Risky bank lending and countercyclical capital buffers

We study the properties of a monetary economy with an essential role for risky bank lending. Banks issue deposits and lend to entrepreneurs. Because banks׳ lending rate cannot be made contingent on aggregate shocks, and because banks face capital adequacy regulations, they require a capital buffer against loan losses. Capital adequacy regulations are modeled on the Basel-III rules, including a minimum capital adequacy ratio, an endogenous capital conservation buffer, and a countercyclical capital buffer. We find that a countercyclical capital buffer leads to a significant increase in welfare. It also reduces the need for countercyclical adjustments in policy interest rates.     

Macroeconomic uncertainty and bank lending: The case of Ukraine

This study investigates the link between bank lending behavior and country-level instability. Our dynamic model of bank's profit maximization predicts a non-monotonic relationship between bank lending and macroeconomic uncertainty. We test this proposition using a panel of Ukrainian banks over the 2003Q2–2008Q2 period. The estimates indicate that banks decrease their lending ratio in times of substantial economic volatility, which could be explained by higher risk aversion of bank managers. Additionally, small and least profitable banks are less likely to be affected by changes in the macroeconomic environment compared to their large and most profitable peers. This outcome is robust with respect to the different measurements of macroeconomic uncertainty.     

Credit risk of subsidiaries of foreign banks in CEE countries: Impacts of the parent bank and home country economic environment

In this study, using dynamic panel data, we investigated the influences of the home country economic environment and parent bank condition on the credit risk of foreign banks in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. We concentrated on the international transmission of credit risk through the internal capital market of multinational banks. Our theoretical assumptions follow studies that document how the parent bank condition and home country macroeconomic environment affect lending in subsidiaries in CEE countries. However, our results go one step further. We provide evidence that these relationships are reflected in subsidiaries’ credit risk in CEE countries. Our results suggest that the size and profitability of the parent bank have negative influences, while the liquidity and credit risk of the parent bank have positive influences on the subsidiaries’ credit risk. Moreover, the GDP growth in the parent bank’s country has a negative effect on the credit risk of the subsidiary, while the lending rate and liquidity in the parent bank country cause growth in the credit risk. These results indicate a new channel of international risk transfer from parent bank countries to host countries through foreign-owned banks.     

Business fluctuations and bankruptcy avalanches in an evolving network economy

We analyze the properties of a three-sector network economy characterized by credit relationships connecting downstream and upstream firms (inside credit) and credit relationships connecting firms and banks (outside credit). The network topology changes over time due to an endogenous process of partner selection (the preferred-partner choice rule). The output of simulations shows that a business cycle at the macroeconomic level can develop as a consequence of the complex interaction of the heterogeneous financial conditions of the agents involved. In this paper we focus on the emergence of bankruptcy crises: the bankruptcy of one agent can bring about the bankruptcy of one or more other agents in a snowball effect of more or less large size, depending on the network structure and the incidence of non-performing loans on balance sheets of agents involved.     

Firm–bank credit network,business cycle and macroprudential policy

We present an agent-based model to study firm–bank credit market interactions in different phases of the business cycle. The business cycle is exogenously set, and it can give rise to various scenarios. Compared to other models in this literature strand, we improve the mechanism according to which the dividends are distributed, including the possibility of stock repurchase by firms. In addition, we locate firms and banks over a space and firms may ask credit to many banks, resulting in a complex spatial network. The model reproduces a long list of stylized facts and their dynamic evolution as described by the cross-correlations among model variables. The model allows us to test the effectiveness of rules designed by the current financial regulation, such as the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer. We find that the effectiveness of this rule changes in different business cycle environments and this should be considered by policy makers.

     

Lending attitude as a financial accelerator in a credit network economy

In existing literature, commercial banks are often considered mere financial intermediaries that facilitate the flow of credit in an imperfect credit market. However, as demonstrated in the history of financial instability, the behavior of financial institutions plays an important role. This paper examines how lenders’ attitudes affect macroeconomic performance. In our analysis, the economy is composed of multiple borrowers (firms) and one lender (bank). Each borrower is directly connected to the lender through its credit contract. At the same time, each borrower is indirectly connected to all the other borrowers within the credit network. Using this model, we execute computer simulations to examine the economic consequences of lending attitudes. The results of the simulations demonstrate that the bank’s lending attitude functions as a financial accelerator; that is, it significantly affects the dynamics of the economic system through the credit network. Consequently, the same level of exogenous shock generates completely different outcomes depending on the different lending attitudes. The results also show that there exists an optimal lending attitude that leads to high economic growth and a stable growth path.     

What drives credit risk in the Indian banking industry? An empirical investigation

Using a two-step system GMM approach on a unique bank-level dataset for the period 1998/99–2013/14, this paper tries to explore the key determinants of credit risk in the Indian banking industry. The main premise of this paper is that, along with regulatory and institutional factors, both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables influence the formation of credit risk in a banking system, and their influences vary across ownership groups. The empirical findings suggest that lower profitability, more diversification in the banking business, the large size of banks and a higher concentration of banks in lending increase the probability of defaults in India. We find a significant degree of persistence in credit risk, and the observed persistence is higher in the gross non-performing loans (NPLs) specification relative to what has been observed in the net NPLs specification. In the case of public sector banks, NPLs are more sensitive to internal bank-specific factors, while for private and foreign banks, macroeconomic and industry-related factors play a significant role in determining credit risk. Our results are robust for different panel data estimation models and sub-samples of ownership groups. The findings of this paper provide important insights into the formation of default risk in the banking system of an emerging market economy.     

Financial Intermediaries,Credit Shocks and Business Cycles

We document the cyclical properties of aggregate balance sheet variables of the US commercial banks: (i) Bank credits and deposits are less volatile than output, while net worth and leverage ratio are several times more volatile, (ii) bank credits and net worth are procyclical, while deposits, leverage ratio and loan spread are countercyclical. We then present a real business cycle model with a financial sector to investigate how the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates and balance sheet variables of the US banks are influenced by empirically disciplined shocks to bank net worth. Both calibrated and estimated versions of the model show that these financial shocks are important not only for explaining the dynamics of financial flows but also for the dynamics of macroeconomic variables. We find that the recent deterioration in aggregate net worth of the US banking sector contributed significantly to the 2007–09 recession.     

Financial fragility,sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs

We show that with intertwined weak banks and weak sovereigns, bank recapitalizations become much less effective. We construct a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks lending to firms and holding domestic government bonds. Bond prices reflect endogenously generated sovereign risk. This introduces a negative amplification cycle: after a credit crisis output losses increase more because higher interest rates trigger lower bond prices and subsequent losses at banks. This further tightens bank leverage constraints, and causes interest rates to rise further. Also bank recapitalizations are then much less effective. Recaps involve swaps of newly issued sovereign bonds for bank equity, the new debt increases sovereign debt discounts, leading to capital losses for the banks on their holdings of sovereign debt that (partially) offset the impact of the recapitalization. The favorable macroeconomic effects of bank recaps on the recovery after a financial crisis are correspondingly lower.     

我国银行体系的稳健性研究——基于面板VAR的实证分析

本文构建了我国银行稳健性指标体系的核心指标组,并合成银行稳健性指数BSI以综合评价我国银行体系的稳定性,检验了银行稳健性与经济增长、信贷规模扩张及资本市场价格之间的面板Granger因果关系。通过构建面板VAR模型度量了宏观经济与金融变量对银行稳定性的冲击。方差分解的结果显示,银行稳健性的波动主要受自身和GDP的影响,GDP增长率对BSI的波动的解释程度接近50%,说明银行的稳健性依赖于稳定的经济增长,受经济冲击的影响程度相当高。     

Towards a credit network based early warning indicator for crises

This paper presents an agent based model which underlines the importance of credit network and leverage dynamics in determining the resilience of the system, defining an early warning indicator for crises. The model reproduces macroeconomic dynamics emerging from the interactions of heterogeneous banks and firms in an endogenous credit network. Banks and firms are linked through multiple credit relations, which derive from individual target leverage choices: agents choose the more convenient leverage level, according to a basic reinforcement learning algorithm. Simulations are calibrated on balance sheet data of banks and firms quoted in the Japanese stock-exchange markets from 1980 to 2012.     

Environmental Credit Risk Management in Banks and Financial Service Institutions

How do Canadian banks integrate environmental risks into corporate lending and where are they located compared with their global peers? In this paper we report a mixed method analysis of the integration of environmental risks into the credit management. The qualitative and quantitative analyses suggest that all analyzed Canadian commercial banks, credit unions and Export Development Canada manage environmental risks in credit management to avoid financial risks. Some of the institutions even connect environmental and sustainability issues with their general business strategies. Compared with other countries, Canadian banks are best in class, as all six Canadian commercial banks, comprising over 90 percent of Canadian assets, systematically examine environmental risks for credits, loans and mortgages. We conclude that Canadian banks are proactive regarding environmental examinations of loans and that there is a need for a more accountancy related reporting on environmental risk management in financial institutions. Further research is needed to be able to calculate costs and benefits of integrating environmental and sustainability issues into the credit risk management. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Are small firms really credit constrained? Empirical evidence from Kosova

This article uses firm level data from an SME survey conducted by Riinvest Institute in 2006 in order to examine the determinants of obtaining bank finance conditional upon applying. The results of the survey show that not all the firms receive credit they apply for, suggesting a slight excess of demand over supply of credit. Unlike some other studies in transition economies this article corrects for sample selection bias. Econometric evidence indicates that commercial banks base their decision to loan firms primarily on the basis of collateral. Well performing firms are more likely to ask for credit because of better business prospects in the future, but profitability as a measure of firm performance does not seem to be sufficient signaling for banks in order to allocate credits. Banks seems to prefer more to secure themselves from likely opportunistic behavior of potentially “bad borrowers” with use of collateral. Findings are in line with theoretical and empirical arguments that systematic use of collateral can mitigate the adverse selection by banks in choosing whom to allocate the credit especially in country with turbulent political environment and weak property right system. However, unlike other studies findings suggest that the rhetoric of financial constraints to some extent has been exaggerated in a transition context.     

Macroeconomic and financial stability in a monetary union: The case of Lithuania

In this paper, we study the implications of macroprudential policies in a monetary union for macroeconomic and financial stability. For this purpose, we develop a two-country monetary union new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints, to be calibrated for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. We consider two different scenarios for macroprudential policies: one in which the ECB extends its goals to also include financial stability and a second one in which a national macroprudential authority uses the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as an instrument. The results show that both rules are effective in making the financial system more stable in both countries, and especially in Lithuania. This is because the financial sector in this country is more sensitive to shocks. We find that an extended Taylor rule is indeed effective in reducing the volatility of credit, but comes with a cost in terms of higher inflation volatility. The simple LTV rule, on the other hand, does not compromise the objective of monetary policy. This reinforces the “Tinbergen principle”, which argues that there should be two different instruments when there are two different policy goals.     

Probability of default in collateralized credit operations

The goal of this paper is to identify the major determinants of the probability of default in a mortgage credit operation, which is backed by collateral. We use an exclusive data set with 268,036 loan contracts and apply logistic regression and Cox proportional hazards model in the estimation. The discriminatory power of the estimated models is analyzed by several accuracy indicators. The inclusion of time-dependent macroeconomic variables in addition to covariates representing characteristics of the contract and individuals improved the overall performance. Logistic regression showed a higher discriminatory power than Cox proportional hazards model according to all accuracy indicators. It is worth mentioning the negative relationship between the probability of default and the economy base interest rate. Decreases in the base interest rate lead banks to lose revenue from treasury operations and expand credit operations to compensate the loss. This strategy brings individuals with a higher probability of default to the financial market.     

Risk contagion in the banking network: New evidence from China

Based on data from 111 Chinese banks over the 2013–2016 period, this paper estimates the interbank bilateral lending matrix using the maximum entropy method. The estimated matrix is used to simulate the effects of credit and liquidity shocks on China’s banking network. Simulation results show that, under the extreme pressure scenario, the contagion arising from a liquidity shock is significantly stronger than the effect of a credit shock, indicating the importance of liquidity in the banking system. The contagion effect arising from a credit shock does not vary much over the sample period. However, the contagion effect arising from a liquidity shock decreases significantly, which could be attributed to contraction in interbank business due to stricter interbank business supervision. The simulation results also identify the most important and most vulnerable nodes of the banking system. An increase in the level of capital level can enhance the ability of banks to withstand credit and liquidity shocks. Our analysis also suggests that risk contagion faced by China’s banks varies across banking network structures.     

Understanding the consequences of diversification on financial stability

In this paper, we study the consequences of diversification on financial stability and social welfare using an agent based model that couples the real economy and a financial system. We validate the model against its ability to reproduce several stylized facts reported in real economies. We find that the risk of an isolated bank failure (i.e. idiosyncratic risk) is decreasing with diversification. In contrast, the probability of joint failures (i.e. systemic risk) is increasing with diversification which results in more downturns in the real sector. Additionally, we find that the system displays a “robust yet fragile” behaviour particularly for low diversification. Moreover, we study the impact of introducing preferential attachment into the lending relationships between banks and firms. Finally, we show that a regulatory policy that promotes bank–firm credit transactions that reduce similarity between banks can improve financial stability whilst permitting diversification.

     

COLLATERAL AND CREDIT RATIONING: A REVIEW OF RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES AS A GUIDE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Abstract.  The relationship between firms and banks often suffers from informational opacity that may result in credit rationing. In theory, providing collateral to the bank can have a mitigating effect on these informational asymmetries and thus solve the credit-rationing problem. Even though collateral is already a widespread debt contract feature, recent trends predict that, in the future, collateral will become even more important for informationally opaque firms. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a review of the recently growing empirical research on collateral as a remedy for credit rationing. Second, we would like to pinpoint gaps and limitations in current empirical research. Most studies contend with a flawed research design by not distinguishing between business and personal collateral and excluding other information opaqueness reducing tools such as the strength of the relationship between borrower and lender, loan maturity and covenants. We also discuss the limitations of using a single equation estimation method and the usefulness of incorporating interaction effects into the estimation models. Finally, we provide suggestions for fruitful research avenues that would fill these gaps and enrich the empirical knowledge in this research domain.     

Collateral amplification under complete markets

This paper examines the robustness of the Kiyotaki–Moore collateral amplification mechanism to the existence of complete markets for aggregate risk. We show that, when borrowers can hedge against aggregate shocks at fair prices, the volatility of endogenous variables becomes identical to the first best in the absence of credit constraints. The collateral amplification mechanism disappears.To motivate the limited use of contingent contracts, we introduce costs of issuing contingent debt and calibrate them to match the liquidity and safety premia the data. We find that realistic costs of state contingent market participation can rationalize the predominant use of uncontingent debt. Amplification is restored in such an environment.