Inter-firm linkages and the wealth effects of financial distress along the supply chain

Extant research examines the extent to which bankruptcy has intra-industry valuation consequences. This study broadens the investigation by examining the wealth effects of distress and bankruptcy filing for suppliers and customers of filing firms. On average, important wealth effects occur prior to and at bankruptcy filings and extend beyond industry competitors along the supply chain. Specifically, distress related to bankruptcy filings is associated with negative and significant stock price effects for suppliers. Supplier wealth effects are more negative when intra-industry contagion is more severe. We also investigate the importance of industry structure, specialized product nature, and leverage on supply chain effects.     

Intra‐industry bankruptcy contagion: Evidence from the pricing of industry recovery rates

How does bankruptcy contagion propagate among industry peers? We study the debt recovery channel of industry contagion by examining whether the cost of a company's debt is affected by the observed recovery rates of its bankrupt industry peers. Our results show that lower industry recovery rates are associated with higher loan spreads, but only when the contracts were originated during industry bankruptcy waves. Consistent with the debt recovery channel of industry contagion, we find that the negative effects of industry recovery rates are significantly stronger under situations where the effect is expected to be more salient.     

Bankruptcy,overlapping directors,and bank loan pricing

Using a sample of loan facilities borrowed by firms that share directors with bankrupt firms, this study investigates whether the overlapping directors are a transmission channel of the bankruptcy contagion effect in the bank loan market and, if so, what the underlying mechanism is. We find that firms are charged higher loan spreads in the period following the bankruptcy filing of a firm with a common director and that overlapping directors are a relevant channel for the bankruptcy contagion effect, in addition to other channels identified in literature. We also find that the negative contagion effect on loan pricing is most likely driven by the overlapping directors' reputation loss due to their involvement in bankruptcy events, and not by competing hypotheses, such as director distraction and director career concern/experience. Further analyses reveal that the adverse contagion impact on loan spreads is more pronounced when overlapping directors have greater influence over corporate policies or when their reputation is more seriously damaged. Meanwhile, the contagion effect is mitigated when interlocked firms have a higher-quality board. These results further support our evidence of the director reputation loss hypothesis. We strengthen the identification strategy to establish causality. In sum, our study identifies common directors as a channel of bankruptcy contagion effects on loan pricing and director reputation loss as an underlying mechanism.     

Are the bankrupt skies the friendliest?

We use data from the US airline industry to investigate whether firms that are under bankruptcy protection, as well as these firm's product market rivals, change the quality of the products they offer. We measure the quality of the services offered by a carrier using flight cancelations and delays, and the age of the aircraft used by the carrier. We find that delays and cancelations are less frequent during bankruptcy filings but return to their pre-bankruptcy levels once the bankrupt firm emerges from bankruptcy. We also find that firms use Chapter 11 filings to permanently reduce the age of their fleet. We do not find evidence of statistically and economically significant changes by the airline's competitors along any of the dimensions above.     

The impact of strategic interaction on earnings expectations associated with corporate product strategies

We examine how strategic interaction in an industry influences the earnings expectations of financial analysts with regard to new product strategies. We find that following announcement of new products, analysts revise earnings forecasts upward more for announcing firms competing in low-strategic interaction industries than for firms competing in high-strategic interaction industries. For value-enhancing (value-reducing) product strategies, earnings forecast revisions are more favorable for rivals competing under a high (low) degree of strategic interaction than for rivals competing under a low (high) degree of strategic interaction. Overall empirical evidence indicates that the nature of strategic competition within the industry is important in assessing the market expectations of earnings for new product announcers and their rivals.     

Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Is It Good News or Bad News for Industry Competitors?

A firm under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection may emerge from bankruptcy in a more advantageous competitive position within its industry to the detriment of their industry rivals. Using a sample of 264 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the period 1999-2006, I find that its industry competitors demonstrate negative postemergence long-term equity returns and deteriorating financial performance. Additional tests indicate that this outcome is less likely due to overall industry distress. Competitors tend to be more adversely affected if they are in more concentrated industries, if they have lower credit quality, when a more efficient firm emerges, and when the duration of bankruptcy is longer. This study suggests a need to reconsider Chapter 11's role in promoting competition and allocation of resources given its negative externalities on industry competitors.     

INDUSTRY EFFECTS OF ANALYST STOCK REVISIONS

We examine the industry valuation effects of analyst stock revisions and identify the variables that influence these effects. Our results show that industry rivals experience significant abnormal returns in response to revision announcements. Although the mean stock price response suggests contagion effects, there is also evidence of significant competitive effects. The valuation effects are influenced by the magnitude of the rated firm's announcement return, along with analyst‐specific and industry‐specific characteristics. However, the sensitivity of the valuation effects to these characteristics is conditioned on whether the industry effects are contagious or competitive.     

Information Contagion and Bank Herding

We show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit-maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks. When bank loan returns have a common systematic factor, the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor. The increase in a bank's cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality (in addition to the systematic risk factor). Hence, banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing. Competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives.     

Bankruptcy spillover effects on strategic alliance partners

This paper examines whether a party to a strategic alliance or joint venture suffers from spillover effects when the other partner files for bankruptcy. We find that the non-bankrupt strategic alliance partners, on average, experience a negative stock price reaction around their partner firm's bankruptcy filing announcement. This negative effect is strongest for longer partnerships and those with higher returns at the announcement of the initial alliance formation. Furthermore, horizontal alliance firms in declining industries have lower returns, indicating that industry conditions can exacerbate expected problems for the non-bankrupt firm. Non-bankrupt partners also experience drops in profit margins and investment levels in the subsequent two years with the worst performance concentrated among the longer-term agreements. There is very little impact on the returns or performance for joint venture partners, which suggests that these agreements are more insulating for the partner firm.     

Intra-industry transfer effects of credit risk news: Rated versus unrated rivals

We examine the information transfer effect of bond-rating adjustments on industry rivals. Our research is based on the premise that the transfer effect is influenced by the rated status of rivals, i.e., whether the rival’s debt is rated by any credit rating agency. The results reveal that credit rating adjustments induce different/stronger effects. First, the intra-industry transfer effects (on returns and risk) are stronger on rated rivals than on unrated rivals. Second, the credit risk news produces lower co-movements between the returns of the two types of rivals. Third, the differential effect is stronger in the manufacturing industry, in the riskiest industries and in the industries with the lowest competition levels. Interestingly, our results suggest that credit rating news is more relevant for rivals with access to the public debt market (such as re-rated firms) than for rivals that focus on other sources of funding.     

Information Transfer Effects of Bond Rating Downgrades

This paper investigates information transfer effects of bond rating downgrades measured by equity abnormal returns for industry portfolios. Industry rivals can be subject to two opposing effects, the contagion effect and the competition effect. We find that the net effect is strongly dependent on the original bond rating of the downgraded firm. For investment‐grade (speculative‐grade) firms, industry abnormal equity returns are negative (positive), which implies a predominant contagion (competition) effect. The analysis reveals a rich pattern of positive and negative correlations across negative credit events, which can be used to improve our understanding of portfolio credit risk models.     

The determinants of bank loan recovery rates

Using Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database, we estimate a model for bank loan recoveries using variables reflecting loan and borrower characteristics, industry and macroeconomic conditions, and several recovery process variables. We find that loan characteristics are more significant determinants of recovery rates than are borrower characteristics prior to default. Industry and macroeconomic conditions are relevant, as are prepackaged bankruptcy arrangements. We examine whether a commonly used proxy for recovery rates, the 30-day post-default trading price of the loan, represents an efficient estimate of actual recoveries and find that such a proxy is biased and inefficient.     

Distressed Debt Restructuring in the Presence of Credit Default Swaps

The availability of credit insurance via credit default swaps has been closely associated with the emergence of empty creditors. We empirically investigate this issue by looking at the debt restructurings (distressed exchanges and bankruptcy filings) of rated, nonfinancial U.S. companies over the period January 2007–June 2011. Using different proxies for the existence of insured creditors, we do not find evidence that the access to credit insurance favors bankruptcy over a debt workout. However, we document higher recovery prices following a distressed exchange in firms where empty creditors are more likely to emerge.     

Bankruptcy as an Auction Process: Lessons from Sweden

The traditional U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy process in which financial claims are renegotiated under court protection and the firm continues to operate under existing management has long been criticized by economists as an inefficient way of dealing with financially distressed companies. In this paper, the authors make the case for a mandatory auction bankruptcy system of the kind now used in Sweden—one that requires all companies filing for Chapter 11 to be sold in open auctions soon after the filing. After discussing the notable features of and differences between the U.S. and Swedish bankruptcy systems, the authors summarize recent research (much of it their own) on the benefits and possible drawbacks of the Swedish system. Among the most notable findings of this research, there is no evidence that mandatory bankruptcy auctions in Sweden lead to “fire‐sale” discounts in auction premiums. Moreover, the fact that three‐quarters of the Swedish companies that filed for bankruptcy survived as going concerns should allay concerns that an auction system will produce excessive liquidations. At the same time, the post‐bankruptcy operating profitability of the companies that emerge from Swedish auctions as going concerns tends to be on a par with that of their (non‐bankrupt) industry peers. Such post‐operating performance, when combined with a 75% rate of reorganization (versus liquidation), suggests that allowing auction investors—instead of the bankruptcy court—decide which companies survive and how they get capitalized and restructured has been quite effective in accomplishing the two aims of a bankruptcy system: (1) preserving intact all economically viable enterprises while (2) eliminating the excess capacity that results from prolonging the existence of companies that are never expected to earn high enough returns on capital to attract private investment. Consistent with these findings, the U.S. in recent years has seen a sharp increase in the use of auctions in Chapter 11 bankruptcies, though on a voluntary rather than a mandatory basis. Such a change reflects the growing recognition of the role of auction processes in reducing bankruptcy costs and preserving going‐concern values as U.S. capital market participants push harder for private workouts, “prepackaged” Chapter 11 filings, and auction sales in Chapter 11.     

Prior Wall Street Journal Announcements of Possible Bankruptcy Filings and Price Reactions to Subsequent Bankruptcy Filings

This study examines the relation between prior Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcements of possible bankruptcy filings and price reactions to subsequent bankruptcy filings for 336 firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1980 and 1993. Extant research indicates that price reactions to announcements of economic events are inversely related to the amount of surprise in the announcements. Prior WSJ anouncements of possible bankruptcy filings increase the markets a priori assessment of firms' probability of bankruptcy, thereby potentially reducing the surprise in subsequent bankruptcy filings. We hypothesize smaller price reactions to bankruptcy filings for firms where the WSJ previously published an article indicating that the firm may file for bankruptcy. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, we find smaller price reactions to bankruptcy filings for firms with prior WSJ announcements of possible bankruptcy filings. Our results hold after controlling for firm size, probability of bankruptcy, exchange listing, leverage, and predisclosure information.     

Does the market dole out collective punishment? An empirical analysis of industry,geography, and Arthur Andersen’s reputation

Arthur Andersen’s reputation was tarnished following news that its Houston office had shredded documents related to the auditing of energy giant Enron. Earlier studies documented widespread spillover of the reputation effect, suggesting a strong commonality in Big 5 audit practices. We examine whether the market is more discriminating in its assessments. We focus on the roles industry specialization of auditors and the geography of clients’ audit offices play in accounting for the contagion. Our results are supportive of investors who differentiate audit practices by industry and who account for the location of the specific office where the audit work is done. We find that losses suffered by energy firms or firms located close to Houston are equivalent to approximately 90% of the aggregate abnormal losses suffered by Big 5 clients. Our evidence suggests the possibility of more localized impact of accounting scandals and supports accounting regulations targeted at individual industries.     

Industry Structure and Corporate Debt Maturity

We examine how industry competition affects firms’ choice of short‐term debt. We find that the percentage of short‐term debt is positively related to industry concentration at low levels of concentration, and inversely related to industry concentration at higher levels of concentration. This nonlinear relation is stronger in industries where firms are either more homogeneous or compete more aggressively. Moreover, we find that firms with shorter‐maturity debt are less aggressive than their rivals in the product market. The overall evidence suggests that although financial contracts alleviate agency problems, they exacerbate the risk of predation.     

Good and bad credit contagion: Evidence from credit default swaps

This study examines the intra-industry information transfer effect of credit events, as captured in the credit default swaps (CDS) and stock markets. Positive correlations across CDS spreads imply that contagion effects dominate, whereas negative correlations indicate competition effects. We find strong evidence of contagion effects for Chapter 11 bankruptcies and competition effects for Chapter 7 bankruptcies. We also introduce a purely unanticipated event, in the form of a large jump in a company's CDS spread, and find that this leads to the strongest evidence of credit contagion across the industry. These results have important implications for the construction of portfolios with credit-sensitive instruments.     

What Effect Did AIG's Bailout,and the Preceding Events,Have on Its Competitors?

We examine the effect of American International Group's (AIG) bailout, and the events leading up to it, on its insurance industry rivals. The reaction of rivals to AIG‐related events depends on the relative strength of two competing effects. The contagion effect implies that rival returns will decrease following negative events affecting AIG. In contrast, competitive effects will occur if investors expect that rivals will be able to benefit from AIG's downfall. Using three‐factor multivariate regression model event study methodology, we find evidence of both effects around several key dates in AIG's decline.     

Industry Structure and Ripple Effects of Bankruptcy Announcements

The market structure of an industry plays an important role in determining the stock market performance of surviving firms during intra-industry bankruptcy announcements. On evaluating the announcement effects of a survivor sample from each of two industries with very different market structures, namely the airline industry and the railroad industry, we find that the airline sample received significant abnormal returns (positive ripple) while the railroad sample experienced significant abnormal losses (negative ripple). Furthermore, the differences of the abnormal returns from the two samples also are statistically significant. These findings demonstrate support for the market structure hypothesis (MSH), but cast doubt on the contagion effect hypothesis (CEH).