase. Results are consistent with this expectation. In particular, I find that in the first sub-period earnings expectations based on random walk exhibit greater relative information content than earnings expectations based on analyst forecasts. This pattern is reversed in the third sub-period where analyst forecast errors better explain returns. Incremental information content tests produce similar results. Future research should further investigate the relation between financial analysts and other important market characteristics in emerging economies.     

Beating market expectations and the pricing of firms’ probability of default

This study explores the impact of beating analysts' forecasts on investors' perceptions about firms' default probability. The information contained in analysts’ forecasts, both earnings and revenues, provides additional information to investors in pricing CDSs. While previous research has focused on the impact of beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, this study shows that firms that beat analysts' revenue forecasts also experience, on average, a decrease in the CDS premium around the earnings announcement date. This study also documents that the effect is stronger when firms beat/miss both earnings and revenue forecasts. When firms beat (miss) earnings and miss (beat) revenues, the effect of earnings is the dominant signal. These effects are stronger for firms with high levels of default risk.     

The stock price effects of changes in dispersion of investor beliefs during earnings announcements

Existing research provides competing theories about how dispersion of investor beliefs might affect stock prices. We measure changes in dispersion of investor beliefs around earnings announcements using changes in the dispersion of individual analysts’ forecasts. We find that the 3-day market response to earnings announcements is negatively associated with changes in dispersion, consistent with the cost of capital hypothesis. The results hold after controlling for the current earnings surprise, forecast revisions of future earnings, and reported earnings relative to various earnings thresholds. Our study provides new insight about the information contained in earnings announcements that is incremental to the magnitude and timing of cash flows.     

Do managers use earnings guidance to influence street earnings exclusions?

Despite the apparent importance of “street earnings” to investors, we know relatively little about the process through which this earnings metric is determined. The limited evidence in the extant literature provides analyst-centric explanations, suggesting that analysts’ abilities and incentives influence which line items forecast-tracking services exclude from GAAP earnings to arrive at street earnings. We propose an alternative explanation: managers actively influence analysts’ forecast exclusion decisions via earnings guidance. We test this explanation by examining how earnings guidance influences two aspects of analysts’ exclusions: (1) special item exclusions (i.e., nonrecurring items) and (2) incremental exclusions (i.e., recurring items). We find that for firms with no special items in the previous year, when managers guide, analysts exclude almost all current-year special items, whereas when managers do not guide, the proportion that analysts exclude is significantly lower. More importantly, we that analysts’ incremental exclusions are significantly higher when managers guide than when they do not guide. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers play an active role in influencing the composition of street earnings via earnings guidance.