Socially responsible investment funds: Investor reaction to current and past returns

This paper investigates and compares the determinants of fund flows for socially responsible investment (SRI) funds and conventional funds. We consider the impact of current and past measures of monthly and annual return on fund flow. The results suggest SRI fund flows are less sensitive to returns than conventional funds. Our model also shows that flow is persistent and SRI investors are more likely to invest in a fund they already own relative to conventional investors. These results reflect the difficulty SRI investors face in finding alternative investments that meet their non-financial goals.     

Behavioural analysis of socially responsible investment managers: specialists versus non-specialists

We analyse the performance and performance persistence of US socially responsible investment (SRI) managers from a managers’ perspective, differentiating between specialist managers (only running SRI mutual funds) and non-specialists (running SRI and conventional mutual funds). We find that the SRI fund nature has a significantly negative influence on the non-specialist performance. Furthermore, top managers of both groups persistently outperform SRI funds. However, non-specialist managers obtain superior performance to specialist managers, perhaps because of learning synergies in both fund niches. Results also show more persistence with non-specialists, especially with regard to conventional mutual funds.     

Is ethical money financially smart? Nonfinancial attributes and money flows of socially responsible investment funds

We study the money flows into and out of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds around the world. In their investment decisions, investors in SRI funds may be more concerned with ethical or social issues than with fund performance. Therefore, SRI money flows are less related to past fund returns. Ethical money is less sensitive to past negative returns than are conventional fund flows, especially when SRI funds primarily use negative or Sin/Ethical screens. Social attributes of SRI funds weaken the relation between money inflows and past positive returns. However, money flows into funds with environmental screens are more sensitive to past positive returns than are conventional fund flows. Stock picking based on in-house SRI research increases the money flows. These results give evidence on the role of nonfinancial attributes, which induce heterogeneity of investor clienteles within SRI funds. We find no evidence of a smart money effect, as the funds that receive more inflows neither outperform nor underperform their benchmarks or conventional funds.     

What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks?

We examine the portfolio rebalancing, measured by the equity churn rate, of mutual funds from 29 countries based on annual stockholdings over the 1999–2006 period. We find that funds more often trade the stocks of companies located in countries with higher degree of information asymmetry and are less familiar to fund managers, after we control for the effects of stock market development and investor protection. Consistent with the behavioral bias, fund managers more often rebalance stocks in foreign markets that perform well. This bias is exacerbated when fund managers are less familiar with and less informed about those markets.     

Socially Responsible Fixed-Income Funds

Abstract:  The growing importance of SRI in the investment arena has resulted in considerable academic interest in the performance of socially responsible equity mutual funds. Remarkably, no attempts have been made to evaluate the performance of mutual funds that invest in socially responsible fixed-income securities. This study fills that gap by measuring the performance of socially responsible bond and balanced funds relative to matched samples of conventional funds, over the period 1987–2003. Using multi-index performance evaluation models, we show that the average SRI bond fund performed similar to conventional funds, while the average SRI balanced fund outperformed its conventional peers by more than 1.3% per year. The expenses charged by SRI funds, match those charged by conventional funds and, evidently, do not cause SRI funds to underperform.     

Is corporate social responsibility sufficient enough to explain the investment by socially responsible funds?

I propose an explanation for investment decisions by socially responsible investment funds (SRI) on the firms with higher corporate social responsibility (CSR). Different from the previous literature, I use a unique and comprehensive measure that considers both firm CSR ratings and fund CSR perception. I show SRI mutual funds increase their ownership about 15 % for one unit increase in the firm CSR score when those funds are highly sensitive to CSR. This finding is more pronounced for employee relations and society areas of CSR. The results also hold for a broader range of mutual funds. While industry concentration does not have influence on the fund investment, SRI funds particularly choose socially responsible firms operating in construction, transportation, personal services, and financial sector. I show the funds with CSR sensitivity underperform the market in general and fail to improve their portfolio performance after they invest in the firms with high CSR.     

Socially responsible investing: Is it for real or just for show?

Many mutual funds declare themselves as socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. However, it is unclear whether this rhetoric is simply window-dressing to attract capital inflows or reflects genuine concern. We show that companies with better environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance are more attractive to SRI mutual funds. More importantly, SRI mutual funds positively affect their investee firms' ESG performance after controlling for firm characteristics, possible endogeneity issues, and omitted variables. Furthermore, ownership structure, board members' international experience, and social media attention are important channels through which SRI mutual funds influence their investee firms' ESG performance.     

Fund flows and performance: New evidence from retail and institutional SRI mutual funds

In this paper we provide a comprehensive analysis of the performance of US SRI mutual funds as well as its relation to the flow of new money that those funds experience in the context of investors sophistication. In particular, we compare the performance of SRI funds with their conventional peers, matched by both managers and characteristics criteria, using several performance measures. We investigate the role of investors sophistication and its influence on the flow-performance and performance-flow relations within the retail and institutional SRI fund shareclasses. For the analysis of the flow-performance relation we use portfolio approach along with monotonic relation test, while the shape of the flow-performance relation is studied using piecewise linear panel regressions. For the performance-flow relation, the flow and unexpected flow portfolios are formed and their risk-adjusted performance is evaluated. We find that SRI mutual fund sector earns positive abnormal returns before expenses and retail SRI funds outperform their institutional peers both, before and after fees. No differences in performance when we consider SRI and conventional funds run by the same management companies. Moreover, we find a positive flow-performance relation which is convex for retail SRI funds but no convexity is found for the institutional ones. We cannot confirm the smart money effect for retail SRI funds, instead we find a dumb money effect for SRI institutional funds. Our paper provides new insights into the role of the investors sophistication for those relations in the presence of sustainability preferences.     

Time-varying fund manager skills of socially responsible investing (SRI) funds in developed and emerging markets

We examine stock selectivity and timing abilities in the market-wide return, volatility and liquidity of SRI fund managers. We find that multi-dimensional fund manager skills are time-varying and persistent in the short run, with developed market funds exhibiting longer persistence in all dimensions. Fund manager skills tend to be affected by fund characteristics (i.e., expense ratio, fund size, turnover and management tenure) and market characteristics (i.e., ESG market capitalization, mandatory ESG regulation and 10–2 yield spread). Fund managers of developed (emerging) market funds outperform (underperform) the market indices. For both fund types, fund managers possess exceptional volatility and liquidity timing despite poor return timing. Moreover, fund managers focus more (less) on timing the market’s return and less (more) on picking stocks when the prospect of recession keeps increasing (decreasing). Interestingly, if fund managers attempt to time the market-wide return or liquidity, stock selectivity will be worsened by their timing behavior.     

Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

Closing and cloning in open-end mutual funds

Using a unique dataset, we document that only those closed funds for which no new fund is subsequently launched continuously deliver positive abnormal returns. This suggests the existence of an optimal fund scale. In spite of the potential diseconomies of scale, a non-trivial proportion of closed funds have new funds cloned—the scale motive would not be a complete explanation for the closure. When managers of closed funds clone new funds, they receive greater public attention and thus can attract more fund flows and charge higher fees. Furthermore, better-performing closed fund managers attract more fund flows to their new siblings, making the closure an effective mechanism to extract economic rents. Overall, we find that closing and cloning is an attractive strategy for funds seeking to increase their management fees and funds with more managers in place. Aspects of the closed fund family also affect the launch decision of new siblings.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.     

Do social factors influence investment behavior and performance? Evidence from mutual fund holdings

We study the economic significance of social dimensions in investment decisions by analyzing the holdings of U.S. equity mutual funds over the period 2004–2012. Using these holdings, we measure funds’ exposures to socially sensitive stocks in order to answer two questions. What explains cross-sectional variation in mutual funds’ exposure to controversial companies? Does exposure to controversial stocks drive fund returns? We find that exposures to socially sensitive stocks are weaker for funds that aim to attract socially conscious and institutional investor clientele, and they relate to local political and religious factors. The financial payoff associated with greater “sin” stock exposure is positive and statistically significant, but becomes non-significant with broader definitions of socially sensitive investments. Despite the positive relation between mutual fund return and sin stock exposure, the annualized risk-adjusted return spread between a portfolio of funds with highest sin stock exposure and its lowest-ranked counterpart is statistically not significant. The results suggest that fund managers do not tilt heavily towards controversial stocks because of social considerations and practical constraints.     

Analyst forecasts and European mutual fund trading

This paper addresses the questions whether European mutual fund managers rely on sell-side analyst information and whether this behavior impacts fund performance. Results show that mutual funds significantly increase (decrease) their holdings in stocks when any of the consensus forecast measures increases (decreases) within the quarter prior to the observation period. Furthermore, mutual fund managers primarily attribute high information value to consensus forecast revisions that contain positive information, that are based on a sufficiently high number of inputs, and with more unanimous inputs to the consensus. Finally, following sell-side research seems to be beneficial for mutual fund managers since our results show that stock trades that are in line with analyst forecast revisions significantly outperform trades that are contrary to analyst research.     

IMPORTANCE OF THE FUND MANAGEMENT COMPANY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE MUTUAL FUNDS

We compare the performance of a sample of U.K.‐based socially responsible investment (SRI) funds with similar conventional funds using a matched‐pair analysis based on size, age, investment universe, and fund management company (FMC). We find that both the SRI and conventional funds outperform the market index about 50% of the time, even after fees. Subsample tests show that the SRI funds in our sample perform better in the pre‐ and postfinancial crisis periods but underperform during the financial crisis period. Importantly, we find that the FMC plays a major role in the outperformance of both SRI and conventional funds.     

Socially responsible funds and market crises

Compared to matched conventional mutual funds, socially responsible mutual funds outperform during periods of market crises. This dampening of downside risk comes at the cost of underperforming during non-crisis periods. Investors seeking downside protection would value the asymmetry of these returns. This asymmetric return pattern is driven by the mutual funds that focus on environmental, social, or governance (ESG) attributes and is especially pronounced in ESG funds that use positive screening techniques. Furthermore, the observed patterns are attributed to the funds’ socially responsible attributes and not the differences in fund portfolio management or the characteristics of the companies in fund portfolios.     

Reputation stretching in mutual fund starts

This study examines the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual funds. We show that the reputation stretching strategy increases net fund inflows to new funds run by well-performing fund managers and yields a net increase of fund inflows to fund families. Reputable fund managers exhibit one-year performance persistence for managing new funds, which can help investors assess managers when selecting funds. We also find that the decrease in information asymmetry associated with managerial reputation benefits investors by leading to an increase in new fund returns in the short run, compared to those of new funds run by managers without track records. Overall, the reputation stretching strategy benefits both investors, by reducing information asymmetry and improving investment returns, and fund families, by increasing net fund inflows to new equity funds.     

Is there a Difference? The Performance Characteristics of SRI Equity Indices

Abstract:  This study analyses whether stock indices that represent socially responsible investments (SRI) exhibit a different performance compared to conventional benchmark indices. In contrast to other studies, the analysis concentrates on SRI indices and not on investment funds. This has several advantages, since transaction costs of funds, the timing activities and the skill of the fund management do not have to be considered. A direct measure of the performance effects of SRI screens is therefore examined. The 29 SRI stock indices are analysed by single-equation models as well as by multi-equation systems that exploit the information in the cross-section. SRI stock indices do not exhibit a different level of risk-adjusted return than conventional benchmarks. But many SRI indices have a higher risk relative to the benchmarks. The findings are robust to the use of different benchmark indices and apply to all common types of SRI screening.