Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.     

Monetary and fiscal policy under deep habits

Allowing habits to be formed at the level of individual goods – deep habits - can radically alter the fiscal policy transmission mechanism as the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in rather than crowding-out private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy. We find that the presence of deep habits at empirically estimated levels can imply large externalities that significantly affect the conduct of monetary and tax policy. However, despite the rise in government spending multipliers implied by deep habits, government spending is barely used as a stabilisation tool under the optimal policy.     

The causal relation between government revenue and spending: Evidence from Egypt and Jordan

In investigating the causal relation between government revenue and spending, our empirical results support the tax-and-spend hypothesis for Egypt and the fiscal synchronization hypothesis for Jordan. Breaking away from these historical trends is essential for both countries to eliminate the budget deficit and therefore ensure the availability of domestic saving for private investment. To cope with unemployment and poverty, continuing privatization is recommended for both countries to improve productivity and efficiency in the domestic economy. Privatization should lead to higher domestic saving and investment and at the same time eliminate the budget deficit by enhancing revenue and curbing spending. (JEL H62, H63)     

The impact of credit and fiscal policy under a liquidity trap

This study examines the interaction of non-conventional credit policy and fiscal policy when adverse financial conditions drive the economy to a deep contraction and conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective as the policy interest rate reaches its effective lower bound. Consistent with other studies, under counter-cyclical financial intermediation costs, credit easing policies aimed at reducing credit spread ameliorate the response of the economy and lead to a faster recovery. More importantly, I find that expansionary fiscal policy during an episode of liquidity trap is associated with a large multiplier effect that prevents an otherwise deeper and longer recession. Moreover, the large impact of expansionary fiscal policy is maintained even if credit policy is already in place.     

Growth, debt and public infrastructure

This paper presents a closed economy model of endogenous growth driven by capital externalities arising from both private capital and public infrastructure. The model is calibrated to fit data for India, an approximately closed economy. Simulations suggest that fiscal policy certainly matters and the choice of the income taxation rate, the mix of government spending between infrastructure and public consumption goods, and the long-run government debt/GDP ratio can all significantly affect the long-run growth rate. Intertemporal aspects of fiscal policy are also important and the precommitment (time-inconsistent) and non-precommitment policies differ substantially.     

The impact of adjustment and stabilization policies on infrastructure spending in Central America

During the 1980s and 1990s the countries of Central America experienced protracted fiscal crises and debt repayment problems which resulted in the implementation of structural adjustment agreements. Apart from attempting to reestablish fiscal balance and to control inflation, the proponents of adjustment policies sought to enhance growth by de-emphasizing the wasteful aspects of state spending while maintaining public expenditures on physical and human capital, which were believed to promote private sector productivity. By comparing a pre-debt crisis period with the period given by debt crisis and adjustment, the study reveals that the shares of government spending on human and, particularly, physical infrastructure dropped precipitously during the adjustment period. At the same time, the shares devoted to defense and subsidy categories—as well as interest payments on external debt—generally registered notable gains. The experience of adjustment policies in Central America indicated that substantial discrepancies existed between the idea and the reality.     

The politics of cutback management in thirteen European countries: statistical evidence on causes and effects

The politics of fiscal consolidation in thirteen European countries are statistically analysed. Based on the political economy literature, political factors are identified that explain for the consolidation. Variables are selected representing strength of government and political orientation, and fiscal consolidation is distinguished into spending cuts and cuts in administration. The statistical analysis of political explanations for cutbacks hardly yields significant results and nor does the analysis of fiscal and economic effects of consolidation. The analysis of political effects of consolidation does lead to significant results. Some earlier political economic findings are not supported for our sample of thirteen European countries.     

The Coalition's Economic Strategy; Has it made a bad thing worse?

The source of the present recession in the UK and elsewhere was the world‐wide financial crisis that followed a generalised collapse in inter‐bank and bank lending to the private sector, which led to huge falls in spending and a collapse in output in most developed countries. By effectively ignoring this amplified credit effect, supply‐side explanations place their emphasis instead on changes to the pattern of productivity shocks, downgrades in risk premia or shifts in aggregate production functions. Our review of some high profile examples of supply‐side accounts suggests that the evidence is against them and a world‐wide fall in aggregate demand seems a more likely explanation. Nonetheless, the supply‐side view still appears to be the approach preferred by the Treasury suggesting, as it does, that present levels of slack in the economy are small. The Coalition's main response to the recession here has been fiscal consolidation, based on the claim that the jump in the fiscal deficit was not due to the world recession and was instead caused by Labour's profligate spending. Also, the Coalition's strategy treats the two problems; that of ensuring recovery and that of achieving a sustainable debt ratio in the longer term as if they were the same problem. Not only are these two claims wholly wrong, the risks they pose to the economic future of the country are very large and of long duration. It is already evident that the “cuts now” programme has retarded the recovery as it assumes, incorrectly, that the deficit can be reduced by making cuts to spending without these having adverse effects on economic growth. And its precipitate rush to cut Welfare and non‐investment Education budgets are visibly leading to worse, not better, efficiency outcomes in these key sectors, in spite of government claims to the contrary. A low wage, low productivity economy seems a highly likely outcome of the present policy over the medium to longer term.     

Prudence and Pragmatism in the Fiscal Stance

In this article, Simon Price argues that the government is pursuing a remarkably conservative fiscal policy. Not only has demand management been left almost entirely to the MPC, but since 1997 spending has been held down while the overall tax burden has been raised. Consequently, the relative size of the national debt is declining at a rapid rate. There are rules that are intended to govern debt policy, but they are based on less sound principles than the government argues, and may be inconsistent. Oddly, despite the emphasis on these rules, the government has announced a path for spending that makes it clear that it is in fact planning not to follow them. The government may be planning to reduce the national debt at an excessive rate. This may make sense in the short run, but is more problematic in the medium to long term. This is not to say fiscal policy should be immediately relaxed; the current low levels of private sector saving may well justify a temporarily tight fiscal stance.     

Topics in macro-modelling of East European countries in the period of transition

Central and European former Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs) entered a period of transition towards market economies. The evolution is marked by a transition from shortage- to demand-determined economies, associated with the abandonment of price control and the introduction of tight wage control. Stabilization programmes (in Poland from 1990), implementing tough deflationary fiscal and monetary policies, brought about the suppression of hyperinflation. The high adjustment costs — deep recession, high rates of unemployment — are characteristics of the early '90s. The deregulation of the public sector and the building of the private one commenced, and will be a long-lasting process.To meet the changes in economic regimes and mechanisms, the existing models had to be adequately respecified and new models constructed. The large W-5 macromodel for Poland, which covers the final and intermediate demands, had to be extended to introduce the market adjustment mechanisms and, more broadly, the financial flows. To meet the needs of short-term financial policies, new quarterly models had to be built, as, for instance, the WK macromodel for the Polish economy. The paper discusses the major problems of the models' specification under the data constraints.     

Assessing the Empirical Relevance of Labour Frictions to Business Cycle Fluctuations

This paper describes a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model augmented with labour frictions, namely: indivisible labour, predetermined employment and adjustment costs. This improves the fit to the data as shown by a higher log marginal likelihood and closer match to key business cycle statistics. The labour frictions introduced are relevant for model dynamics and economic policy: the effect of total factor productivity shocks on most macroeconomic variables is substantially mitigated; fiscal policy leads to a greater crowding out of private sector activity and monetary policy has a lower impact on output. Labour frictions also provide a better match to impulse response functions from vector autoregressive models.     

做好企业所得税纳税调整

近年来,财税政策发生了建国以来的重大变化,社会各监管部门对大型国有垄断企业的财务监管力度进一步加强,税务检查非常频繁,这就对企业财务人员提出了新的更高的要求,做好企业所得税纳税调整,就显得十分重要。本文从工资性支出等方面阐述应当做好企业所得税纳税调整。     

Economic uncertainty,central bank digital currency,and negative interest rate policy

The COVID-19 outbreak has brought unprecedented social attention to economic uncertainty and negative interest rate policy (NIRP). How does uncertainty affect economic activity, and how effective is a NIRP based on central bank digital currency (CBDC)? To answer the two questions, we constructed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that accommodates sticky prices and wages. The results indicated: (i) Economic uncertainty has substantially reduced investment, output, wage, and loans, which increases unemployment risk. In the short term, it has triggered impulsive consumption by households, while consumption has fallen into a slump in the long run. (ii) After suffering an uncertainty shock, the economy entered short-term stagflation and long-term deflation. The short-term stagflation was mainly caused by resident wage adjustment, and the long-term deflation was due to the decline in effective demand caused by unemployment risk. (iii) CBDC could eliminate the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, thereby improving the effectiveness of NIRP. Compared with traditional currency, CBDC-based NIRP could more effectively smooth macroeconomic fluctuations and alleviate the negative impact of an uncertainty shock, which is more conducive to restoring market confidence and promoting economic recovery.     

THE TREASURY'S BUDGET

This year's Budget not only marked the end of Thatcherism, it also pointed to a shift in power back towards the Treasury. Mrs. Thatcher's favoured approach on local finance, child benefit and mortgage tax relief were unceremoniously dumped and replaced by the Treasury emphasis on fiscal neutrality and marginal tax rates. We discuss what this might mean for future Budgets. The Treasury forecast is extremely gloomy, predicting a 2 per cent drop in output this year. We remain more optimistic and, as in February, expect a revival in consumer spending to lead the recovery over the next few months. Despite our stronger output forecast, we endorse the Treasury view that inflation and the current account deficit will fall sharply this year.     

Dismissals and match-specific rents

Labor contracts that result in dismissals are quite common in the real world. The question that arises is why employers do not just offer reduced wages instead of asking workers with low realized productivity to leave. This paper argues that such behavior can be explained by workers' understandable unwillingness to agree to contracts that an employer will not have an incentive to honor in the future. Specifically, we construct a matching model in which the employer and the worker are both uncertain about the value the other places on the match. Because the worker's match-specific productivity is the employer's private information, a commitment to pay a wage equal to the worker's value of marginal product is not enforceable. In the absence of a wage guarantee, the employer will offer retained workers wages below their value of marginal product, which causes quits to be inefficiently high. The employer can reduce quits by contractually promising a guaranteed wage to retained workers. Although this will lead to some involuntary dismissals, the loss from dismissals will be less than the gain from lower quits if the wage guarantee is not too high.     

What (really) accounts for the fall in hours after a technology shock?

The paper asks how state of the art DSGE models that account for the conditional response of hours following a positive neutral technology shock compare in a marginal likelihood race. To that end we construct and estimate several competing small-scale DSGE models that extend the standard real business cycle model. In particular, we identify from the literature six different hypotheses that generate the empirically observed decline in hours worked after a positive technology shock. These models alternatively exhibit (i) sticky prices; (ii) firm entry and exit with time to build; (iii) habit in consumption and costly adjustment of investment; (iv) persistence in the permanent technology shocks; (v) labor market friction with procyclical hiring costs; and (vi) Leontief production function with labor-saving technology shocks. In terms of model posterior probabilities, impulse responses, and autocorrelations, the model favored is the one that exhibits habit formation in consumption and investment adjustment costs. A robustness test shows that the sticky price model becomes as competitive as the habit formation and costly adjustment of investment model when sticky wages are included.     

Nominal rigidities equilibria in a non-Ricardian economy

I consider a cash-in-advance economy with nominal price rigidities. Nominal interest rates are the cost of liquidity and fiscal policy sets nominal transfers that affect the distribution of wealth. Under a fiscal policy associated with an unequal distribution of wealth and for policies of low or even zero interest rates, coordination failures exist, that is, involuntary unemployment persist even if prices are set at full employment levels. Coordination failures exist if and only if nominal rates are below a threshold. Moreover, I demonstrate the following result on welfare: full employment allocations at a nominal rate equal to the threshold (high liquidity costs) are better, in terms of welfare, from unemployment allocations at any non-negative interest rates below the threshold. On the other hand, under a sufficiently progressive fiscal system that reduces the inequality in the wealth distribution, coordination failures do not exist.     

财政金融政策对中国民营经济发展的影响效应研究

当前中国民营经济正处于转型发展期,分析影响中国民营经济发展的因素显得尤为重要。本文运用向量误差修正模型实证研究了财政金融政策与中国民营经济发展的关系。结果显示,财政政策、金融政策都会正向长期地促进中国民营经济发展,金融政策对中国民营经济发展的影响效应明显比财政政策大,且财政金融政策均为中国民营经济发展的单向因果原因。在此基础上,提出了促进中国民营经济转型发展的相关财政金融政策建议。     

Budget regimes and internal governance: considerations for the sustainability of fiscal policy

In a fiscal policy set-up with Ricardian equivalence and rational expectations, the decision-making of private agents is based on the knowledge that current deficits will be met with future tax increases or spending decreases. This view requires that the government's budget exhibit intertemporal balance, or that fiscal policy be sustainable. This paper examines the extent to which sustainability holds in the light of changes in the institutional structure of the budget process and changes in internal House governance rules. The results indicate that certain aspects of sustainability are related to the underlying institutional structure and governance of the budget process. The authors wish to thank the editors and three anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors remain our own.