What are China's real gains within global value chains? Measuring domestic value added in China's exports of manufactures

This paper aims to investigate China's gains of participating in global value chains (GVCs) in terms of GDP in exports (DVA - domestic value added) and the factors affecting China's gains. The paper decomposes the gross exports of China so as to get the components that make up total GDP in the exports of the country, namely the value-added exports and DVA that are returned from abroad. Then the two components are measured to obtain the scale of GDP in China's exports both on country and sector level. The results show that, firstly, both value-added exports and the GDP in China's exports are less than the traditional gross trade statistics, indicating that there is a gap of real trade gains under GVCs. Secondly, comparing whether the proportion of DVA in total exports, the proportion of DVA in exports of manufactures or the proportion of RDV in total DVA, the gaps between China and the developed countries such as the United States, Germany and Japan do exist. Especially, considering the RDV of China, the proportion is significantly lower than that of major developed countries such as the United States and Germany, indicating that China lags far behind developed countries in the capabilities of supplying high value-added intermediate goods. Lastly, the empirical results suggest that DVA in China's exports has progressively increased in response to the productivity enhancement; research and development (R&D) inputs and capital formation, and the synergies between R&D and vertical specialization affect China's DVA growth in exports positively.     

Trade in factor income and the US-China trade balance

US multindoational enterprises sell considerable amounts of products to China's domestic consumers that are “made” in either China or other countries. However, these sales are not counted as US exports to China. To account for this, we propose a beyond-borders approach to measuring trade flows that explicitly considers firm ownership, termed “trade in factor income (TiFI),” that defines the US-owned factor income induced by China's final demand as US exports to China. Applying this approach to OECD data, we find that on average from 2005 to 2016 in TiFI terms, US exports to China were 20.34% and 8.21% greater, China's exports to the US were 1.64% and 16.04% less, and the US trade deficits with China were 17.4% and 32.0% less than the trade figures reported in value added and gross terms, respectively. The concept of TiFI transforms trade measures from a territory-based “made in” label to a factor income-based “created by” label.     

Domestic value added and employment generated by Chinese exports: A quantitative estimation

We develop an input–output methodology to estimate how Chinese exports affected the country's total domestic value added (DVA) and employment in the years 2002 and 2007. For every US$1000 dollar of Chinese exports in 2007 (2002), DVA and employment are estimated to be US$591 (US$466) and 0.096 (0.242) person-year, respectively. To implement these estimations, we use hitherto unpublished Chinese government data to construct several completely new datasets, including an input–output table with separate input–output and employment-output coefficients for processing exports, non-processing exports, and output for domestic use. We hypothesize that, in comparison with the export sector, China's domestic sector would be relatively autarkic due to China's history of central planning. We expect that exports would generate less DVA and employment than output for domestic use. Processing exports, which are highly dependent on imported inputs, would similarly generate less DVA and employment than non-processing exports. Our findings support these expectations. For both 2002 and 2007, the DVA and employment effects of domestic final demand were higher than those of non-processing exports, which were in turn higher than those of processing exports. However, with the progress of economic reforms, we found that the total DVAs of exports and domestic final demand have converged from 2002 to 2007.     

Economic Benefits and Environmental Costs of China's Exports: A Comparison with the USA Based on Network Analysis

This paper decomposes economic benefits (value‐added) and environmental costs (CO₂) of exports according to their sources, and maps the global value network (GVN) and the global emissions network (GEN) for China's exports during 1995–2009 from national, sectoral and national–sectoral perspectives. A comparison is conducted between China and the USA. National GVN and GEN show that shares of value‐added and CO₂ emissions from China in its GVN and GEN both decreased first then increased after 2006, while shares from the USA in its GVN and GEN generally decreased. Sectoral GVN and GEN show that among China's exports, “electrical and optical equipment” and “electricity, gas and water supply” were, respectively, the sectors that obtained the most value‐added and emitted the most CO₂. National–sectoral GVN and GEN for China exhibited reciprocal and disassortative patterns, and in‐strengths and out‐strengths of GVN and GEN for China's exports were mainly captured by several domestic country–sector pairs.     

The Belt,the Road,and the carbon emissions in China

This paper explores the effect of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on China's exports and the domestic carbon emissions induced by the exports. We employ a decomposition framework to assess the driving factors of the change of CO₂ emissions induced by China's exports to different destinations and evaluate the main contributions of the gap between the BRI countries and non-BRI (NBRI) countries. The decomposition results show that while the scale effect was the dominant force behind the pre-BRI emission growth, the contribution of the composition effect became more prominent after the inception of the Initiative. Our econometric analysis suggests that the Initiative leads to an increase in the share of carbon-intensive products in China's exports to the BRI countries by nearly 5 percentage points, which is approximately one quarter of the share of carbon-intensive exports to the BRI countries. A further investigation reveals that China's international project contracting is the main channel that has resulted in the increase of the share of carbon-intensive exports in China's exports to the BRI countries.     

China,Like the US,Faces Challenges in Achieving Inclusive Growth through Manufacturing

For more than three decades the goal of becoming “the factory of the world” has been at the core of China's development strategy. This strategy, in combination with high rates of domestic investment and low rates of consumption, has made Chinese production the most manufacturing intensive in the world. But as its wages have risen, China's competitiveness in the most labor‐intensive manufacturing industries has eroded. Its ability to assemble products remains a major source of its exports, but it has also tried to shift toward more sophisticated value‐added production domestically. Chinese domestic spending has shifted away from investment toward consumption as citizens' income has grown. Like Americans, Chinese are also spending more on services than on manufactured goods. All of these changes are fundamentally altering the structure of China's production, reducing the role of manufacturing and increasing the skill levels of workers in manufacturing. This paper reviews the challenges posed by these developments for China's long‐term goal of achieving more inclusive growth. It presents evidence that the commonly held perceptions that Chinese manufacturing employment growth is robust are wrong. In fact, such growth has peaked and China is now following a pattern of structural change that is typical of a more mature emerging economy, in which the share of employment in manufacturing declines as workers are increasingly employed in services.     

How much did China's emergence as “the world's factory” contribute to its national income?

Over time, China upgraded its capabilities to such an extent that it requires less imported materials, components, and services to maintain its central role in the global production network. Consequently, the domestic value added content of its exports has increased over time. Still, value added includes profits, which are partly earned by foreign capital owners, many of whom have set up operations in export processing zones. Such profits can be repatriated, and do not directly enhance the living standards in China. This paper will focus on the extent to which China's exporting activities have contributed to its Gross National Income (GNI), which is a better indicator of economy-wide living standards than GDP. Our results, based on input-output analysis, show that the increase in the share of Chinese GNI of a yuan of Chinese exports from 2002 to 2007 was modest, despite a marked growth of Chinese GDP contained in such a yuan of exports. From 2007 to 2017, however, the continued increase of domestic value added per yuan of exports did actually translate into considerably higher contributions of exports to GNI. Decomposition analyses show that changes in the commodity composition of China's export bundle and changes in the shares of national income in value added were the main cause of the different patterns before and after the financial crisis.     

增加值视角下金砖国家制造业的贸易利得与竞争力研究

基于贸易增加值核算的基本原理,对金砖五国制造业出口增加值进行分解,同时利用标准显示性竞争指数测算金砖国家制造业竞争力,研究发现：中国的贸易利得与庞大的出口总额严重不匹配,其他金砖四国的贸易利得远远高于中国;对中国、巴西和印度而言,基于国内增加值测算的NRCA值要高于基于出口总额测算的NRCA值,而俄罗斯和南非恰恰相反;金砖五国在低技术制造业上表现出各自的竞争优势,除了中国在电子通信和光学设备制造业及机械制造业有相对的竞争优势外,金砖五国整体上在高技术产业层面与美日德等发达国家存在较大差距。应从培育高级要素、产能合作、共建科技创新体系等方面来提高金砖国家制造业竞争力。     

Two sides of the same coin: The economic and environmental effects of China's international trade from a global value chain perspective

China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has led to rapid economic growth and international trade development. However, China is also challenged with a heavy environmental burden due to the massive carbon emissions transferred through trade. By splitting production activities into traditional trade and global value chain (GVC) activities, this paper uses an intercountry input-output (ICIO) framework to study the imbalances of the economic and environmental effects between China's imports and exports at different levels. We define the indices value added per embodied emission in imports and exports (VPM and VPX, respectively). Additionally, we find a large gap between China's VPM and VPX, primarily because developed economies gain much higher value added per embodied emission than China gained through exports in GVC activities. Then, we study how to narrow the gap between China's VPM and VPX. The application of multiplicative structural decomposition analysis (SDA) and the logarithmic mean Divisia index I (LMDI-I) approach reveals the total and bilateral-sectoral contributions of the driving factor effects to the changes in China's VPM and VPX. The results provide tailored implications for promoting the comprehensive economic and environmental benefits of China's imports and exports.     

Effects of China's Structural Change on the Exports of East Asian Economies

The Chinese economy is slowing down and is in the midst of a structural transformation from export‐led and investment‐led growth to domestic demand‐led and consumption‐led growth. While there are widespread concerns among China's trading partners about the effect of the slowdown in China's growth on their exports, China's structural changes are also likely to have a significant impact: for example, China will import fewer machines and more cosmetics. The central objective of the present paper is to empirically examine the effect of China's structural transformation on the exports of East Asian economies, which have close trade linkages with China. We find that economies that have failed to increase the share of consumption goods in their exports to China have suffered larger declines in their quantities of exports to China. In addition, economies that have suffered losses in their shares of China's parts and components imports have faced reductions in their shares in China's total imports.     

Assessing carbon emissions embodied in international trade based on shared responsibility

We study the carbon emissions of the world's five highest carbon emitters under three different criteria. In particular, we explore the shared responsibility (SR) criterion, under which both producers and consumers share the responsibility for emissions. Employing the multi-region input-output model to calculate the SR based on the value-added method, we can investigate carbon emissions at both national and sectoral levels. Between 2002–2014, carbon emissions in China and India grew dramatically. SR increased by 157% in China and 116% in India. The main driving force of China's carbon emissions was the rapid growth of its exports, and the main driver of India's carbon emissions was its high carbon-intensive production technologies. Although carbon emissions had a declining trend in the USA and Japan, it could have resulted from cross-border carbon leakage. More than 40% of the five countries’ national carbon emissions under SR were attributed to “electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply”. This overwhelming share was attributable to their large amounts of production and high carbon emission intensity.     

Blue Box Policy Reform in the Doha Round Negotiations： Effects and China＇s Position

This paper uses an agricultural trade policy simulation model to quantitatively evaluate the effects of Blue Box policy reform on agricultural production and trade, and further provides specific proposals regarding China ＇ s reform position. The results indicate that, if the reform could achieve a reduction in distorting supports in more developed countries, China＇ s total agricultural production would increase, accompanied by a decrease in agricultural imports and a slight increase in exports. In terms of social welfare, producers would gain significantly, consumers would lose and government would not suffer greatly, which is in accordance with current agricultural policies in China. As a core member of G20, China should approve a subsidy level as low as possible required by Blue Box to achieve ＂substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic supports＂.     

Looking into global value chains: influence of foreign services on export performance

Using data from the OECD Inter-Country Input–Output database, we explore the impact of foreign services value added content of exports on export performance, specifically on duration of trade. Our data show that the share of foreign services content in manufacturing exports grows from 1995 to 2011, in a way similar to foreign goods content, and in contrast to the decreasing share of domestic services. Moreover, the share of foreign services value added content is larger for developing and emerging countries than for advanced countries. Our econometric findings confirm that foreign services value added embodied in manufacturing exports contribute positively to more resilient exports relationships, a positive effect which occurs for the three groups of manufacturing industries (high, medium and low technology industries) and, for each group, it is more pronounced for developing and emerging economies.     

Vertical trade and China's export dynamics

This paper examines how China's exports are affected by exchange rate shocks from countries that supply intermediate inputs to China. We build a simple small open economy model with intermediate goods trade to show that due to the intra-regional trade in intermediate goods, a devaluation of other Asian currencies does not necessarily hurt China's exports, as imported intermediate goods could become cheaper. The effect of intermediate goods costs depends critically on the share of intermediate goods used in China's export goods production and the degree of exchange rate pass-through in imported intermediate goods prices. If prices for intermediate goods are not very sticky, the effect through this channel could be large, and China's exports could even benefit. We find that these findings do not depend on China's choice of currency invoicing between the RMB and the US dollar or the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes.     

Do High-technology Exports Cause More Technology Spillover in China？

The volume of China’s high-technology exports has grown sharply since the implementation of its export promotion strategy "Revitalizing Trade through Science and Technology" in 1999.This paper investigates whether technology spillover effects are greater for hightechnology exports than for primary manufactured goods exports.We present a generalized multi-sector spillover model to identify both between spillover effects from exports towards non-exporters and within-spillover effects among export sectors.Using panel data for 31 provinces in China over the period from 1998 to 2005,we find that although high-technology export sectors have higher productivity compared with other sectors,this productivity advantage does not lead to technology spillover to both domestic sectors and other export sectors,and export technology spillover mainly derives from traditional export sectors rather than high-technology export sectors.As such findings can be largely attributed to the fact that China’s high-technology exports depend significantly on processing trade by foreign- invested firms,policy implications are discussed in relation to how to best promote the role of China’s high-technology exports during economic expansion.     

An empirical analysis of China's aggregate import demand function

This study uses the cointegration concept to analyze the long-run relationship of China's aggregate import demand function for the period 1970–1999. The conventional specification for the import demand function reveals that the volume of imports demanded responds to domestic activity and relative prices. This study considers four definitions of domestic activity, namely gross domestic product (GDP), GDP minus exports [IMF Staff Pap. 45 (1998) 236], “national cash flow” [Econ. Lett. 74 (2002) 265], and final expenditure components [Appl. Econ. 21 (1989) 957]. The empirical results indicate a long-run equilibrium relationship between these measures of domestic activity and China's import demand. Overall, domestic activity and relative prices are inelastic in the long run. This study also highlights some policy implications.     

Is the Chinese Economy Moving in the Direction of Tertiarization？

Drawing upon output, employment, consumption and trade data, this article examtnes whether there is an economic tertiarization trend in China ＇s economy and evaluates the common factors driving current trends. It shows that the tertiarization trend is evident for the overall economy and most regions in terms of the service nominal value-added ratio and service employment and consumption. However, the tertiarization trend is not significant in terms of the service real value-added ratio, and there is even some concurrent ＂detertiarization ＂ because of the decreasing proportion of services in imports and exports. lndeed, China ＇s tertiarization trend is far behind its industrialization trend The rise in the relative prices of services explains the rising proportion of household service consumption expenditure and further illuminates why the service real value-added ratio has not grown. The main cause for the growing percentage of service employment is the lag in service labor productivity growth in interaction with the price inelasticity of service demand ＂Cost disease ＂ has appeared in service consumption.     

Can Cultural Affinity Promote Trade ? HSK Test Data from the Belt and Road Countries

As Chinese culture is “going out,” more and more non‐native Chinese speakers are beginning to study Mandarin and are taking the Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) test. Mandarin has become a very important trade language for the Belt and Road countries. This paper uses the difference‐in‐difference model and the Mahalanobis distance and the nearest neighbor distance matching methods to study the internal relationship between culture “going out” and foreign trade. We find that cultural affinity is an important factor in promoting trade, and that the HSK project has expanded China's exports to the Belt and Road countries. Culture's promotion effect in Asia is stronger than that in Europe. Culture's promotion effect shows the characteristics of regional differences, a time‐lag and a fluctuating upward trend. Therefore, further enhancing the international influence of its culture would help China to find a new source of export growth.     

The sophistication of exports: Is China special?

Recent studies have found that China is “special” in exporting highly sophisticated goods not comparable with its income level. In this paper we identify two measurement biases that account for this “China is special” observation. First, product quality has not been fully considered in the measurement of sophistication, which has caused an overestimation of the sophistication of China's exports. Second, the average income of China has been used to measure the export capability of China, which has caused an underestimation of China's capability of exporting sophisticated goods. After correcting the two measurement biases, China appears much less as an outlier in the cross-country comparison of the sophistication of exports.     

Value,Structure and Spatial Distribution of Interprovincial Trade in China

This study uses two different datasets to explore the stylized facts of interprovincial trade in China during the recent two decades. One dataset provides the magnitude of bilateral interprovincial goods trade calculated using firms' value‐added tax invoices. The other supplies estimates of interprovincial trade using provincial input–output tables. We find that China has both a large value and a high growth rate of interprovincial trade, but there still exists a home bias in internal trade for most provinces. In addition, disaggregation by product shows that the manufacturing sector has the largest share of interprovincial trade and this share continues to grow. Finally, the spatial distribution of trade suggests that all provinces can be clustered into a smaller number of trade areas with large intra‐cluster trade. Therefore, China's central government should make more effort to reduce local protection, stimulate domestic demand and coordinate interregional trade among local jurisdictions.