股权结构对上市公司绩效的影响

文章总结了国外的研究成果,说明股权结构是通过影响公司治理机制来影响公司的业绩,并分析了中国上市公司股权结构的缺陷与成因,以及中国上市公司治理机制的缺陷,同时提出了改善治理绩效的对策。     

Evolving corporate governance and firms performance: evidence from Japanese firms

This study is an attempt to investigate the implications of the ownership structure and control transfers in the Japanese corporate market, which are attributed mainly to the government’s liberalization policies during 1990s. It appears that institutional shareholdings—either financial or non-financial corporations—are associated with poor performance, whereas the foreign and domestic private ownerships lead to an improvement in the performance of the firms. We observe that unwinding the cross-shareholding between banks and corporations and mutual transfers among non-financial institutions allows for efficiency gain. Furthermore, the ownership transfer to private and foreign individuals is consistently associated with high market value, which implies that individuals’ transfers lead to an increase in efficiency.     

Family ownership,corporate governance,and top executive compensation

In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non‐executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of corporate governance on state-owned and non-state-owned firms efficiency in China

The purpose of this paper is to expand the literature on the corporate governance of transition economies by analyzing the relationship between corporate governance and productive efficiency in China's publicly listed manufacturing industry firms. We use the principal component analysis and the hybrid meta-frontier DEA model, separating inputs into radial inputs that change proportionally and non-radial inputs that change non-proportionally to measure the technical efficiency and technology gap ratios of publicly listed Chinese firms in different manufacturing industries during 2010–2013. The input variables are the net value of fixed assets, staff number, and the characteristics of the corporate governance system, while the output variables are gross revenue and total profit. The empirical result shows that inefficiency due to corporate governance is the main reason for lower efficiency in most manufacturing firms. For the technology gap ratio (TGR), the metal and mineral and the machinery, equipment and instrument are the two highest efficient sectors, whereas the paper and allied products sub-industry has the lowest efficiency during 2010–2013. In addition, the ratio of state-owned firms whose inefficiency is mainly caused by corporate governance to total state-owned firms is greater than that of non-state-owned firms in each year. The TGR analysis shows that the efficiency performance of non-state-owned firms is greater than state-owned firms.     

资本结构、财务关系与公司治理

由不同融资方式形成的复杂资本结构背后是不同类型的投资者群体,其收益索取权和对公司的控制权不同,必然会导致其目标不一致和发生利益冲突,从而产生代理问题.公司治理机制的引入旨在降低代理成本,维持各类投资者对公司合约的参与,而最优资本结构则是受财务关系及公司治理结构影响的动态、内生性概念.本文拟对这种认识和关系进行分析和论述.     

Agency costs,corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis

This paper examines the impact of governance and ownership variables on agency costs for a panel of large UK quoted companies. We use three measures of agency costs: the ratio of sales-to-total assets, the interaction of free cash flows and growth prospects and the number of acquisitions. We employ a range of techniques to analyse the data: fixed-effects, instrumental variables, and Tobit regressions. We find that the changes in board structures that have occurred in the post-Cadbury period have not, generally, affected agency costs. This suggests a range of mechanisms is consistent with firm value maximisation. We also find that having a nomination committee increases agency costs, which indicates that there are costs associated with certain governance mechanisms. Increasing board ownership also helps to reduce agency costs. We also find that debt reduces agency costs. Our results raise questions about the usefulness of the information sent to shareholders when firms adopt a recommended governance framework.     

Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China

This paper investigates whether and to what extent ownership structure and corporate governance affect productive efficiency in a sample of 744 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2006. The paper finds that firm efficiency, as estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis, is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped, indicating that the largest shareholder may engage in tunneling activities. As the identity of the largest shareholder changes from government, government-controlled legal entity to other types of legal entity, firm efficiency significantly improves. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. Moreover, firms with more independent board are more efficient, supporting the argument that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, the findings illustrate that restructuring state-owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China.     

国有上市公司金字塔股权结构与公司价值

金字塔结构能一定程度减少政治目标的束缚,寻求高回报的投资项目。但如果控制性股东在上市公司中现金流权比例较少,则会倾向于选择收益不高的项目,从而导致上市公司的价值损失增加。     

公司治理结构与财务困境相关性探究

公司治理结构特征是探究企业陷入财务困境原因不可忽略的重要范畴。对来自中国上市公司近期数据的研究表明,股权集中度和高管薪酬两个因素与企业陷入财务困境的可能性显著负相关,第一大股东较高的持股比例和管理层待遇有助于企业避免陷入财务困境。这种结果体现了中国转型经济背景下企业在公司治理和财务管理衔接上的特殊性。企业应该重视并构建符合自身的公司治理结构,以有效规避财务困境。     

Management ownership and corporate value

Existing literature on the relation between management ownership and firm value has provided competing hypotheses and conflicting evidence. Using samples of Fortune 500-sized firms in 1976, 1980 and 1984, we find that corporate value measured by Tobin's q is a function of management ownership. Specifically, the q rises when management ownership is between 0% and 5-7%, and falls as the ownership increases to 10-12%. Beyond this range, we find that the q continues to fall in the 1976 sample, and starts to rise in the 1980 and 1984 samples. The evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a nonmonotonic relation between management ownership and corporate value.     

External corporate venturing modes as new way to develop dynamic capabilities

Today, firms encounter scarce resources and rapid technology change which render formerly successful business models obsolete. Research shows that some firms perform better than others in continuously discovering, evaluating, and exploiting opportunities in volatile environments and that this is dependent on firm’s dynamic capabilities. Besides obtaining dynamic capabilities through internal R&D activities, firms have open up their innovation process to pursue dynamic capabilities outside their organizational boundaries through external corporate venturing by accessing startup's technological capabilities necessary to innovate. External corporate venturing is a means to develop new distinctive capabilities and businesses by exploring and exploiting business opportunities outside a firm’s existing boundaries. Drawing on the dynamic capability literature, we use a multiple case study approach to examine the contribution of external corporate venturing to firms’ dynamic capabilities. Our results reveal that firms indeed use corporate venturing to identify and exploit startup’s technological knowledge and competencies to increase firm’s dynamic capabilities. But our empirical data also shows that not every firm is fully profiting from all dynamic capability phases as their corporate venturing modes are not linked with each other and cumulative effects are not realized.     

An analysis on corporate governance

Corporate governance has become one of the major international issues that have succeeded in attracting a good deal of public interest in recent years, especially since the recent spate of ＂world famous＂ scandalous corporate failures. Today, it is considered that corporate governance plays an important role in the economic health of corporations and society in general. Improving corporate governance is a systematic project, it is necessary to the internal governance and external governance of the ways multi-pronged.     

Common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct

This paper explores the relationship between common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct. Empirical evidence indicates that common institutional blockholders (institutional blockholders with multiple blockholdings), with advantages in information, experience and resources, can effectively inhibit corporate misconduct. Furthermore, the inhibitory effect is stronger in firms prone to commit misconduct. Empirical results also support the role of state blockholders with multiple blockholdings and common institutional blockholders with high ownership proportions in restraining corporate misconduct. This paper contributes to the heated debate on the economic implications of common ownership and provides additional evidence for the role of common blockholders in Chinese capital markets.     

Large shareholders and corporate governance

The paper looks at the voluntary provision of governance to outside shareholders by an entrepreneur who takes his firm public but remains a large shareholder after the IPO. We find that the entrepreneur always puts in place an independent board which acts in the interests of the outside shareholders, but may put in place a friendly remuneration committee that ensures that CEO pay is structured to suit the entrepreneur in the cases where the retained equity stake is sufficiently large. When comparing this provision of governance to the provision preferred by a welfare maximizing regulator, we find that both voluntary overprovision and underprovision of governance can happen. Overprovision of governance happens in the cases where the entrepreneur commits to independence at the level of the remuneration committee when the regulator prefer a friendly remuneration committee. Underprovision of governance takes the form of establishing a friendly remuneration committee (with an independent board), when the regulator would prefer an independent remuneration committee (with a friendly board). We discuss the empirical predictions of the model.     

A note on equity ownership and corporate value in Greece

This study attempts to investigate whether corporate performance is affected by the ownership structure, using data from companies quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange for the period 1996–1998. Given such an objective, the basic hypothesis examined, is that corporate performance as measured by Tobin's Q ratio is a function of ownership and other control variables. Our econometric approach relies on the use of a combination of time series and cross section data (panel‐data analysis), a procedure that avoids many statistical problems. After examining the role of each identifiable shareholder, we find a positive relationship between institutional investors and corporate performance. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The analysis of corporate governance policy and corporate financial performance

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between the quality of corporate governance policy and the firm financial performance and. Data were collected from Corporate Library. A sample of 3,068 firms from the database of 2010 Corporate Library was analyzed. Logistic regression models were employed and SPSS statistical package was utilized to perform the analysis. Our results show that when firms have better corporate governance policies, they are more likely to perform better. Specifically, when firms have a better board rating, compensation policy, takeover defense strategy, accounting practice, and a formal governance policy, they are more likely to perform better than their counterparts without such quality corporate governance policies.     

基于公司治理的会计控制问题探讨

有效的会计控制对于公司治理结构的优化及推行均有重要作用;反过来,公司治理结构直接影响会计控制的有效性。公司治理与会计控制具有“共生互动”的关系,因而会计控制须纳入公司治理的整体架构当中,做到两个同步：一是在搭建公司治理结构的过程中,同步设计会计组织架构及运行机制;二是在公司治理配套制度体系建设过程中,同步建立会计监督和资金监控机制。     

风险导向内部审计与公司治理研究

内部审计正朝着风险导向审计不断迈进,对风险的评估与改善是风险导向内部审计的首要目标;风险管理是公司治理不可回避的重要因素;风险导向内部审计对公司治理具有重要的促进作用.     

公司治理导向审计模式探讨

随着审计理论与实践的发展,审计模式也在不断变革。本文立足于全面实现公司治理的要求,以契约理论和受托经济责任观为指导,分析了现有审计模式无法满足公司治理要求的客观现状,探讨了治理导向审计模式一一以“治理”作为审计的目标导向,审计工作为了实现全面治理而展开,如何以治理的思想采指导现代审计工作的全面开展：笔者封治理导向审计模式的内涵和特点作了深入探讨.