Political Learning: The Neglected Precondition of Constitutional Reform

This paper analyses the claim of constitutional economics that liberal economic policy requires far-reaching constitutional reform. The paper starts with a restatement of this claim and reinforces the rationale of the currently most influential variants of constitutional economics as represented by contractarian constitutional economics (Brennan, Buchanan), on the one hand, and Hayek s evolutionary theory, on the other. However, these constitutional proposals have shortcomings because the institutional preconditions of constitutional reform are not sufficiently reflected. Instead, I argue that, in face of economic crisis, a revision of in-period politics requires no more collective rationality than constitutional reform does. As a consequence, the introduction of new constitutional rules depends on political learning. The article concludes that constitutional rules in the sense of CPE can stabilise political learning but they cannot replace it.     

Conditions affecting the survivial of constitutional rules

Massive changes in the effective constitution—primarily bearing on the economic powers of the federal government, primarily in the past 60 years—have revived interest in the problem of constitutional maintenance. This paper finds the conventional American theory of constitutional maintenance to have at least three major problems. The paper then suggests three propositions about constitutional maintenance, building on the developing theory ofproprietary government. The most important conclusion is how little we know about this subject. Paper presented at Panel on Constitutional Political Economy: Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association; Orlando, Florida; 19–21 Nov. 1989     

Evolutionary macroeconomics: a research agenda

In this article, the goal is to offer a new research agenda for evolutionary macroeconomics. The article commences with a broad review of the main ideas in the history of thought concerning the determinants of economic growth and an introduction to the evolutionary perspective. This is followed by a selective review of recent evolutionary approaches to macroeconomics. These approaches are found to be somewhat disconnected. It is argued that the ‘micro-meso-macro’ approach to economic evolution is capable of resolving this problem by offering an analytical framework in which macroeconomics can be built upon ‘meso-foundations’, not micro-foundations, as asserted in the mainstream. It is also stressed that the economic system and its components are complex adaptive systems and that this complexity must not be assumed away through the imposition of simplistic assumptions made for analytical convenience. It is explained that complex economic systems are, at base, energetic in character but differ from biological complex systems in the way that they collect, store and apply knowledge. It is argued that a focus upon stocks and flows of energy and knowledge in complex economic systems can yield an appropriate analytical framework for macroeconomics. It is explained how such a framework can be connected with key insights of both Schumpeter and Keynes that have been eliminated in modern macroeconomics. A macroeconomic framework that cannot be operationalized empirically is of limited usefulness so, in the last part of the article, an appropriate methodology for evolutionary macroeconomics is discussed.     

Exchange and evolution

This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination, adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general “generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.      

A constitutional theory of public enterprise

This article rationalizes public enterprise by analyzing the constitutional choice between private and public ownership of production arrangements. Arguing that results depend on who does the choosing, the article compares choices by self-governing citizens with choices by self-directed governmental officials. The resulting institutional theory identifies four conditions that cause citizens to favor public over private ownership. None of the conditions refers to the standard concept of economic efficiency, which guides most economic comparisons of public and private enterprise.     

The Powers of The Central Governments and the Problems of Enlarging and Deepening the European Union: An Essay of Constitutional Political Economy

In this paper we present an adaptation of Buchanan and Tullock’s model in order to apply it to the constitutional choices regarding the assigning of powers to a supranational authority. The outcome of the economic-political model developed in this paper demonstrates that there are constraints in the supply of integration, suggesting that the enlargement and deepening of the European Union will have to be based on federalist conceptions. The authors should like to thanks seminar participants at European Public Choice conference (Belgirate 2002) and ECSA-C conference (Toronto 2002) where earlier versions of the paper have benefited from constructive suggestions. The authors assume the sole responsibility for any errors remaining in this version.     

Constitutional Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis

Using time-series cross-section analysis, we provide additional empirical validation for the principal-agent model developed by Adserà et al. (2003). In our innovation, efficient economic policy is proxied by “economic freedom” from the Fraser Institute database and constitutional “political institutions” are proxied by variables from the Database of Political Institutions. Our results suggest that the more credible the threat of removal from office, the more government officials will pursue efficient economic policies. The authors are grateful to Alan Hamlin and an anonymous referee for their highly valuable input to the development of this paper. Tel.: +1-604-291-4167     

The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum

Recent studies of the linkages between the wealth of nations and the institutions of governance suggest that concentrating political power in a monarchy or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and, moreover, that while power-diffusing reforms can enhance the wellbeing of society in general, opposition by groups benefiting from the status quo is predictable. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution that, despite promises made by their new chief executive, would not have lessened the powers of the presidency. Using a unique, constituency-level dataset on the referendum vote, we estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and find that ethnic groups’ voting decisions are influenced by their expected gains and losses from constitutional change. The results also highlight the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power-diffusion process, and thus establish a channel through which ethnic fragmentation adversely impacts economic development.     

Regional innovation and competitiveness in a dynamic representation

This paper combines the various strands of literature on knowledge and innovation as drivers of regional growth in an evolutionary model, representing the internal dynamics of a regional system focusing on Arthurian dynamic increasing returns to scale. The model shows how different evolutionary patterns can arise starting from identical local systems, and that the effects of policies are different depending on the state of the system. Simulation evolutionary economic geography models also allow to represent the complexity of spatial economic development without radically simplifying it and to formalize concepts which are otherwise only expressed—by economic geographers—as logical arguments.     

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology

Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses. However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain.     

Are Optimal CO2 Emissions Really Optimal?

Although the greenhouse effect is by many considered as one of the most serious environmental problems, several economic studies of the greenhouse effect, most notably Nordhaus's DICE model, suggest that it is optimal to allow the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) to increase by a factor of three over the next century. Other studies have found that substantial reductions can be justified on economic grounds. This paper explores into the reasons for these differences and identifies four (partly overlapping) crucial issues that have to be dealt with when analysing the economics of the greenhouse effect: low-probability but catastrophic events; cost evaluation methods; the choice of discount rate; the choice of decision criterion. The paper shows that (i) these aspects are crucial for the policy conclusions drawn from models of the economics of climate change, and that (ii) ethical choices have to be made for each of these issues. This fact needs wider recognition since economics is very often perceived as a value neutral tool that can be used to provide policy makers with “optimal” policies.     

The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics: implications for understanding the third sector

This paper reconsiders the exchange paradigm of constitutional economics from the perspective of the theory of the division of labor. According to this theory, human wants can be satisfied by two basic mechanisms—exchange and self-sufficiency. The exchange paradigm of constitutional economics emphasizes the former mechanism while neglecting the latter. Building on major economic theories of the third sector, it is argued that the latter mechanism is more helpful than the former in explaining the existence of third sector organizations. The paper concludes by discussing implications of this argument for the further development of constitutional economics.      

Conformity and the Demand for Environmental Goods

The existing literature on eco-labeling and green consumerism has been framed within a classical market context where price and quality are the drivers of consumer choice. However, it seems possible that consumers are also concerned about the choices made by other consumers. In fact, it is unclear that people’s consumption decisions are made independently of social context. For instance, under the desire to conform to certain social norms—or in the presence of status concerns—some individuals may be willing to pay a higher price premium for green products the more widespread green consumerism is in society. We test this hypothesis using a choice experiment where the respondents were asked to choose among coffee products varying with respect to their share of ecological beans, share of fair trade beans, and price. Three treatments were used, differing only in the information given about the choices made by other consumers. We find different responses to the treatments across individuals and we can only confirm our hypothesis of conformity for women, although men appear to have stronger preferences for ecological coffee than women have.     

Evolutionary developmental economics: how to generalize Darwinism fruitfully to help comprehend economic change

Darwinism is shown possible to generalize fruitfully to help comprehend economic change by drawing on evolutionary developmental biology (“evo–devo”)—its recent version, less concerned with replication of genes than with genomic instructing of development of organisms. The result is a conceptual model with multilevel applications, generalizing development as instructed self-organizing with inputs from environments, and evolution as experimental search for instructions making the development successful. Its economic interpretation suggests to unite several existing fields into evolutionary developmental economics, where economic change can be studied comprehensively as development instructed by actual institutional rules, intertwined with the evolution of these rules.     

A framework for the study of firms as constitutional orders

Much of the literature on corporate performance focuses on institutional restructuring, and implicitly assumes that constitutional factors are determined exogenously. Existing theories of the firm—whether a “goal paradigm” or an “exchange paradigm”—provide useful insights; but we find them incomplete because they miss the extent to which companies build unique and meaningful constitutional orders. Building on Vanberg (Const Polit Econ 3(2):223–253, 1992), we investigate the extent to which the field of constitutional political economy (CPE) can improve our understanding of organisations, by providing a typology of CPE that can be applied to a study of firms. We make a distinction among (1) operational; (2) institutional; and (3) constitutional levels of management, and based on the CPE literature argue that “constitutional” considerations help us to define the boundaries of a firm and its operational environment.     

Spatial dependence in constitutional constraints: the case of US states

Several theories suggest that states?? choices of constitutional rules are at least partially a function of neighboring constitutions. This paper provides the first analysis of spatial dependence of specific provisions within state constitutions in the United States. The analysis effectively makes constitutional rules endogenous, contributing to a relatively underdeveloped branch of constitutional economics. By employing a series of probit estimations of nineteen specific constitutional rules, I find evidence of spatial dependence in state constitutions. Specifically, the presence of specific constitutional constraints pertaining to term limits, supreme court justice selection, recall, home rule, direct democracy, constitutional amendment by convention, balanced budget requirements, tax and expenditure limits, line item veto, victims?? bill of rights, health and welfare, right to privacy, environmental protection, sex discrimination, abortion, and official language all exhibit some evidence spatial dependence.     

新经济地理学与复杂科学的区位选择模型

1990年代初,新经济地理学和复杂科学都对经济主体区位选择以全新的诠释。基本的不同点在于,新经济地理学模型的基本假设是经济主体行为的完全理性,而复杂科学假设经济主体的行为为有限理性。新经济地理学仍沿用主流经济学一般均衡的框架,而复杂科学的模型是动态和演化的过程。它们的相似之处在于都具有报酬递增、路径依赖和事后决策和调整的特征。根据分析和比较,得出经济地理学未来的学科交叉融合趋势。     

Out of a slave contract: the analysis of pre-Hobbesian anarchists in the Old Testament

Buchanan’s constitutional economics takes social conflict (the ‘Hobbesian jungle’, ‘Hobbesian anarchy’) as the starting point for the analysis of social contract. Buchanan argues that in the presence of social conflict either some social contract (e.g. some system of formal laws) or some generally shared moral precepts are needed to resolve the predicament that social conflict presents. The present paper argues that a social conflict model also served the Old Testament as an analytical starting point. However, contrary to both standard theological interpretation and Buchanan’s explicit claims, I argue that the Old Testament had already made an attempt to model ‘Hobbesian anarchy’ in order to approach social conflict in an essentially modern, non-metaphysical manner. I argue that figures like Adam and Eve or Jacob, in the tradition of Hobbesian anarchists, questioned godly authority and the associated imposed, authoritarian, metaphysical social contract. In this way, one can detect a modern, contractarian constitutional economics in pre-Enlightenment literature (and in Genesis, specifically) in direct contrast to Buchanan’s claims.