Factor decomposition of the Eurozone sovereign CDS spreads

In the present study, we examine the factors driving Eurozone sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. For identifying factors we utilize independent component analysis (ICA), a technique similar to principal component analysis (PCA). We identify three factors that impact spreads and capture the features specific to the crisis such as the breakup risk of the Eurozone: peripheral factor, global factor, and Eurozone common factor. In contrast, when PCA is applied, only a single factor is identified. Moreover, using ICA with a GARCH model, we show that the source of volatility for CDS spreads shifted from the global factor in 2009 and the peripheral factor in 2010 to the Eurozone common factor in 2012, and that the dynamic correlation reflects the decoupling between low credit risk countries such as Germany and high credit risk countries such as Greece. We also show that the goodness-of-fit of the ICA-based model is better than other models used such as the Student's t copula model.     

Sovereign asset values and implications for the credit market

Using the contingent claim approach and market data on sovereign credit default swaps we assess the drivers of a country's risk perception. Deriving market-based asset values for a set of advanced economies we gain insights into the capital markets' perspectives on sovereign creditworthiness. We find the market-based asset values to be positively influenced by debt and to be an early risk indicator for economic developments. In a cross-section analysis we identify drivers of the economic risk of countries. Clustering the countries according to their debt to asset value ratios provides further insights into the market perceptions of sovereign credit risk. For example we find that the asset values of countries with higher ratios react to changes in the global equity market. Countries with a lower ratio react more to the political stability within the country.     

Sovereign defaults by currency denomination

This paper explores the drivers of sovereign default in 100 countries over the period 1996–2012. We build a new data set of sovereign defaults and find that default events for local and foreign currency bonds are equally likely. However, governments default under different economic and financial conditions depending on the currency in which bonds are issued. The explained variation in default probability rises from 43% to 62% when we account for differences in currency denomination. We also provide evidence that global factors and market sentiment, which are known to drive sovereign spreads, do not help explain the probability of sovereign default. Hence, these factors appear to affect the price of sovereign credit risk, although not the risk itself.     

Evaluating corporate credit risks in emerging markets

Corporate leverage among emerging market firms went up considerably after the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We investigate how the increased emerging market corporate leverage in the post-GFC period (2010–15) impacted the underlying credit risk, compared to the pre-GFC (2002–2006) and GFC (2007–09) periods. Using firm-level credit risk, financial, and balance sheet data for 350 firms in 23 emerging markets, we find that leverage growth leads to a significant increase in corporate credit default swap (CDS) spreads only in the post-GFC period, and the incremental effect is mainly evident among risky firms (firms with high leverage and idiosyncratic volatility). In contrast, emerging market CDS spreads during the GFC period are mainly driven by global market risk factors. The post-GFC corporate debt vulnerability is mitigated for high growth prospect firms and firms domiciled in countries with high net capital inflows and superior governance. While corporate leverage growth impacts aggregate corporate credit risk, there is no evidence that it increases sovereign credit risk. Our paper contributes to the recent literature on potential sources of default risk in emerging markets.     

News spillovers in the sovereign debt market

We study the effect of a sovereign credit rating change of one country on the sovereign credit spreads of other countries from 1991 to 2000. We find evidence of spillover effects; that is, a ratings change in one country has a significant effect on sovereign credit spreads of other countries. This effect is asymmetric: positive ratings events abroad have no discernable impact on sovereign spreads, whereas negative ratings events are associated with an increase in spreads. On average, a one-notch downgrade of a sovereign bond is associated with a 12 basis point increase in spreads of sovereign bonds of other countries. The magnitude of the spillover effect following a negative ratings change is amplified by recent ratings changes in other countries. We distinguish between common information and differential components of spillovers. While common information spillovers imply that sovereign spreads move in tandem, differential spillovers are expected to result in opposite effects of ratings events across countries. Despite the predominance of common information spillovers, we also find evidence of differential spillovers among countries with highly negatively correlated capital flows or trade flows vis-á-vis the United States. That is, spreads in these countries generally fall in response to a downgrade of a country with highly negatively correlated capital or trade flows. Variables proxying for cultural or institutional linkages (e.g., common language, formal trade blocs, common law legal systems), physical proximity, and rule of law traditions across countries do not seem to affect estimated spillover effects.     

The anatomy of sovereign risk contagion

The channels for the cross-border propagation of sovereign risk in the international sovereign debt market are analysed. Identifying sovereign credit events as extraordinary jumps in CDS spreads, we distinguish between the immediate effects of such events and their longer term spillover effects. To analyse “fast and furious” contagion, we use daily CDS data to conduct event studies around a total of 89 identified credit events in a global country sample. To analyse “slow-burn” spillover effects, we apply a multifactor risk model, distinguishing between global and regional risk factors. We find that “fast and furious” contagion has been primarily a regional phenomenon, whilst “slow-burn” spillover effects can often be global in scope, especially those of the recent European debt crisis. The global risk factors are found to be driven by investor risk appetites and debt levels, whilst the regional factors depend on economic fundamentals of countries within a region.     

Credit default swaps and the market for sovereign debt

In this paper, we analyze the determinants and effects of credit default swap (CDS) trading initiation in the sovereign bond market. CDS trading initiation is associated with a 30–150 basis point reduction in sovereign bond yields, with greater yield reductions accruing to higher default risk economies. For countries with high default risk, rated B or lower by Standard and Poor’s, CDS initiation is also associated with significant price efficiency benefits in the underlying market. CDS trading initiation is more likely following increases in local equity index volatility, index spreads for regional and global CDS markets, or depreciation of the local currency relative to the US dollar, and decreases in a country’s ability to service foreign debt. Our results are robust to selection bias controls based on these factors.     

Bank use of sovereign CDS in the Eurozone crisis: Hedging and risk incentives

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.     

Optimal Portfolios with Credit Default Swaps

Using a continuous-time, stochastic, and dynamic framework, this study derives a closed-form solution for the optimal investment problem for an agent with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion preferences for maximising the expected utility of his or her final wealth. The agent invests in a frictionless, complete market in which a riskless asset, a (defaultable) bond, and a credit default swap written on the bond are listed. The model is calibrated to market data of six European countries and assesses the behaviour of an investor exposed to different levels of sovereign risk. A numerical analysis shows that it is optimal to issue credit default swaps in a larger quantity than that of bonds, which are optimally purchased. This speculative strategy is more aggressive in countries characterised by higher sovereign risk. This result is confirmed when the investor is endowed with a different level of risk aversion. Finally, we solve a static version of the optimisation problem and show that the speculative/hedging strategy is definitely different with respect to the dynamic one.     

Banks' home bias in government bond holdings: Will banks in low‐rated countries invest in European safe bonds (ESBies)?

This paper offers two new explanations for banks' home bias in government bond holdings: a sovereign‐based rating cap on corporates and the existence of a ‘bank tax.’ These are complementary to the four explanations offered in the literature: risk‐shifting, gambling for resurrection, moral suasion, and a means to store liquidity for financing future investment. Collectively, they cast doubt on the European Union's demand‐led approach to investment in European safe bonds (ESBies) by banks in low‐rated countries. Bank regulations such as constraints on large exposure or risk‐based capital on credit risk concentration will be needed if the objective is to break the so‐called ‘deadly embrace.’     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Impacts of the financial crisis on eurozone sovereign CDS spreads

We study the variation of sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs) of eurozone countries, their persistence and co-movements, with particular attention given to the impact of the financial crisis. Specifically, using a dual fractional integration model, we test the evidence of long memory for CDSs of ten eurozone countries. Our analysis reveals that price discovery processes satisfy the minimum requirements for a weak form of efficiency for sovereign CDS markets, even during the crisis. In contrast, we document the spreading out of persistent CDS uncertainty among the peripheral economies with its outbreak. We provide evidence that CDS uncertainty has implications for the pricing of sovereign risk including that of core countries in the crisis period. Finally, we present the potential spillover effects utilizing a dynamic conditional correlation model and show that, with the collapse of Lehman, the probability of a contagion increased across all countries and became more explicit for peripheral economies as the sovereign crisis took on a new dimension.     

Sovereign to Corporate Risk Spillovers

The first Greek bailout on April 11, 2010 triggered a significant reevaluation of sovereign credit risk across Europe. We exploit this event to examine the transmission of sovereign to corporate credit risk. A 10% increase in sovereign credit risk raises corporate credit risk on average by 1.1% after the bailout. The evidence is suggestive of risk spillovers from sovereign to corporate credit risk through a financial and a fiscal channel, as the effects are more pronounced for firms that are bank or government dependent. We find no support for indirect risk transmission through a deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals.     

Does the disclosure of unsolicited sovereign rating status affect bank ratings?

This paper integrates three themes on regulation, unsolicited credit ratings, and the sovereign-bank rating ceiling. We reveal an unintended consequence of the EU rating agency disclosure rules upon rating changes, using data for S&P-rated banks in 42 countries between 2006 and 2013. The disclosure of sovereign rating solicitation status for 13 countries in February 2011 has an adverse effect on the ratings of intermediaries operating in these countries. Conversion to unsolicited sovereign rating status transmits risk to banks via the rating channel. The results suggest that banks bear a penalty if their host sovereign does not solicit its ratings.     

Modeling the global sovereign credit network under climate change

Climate change is becoming an urgent issue for the global economy. Our study employs a multivariate extreme value regression model that incorporates a LASSO-type estimator to investigate the tail dependence of the global sovereign credit default swap market conditional on climate change. Herein, we propose an extremal connectedness measure based on tail dependence to construct a sovereign credit network. The findings show that extreme weather or climate disasters significantly impact country-specific sovereign risk with heterogeneous network structure outcomes. Specifically, extreme weather conditions have a strong impact on countries' sovereign credit and magnify their influence on the global sovereign credit network. Furthermore, we identify an asymmetric risk spillover effect in the global sovereign credit network, where the degree of risk spillover is higher under extremely hot weather conditions. Our analysis provides new insights into the role of climate change in sovereign risk.     

Sovereign Credit Risk,Banks' Government Support,and Bank Stock Returns around the World

We explore the joint effect of expected government support to banks and changes in sovereign credit ratings on bank stock returns using data for banks in 37 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find that sovereign credit rating downgrades have a large negative effect on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger support from their governments. This result is stronger for banks in advanced economies where governments are better positioned to provide that support. Our results suggest that stock market investors perceive sovereigns and domestic banks as markedly interconnected, partly through government guarantees.     

Systemic sovereign credit risk: Lessons from the U.S. and Europe

We study the nature of systemic sovereign credit risk using CDS spreads for the U.S. Treasury, individual U.S. states, and major Eurozone countries. Using a multifactor affine framework that allows for both systemic and sovereign-specific credit shocks, we find that there is much less systemic risk among U.S. sovereigns than among Eurozone sovereigns. We find that both U.S. and Eurozone systemic sovereign risk are strongly related to financial market variables. These results provide strong support for the view that systemic sovereign risk has its roots in financial markets rather than in macroeconomic fundamentals.     

Institutional investment horizons,corporate governance,and credit ratings: International evidence

Using a comprehensive set of firms from 57 countries over the 2000–2016 period, we examine the relation between institutional investor horizons and firm-level credit ratings. Controlling for firm- and country-specific factors, as well as for firm fixed effects, we find that larger long-term (short-term) institutional ownership is associated with higher (lower) credit ratings. This finding is robust to sample composition, alternative estimation methods, and endogeneity concerns. Long-term institutional ownership affects ratings more during times of higher expropriation risk, for firms with weaker internal corporate governance, and for those in countries with lower-quality institutional environments. Additional analysis shows that long-term investors facilitate access to debt markets for firms facing severe agency problems. These findings suggest that, unlike their short-term counterparts, long-term investors improve a firm's credit risk profile through effective monitoring.     

Sovereign ceilings “lite”? The impact of sovereign ratings on corporate ratings

Although credit rating agencies have gradually moved away from a policy of never rating a corporation above the sovereign (the ‘sovereign ceiling’), it appears that sovereign credit ratings remain a significant determinant of corporate credit ratings. We examine this link using data for advanced and emerging economies over the period of 1995–2009. Our main result is that a sovereign ceiling continues to affect the rating of corporations. The results also suggest that the influence of a sovereign ceiling on corporate ratings remains particularly significant in countries where capital account restrictions are still in place and with high political risk.     

Economic policy uncertainty and sovereign credit rating decisions: Panel quantile evidence for the Eurozone

We employ a panel quantile framework that quantifies the relative importance of quantitative and qualitative factors across the conditional distribution of sovereign credit ratings in the Eurozone area. We find that regulatory quality and competitiveness have a stronger impact for low rated countries whereas GDP per capita is a major driver of high rated countries. A reduction in the current account deficit leads to a rating or outlook upgrade for low rated countries. Economic policy uncertainty impacts negatively on credit ratings across the conditional distribution; however, the impact is stronger for the lower rated countries. In other words, the creditworthiness of low rated countries takes a much bigger ‘hit’ than that of high rated countries when European policy uncertainty is on the rise.