Pricing real assets with costly search

Markets for many real assets are characterized by sequentialsearch followed by bilateral bargaining between matched buyersand sellers. For a category of real assets, the joint, intertemporalvaluation problems of buyers, owners, and sellers and the associatedNash pricing function are solved explicity. In equilibrium,the average transaction price is a noisy, proportional randomwalk, and the liquidity premium is positive for matched owners.Depending on the values of the parameters, the liquidity ofoptimal development with costly search, the optimal exercisepoint, cost of development, and value of the undeveloped assetare calculated analytically. With search, development can occursooner and undeveloped assets have lower market values thanthe standard solution without search.     

论我国农村土地所有者与代理者

我国农村土地归村农民集体所有已经不能适应形势发展的需要,存在的主要问题有:土地盲目流转,侵占农民利益;耕地保护不利,乱占耕地.究其原因主要是农村土地产权不到位,耕地保护缺乏真正的主体,因此必须明确农村土地的所有者及其代理者,我国农村土地的真正所有者应该是国家,而代理者应该是农民.由农民代表国家行使土地所有者权力,与规模经营、农业现代化并不矛盾,但是,应该防止土地兼并,国家应该从法律上予以规范.     

When Should Providers of Recreational Land be Immune from Liability?

This article examines statutes that limit the liability of landowners who open their property for recreational use. We ask whether landowner immunity promotes efficient provision by owners and efficient entry by recreational users. We examine these questions in several contexts, depending on whether the land is developed or undeveloped, privately or publicly owned, and whether or not the owner charges an entry fee. Our main finding is that, for both privately and publicly owned land, owner immunity is more efficient than owner liability when the land is undeveloped, but this is not true when the land is developed.     

A theory of Markovian time-inconsistent stochastic control in discrete time

We develop a theory for a general class of discrete-time stochastic control problems that, in various ways, are time-inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We attack these problems by viewing them within a game theoretic framework, and we look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium points. For a general controlled Markov process and a fairly general objective functional, we derive an extension of the standard Bellman equation, in the form of a system of nonlinear equations, for the determination of the equilibrium strategy as well as the equilibrium value function. Most known examples of time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in the literature are easily seen to be special cases of the present theory. We also prove that for every time-inconsistent problem, there exists an associated time-consistent problem such that the optimal control and the optimal value function for the consistent problem coincide with the equilibrium control and value function, respectively for the time-inconsistent problem. To exemplify the theory, we study some concrete examples, such as hyperbolic discounting and mean–variance control.     

The diversification cost of large,concentrated equity stakes. How big is it? Is it justified?

While the hypothesis that ownership concentration can affect the value of a company has seen a lot of empirical study, little light has been shed on a complementary problem, that these concentrated owners have a cost of their position due to an undiversified portfolio. Using a unique data set of the actual diversification of all Norwegian equity owners, we show that the largest owners of a corporation in fact have very undiversified equity portfolios, and that such owners have significant costs to their concentrated portfolios. At the level of risk of a benchmark portfolio, if they were to move from their present portfolio composition in risky assets to a well diversified portfolio, their returns would have increased by about 13 percentage points in annual terms. We ask whether this cost can be explained by estimated benefits of ownership concentration (private benefits), and show that extant estimates of private benefits are too low to offset our cost estimates.     

Determinants of bid and ask quotes and implications for the cost of trading

Financial transaction costs are time varying. This paper proposes a model that relates transaction cost to characteristics of order flow. We obtain qualitatively consistent model results for different stocks and across different time periods. We find that an unusual excess of buyers (sellers) relative to sellers (buyers) tends to increase the ask (bid) price. Hence, the ask and bid components of spread change asymmetrically about the efficient price. For a fixed order imbalance surprise these effects are muted when unanticipated total volume is high. Unexpected high volatility in the transaction price process tends to widen the spread symmetrically about the efficient price. Our findings are consistent with predications from market microstructure theory that the cost of market making should depend on both the risk of trading with better-informed traders and inventory risk. We also find that order flow surprises have a significant impact on the efficient price and can also explain a substantial amount of persistence in the volatility of the efficient price. This dependence does not violate the efficient market hypothesis since the surprises, by definition, are not predictable.     

Buying reputation as a signal of quality: Evidence from an online marketplace

Seller reputation, generated by buyer feedback, is critical to fostering trust in online marketplaces. Marketplaces or sellers may choose to compensate buyers for providing feedback. Signaling theory predicts that only sellers of high-quality products will reward buyers for truthful feedback, especially when a product lacks any feedback and when the seller is not established. We confirm these hypotheses using Taobao's reward-for-feedback mechanism. High-quality products, especially without established feedback, are chosen for feedback rewards, which cause sales to increase by 36%. Marketplaces and consumers can therefore benefit from allowing sellers to buy feedback and signal their high-quality products in the process.     

Impact of short selling activity on market dynamics: Evidence from an emerging market

With unique daily short sale data of Borsa Istanbul (stock exchange of Turkey), we investigate the dynamic relationship between short selling activity and volatility, liquidity and market return from January 2005 to December 2012 using a VAR(p)-cDCC-FIEGARCH(1,d,1) approach. Our findings suggest that short sellers are contrarian traders and contribute to efficient stock market in Turkey. We also show that increased short selling activity is associated with higher liquidity and decreased volatility. However this relation weakens during the financial turmoil of 2008. Our results indicate that any ban on short sales may be detrimental for financial stability and market quality in Turkey.     

Disposition effect as a behavioral trading activity elicited by investors' different risk preferences

This paper draws on numerical simulations to discuss the mechanism driving the disposition effect. The computational model is constructed from the basic ideas of prospect theory. The objective (or crude) rewards, obtained from investment, are transformed into subjective rewards via the value function proposed by prospect theory, which characterizes risk-aversion in gains and risk-seeking in losses. The optimal action is then chosen by maximizing the expected value of future subjective rewards. The results of numerical simulations of a finite-period optimal investment problem show that the disposition effect is given as its optimal solution, where the risk-seeking in losses is considered to play a key role in driving the effect.     

A constrained least square approach to the estimation of the term structure of interest rates

This paper proposes a new practical method for estimating forward rate curves using bond prices available in the market. It is intended to improve the least square estimation method proposed by Carleton and Cooper by imposing additional constraints to guarantee the smoothness of the forward rate curves. The resulting problem is a nonconvex minimization problem, for which we will propose an efficient algorithm for calculating an approximate optimal solution. Computational experiments show that this method can efficiently generate smooth forward rate curves without increasing the residual errors in terms of least square fitting. Also, we will compare this result with an alternative and more efficient constrained least absolute deviation method.     

Money and asset prices with uninsurable risks

We present a theory of differences of liquidity across assets, based on an endogenous ranking of assets as media of exchange arising from their relative quality as hedging devices. When assets have two distinct roles, as intertemporal media of exchange and hedging devices, buyers have generically a strict preference for paying sellers with the asset which is the relative better hedging device for sellers. The consequence of this preference is that there are three monetary policy regimes, and these regimes differ in which assets serve as media of exchange, whether assets carry a liquidity premium, and in the impact that monetary policy has on asset prices.     

Evaluating the Behavioural Performance of Alternative Logit Models: An Application to Corporate Takeovers Research

Abstract:  Econometric models involving a discrete outcome dependent variable abound in the finance and accounting literatures. However, much of the literature to date utilises a basic or standard logit model. Capitalising on recent developments in the discrete choice literature, we examine three advanced (or non-IID) logit models, namely: nested logit, mixed logit and latent class MNL. Using an illustration from corporate takeovers research, we compare the explanatory and predictive performance of each class of advanced model relative to the standard model. We find that in all cases the more advanced logit model structures, which correct for the highly restrictive IID and IIA conditions, provide significantly greater explanatory power than standard logit. Mixed logit and latent class MNL models exhibited the highest overall predictive accuracy on a holdout sample, while the standard logit model performed the worst. Moreover, the analysis of marginal effects of all models indicates that use of advanced models can lead to more insightful and behaviourally meaningful interpretations of the role and influence of explanatory variables and parameter estimates in model estimation. The results of this paper have implications for the use of more optimal logit structures in future research and practice.     

Liquidity and Information Asymmetry in the Real Estate Market

George Akerlof??s asymmetric information theory explains why lemons are rarely, if at all, transacted. We extend his theory to explain liquidity in the second-hand real estate market. The idea is to decompose real estate into two components: land and the building structure. While sellers may know more about the quality of their structures than buyers, information on land, predominantly its locational attributes, is much more transparent. Without assuming any credit constraints or loss aversion behaviour, our information asymmetry model shows that: 1) the liquidity of real estate increases with the share of its land value; 2) there is a positive relationship between real estate prices and turnover rates when land supply is more inelastic than the supply of structures; 3) the positive relationship is stronger when the land value component gets smaller; and 4) while the availability of first-hand real estate may divert demand away from the second-hand market, such a substitution effect is weaker when the land value component is large. These four implications were confirmed with panel data analysis using Hong Kong??s housing transactions from 1992 to 2008 across 50 districts.     

Optimal securitization with moral hazard

We consider the optimal design of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in a dynamic setting in which a mortgage underwriter with limited liability can engage in costly hidden effort to screen borrowers and can sell loans to investors. We show that (i) the timing of payments to the underwriter is the key incentive mechanism, (ii) the maturity of the optimal contract can be short, and that (iii) bundling mortgages is efficient as it allows investors to learn about underwriter effort more quickly, an information enhancement effect. Finally, we demonstrate that the optimal contract can be closely approximated by the “first loss piece.”     

The real estate takeover: Application of Grossman and Hart theory

In this article, I adopt a corporate takeover model to the problem of a developer who wants to renew an urban neighborhood. The problem outlined is a combination of the problems addressed by Grossman and Hart (1980)(. The Bell Journal of Economics 11, 42–64) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)(. Journal of Political Economy 94, 461–488) in the corporate control literature. The relevant corporate story concerns value-improving monitoring performed by shareholders. Even though monitoring increases the value of the company for each investor, no shareholder would be willing to do it because there is an externality involved. Translating this into the language of urban redevelopment, no homeowner would do any improvement in the neighborhood unless he or she can internalize the benefit. The story in the urban renewal framework is more complicated. These property owners may differ in their valuation of even otherwise identical units since the owners may have different attachments to the neighborhood. I address some of these problems and also introduce the notion of dilution as the participating government agency's ability to force initial residents to sell to the developer or comply with costly new standards for development. Dilution increases the costs to potential holdouts.     

The puzzling behavior of short sellers around earnings announcements

We examine the performance of ‘predictive’ and ‘reactive’ short sellers who take relatively large short positions immediately before and after quarterly earnings announcements, respectively. While both types short into advancing markets, it is surprising for reactive shorts since their trades are in stocks that just announced unexpected good news and thus, according to the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly, will subsequently have abnormally high cumulative returns. Nevertheless, we find that for both types of short sellers: (1) subsequent cumulative returns are significantly negatively related to the amount of abnormal short selling, suggesting they are informed, and (2) relative to non-earnings dates, the subsequent returns around earnings announcements are significantly more negative, indicating they appear to be adept at exploiting earnings announcements. Surprisingly, we find that the subsequent returns of reactive short sellers are significantly greater than those of predictive short sellers except for S&P 500 stocks, perhaps due to their greater analyst following. Importantly, we are left with two puzzles. First, reactive shorts would have significantly improved their performance had they based their trades on the size of standardized unexpected earnings (‘SUE’). Second, predictive shorts of Micro stocks would have significantly improved their performance had they simply waited until earnings were announced and then based their trades on SUE.     

Stock‐Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation

Stock‐based compensation has been viewed as an important mechanism for tying managers’ wealth to firm performance, and thus alleviating the agency conflict between the shareholders and the managers when ownership is diffused. However, in a concentrated ownership structure, controlling owners are usually the management of the firm; they can engage in self‐dealing activities to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests. Yet, outside investors may anticipate the problem and discount the share price for the entrenchment behaviors they observe. In this study, we investigate how controlling owners trade off the benefits and the costs of using stock‐based compensation. Based on a sample of Taiwanese firms, our evidence shows that stock‐based compensation is negatively related to the agency problem embedded in a concentrated ownership structure. This relationship is evident among firms with more frequent equity offerings. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that controlling owners consider the negative price effects of stock‐based compensation and trade off these costs with the benefits of expropriating minority shareholders’ interests, particularly when firms seek more external equity capital. Our results hold after controlling for selection bias and share collateral by controlling owners.     

Distortions in Real Estate Transactions with Out-of-State Participants

Using the MLS and the land registration data from Indiana, this paper identifies and explains price distortions associated with out-of-state sellers and buyers in the housing market. We find that out-of-state buyers pay 20.4% higher prices than local buyers, and the premium is fully explained by the former purchasing larger homes than the latter. On the other hand, out-of-state sellers receive a 21.2% price discount, among which 9.3% is attributable to differences in transactional characteristics, 3.2% is explained by increased motivation and weak bargaining power of out-of-state sellers, and 1.5% is due to differences in agent characteristics and behaviours. The remaining 7.2% discount varies systematically with the informational disadvantage of out-of-state sellers, and with the market condition. Our results are robust to model misspecification.     

An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities

We analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity‐dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. We show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys. Also, the seller's allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient. As an illustration, we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non‐anchor stores. We show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough.     

Algorithmic trading in a microstructural limit order book model

We propose a microstructural modeling framework for studying optimal market-making policies in a FIFO (first in first out) limit order book (order book). In this context, the limit orders, market orders, and cancel orders arrivals in the order book are modeled as point processes with intensities that only depend on the state of the order book. These are high-dimensional models which are realistic from a micro-structure point of view and have been recently developed in the literature. In this context, we consider a market maker who stands ready to buy and sell stock on a regular and continuous basis at a publicly quoted price, and identifies the strategies that maximize their P&L penalized by their inventory. An extension of the methodology is proposed to solve market-making problems where the orders arrivals are modeled using Hawkes processes with exponential kernel.

We apply the theory of Markov Decision Processes and dynamic programming method to characterize analytically the solutions to our optimal market-making problem. The second part of the paper deals with the numerical aspect of the high-dimensional trading problem. We use a control randomization method combined with quantization method to compute the optimal strategies. Several computational tests are performed on simulated data to illustrate the efficiency of the computed optimal strategy. In particular, we simulated an order book with constant/ symmetric/ asymmetrical/ state dependent intensities, and compared the computed optimal strategy with naive strategies. Some codes are available on https://github.com/comeh.