Economic downturns,inequality, and democratic improvements

This paper explores the extent to which discrete improvements in the democratic quality of political institutions can be explained by income inequality. Empirical tests of this relationship have generally yielded null results, though typically test an unconditional relationship. Guided by a theoretical nuance of the “new economic view” of democratization and using an instrumental variable strategy, we re-examine the relationship conditional on the state of the macroeconomy. We demonstrate that the more unequal are societies, the higher the probability of experiencing democratic improvements following economic downturns. Following growth periods, higher income inequality has a slight negative or null effect on the likelihood of democratic improvement. The conditional result provides a simple explanation for why previous literature has found largely null results concerning inequality and democratization and offers additional evidence in support of the new economic view.     

International trade, exhaustible-resource abundance and economic growth

Countries with oil and other natural resources have grown less rapidly than those countries without. This phenomenon is known as the “natural resource curse”. We develop an infinite-horizon, two-country model of trade in which countries are identical, except that one country is endowed with deposits of an exhaustible resource and the other is not. Within the context of the model, we show that this phenomenon can be explained in part by an inelastic demand for the exhaustible resource that increases growth in trade revenues and induces the resource-abundant country to invest relatively less than the country lacking in exhaustible resources. These results are derived analytically and illustrated by an empirical analysis based on plausible parameters obtained from data.     

Crime and growth convergence: Evidence from Mexico

Scholars have often argued that crime hinders growth, but the empirical literature assessing such an effect is scarce. By exploiting cross-municipal income and crime data for Mexico, in this study we find evidence indicating that drug-related crime indeed deters growth.     

Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism in developing countries: An empirical assessment

We find that political freedom has a significant and non-linear effect on domestic terrorism, but has no statistically significant effect on transnational terrorism. Geography and fractionalization limit a country’s ability to curb terrorism, while strong legal institutions deter terrorism.     

Poverty trap and global indeterminacy in a growth model with open-access natural resources

In this paper we use global analysis techniques to analyze an economic growth model with environmental negative externalities, giving rise to a three-dimensional dynamic system (the framework is the one introduced by Wirl (1997) [53]). The dynamics of our model admits a locally attracting stationary state , which is, in fact, a poverty trap, coexisting with another stationary state possessing saddle-point stability. Global dynamical analysis shows that, under some conditions on the parameters, if the initial values of the state variables are close enough to the coordinates of , then there exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories approaching and one trajectory approaching . Therefore, our model exhibits global indeterminacy, since either or can be selected according to agent expectations. Moreover, we prove that conditions guaranteeing the attractivity of also imply the saddle-point stability of . However, when is not attractive, numerical simulations show the possible existence of one or two limit cycles: an attractive one surrounding and one endowed with a two-dimensional stable manifold surrounding .     

Democracy vs. dictatorship

A democratic society is often regarded as a prerequisite for economic growth and development. Yet, most empirical studies are not capable of identifying a positive link between GDP growth and democracy indexes. In addition, it is a stylized empirical fact that: (i) most developing countries are dictatorships; and (ii) many poor dictatorships have experienced high growth performances and emerged from poverty such as South Korea, China and Egypt. Against this background, it is of interest to analyse in which ways the growth performance between autocratic and democratic economies may differ, in particular among low-income countries. To answer this question, we compare the endogenous growth paths of two economies that differ only in their political regimes in the context of an overlapping generations model. The key features of the model are: (i) a positive bequest motive in the form of investments in education or productive public capital (infrastructure); (ii) a higher marginal (inter-temporal) utility of consumption today versus consumption tomorrow in low-income countries (for example, subsistence level of consumption); and (iii) a dictator that cares about her income or the income of her dynasty tomorrow. In this framework, we demonstrate that poor but large and stable dictatorships exhibit a higher equilibrium growth rate than comparable (equally poor) democracies. Moreover, there exists a particular threshold value in income such that the growth-reducing impact of dictatorial consumption (corruption) outweighs the higher (initial) public investments. Above this, the growth rate under democracy dominates the one in dictatorship.     

Democracy,dictatorship, and transformation: A proposal for a constitution-guided systematic change in formerly Soviet republics

A system transformation contains complicated social dilemmas and special-interest problems. Thus it is frequently suggested that democratic decisionmaking is inappropriate for introducing a market economy in the former socialist countries. In this paper I argue that this view rests on a nirvana approach, because it neglects the dynamics of authoritarian governments. It is shown that dictatorships tend to serve even narrower special interests than democracies and are therefore usually less likely to pursue a consistent transformation policy. However, a dictatorship could, under certain cultural and social conditions, have some advantages over democracies. But those conditions are barely present in the formerly socialist countries. Moreover, a dictatorship can by its very nature not be committed and cannot even commit itself to a certain public policy. Hence, there is only one instrument to mitigate social dilemmas in transformation countries: a set of constitutional rules. Some basic properties of a constitutional approach of system transformation are introduced in the last section of the paper.     

Reputation, group structure and social tensions

Social tensions impede social cohesion and public goods provision, and can be a driving force for more serious conflicts such as civil wars. Surprisingly, the emergence of social tensions has been studied only rarely in the literature. In the present contribution a game-theoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the structure of group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In particular, the respective effects of ethnic fractionalization, polarization and segregation are analyzed. The differences between ethnicity and class, and the role of social mobility are also studied. The predictions of the model can account for recent empirical evidence.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.     

Power, growth, and the voracity effect

Why is it that resource-rich countries tend to have lower growth rates than resource-poor countries? And why is it that many countries that enjoy terms-of-trade windfalls end up with lower growth rates? To explain these puzzles, we extend the neoclassical growth model by replacing the representative agent with multiple powerful groups and by introducing a new concept, the voracity effect—a more than proportional increase in redistribution in response to an increase in the raw rate of return. We show that, in an economy with powerful groups and weak institutions, the voracity effect operates if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high enough. That is, there exists a negative relationship between the growth rate and the raw rate of return, which is positively related to the terms of trade. We provide some empirical evidence in support of the mechanism we propose.     

Variable factor shares, measurement and growth accounting

Recent evidence shows that factor shares are not constant. Consequently, growth accounting exercises rely on a false assumption and a measurement problem arises. We propose an empirical methodology to solve the measurement issue and estimate TFP growth.     

Geography,health, and the pace of demo-economic development

This paper investigates the impact of subsistence consumption and extrinsic and intrinsic causes of child mortality on fertility and child expenditure. It offers a theory for why mankind multiplies at higher rates at geographically unfavorable, tropical locations. Placed into a macroeconomic framework this behavior creates an indirect channel through which geography shapes economic performance. It is explained why it are countries of low absolute latitude where we observe exceedingly slow (if not stalled) economic development and demographic transition.     

Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.     

Variety of products,public capital,and endogenous growth

This paper develops an extension of the endogenous growth model with variety expansion presented in Romer [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technical change, Journal of Political Economy 98, part 2, S71–S102] by considering public capital accumulation. Characterizing the transitional dynamics, the growth rate of consumption traces (and available number of intermediate goods also might trace) an S-shaped converging path to the equilibrium growth rate, similar to a logistic growth curve, if the intensity of public capital is sufficiently high. We also show that public investment enhances economic growth because it stimulates demand for intermediate goods and raises the market interest rate.     

Information disclosure, banking development and knowledge-driven growth

In this study we develop a knowledge-driven growth model which explicitly models the banking sector as monopolistically competitive. The main mechanism through which financial intermediaries affect the real economy is through the evaluation and provision of liquidity to R&D projects. We distinguish two scenarios. In the regime with information disclosure, banks are able to use the stock of information obtained by the banking industry from evaluating R&D projects. This information externality brings about efficiency improvements, thereby leading to a positive entry of banks, more bank-funded research and in turn positive economic growth. By contrast, in the regime with no information disclosure, it is not profitable for new banks to enter the industry. This implies that no more potential R&D projects can be evaluated and hence financed, thus leading the economy to a zero-growth equilibrium.     

Reform Unleashed Korean Growth

Before the reform in the 1960s, twin vicious circles perpetuated the shortages of foreign exchange and labor skill, and prevented the Korean economy from realizing its considerable growth potential. The breakthrough came when the Japanese labor shortage facilitated Korean exports, after economic normalization between the two countries. The reformed institutions reduced rent‐seeking and refocused Korean managerial efforts to pioneering activities. The Korean takeoff scenario is a shared theme among all four Asian newly industrialized economies cited by Lucas (1988) as showcases.     

Trade liberalization and economic growth: a case study of Iran

We estimate the impact of trade liberalization and physical and human capital accumulation on Iran’s economic growth during the period 1959?2007. Using co-integration techniques and a vector error correction model, we find a unique long-run relationship between economic growth and its major determinants. These determinants include the physical and human capital stock, the labor force, real non-oil exports, and import tariffs. In addition, the short-term error correction dynamics analysis suggests that trade liberalization has a significant long run positive role in dynamic of growth. Our results support the view that the integration of the Iranian economy with the world economy is undoubtedly welfare improving.     

Population heterogeneity and growth

I investigate the robustness of the link between growth and heterogeneity in a population along ethnic, linguistic, religious, and socio-economic class lines using cross-country data covering the period 1960–92 and 72 countries. In addition to 21 distinct explanatory variables extensively used in the empirical growth literature, I consider several fragmentation and polarization indices capturing the heterogeneity in a population to deal with measurement uncertainty, and utilize Bayesian Model Averaging techniques to address uncertainty issues regarding model specification. My results indicate that while substantial data evidence favors the inclusion of population heterogeneity as a theory when proxied by fragmentation indices, it does not support the inclusion of this theory when proxied by polarization indices. Furthermore, the religious fragmentation index has the strongest evidence in favor of its inclusion as opposed to ethnic and linguistic fragmentation indices and income inequality.     

Does oil corrupt? Evidence from a natural experiment in West Africa

This paper explores the oil discovery announcements in Sao Tome and Principe (1997-1999) to assess the role of natural resources in determining corruption. For this purpose, we use a natural experiment framework which contrasts Sao Tome and Principe to Cape Verde, a control West African country sharing the same colonial past and important recent economic and political shocks. Our measurement is based on tailored household surveys we conducted in both island countries. The unique survey instrument was retrospective and used personal histories to elicit memories from the respondents. We analyze changes in perceived corruption across a wide range of public services and allocations. We find clearest increases on vote buying, education (namely in the allocation of scholarships) and customs, ranging from 31 to 40% of the subjective scale. We interpret these findings as symptoms of increased competition for core state resources.