关于检察机关提升执法公信力的思考

检察机关公信力体现的是公众对检察制度的实施、检察权的运用过程和造成的结果的心理感受,是公众对检察机关办理各类案件的信服度,同时在一定程度上也是考核检察机关检察工作能否让人民群众满意的重要标准。尤其是对处于与人民群众打交道的第一战线的基层检察机关而言,执法公信力的提升不仅有助于推动全国检察事业的发展,而且对构建良好的党群、检群关系也有重要意义。     

推进电子政务建设 提升政府公信力

公信力是政府的影响力与号召力,反映了人民群众对政府的满意度和信任度。公信力的提升,是政府各个方面规范作为、积极作为的结果。本文仅从电子政务建设的角度入手,探讨电子政务的积极构建对政府公信力提升的效果和作用。     

浅谈提高检察公信力的途径

检察公信力是检察权的应有之义,其核心是社会公众对检察机关的心理认同。影响检察公信力的因素来自于多方面,既有内部因素,也有外部因素,笔者在本文略作探讨和交流。     

我国慈善组织公信力提升的法律途径

以郭美美事件为代表的慈善捐赠丑闻,严重影响了我国慈善组织的公信力。为了提升我国慈善组织的公信力,本文从慈善组织的设立、运转、监督三个方面分析了影响我国慈善组织公信力的因素,并提出了提升我国慈善组织公信力的相关法律路径。     

提升领导干部公信力的思考与对策

领导干部是社会的中坚、国家的栋梁,领导干部的公信力引领和影响着社会的公信力,影响着党的执政能力.因此,领导干部较高的公信力是我党领导中国革命和建设走向成功的一项重要资源,是我党成功执政的重要基础.本文探讨了领导干部公信力面临的各种挑战,并初步提出了提升领导干部公信力的途径.     

创新检察管理机制 高执法公信力——以七里河区检察院的司法实践为例

执法公信力是检察事业发展的重要推动力。检察业务建设、检察队伍建设都必须围绕提高执法公信力来展开,都需要执法公信力来推进。群众对检察机关的最大希望就是强化监督,公正司法,帮助他们伸张正义,这是对检察机关最基本的要求。基层检察院就是要针对不同地区、不同行业、不同层面对检察机关的期望而创新实际、可行、有效的工作方式和方法,为辖区经济社会平稳发展、和谐社会构建提供良好的司法环境。     

关于提升公证的公信力的一些思考

一、公证的公信力之实质 1．公证的核心价值 现代意义上的公证是指“公证机构根据当事人的申请，依法证明法律行为、具有法律意义的文书和法律真实性、合法性的一种非讼活动。”任司法实践中，公证常被公认为“预防民事纠纷的第一道防线。”也就是说，公证可能使得民事纠纷不发生，或者降低纠纷的严重性，从而不必涉及救济问题。我国《公证法》第一条就开宗明义地指出“规范公证活动，     

信息时代政府公信力存在的问题及提升路径

政府公信力是政府的信用能力,体现为社会公众对政府的信任程度,关系到政府的影响力和号召力。政府行政行为不当、行政效率低下、行政腐败等问题,通过现代信息媒体的放大效应,使政府公信力受到前所未有的挑战。应提高政府部门服务能力,借助现代媒体技术优化政府信息公开制度,用制度规范政府行为,提高政府回应网络舆论的能力,转变单一的行政改革思维,健全民主制度,切实提高信息时代我国政府公信力。     

浅谈案件信息公开与提升执法公信力——以镇江市润州区人民检察院“三化”做法为例

本文介绍了镇江市润州区人民检察院推动案件信息公开,提升执法公信力的做法.即:坚持高标准要求,推动案件信息公开制度化;坚持多渠道公开,确保案件信息公开效能化;坚持全方位延伸,实现案件信息公开多元化.从而达到维护司法公正,提升执法公信力的法律效果与社会效果,让人民群众在每一个司法案件中都能感受到公平正义.     

试论如何加强检察机关的内部监督

检察机关的内部监督，必须贯穿执法办案的全部环节，形成完整的监督体系，讲究监督方法，才能取得实效。     

论执法人员在执法活动中的失误及其补救

执法人员在执法过程中造成的失误 ,给公民、法人和社会组织的合法权益造成了损失。究其原因是多方面的 ,既有主观的 ,也有客观的。主观方面表现为执法人员素质低下 ,对法律、法规的理解不透 ;客观方面表现在法律不健全及各方面的干扰 ,造成了执法方面的失误。因此 ,就要求我们对执法人员造成的失误要及时补救 ,这样做才能体现社会主义法制的优越性 ,树立执法机关的形象 ,维护公民、法人和社会组织的合法权不受侵害     

The Economic Effect Of Competition Law Enforcement: The Case Of The Netherlands

Summary  In this paper we try to bridge the gap between the outcome ambitions of competition policy in terms of welfare gains and consumer surplus and the longer term effects of competition policy on growth and employment. First of all, an overview is given of the different definitions of welfare. We explain why maximising the consumer surplus is an important part of the mission statement for most competition authorities. In the second part of the paper we estimate the impact of the introduction of the competition law on economic development. The effects of antitrust policies, merger control and energy regulation on the consumer surplus appear substantial. This increase in consumer surplus can be interpreted as a cut in the “market power wedge” which, from a modelling point of view, is comparable to a cut in the tax wedge. A model simulation for the Netherlands shows that the economy responded positively to this increase in the consumer surplus. We find that production has grown by an extra 0.5% and that employment has increased by 0.4% as a result of the enforcement of the Competition Law. The authors are respectively Chief Economist of the NMa and senior advisor at the Office of the Chief Economist of the NMa. This paper is the background paper for the presentation with the same title at the conference “Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement”, held in The Hague, 17 and 18 October 2007. The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.     

Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement

Summary  Together with a move from a rules-based legal approach to a more economic approach in competition cases, the economic effects of competition law enforcement have received increasing attention. Measuring these effects is important for external accountability of the Competition Authority, for quality control of its decisions and for evaluating the effectiveness of the competition law. This raises many issues in measurement, including the choice of counterfactual, the choice of effects to be measured, and the proper use of available data. The papers in this Special Issue of De Economist discuss these and related issues, based on a broad range of experience in competition law enforcement.      

The Optimal Enforcement of a Finance-Constrained Immigration Law

We extend the Bucci and Tenorio (1996) model of illegal immigration by constructing a two-country, one-good, two-factor model, and use a Cobb-Douglas production function to analyze political issues not considered in their work. We consider the case where capital is immobile between the two countries, as well as the case in which capital is mobile. Our main result is that the host country's government can, under some circumstances, optimally enforce employer sanctions in order to maximize the host country's welfare under both capital mobility and immobility.     

论国土资源执法监察效能建设

基于国土执法形势更加严峻的现状,分析其原因,倡议从政府体制、法律机制和土地执法内部体系等方面进行改革建设,增强土地执法监察效能,以保护国土资源,减少滥用耕地,促进并稳定房地产市场。     

会计诚信建设的途径探析

会计造假现象不仅给国家的财产造成巨大的损失,而且给人民的生活也带来巨大危害,因此会计诚信成为消除会计造假现象的一剂良药。本文立足会计诚信的现状分析会计诚信缺失造成的危害,以及会计诚信缺失的原因,并提出建设良好会计诚信的建议。     

The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement

Summary  The paper briefly reviews previous studies of the deterrent effect of competition enforcement. It then describes the key findings of a recent report commissioned by the Office of Fair Trading on the scale of the deterrent effect of merger control and competition law enforcement in the UK. The research, which was based on in-depth interviews and phone surveys with senior competition lawyers and large UK companies also indicated which sanctions may be more effective at deterring anti-competitive behaviour and provided suggestions for improving deterrence. The paper discusses a number of policy issues raised by the research’s findings. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the OFT or Deloitte. This paper was prepared for the October 2007 workshop on Measuring the Effects of Competition Law Enforcement, organized by the Netherlands Competition Authority.     

基于演化博弈的社会诚信分析

诚信不足是制约我国近年经济发展的一个重要因素。通过利用演化博弈的方法,建立社会诚信的演化博弈模型,分析得出欺骗者可能的损失相对其收益较小是诚信缺失的根本原因,提出解决目前诚信危机的政策建议。     

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? or Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement

Summary  This article surveys, discusses and classifies methods for ex-post evaluation of the efficiency of competition authorities: court appeals, peer reviews, case studies, event studies, (authorities’ own) bottom-up calculations of consumer gains, deadweight-loss estimates, cross-country panel studies etc. Based on empirical estimates from other types of studies and on a simple oligopoly model, one conclusion is that many bottom-up calculations are based on exaggerated estimates of gains from cartel enforcement, relative to those from merger enforcement. Another conclusion is that authorities’ ex-post self evaluations are of limited value, relative to external evaluations. “Who watches the guardians?”, by Juvenal, 2nd century Roman poet and critic.     

垄断厂商的过剩生产能力可置信威胁行为分析

本文以完全垄断市场中在位企业阻止对手进入作为研究的基本问题,使用博弈论方法,在假定完全信息条件下,通过允许对手进入的斯塔克尔伯格均衡和阻止对手进入的过剩生产能力可置信威胁策略性行为的比较分析,论证了企业中存在过剩生产能力的一类原因,解释了企业的理性选择使部分的生产能力闲置,是一种特定条件下各利益主体最大化其效用时出现的相对稳定状态。垄断企业通过投资于过剩生产能力,使它对潜在进入者的威胁变得可置信,从而能够阻止进入。本文的研究结果表明,企业选择保持过剩的生产能力是在特定条件下的理性选择,是根据特定的技术和市场条件确定的。