Is the diversification discount caused by the book value bias of debt?

We analyze whether the diversification discount is driven by the book value bias of corporate debt. Book values of debt may be a more downward biased proxy of the market value of debt for diversified firms, relative to undiversified firms, as diversification leads to lower firm risk. Thus, measures of firm value based on book values of debt undervalue diversified firms relative to focused firms. Our paper complements recent literature which uses market values to test the risk reduction hypothesis for a subsample of firms for which debt is traded. Alternatively, we employ market value of debt estimates for the whole firm universe. Consistent with the above hypothesis, we show that the use of book values of debt underestimates the value of diversified firms. There is no discount for mainly equity financed firms and lower distress risk and equity volatility for diversified firms. More concentrated ownership increases firm valuation.     

How much can illiquidity affect corporate debt yield spread?

We present a structural method for measuring the upper bound for the illiquidity risk of liabilities issued by a levered firm. The method calculates the upper bound of illiquidity spread of a corporate bond given its duration and the issuing firm’s asset risk and leverage ratio. Consistent with the empirical literature the illiquidity spread is positively related to the issuing firm’s asset risk and leverage ratio and the illiquidity component increases with a bond’s credit quality. The term structure of illiquidity spread has a humped shape, where its maximum level depends on the firm’s leverage ratio. Finally, we demonstrate how the method’s implied restricted trading period can be used as a measure for illiquidity in the bonds’ market.     

How to explain non-performing loans by many corporate governance variables simultaneously? A corporate governance index is built to US commercial banks

This paper aims to combine the principal component analysis and GMM dynamic panel data methods in order to estimate the effect of corporate governance system on non-performing loans. The first method is meant to construct a corporate governance index for US commercial banks. The second one allows us to study the relation between the built index and non-performing loans. The advantage of the combination of these methods is reducing the number of corporate governance variables into a single one and ensuring the consistency of GMM estimates, given that a high number of variables leads to an increase in the number of GMM instruments, which in turns results in biased estimators. Applying these methods to US commercial banks, for a period including the financial crisis years, we find that small banks are characterized by a sound corporate governance system that reduces their non-performing loans. In opposition, the corporate governance fails to protect medium and large US commercial banks from excessive risk-taking that damages their loans’ quality and even leads to enormous losses especially during the global financial crisis.     

May the course of the tuberculosis-mortality chiefly be explained by the movements of the infection-curve (tuberculin-curve)?

Abstract

Let us suppose that we have a population which is kept constant by the birth of 10,000 children annually, and that this has been the case for a number of years.     

How useful are commercial corporate governance ratings? Evidence from emerging markets

A central issue in evaluating the effects of firm-level corporate governance (FLCG) is how to measure it. We focus here on emerging markets (EMs). One common approach to measuring FLCG uses country-specific (CSIs), tailored to each country's laws and institutions. Several studies report that CSIs can predict firm outcomes in a panel data framework with two-way (firm and time) fixed effects (TWFE). An alternate approach uses commercial CG ratings (CCGRs) that apply the same or similar elements across many countries. We assess the three best available CCGRs covering EMs (Asset4, Thomson Reuters, and MSCI), and find that they do not predict firm outcomes with TWFE in EMs. We also provide evidence that the likely cause for CCGRs' lack of performance is their poor construction rather than the inability of FLCG measures to predict outcomes. CSI-based studies suggest that disclosure (beyond country-mandated minimums) is the FLCG aspect that most consistently predicts firm outcomes in EMs. Yet, these CCGRs have no or minimal measures of disclosure. Other important limitations of the CCGRs include the use of elements that are U.S.-centric; reflect firm outcomes rather than CG; are implausible measures of good FLCG, or are vaguely or subjectively defined. We also attempt, but fail, to use element-level information from CCGRs to construct sound measures of FLCG.     

Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing?

We investigate how company-level corporate governance practices and country-level legal investor protection jointly affect company performance. We find that in any legal regime there are a few specific governance practices that improve performance. Companies with good governance practices operating in stringent legal environments, however, show a valuation discount relative to similar companies operating in flexible legal environments. At the same time, a stronger country-level regime does not reduce the valuation discount of companies with weak governance practices. Our analysis suggests a threshold level of country development above which stringent regulation hurts the performance of well governed companies or has a neutral effect for poorly governed companies.     

Do corporate governance recommendations improve the performance and accountability of small listed companies?

This study examines whether the implementation of the 2003 Australian Securities Exchange Limited governance recommendations influenced the governance choices of small companies and whether compliance improves their accounting and market performance and earnings quality. Our analysis examines small and large companies because we are interested in the different effects of the governance recommendations on the two groups. The analysis shows a significant shift by small and large companies to comply with the recommendations around the time of their introduction. We find that formation of an audit committee surrounding the reform period is significantly associated with improved earnings quality for small and large companies. However, compliance with other governance recommendations is not systematically associated with improved performance or earnings quality.     

Does corporate diversification by business groups create value? Evidence from Korean chaebols

We investigate the valuation effects of diversification activities by Korean business groups known as chaebols. Employing an extensive dataset of Korean firms and accounting for the endogeneity problem associated with firms' diversification decisions, we offer reconciling evidence that unrelated diversification by Korean firms erodes firm value, but their related diversification does not decrease firm value. Undocumented in the existing literature, we further provide new evidence that a firm's affiliation to a large business group amplifies the valuation effect of firm-level diversification, such that the non-negative or weak positive valuation effect of related diversification is stronger for large business group firms. These findings are supportive of the notion that the unique characteristics of large business group firms such as stronger internal factor markets enable these firms to take advantage of the synergic benefits associated with related diversification. Our findings are robust to different model and sample specifications.     

Information asymmetry and bank regulation: Can the spread of debt contracts be explained by recovery rates?

We investigate whether the spread of corporate debt contacts can be explained by their ultimate recovery rates. Using the actual realized recovery rates of defaulted debt instruments issued in the US from 1962 to 2007, we find that recovery rate is reflected in the spread at issuance, and that this relationship has become more significant since commercial banks were allowed to underwrite corporate securities. Our further investigation indicates that the enhanced informativeness of recovery rate can be attributed to the lowering of information asymmetry of individual firms. Besides, the relation between the spread at issuance and the recovery rate is stronger for weak corporate governance and non-investment grade issuers. Our conclusions are found to be robust to endogeneity issues, potentially omitted variables and alternative model specifications.     

Conglomerates on the rise again? A cross-regional study on the impact of the 2008–2009 financial crisis on the diversification discount

This paper investigates how the 2008–2009 financial crisis affected the value of diversification in different regions of the world, thereby emphasizing the role of the institutional context. We show that the effect of the credit crunch upon the diversification discount varied with the regions' level of capital market maturity and legal environment. In developed Asia Pacific, the British Isles, and North America, we find that the discount on conglomerates fell significantly during the crisis years; however, in Continental Europe – the region possessing the least developed capital markets and lowest legal investor protection in our sample – the impact of the financial meltdown upon the relative value of diversified firms was insignificant. Our study provides additional evidence on factors influencing the relative costs and benefits of diversified firms and highlights in particular the importance of accounting for different institutional settings.     

How right should the customer be?

If your salespeople aren't sure who their boss is--the district manager? the regional manager? the customer?--it could be a sign that your company's sales force controls are working at cross-purposes and that your sales function is in trouble. Sales force controls are the policies and practices that govern the way you train, supervise, motivate, and evaluate your sales staff. They include the types of compensation you offer your people and the criteria your sales managers use to evaluate the reps' performance. These controls let salespeople know which trade-offs the company would prefer them to make when the inevitable conflicts arise between what they want to do (spend lots of time and money to get a sale) and what they actually can do (use limited resources and still get the sale). When sales force controls aren't aligned--when, say, the system simultaneously encourages reps to be entrepreneurial but also to file detailed call reports and check in frequently with their bosses--individuals become discouraged and unproductive, and they eventually leave the company. The authors' research suggests there are significant differences between the control systems of companies that encourage salespeople to put the customer first-outcome control (OC) systems--and those that encourage reps to put their managers first--behavior control (BC) systems. In this article, they list the characteristics of OC and BC systems, describe the potential fallout from conflicts within these systems, and explain how you can tell which control system is appropriate for your firm. In most cases, the right choice will be a consistent system somewhere in the middle of the OC-BC continuum.     

The role of the media in corporate governance: Do the media influence managers' capital allocation decisions?

Using 636 large acquisition attempts that are accompanied by a negative stock price reaction at their announcement (“value-reducing acquisition attempts”) from 1990 to 2010, we find that, in deciding whether to abandon a value-reducing acquisition attempt, managers' sensitivity to the firm's stock price reaction at the announcement is influenced by the level and the tone of media attention to the proposed transaction. We interpret the results to imply that managers have reputational capital at risk in making corporate capital allocation decisions and that the level and tone of media attention heighten the impact of a value-reducing acquisition on the managers' reputational capital. To the extent that value-reducing acquisition attempts are more likely to be abandoned, the media can play a role in aligning managers' and shareholders' interests.     

Institutional block-holdings of UK firms: do corporate governance mechanisms matter?

Using a sample of UK firms, we find that institutional block-holding is negatively associated with directors’ ownership and is positively associated with board composition, suggesting that institutional block-holders regard directors’ ownership and board composition as substitute and complementary control mechanisms, respectively. We also show that UK institutional block-holders prefer smaller firms and firms with a shorter listing history. The presence of institutional block-holders is associated with smaller boards and lower trading liquidity. Finally, our results indicate that the investment preference of UK institutional block-holders varies with the level of their shareholding.     

How do investors underreact to seasoned equity offerings? Evidence from Taiwan's corporate governance evaluation

This study examines whether long-run stock underperformance following seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) differs with a firm's corporate governance practices. We address this issue by using Taiwan's official annual corporate governance evaluation to represent the quality of firm governance. Results show that firms with better governance exhibit positive long-run post-SEO stock performance, whereas those with poor governance continue to be underperforming after SEOs. Our findings reveal that investor’ underreaction to SEOs varies with the levels of corporate governance.     

Multiple corporate governance attributes and the cost of capital – Evidence from Germany

This paper investigates the extent to which corporate governance affects the cost of debt and equity capital of German exchange-listed companies. I examine corporate governance along three dimensions: financial information quality, ownership structure and board structure. The results suggest that firms with high levels of financial transparency and bonus compensations face lower cost of equity. In addition, block ownership is negatively related to firms' cost of equity when the blockholders are other firms, managers or founding-family members. Consistent with the conjecture that agency costs increase with firm size, I find significant cost of debt effects only in the largest German companies. Here, the creditors demand lower cost of debt from firms with block ownerships held by corporations or banks. My findings demonstrate that a uniform set of governance attributes is unlikely to satisfy suppliers of debt and equity capital equally.     

How do corporate political connections influence financial reporting? A synthesis of the literature

A large stream of research has analyzed the effects of corporate political connections (CPCs) on firms, including first evidence on their effects on financial reporting behavior. However, the evidence so far is inconclusive, and attempts to explain the causality of effects on reporting are limited. In this article, we present the results of a systematic review of the literature on CPCs. We draw on findings in the accounting, finance, and economics literature and derive a framework that identifies four channels through which CPCs affect financial reporting. Our review of the literature suggests that effects of political connections tend to be more ambiguous than suggested by individual studies that often offer directional hypotheses. We also identify eight distinct types of political connectedness and discuss their interrelations and the proxies used in the literature to measure them.     

Does adopting good corporate governance impact the cost of intermediated and non‐intermediated debt?

This study examines the impact of good corporate governance practices on the reported cost of debt for Australian listed companies. Prior research has established that governance lowers the cost of non‐intermediated debt ( Sengupta, 1998 ; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003 ; Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al., 2006 ). We extend this analysis to the Australian corporate debt market which is dominated by intermediated or privately held debt. Our findings are consistent with the prior work and shows that increased corporate governance lowers cost of debt. However, when we split the sample companies into intermediated and non‐intermediated debt sub‐samples, we find this result only holds for the non‐intermediated debt sub‐sample. Furthermore, we find that small companies that adopt better corporate governance practices do not benefit through lower cost of debt. This raises questions about the merits of universal adoption of costly governance practices.     

On the separation of monetary and prudential policy: How much of the precrisis consensus remains?

Prior to the crisis, monetary policymakers and prudential authorities had clearly defined tools and goals with little or no conflict. The crisis revealed a variety of overlaps, where one set of policies seems to influence those in another. Does this mean that two policy realms can no longer remain separate? I address the question by first asking whether monetary policy creates significant financial stability risks. My answer is generally no. Given that, central bankers should refrain from reacting to financial stability risks in most circumstances. Instead, the job of safeguarding the financial system should be left, as it was prior to the crisis, to prudential policymakers. But how can prudential policy best maintain financial stability? I argue that given our current state of knowledge, stress tests are the best tool to ensure crisis will be rare and not terribly severe. So, my answer to the question in the title is that the precrisis consensus remains largely intact.