The price of liquidity: CD rates charged by money market funds

We examine the cost of liquidity in rates on CDs purchased by money market funds (MMFs). We find no evidence that rates vary directly with the size of CDs. However, we do find that large MMFs receive higher rates on large CDs than small MMFs. This suggests banks pay for (potential) liquidity.     

Settlement delays in the money market

We track 38,000 money market trades from execution to delivery and return, and provide a first empirical analysis of settlement delays in financial markets. In accord with the predictions of recent models of strategic settlement of financial claims, we document a tendency by lenders to delay delivery of loaned funds until the afternoon hours. We find banks to follow a simple strategy to manage the risk of account overdrafts, by delaying settlement of large payments relative to that of small payments. More sophisticated strategies such as increasing delays when own liquid balances are low and when dealing with small trading partners play a marginal role. We find evidence of strategic delay also when returning borrowed funds, although we can explain a smaller fraction of the dispersion in delays in the return than in delivery leg of money market lending.     

Using Interest Rate Derivative Prices to Estimate LIBOR-OIS Spread Dynamics and Systemic Funding Liquidity Shock Probabilities

Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, there were severe disruptions in international money markets and banks reportedly faced severe liquidity shocks in particular US dollar funding shortages, prompting central banks around the world to adopt unprecedented policy measures to supply funds to the banks. A better understanding of the forward-looking information content about funding liquidity risk in interest rate derivative prices is therefore necessary to gauge pressures building surrounding systemic liquidity. Using the market prices of the US dollar LIBOR-overnight index swap spread, we estimate the probability of the systemic funding liquidity shock during the crisis period, which deviated from zero on 17 September 2008 to a significant level. This provided an early warning signal of the systemic liquidity shock on 29 September 2008 when the interbank market was totally paralysed.     

Deregulation, Deposit Markets, and Banks' Costs of Funds

Deposit interest rate deregulation and financial service innovation have led to dramatic changes in large banks' deposit composition. This paper presentes a statistical cost analysis of changes in unit costs faced by banks under comprehensive financial deregulation. The results of this paper show that the unit cost of retail deposits-demand and passbook savings deposits-has increased relative to wholesale deposits-federal funds, certificates of deposit, and money market time deposits. We show, contrary to conventional wisdom, that changes in unit costs have been caused by processing costs rather than by interest expenses.     

Deregulation,Correspondent Banking,and the Role of the Federal Reserve

Intrastate branching deregulation allowed correspondent banks to enter downstream retail deposit markets. Integrated correspondent banks may engage in vertical foreclosure, raising prices to downstream rivals or extracting valuable competitive information. The Federal Reserve would then tend to gain market share from private correspondent banks. Deregulation of restrictions on the formation of multibank holding companies, in contrast, allowed other correspondents to enter, increasing competition. We test these hypotheses using a panel data set of respondent account balances. We find that the Federal Reserve became a more important supplier of correspondent services following branching deregulation and that market power in the correspondent market declined following multibank holding company deregulation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, G21, G28, L11.     

Interbank relationship lending revisited: Are the funds available at a similar price?

Under the market discipline hypothesis, monitoring by interbank lenders may induce changes in either the price or availability of new interbank funds to borrower banks. However, the presence of interbank relationship lending has been evaluated based on the availability of funds only—disregarding their price. We revisit relationship lending in unsecured interbank lending markets by simultaneously evaluating the availability and price of funds. We calculate the survival ratio of networks containing the price of daily interbank lending in Colombia from 2014 to 2020. Under this framework, an interbank relation survives from one day to the next if the funds are available at a price that does not increase too much; that is, either a halt in interbank funding or a sizeable increase in the price of interbank funding mark a break in the relation between two banks. We find that about 38 percent of relations in the Colombian unsecured interbank lending market survive from one day to the next. Therefore, from a comprehensive market discipline perspective, we find evidence of interbank relationship lending in Colombia.     

Crises,Liquidity Shocks,and Fire Sales at Commercial Banks

If liquidity shortages cause financial crises, a lender of last resort can provide funds to banks facing potential fire sales. However, if funding problems primarily occur at banks with existing solvency problems, then government liquidity programs may not spur bank lending. We find that commercial bank funding does not typically dry up in a crisis, not even during the subprime crisis. Rather, weak banks are more likely to borrow less. Furthermore, banks rely more on deposits and newly issued equity than fire sales. When they do sell assets, they cherry pick assets in order to alleviate pressure from capital regulations.     

The dynamic relationship among the money market mutual funds,the commercial paper market,and the repo market

In this paper, we present the short-run and the long-run relationships among the financial assets of the money market funds, the commercial paper market, and the repurchase agreement market by undertaking a cointegration analysis of quarterly data over the 1985–2017 period. This was based on the empirical observation that the commercial paper and repo markets account for 50 percent of the assets of money market funds. The evidence suggests that there exists a common long-term cointegrating trend among these three components of the shadow banking system. Any disequilibrium in this long-run relationship among these variables is corrected by movement in the financial assets of money market funds. The Beveridge-Nelson decomposition from the estimated cointegrating relationship shows that the cyclical component of money market funds is large and captures huge swings in these markets during the financial crisis. We also find evidence of change in these dynamic relationships in the post-crisis period, where in addition to the money market funds, the commercial paper market also exhibits a tendency to correct for the disequilbrium.     

Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector

We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks’ funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt.     

How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility

The events following Lehman's failure in 2008 and the current turmoil emanating from Europe highlight the structural vulnerabilities of short‐term credit markets and the role of central banks as back‐stop liquidity providers. The Federal Reserve's response to financial disruptions in the United States importantly included the creation of liquidity facilities. Using a differences‐in‐differences approach, we evaluate one of the most unusual of these interventions—the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility. We find that this facility helped stabilize asset outflows from money market funds and reduced asset‐backed commercial paper yields significantly.     

Credit risk assessment in real estate investment trusts: A perspective on blockholding and lending networks

This study assesses the credit risk of Japan's real estate investment trusts (J-REITs) in two related markets during the fiscal years 2008–2017. The first J-REIT market involves blockholders, while the second is a lending market of institutions, i.e., banks and insurers. J-REITs are corporation type of closed-end funds listed on the stock exchange and thus, has corporate credit risk. Consequently, a J-REIT's financial variables and its sponsor have a substantial effect on the J-REIT's credit risk. A sponsor's probability of default is a leading indicator of the J-REIT's default and double default probability acts as a coincident indicator of default. Network analysis indicates that some network centralities are proxies for funding liquidity via blockholding and lending networks. Rather than increases in other centralities, an increase in the degree of lending to a J-REIT explains a decrease in the issued J-REIT's credit risk.     

Deregulation,technological change,and the business-lending performance of large and small banks

According to DeYoung et al. [Journal of Financial Services Research, 2004] deregulation and technological change has divided the US banking industry into two primary size-based groups: very large banks, specializing in the use of “hard” information to make standardized loans and smaller banks, specializing in the use of “soft” information and relationship development to make non-standardized loans. We evaluate business-lending performance for small and large banks over the 1993–2001 period. Small business lending by small banks is characterized by relationship development and non-standardized loans. Consistent with DeYoung et al.'s model, we find that, after controlling for market concentration, cost of funds, and a variety of other factors that might influence yields, smaller banks perform better than larger banks in the small business lending market. However, larger banks appear to have the advantage in credit card lending, a market characterized by impersonal relationships and standardized loans. Interestingly, we find evidence that larger banks have been making inroads in the market for the smallest business loans, a result consistent with the use of credit scoring by large banks to make very small business loans [Berger et al., Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 2004].     

Asymmetric information and price competition in small business lending

This paper examines the relationship between bank lending rates and their cost of funds in New Zealand. Our results show that on average mortgage rates respond more quickly to changes in the cost of funds than base business lending rates. We also find an asymmetry in the initial (short-run) response of banks to changes in funding costs; in particular, our results show banks adjust mortgage rates downwards faster than upwards. The speed to which lending rates revert back to their equilibrium relationship with funding costs varies across the lending markets. We find the adjustment speed is faster when mortgage rates are below equilibrium, whereas it is slower when business lending rates are above long-run levels in relation to funding costs. Our analysis suggests that banks prefer the plain-vanilla type of lending such as mortgages in comparison to small business lending consistent with asymmetric information associated with business loans.     

Volatility in the federal funds market and money market spreads during the financial crisis

We analyze the role of federal funds rate volatility in affecting risk premium as measured by various money market spreads during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We find that volatility in the federal funds market contributed to elevated Overnight Index Swap (OIS) spreads of unsecured bank funding rates during the crisis. Using OIS as a proxy for market expectations, we also decompose London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (Libor) into its permanent and transitory components in a dynamic factor framework and show that increased volatility in the federal funds market contributed to substantial transitory movements of Libor away from its long-run trend during the financial crisis.     

美国货币市场基金发展及商业银行应对的经验和启示

美国货币市场基金在利率市场化进程中扮演了非常重要的角色,成为利率市场化的助推器。本文回顾了美国利率市场化完成阶段货币市场基金的发展过程和商业银行的应对措施,分析了利率市场化对货币市场基金和商业银行的影响,吸取其经验和教训,对我国适时适度地推进利率市场化改革,防范利率市场化进程中的金融风险,有效加强货币市场基金监管和促进商业银行健康发展具有重要的借鉴意义。     

Joint Effects of Interest Rate Deregulation and Capital Requirements on Optimal Bank Portfolio Adjustments

The 1980 Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) mandates that Regulation Q be phased out by 1986. With deregulation of interest rate ceilings, the cost of raising capital funds for commercial banks would become more volatile and more closely related with interest rates in the money and capital markets. Thus, value-maximizing bank managers would need to be concerned not only with the internal risk, but also with the external risk in bank portfolio management decisions. Based upon the cash flow version of the capital asset pricing model, this paper analyzes the joint impact of interest rate deregulation and capital requirements on the portfolio behavior of a banking firm.     

Sovereign credit ratings and bank funding cost: Evidence from Africa

This paper aims to examine the relationship between sovereign credit ratings and funding costs of banks and also the relationship between sovereign credit ratings. Using over 300 banks operating in Africa from 2006 to 2012, the study investigates sovereign ratings’ impact on funding cost. The long term domestic sovereign ratings announced by Fitch and Standard & Poor’s during the period under study were used. The panel made use of Generalized Method of Moments estimation strategy for funding cost. The findings of the study indicate that sovereign ratings upgrades have an inverse and statistically significant relationship with funding costs. The findings suggest that sovereign rating upgrades makes it easier for banks to access funds from the capital and global market at a cheaper cost compared to rating downgrades. The study recommends and encourages emerging economies to use the services provided by credit rating agencies since these agencies may help improve accessibility of funds in the international markets by banks. It is recommended that sovereign rating should be considered as a supplement and not a substitute to our own perceived judgement and research.     

Multinational banks in the crisis: Foreign affiliate lending as a mirror of funding pressure and competition on the internal capital market

We investigate how the lending activities abroad of a multinational bank’s local and hub affiliates have been affected by funding difficulties during the financial crisis. We find that affiliates’ local deposits and performance have been stabilizing loan supply. By contrast, relying on short-term wholesale funding has increasingly proven to be a disadvantage in the crisis, which has seen inter-bank and capital markets freeze. By introducing a liable approximate measure for intra-bank flows, we detect competition for intra-bank funding between the affiliates abroad as well as an increasing focus on the parent bank’s home market activities. In addition, the more an affiliate abroad relies on intra-bank funding in the crisis, the greater its dependence on its parent bank having a stable deposit and long-term wholesale funding position. We consider changes in long-term lending to the private sectors of 40 countries by the affiliates of the 68 largest German banks. To obtain a more precise picture, we clean our lending data from valuation effects.     

Do we need big banks? Evidence on performance,strategy and market discipline

For an international sample of banks, we construct measures of a bank’s absolute size and its systemic size defined as size relative to the national economy. We then examine how a bank’s risk and return on equity, its activity mix and funding strategy, and the extent to which it faces market discipline depend on both size measures. We show that bank returns increase with absolute size, yet decline with systemic size, while neither size measure is associated with bank risk as implicit in the Z-score. These results are consistent with the view that growing to a size that is systemic is not in the interest of bank shareholders. We also find that systemically large banks are subject to greater market discipline as evidenced by a higher sensitivity of their funding costs to risk proxies, consistent with the view that they can become too large to save. A bank’s interest costs, however, are estimated to decline with bank systemic size for all banks apart from those with very low capitalization levels. This suggests that market discipline, exercised through funding costs, does not prevent banks from attaining larger systemic size.     

Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

Banks have a unique ability to hedge against market‐wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, banks can insure firms against systematic declines in liquidity at lower cost than other institutions. We provide evidence that when liquidity dries up and commercial paper spreads widen, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from commercial paper backup lines without running down their holdings of liquid assets. We also provide evidence that implicit government support for banks during crises explains these funding flows.