跨国公司R＆D分散化的方式与效应分析

当代跨国公司R＆D现出分散化的特点,并采用了国际许可证、国际合作、“绿地投资”和并购等方式。R＆D分散化会产生资源配置与利益分配、“挤出”与“挤入”、技术外溢等诸多效应,并对经济全球化产生影响。     

基于交易成本和产权理论的R＆D外包模式选择

从交易成本经济学和产权理论出发，探索企业R＆D项目内制和外包的边界，并提出了3种R＆D外包模式。同时，根据潜在沉淀成本、技术创新程度、R＆D外包项目成果的期望价值3个因素，对R＆D外包决策边界成本和R＆D外包的效益进行分析权衡，提出了相应R＆D目外包战略选择方法。     

英国R＆D的区位

英国牛津大学地理学院的教授J．R．L．HOWELLS在第18期的《RegionalStudies》杂志上发表了“TheLocationofResearchandDevelopment：SomeObservationsandEvidencefromBritain”一文,文章从宏观和微观两个角度研究了英国R＆D的区位问题。根据HOWELLS所掌握的统计材料,尽管当时（80年代中期）英国R＆D活动集中分布在东南部地区,但此后一段时期,并没有明显的集中趋势,在城乡分布上,R＆D活动反而是分散化,一段时期内,这种分散还有加剧的趋势。HOVWELLS还研究了产业的R＆D活动,并得出结论,认为在产业R＆D活动的区位…     

跨国公司在华R＆D机构区位分布的影响一因素分析

文章从省域尺度上考察跨国公司在华R＆D机构的区位布局。采用2006年跨国公司在华R＆D机构数据,对影响跨国公司在华R＆D机构区位分布的因素进行了实证分析。研究结果表明：区域吸收利用的FDI规模和市场规模是影响跨国公司在华R＆D机构区位布局的决定性因素;R＆0资源的密集程度和知识产权保护水平是影响跨国公司在华R＆D机构区位布局的重要因素,对跨国公司在华R＆D投资布局有一定影响。     

论国际R＆D投资中区位选择的决定因素

国际R＆D体系在全球范围内的自由扩张极大地改变了跨国公司在全球范围内的R＆D投资经营策略。其中一个最重要的变化就是跨国公司国际R＆D投资聚集化，即倾向于将其海外R＆D机构的区位选择在与其相关的其他企业聚集的地方，形成有利于自己发展的聚集经济。众多因素的相互作用决定了某一地区对国际R＆D投资的吸引力，但是一国国家创新体系的有效运行同样至关重要。     

中国省际工业全要素R＆D效率和影响因素：1999—2007

本文通过建立全要素R＆D效率估算框架,对1999—2007年省级大中型工业全要素R＆D效率及其组成全要素R＆D资本效率和全要素R＆D人员效率的变化特点和影响因素进行了分析。研究发现：中国大中型工业全要素R＆D效率和全要素R＆D资本效率除了在2002—2003年出现下降以外,其余年份都是上升的,并且保持东部〉中部〉西部;全要素R＆D人员效率在2005年以后呈东部〉西部〉中部;要素禀赋和产权变量是促进全要素R＆D效率提高的主要因素;企业规模扩大和R＆D投入则起了抑制作用;R＆D投入与FDI的交互项对全要素R＆D效率的提高有抑制作用。     

R＆D项目恶性增资行为分析：认知偏差视角

本文从有限理性人的认知偏差视角，从心理和组织因素方面探讨R＆D项目恶性增资行为。面对R＆D项目是否中止这样的复杂决策，决策者往往会受到感情等非理性因素的影响。文中分析了R＆D项目中止决策过程中的5种认知偏差及其对个人决策中的影响。     

R＆D、R＆D溢出、内生增长和内生收敛

根据强调知识与技术创新、知识与技术溢出重要性的当代内生增长理论，本文建立了一个将R＆D和R＆D溢出与资本积累之间、R＆D和R＆D溢出与总产出增长之间直接关联起来的动态模型。面板数据协整检验实证分析结果表明R＆D和R＆D溢出与资本积累之间、R＆D和R＆D溢出与总产出增长之间分别存在显著的正面长期协整关联。进一步的分析表明，R＆D与资本积累之间、R＆D与总产出增长之间分别存在显著的长期双向格兰杰因果关系。由此观知，R＆D乃长期经济增长源泉之所在。另一方面，尽管资本积累或总产出增长并不格兰杰导致R＆D溢出，证据表明R＆D溢出格兰杰导致资本积累和总产出增长。这种由R＆D溢出到资本积累和总产出增长的单向格兰杰因果关系意味着尽管知识与技术的跨国传播并非必然发生。其实为世界经济增长的重要动力。     

跨国公司在发展中国家R＆D投资的空间格局及其成因研究

跨国公司R＆D全球化，尤其是R＆D投资向发展中国家的扩散，对传统跨国公司理论提出了挑战。文章研究跨国公司在发展中国家R＆D投资的发展历程、空间演变和空间特征，并剖析这种空间格局的形成原因。表明企业的资源观对跨国公司R＆D全球化具有较强的解释力。中国应抓住跨国公司调整R＆D投资空间布局的有利时机，尽快制定政策吸引和利用跨国公司R＆D投资。     

R＆D新技术在投融资中的保护和营运

本文认为R＆D新技术要在投融资中得到保护和运营是以R＆D新技术获得专利为前提，确定R＆D专利战略的依据是部署企业R＆D的专利战略的重要内容之一。R＆D新技术在投资领域的保护和运营涉及：根据R＆D新技术变化，选择最有利于的投资形式；根据R＆D技术性质，选择最有利的投资运作方式。R＆D新技术在融资领域的保护和运营涉及：企业内部知识产权管理制度的不断完善；技术交易中的知识产权的保护与运营。     

Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?

Corruption is harmful for public finances and appears closely related to fiscal deficits. We open a new avenue in addressing the effects of corruption on public deficits through fiscal decentralization. For a sample of 31 OECD countries over the period 1986–2010, we find that fiscal decentralization contributes to mitigating the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits. In addition, our findings indicate diversity in the effects of fiscal decentralization, in that it appears related to lower deficits in countries with higher levels of corruption but not in less corrupt countries. Our results suggest that bringing the government closer to the people through fiscal decentralization in relatively corrupt countries leads to more responsible fiscal management.     

Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties

This study investigates how national levels of corruption are influenced by the interaction of two factors in political decentralization: the presence of local elections and the organizational structure of national parties. Previous studies have focused primarily on the role of fiscal decentralization on corruption and have mostly ignored the institutions of political decentralization. Using new data in a series of expansive models across multiple countries and years, we find that corruption will be lower when local governments are more accountable to and more transparent toward their constituents. This beneficial arrangement is most likely to occur when local elections are combined with nonintegrated political parties, meaning that party institutions themselves are decentralized from national control. Such an institutional arrangement maximizes local accountability by putting the decision to nominate and elect local leaders in the hands of those best in a position to evaluate their honesty—local electors.     

Decentralization and the shadow economy: Oates meets Allingham–Sandmo

This article studies the impact of decentralization on the shadow economy. We argue that decentralization may decrease the size of the shadow economy mainly through two transmission channels: (1) decentralization enhancing public sector efficiency (efficiency effect), and (2) decentralization reducing the distance between bureaucrats and economic agents, which increases the probability of detection of shadow economic activities (deterrence effect). Using various measures of fiscal, political and government employment decentralization in a cross-section of countries, we find the deterrence effect to be of more importance. The deterrence effect is stronger, the lower the degree of institutional quality. We find no robust evidence of the efficiency effect.     

Supranational integration and national reorganization: On the Maastricht treaty’s impact on fiscal decentralization in EU countries

We explore the implications of European integration for fiscal decentralization in EU member states with a dataset on 21 OECD countries over the 1975–2000 period. The difference-in-difference methodology is used to establish causality. EU member states are classified as the treatment and non-EU OECD countries as the control group. The Maastricht treaty is interpreted as a quasi-experimental policy intervention that substantially advanced European integration. Our results suggest that tax decentralization has increased in EU countries after the signing of the Maastricht treaty. The treaty’s effect on expenditure decentralization also seems to be positive, but is less clear-cut.     

Tax decentralization,labour productivity,and employment in OECD countries

Tax decentralization should improve the efficiency of local governments and ultimately boost output growth. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. Decomposing output growth into labour productivity and employment growth, we show that the ultimate effect of fiscal decentralization on growth depends on which factor prevails, thus rendering the direct estimation of tax decentralization on growth ambiguous. Using an instrumental variable approach, with instruments based on institutional similarities and geographic distance, the empirical analysis on a sample of 20 OECD countries shows that the positive and significant effect of tax decentralization on the employment growth rate is offset by the reduction of labour productivity growth, resulting in the absence of any statistically significant effect on output growth.     

Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world

How does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials? Previous empirical studies, using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization, have suggested conflicting conclusions. In search of more precise findings, we combine and explore two new data sources—an original cross-national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms' concrete experiences with bribery. In countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of local public employees, reported bribery was more frequent. When local—or central—governments received a larger share of GDP in revenue, bribery was less frequent. Overall, the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent-seeking as government structures become more complex.     

Fiscal crises,decentralization, and indiscipline

How does fiscal decentralization influence fiscal discipline and the probability of a fiscal crisis? Discrete choice analysis used with panel data reveals that crisis probability is associated positively with spending decentralization and negatively with vertical fiscal imbalance. These effects are prevalent in countries with a higher degree of tax revenue decentralization, while a stronger rule of law mitigates such adverse decentralization effects. The findings imply that reduced risk sharing against local shocks under tax revenue decentralization destabilizes the sustainability of a nation's fiscal system. Therefore, policymakers should be cognizant of the undesirable impacts of decentralization on fiscal crisis and indiscipline.     

财政分权理论及其发展述评

财政分权已经成为世界各国十分普遍的现象,财政分权理论的发展也呈现多样化.不同的学者从不同的角度来研究财政分权问题,他们主要集中研究财政分权的原因、最优财政分权度及财政分权的影响等几个方面.本文对国内外这几个方面的研究作一综述并给予简单的评析.     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy

This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.     

GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION AS A DISINCENTIVE FOR TRANSNATIONAL TERROR? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976–2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.