Trade liberalization and institutional reforms1

The accession of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the European Union (EU) is expected to lead to the new member countries becoming more like the older members, including in terms of trade. In this paper, we focus on two factors promoting CEE–EU trade integration: trade liberalization and institutional reforms. Measures of trade liberalization undertaken by both parties during the 1990s were very substantial, but did not always produce the expected upsurge of regional trade flows. Much less progress has been made in improving the functioning of CEE institutions (e.g., progress in the privatization process or in reducing corruption). Countries where most important changes at the institutional level occurred were also those that most increased their trade with the EU. Comparing the impact of these two factors, we find that improving institutions in CEE countries can generate as much trade as the removal of all tariff and non‐tariff barriers. The paper also addresses the issue of the presence of reversed causality between trade and institutions, and the pro‐trade effect of institutional similarity.     

INTEREST GROUPS,ELECTORAL COMPETITION,AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES*

Current models of trade policy formation in representative democracies lack the micro foundations from which the political actions of voters, interest groups, and policy makers can be deduced. This paper provides microfoundations for the most influential of representative democracy models, the Magee-Brock-Young (MBY) model. Probabilistic voting is formally introduced, the conditions for active lobbying are examined, uniqueness of lobbying equilibrium is established, and the responses of different groups' lobbying to exogenous changes are discussed. Finally, the existence of tariff equilibria is studied when, different from MBY, both parties share a common strategy space.     

The price effect of tariff liberalization: Measuring the impact on household welfare

Trade policy literature has for many years emphasized open policies positive impact on economic growth and development. While these results generally hold when measured on averages, empirical evidence suggests that trade liberalization is unlikely to produce beneficial results across all households. This study adds to the literature by providing an analysis of the distributive effects of tariff liberalization in Mexico. The paper examines the effect of tariff liberalization from the perspective of households both as consumers and factor owners allowing for imperfect domestic price transmission. The results indicate the overall positive effect of tariff liberalization masks significant differences in the distribution of gains both across income levels and across geographic regions. Richer households are found to have gained relatively more. Urban areas, as well as Mexican states closest to the United States border, are also found to be larger beneficiaries while southernmost states have been largely bypassed by the effects of tariff liberalization. Those results can be explained not only in relation to the different endowments of the households, but also by the diverse effects on local prices that has resulted from Mexican trade liberalization.     

Promises,policies and pocketbook voting

Do voters respond to political parties׳ promises or to their past actions? We use a suitable sequence of events in Swedish politics to provide the first answer to this question. In the 1994 election campaign the Social Democrats proposed major cuts in transfers to parents with young children, whereas in the 1998 campaign they promised to increase transfers. The Social Democrats won both elections and delivered on both promises. Using voting among parents with slightly older children as counterfactual, we find that voters with young children responded markedly to economic promises rather than to implemented policies.     

A MODEL OF VOTER CHOICE IN A LIFE-CYCLE SETTING

This paper employs an overlapping generations framework in which voters choose political parties based on the economic shocks faced over their lifetimes. Parties internalize voting preferences and develop platforms based on this information. The resulting equilibrium implies that voters select parties that maximize income in their labor period and that minimize inflation in their retirement period. The equilibrium also has the property that individuals switch their votes between the parties, in the presence of adverse states of nature. These results provide an explanation for post World War II voting patterns in the United States. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical findings.     

Economic Policy, Model Uncertainty and Elections

We analyse a game theoretical model in which policy makers have superior knowledge about the working of the economy relative to voters. We show that parties increase their chances of reelection by basing their policies on the model that best fits in with their preferences. Moreover, we show that if parties care much about holding office, they may deliberately base their policies on a model that is electorally attractive, even if this model does not describe the working of the economy correctly. Our paper provides an explanation for the observation that different political parties subscribe to different economic philosophies.     

Input-trade liberalization and firm export decisions: Evidence from Argentina

Trade openness contributes to the diffusion of the modern technologies embodied in imported intermediate goods, which play a central role in the economic growth of developing countries. This paper investigates the micro-economic effects of input-trade liberalization. Previous work has found positive effects of access to foreign inputs on firm performance. If the availability of imported intermediate goods yields firm productivity gains, we would also expect a positive effect of input-trade liberalization on firm export decisions. This paper contributes to this literature by looking at the relationship between changes in input tariffs and within-firm changes in export status. Using detailed firm-level data from Argentina, I demonstrate that the probability of entering the export market is higher for firms producing in industries that have experienced greater input tariff reductions. These empirical findings are robust to alternative specifications that control for other trade-policy reforms, and industry and firm characteristics.     

Disaggregated data and trade policy analysis: The value of linking partial and general equilibrium models

Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are now routinely utilized for the evaluation of trade policy reforms, yet they are typically quite highly aggregated, which limits their usefulness to trade negotiators who are often interested in impacts at the tariff line. On the other hand, Partial Equilibrium (PE) models, which are typically used for analysis at disaggregate levels, deprive the researcher of the benefits of an economy-wide analysis, which is required to examine the overall impact of broad-based trade policy reforms. Therefore, a PE–GE, nested modeling framework has the prospect of offering an ideal tool for trade policy analysis. In this paper, we develop a PE model that captures international trade, domestic consumption and output, using Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) structures, market clearing conditions and price linkages, nested within the standard GTAP model. In particular, we extend the welfare decomposition of Huff and Hertel (2001) to this PE–GE model in order to contrast the sources of welfare gain in PE and GE analyses. To illustrate the usefulness of this model, we examine the contentious issue of tariff liberalization in the Indian auto sector, using PE, GE and PE–GE models. Both the PE and PE–GE models show that the imports of motorcycles and automobiles change drastically with both unilateral and bilateral tariff liberalization by India, but the PE model does a poor job predicting the overall size and price level in the industry, post-liberalization. On the other hand, the GE model overestimates substitution between regional suppliers due to “false competition” and underestimates the welfare gain, due to the problem of tariff averaging in the aggregated model. These findings are shown to be robust to wide variation in model parameters. We conclude that the linked model is superior to both the GE and PE counterparts.     

Competition,benchmarking, and electoral success: Evidence from 69 years of the German Bundestag

The German electoral system ensures that there is always at least one federal legislator per constituency. This legislator can face competition from additionally elected competitors to the Bundestag from precisely the same constituency. The existence of several legislators per constituency allows voters to benchmark their quality against each other. We analyze the causal impact of having more elected competitors from the same constituency on legislators’ personal success versus the success of their parties. Our data cover the legislative terms in the German Bundestag and federal elections in the period 1953–2021. In our analysis, we rely on exogenous variation in elected competitors by investigating changes induced by legislators who leave the Bundestag during the legislative period and their respective replacement candidates as instrumental variables. We find that legislators are less successful in elections when they are exposed to elected competitors from the same constituency. The results suggest that benchmarking possibilities are relevant for voters to evaluate their representatives.     

Fiscal policy,rent seeking,and growth under electoral uncertainty: theory and evidence from the OECD

Abstract. We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two political parties alternate in power according to exogenous electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive work to rent‐seeking activities; then, distorted incentives hurt growth. This scenario receives empirical support in a dataset of 25 OECD countries over the period 1982–96. In particular, uncertainty about remaining in power leads to larger government shares in GDP, which in turn exert an adverse effect on the ICRG index measuring incentives and this is bad for growth.     

Globalization and financial development

This paper argues that globalization is a key factor in stimulating institutional reforms in developing countries that promote financial development and economic growth. Advanced countries can help in this process by supporting the opening of their markets to goods and services from emerging-market countries. By encouraging these countries to increase their participation in global markets, advanced countries can create exactly the right incentives for developing countries to implement the reforms that will enable them to have high economic growth.     

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE IN THE EU: A CROSS‐COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STUDY ON THE CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS OF NPM REFORM RHETORIC

Framed within the paradigm of New Public Management (NPM), structural reforms in the EU aimed at modernizing the public administrations of Member States (MSs) have long since been a priority area of the EU's economic policy. Since the 1990s, these reforms have been sharply intensified across European countries with the declared purpose of enhancing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in their national public sectors’ organizations. In line with the European Commission's recent research initiatives in search for novel quantitative data on NPM in the EU, this paper studies European parties’ NPM reform rhetoric. More specifically, it investigates the MSs’ institutional, economic and political context within which parties have declared their intention of reforming national administrative systems. Thus, it sheds light on the MSs’ domestic factors that are associated with the diffusion of the NPM values across the political discourse of EU's national parties.     

PUBLIC INVESTMENT,TAX EVASION,AND THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF A TARIFF REFORM

Contrary to the case considered in literature, the experience of developing countries indicates that the tariff reforms have not been revenue neutral due to the heavy dependence of developing countries on trade taxes and pervasive tax evasion. In contrast to the plausibility of a welfare loss shown by the current literature, when the adverse effect of the loss of tariff revenue on public investment is factored in, the welfare outcome of the tariff reforms of past few decades turns out to be much more pessimistic. The constraints imposed by tariff dependence and tax evasion imply that future tariff reforms in these countries should be undertaken after strengthening their domestic tax system and augmenting the ability of their governments to fight tax evasion. For countries of sub‐Saharan Africa, where such reforms are likely to be concentrated, this would need planning and capacity building over a longer time horizon. (JEL D61, D62, F13, H26)     

A model of political parties

This paper presents a new model of political parties. I assume that the role of parties is to increase the commitment ability of politicians vis-à-vis the voters. Whereas a politician running alone can only offer his ideal policy, the set of policies that a party can commit to is the Pareto set of its members. I show that the commitment mechanisms provided by the institution of parties has no effect when the policy space is unidimensional; the policies parties can induce in equilibrium arise also when politicians are running independently. However, when the policy space is multidimensional, politicians use the vehicle of parties to offer equilibrium policies that they cannot offer in their absence.     

“The mother of all political problems”? On asylum seekers and elections

As immigration to Europe has increased, so has support for extremist parties. While many studies have examined the effect of immigration on election outcomes, few have probed the effect of asylum seekers – those fleeing strife and persecution – on voting, nor has there been much research on the mediating role of local economic conditions. Drawing on county level panel data from Germany, our study fills both gaps. We find that economic circumstances, as measured by the unemployment rate and the level of disposable income, condition voters’ responses to the presence of asylum seekers, but the effects for parties on the far right and left diverge markedly. Under economic prosperity, immigration increases support on both sides of the political spectrum. As economic conditions worsen, however, the effect of asylum seekers on the vote share for the far right remains stable, but weakens for the left, eventually becoming negative. This divergence – which has not yet been reported in the literature – suggests that an influx of asylum seekers, particularly when coupled with an economic downturn, could tilt a political system rightwards. From a policy perspective, these results suggest that heterogeneity arising from local economic conditions has important implications for the regional allocation of asylum seekers.     

Did political constraints bind during transition?Evidence from Czech elections, 1990–20021

Many theoretical models of transition are driven by the assumption that economic decision making is subject to political constraints. In this paper we test whether the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of economic reform influenced voting behaviour in the first five national elections in the Czech Republic. We propose that voters, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, could predict whether they would become winners or losers of transition. Using survey data we measure the degree to which regions were ‘not afraid’ or ‘afraid’ of economic reform in 1990. We define the former as potential ‘winners’ who should vote for pro‐reform parties and the latter as potential ‘losers’ who should support left‐wing parties. Using election results and economic indicators at the regional level, we demonstrate that there is persistence in support for pro‐reform and communist parties which is driven by prospective voting based on initial conditions in 1990. We find that regional unemployment rates in 2002 are good predictors of voting patterns in 1990 and provide empirical evidence that political constraints bind during transition.     

SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN A THREE‐COUNTRY MODEL*

Using a simple monopoly model, we examine the effects of economic integration. We show that the number of markets and the shapes of marginal revenue curves, are crucial in evaluating economic integration when the marginal cost is not constant. The effects of tariff reductions in a three‐country model contrast with those found in a two‐country model. Effects also depend on which trade policy the non‐member country adopts. When both importing countries simultaneously lower their tariffs, the Metzler paradox may arise.     

A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College

This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re‐election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.     

INFANT INDUSTRY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE PROTECTION

Abstract.  This paper introduces infant-industry considerations in political economy determination of trade protection. I build a model where the government cares about both political contributions and national welfare. A potentially beneficial high-tech industry is not viable in the country whose initial human capital is low. In the political economy equilibrium, we find that the tariff schedule will be V-shaped: it decreases initially to maintain the viability of the industry but increases thereafter as the industry expands and gains political power. We use the model to explain both China's tariff offers in WTO negotiations and GATT/WTO rules regarding developing countries.     

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra ( 2002 ) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large state‐owned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy.