A Note on Optimal Industrial Policy Towards Bertrand Homogeneous Duopoly

Recent studies in strategic trade and industrial policy analysis suggest that an investment subsidy, in the form of an R&D subsidy, a capacity subsidy or an advertising subsidy, would be a robust industrial policy recommendation towards an international differentiated oligopoly. However, in this paper, we show that this result does not carry over to the case of a Bertrand homogeneous duopoly. This result together with the fact that the optimal industrial policy is to set an investment subsidy when in product market competition firms play a Cournot output game, imply immediately that there hardly exists a robust industrial policy recommendation towards homogeneous goods industries.     

Variety‐Controlling Public Policy Under Addiction and Saturation

This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model for investigating the dissimilar effects of addiction and saturation on consumption and public policy. By introducing an industry‐specific intertemporal consumption externality, we provide clear analytical results that a lump‐sum subsidy for firms can increase welfare in the presence of a negative externality (saturation). A tax can accomplish the same given a positive externality (addiction). Unlike existing studies of cultural goods, these results are not based on assumptions concerning exogenous different preferences across groups, but rather on conventional monopolistic competition and consumption habit formation models in macroeconomics.     

Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.     

产业政策对企业间工资差距的影响—来自中国工业企业的经验证据

中国产业政策的执行对企业间工资差距有何影响?文章首先考虑加入了产业政策因素的异质性企业模型,从理论上将产业政策对企业工资影响分解为补贴转移效应与竞争效应两种机制,并提出如下假说:企业将部分政策补助用于生产,此时支付的更多工资等同于财政的直接补贴;同时,企业工资水平也取决于企业的生产效率,产业政策通过促进或抑制行业竞争改变企业效率,从而对企业的工资水平产生一种间接影响,即竞争效应.使用1998?2007年中国工业规模以上企业数据对理论假说进行实证检验,可以发现:"中国式"产业政策抑制企业效率带来的负向竞争效应超过了正向的补贴转移效应,最终造成了企业工资水平下降;然而,一旦产业政策的施行促进了行业竞争,竞争效应则为正,那么企业的工资水平也会随之提高.文章研究的结论有助于理解经济改革过程中产业政策对企业工资的影响,对推进企业工资体制改革也具有启示意义.     

政府扶持企业技术创新的政策效应分析

企业是技术创新的主体,但创新成果的"公共产品"特性会导致市场失灵,单靠市场对企业创新的激励作用很难达到社会最优研发投入水平。这就需要政府进行适度的干预,从而在一定程度上弥补"市场失灵"带来的缺陷。总结并分析了政府采购、公共研发、政府财政资助等相关科技政策对企业技术创新的引导及调控作用,对于正确制定并利用科技政策提高企业创新能力具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?

The conventional wisdom is that government decentralization promotes policy innovation because it allows for several simultaneous experiments by local governments. However, this ignores a learning externality: successful policy experiments provide useful information for all governments. Local governments will ignore this externality, but a central government should take it into account. This article uses a social learning model to compare policy innovation under centralization and decentralization. Centralization leads to more policy innovation if the local governments are relatively homogeneous or large in number. However, decentralization may induce more policy innovation if there are multiple experimental policies available.     

International R&D Rivalry with Spillovers and Policy Cooperation in R&D Subsidies and Taxes

Abstract

We have investigated non-cooperative and jointly optimal R&D policies in the framework of Spencer & Brander (1983) in the presence of R&D spillovers. When R&D activities are strategic substitutes and the R&D game exhibits a positive externality, the result of Spencer & Brander (1983) reverses: the non-cooperative policy is a tax while the jointly optimal policy is a subsidy. Moreover, when R&D activities are strategic complements, the usual result of the prisoners' dilemma in the strategic subsidy game does not hold, implying that a welfare intervention is preferable over laissez-faire. When spillovers are sufficiently large, the joint welfare increases with subsidies being higher than those under non-cooperation.     

Health subsidies,prevention and welfare

People value healthy ageing but may underinvest in health-improving preventive care. This arises when they ignore the beneficial effects of healthy ageing on public health expenditures and hence on the tax burden of future generations. This health externality justifies public intervention. We build an overlapping generations model with a government subsidizing investment in health by the young generation and paying the health care costs of the old generation. We find that the welfare-maximizing subsidy rate depends positively on the health externality and the size of health care costs, and negatively on the discount factor. The subsidy rate should therefore be high when prevention is cost-effective and when the population is careless about the future. Moreover, the welfare-maximizing subsidy rate is lower than the health-maximizing rate but higher than the capital-maximizing rate. This underlines the trade-off for a policy maker between health and economy.     

政策“目标—工具”视角下政府创新补贴对企业研发投入的影响

军民融合企业发展对制度环境具有高度依赖性，政府支持和引导对企业创新行为具有重要作用。政策目标是政策工具实施效果的评判基准，并且导致政策工具发挥不同作用。利用国泰安数据库213家军民融合板块上市公司2008—2016年非平衡面板数据，对产业扶持和技术创新型创新补贴政策对企业研发投入的影响进行理论分析和实证检验。研究发现，产业扶持型补贴对于国有企业的研发投入具有显著促进作用；技术创新型补贴政策对国有及非国有军工企业研发活动均具有显著激励作用，且对非国有企业研发活动的激励作用更明显。     

Frontiers of Climate Change Economics

The potential of taxes to correct environmental externalities has long been recognized among economists. Yet, this welfare-enhancing policy commonly faces strong opposition by citizens. Conversely, externality-correcting subsidies frequently enjoy high public support. We conduct a lab experiment to explore public support for Pigouvian taxes and subsidies. In an experimental market with a negative externality, participants vote on the introduction of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies under full or reduced information concerning how the tax revenues will be spent and the subsidy paid for. Theoretically the two instruments should produce identical outcomes. However, we find substantially greater support for subsidies than for taxes. This can partially be explained by the participants’ expectation that the subsidy will increase their own payoffs more than a tax, but not because it is expected to be more effective in changing behavior. Furthermore, we find that with greater uncertainty, the preference for subsidies is even stronger, a result which is consistent with loss aversion.     

Why Subsidise Private Health Insurance?

What are the economic rationales for the public subsidy of private health insurance? Inducing more people to purchase private cover has the potential to create a positive fiscal externality, as it frees up the limited public beds and other public resources for people who cannot afford private health insurance. Investigating this quantitatively, based on short‐run demand estimates, we find that the subsidy cannot be justified on the basis of this externality effect alone. We estimate that the optimal subsidy is actually negative, that is, a tax on private health insurance premiums. On the other hand, the externality does finance some of the costs. We then consider a long‐run dynamic version, consistent with the government's stated rationales for the reforms. In this context, the subsidy might be justified, or at least largely offset, by the fiscal externality. We then discuss other rationales for a subsidy and implementation issues.     

Policy Design and Rent Seeking: Targeted versus Broad Based Intervention

The present paper analyzes how policy intervention should be designed so as to create industrialization. We focus on whether intervention should be targeted, promoting investment in specific firms or industries, or broad based, increasing the profitability of investment in general. Our main argument is that in areas with weak institutions, broad based policies should be chosen, while in areas with strong institutions, targeted policies may be less costly in moving the economy out of a poverty trap. The targeted policy is attractive because it internalized a demand externality, but is also more exposed to rent seeking, since “picking a winner” involves a greater measure of discretion in policy formulation and implementation. The broad based policy does not discriminate between industries and is, hence, less likely to be captured by rent seekers, but also does not take advantage of the demand externality.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

Public Policy with Endogenous Preferences

Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population. Such interdependence between policy and preferences may limit (or enhance) the effectiveness of different policies. We demonstrate this idea with a simple model of subsidizing contributions to a public good. While the short‐run effect of such a subsidy will be an increase in the overall contribution, the subsidy triggers an endogenous preference change that results in a lower level of contribution to the public good, despite the explicit monetary incentives to raise that level.     

Sustainability Policy and Environmental Policy

A theoretical, representative‐agent economy with a depletable resource stock, polluting emissions and productive capital is used to contrast environmental policy, which internalises externalised environmental values, with sustainability policy, which achieves some form of intergenerational equity. The obvious environmental policy comprises an emissions tax and a resource stock subsidy, each equal to the respective external cost or benefit. Sustainability policy comprises an incentive affecting the choice between consumption and investment, and can be a consumption tax, capital subsidy or investment subsidy, or a combination thereof. Environmental policy can reduce the strength of the sustainability policy needed. More specialised results are derived in a small open economy with no environmental effects on utility.     

From Industrial Policy to Innovation Policy: Japan's Pursuit of Competitive Advantage*

Japan faces significant challenges in encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship. Attempts to formally model past industrial policy interventions uniformly uncover little, if any, positive impact on productivity, growth, or welfare. The evidence indicates that most resource flows went to large, politically influential “backwards” sectors, suggesting that political economy considerations may be central to the apparent ineffectiveness of Japanese industrial policy. Rather than traditional industrial or science and technology policy, financial and labor market reforms appear more promising. As a group, Japan's industrial firms are competitive relative to their foreign counterparts. Where Japan falls behind is in the heavily regulated service sector. The problems appear to be due less to a lack of industrial policy than to an excess of regulation. Japan may have more to gain through restructuring the lagging service sector than by expending resources in pursuit of marginal gains in the industrial sector.     

Optimal taxation in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital

In this paper we study the optimal policy in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital when agents value both consumption and leisure. We find that the government pursuing the first best can achieve its goal by a subsidy which depends on foregone earnings while studying and which is financed through a lump sum tax. Anyway, the optimal policy, that should be designed to provide incentives for agents to devote more time to schooling and cut both on leisure and working, is not unique. There exists an infinite number of combinations of consumption, capital income, labor income and lump sum taxes that can decentralize the first best.     

基于R语言主题模型的光伏产业创新政策层级性特征分析

以光伏太阳能产业为例，运用R语言主题模型，对国家、山西及大同3个层级政府2007—2019年光伏产业创新政策进行主题挖掘和量化分析，研究不同层级产业创新政策间的关联特征。结果表明：国家级政策主要集中于宏观价格管制和财政补贴制度，政策指导性特征明显；山西省级政策集中于中微观扶持性层面，政策指令性特征显现；大同市级政策主要集中于具体的微观运行机制，政策管控属性更加明显。上述政策特征与产业创新政策总体要求一致，但3个层级政策热门主题间还存在相关性不强、政策间互动影响作用不明显等问题，忽视了产业创新政策的传导渗透性特征。     

Externality Policy Reform: A General Equilibrium Analysis

We characterize Pareto‐improving and equilibrium‐preserving policy reforms in a second‐best (Diamond/Mirrlees) world with a consumption externality. A counterintuitive finding is that, starting from an initial equilibrium with no direct quantity control on the externality, it is possible that all Pareto‐improving and equilibrium‐preserving directions of change require an increase in a negative externality. We provide intuition for these results by establishing a nexus between Guesnerie's approach to designing (tax) policy reforms and the standard Kuhn–Tucker technique for identifying the manifold of feasible Pareto‐optimal states, given the instruments available to the policy maker.     

我国渔业补贴政策及其改革探索

我国的渔业补贴政策在一定程度上是积极有效的,但同时也存在补贴总量不足、渔业补贴结构不合理、补贴种类不齐全和补贴核算指标体系不规范等问题。针对存在的问题,我国应从补贴结构、补贴种类和核算方法三个方面对渔业补贴予以改进：从SCM协定中渔业补贴分类、产业结构和补贴方式三方面调整渔业补贴结构;从逐渐削减渔船燃油补贴、加大远洋渔业补贴、新增休闲渔业补贴、建立政府支持型渔业保险制度等方面调整渔业补贴种类;把生产者补贴等值法（PSE）作为渔业补贴核算方法。