Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation

In this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting. To do so, we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations. The model, which provides a game–theoretic foundation to Rocheteau and Wright (2005)׳s competitive search monetary equilibrium, is used to derive theoretical propositions regarding the effects of inflation in this environment, which we test with a laboratory experiment that closely implements the theoretical framework. We find that the inflation tax is harmful – with cash holdings, production and welfare all falling as inflation rises – and that its effect is relatively larger at low inflation rates than at higher rates. For instance, for inflation rates between 0% and 5%, welfare in the two markets we consider (2[seller]×2[buyer] and 3×2) falls by roughly 1 percent for each percentage–point rise in inflation, compared with 0.4 percent over the range from 5% to 30%. Our findings lead us to conclude that the impact of the inflation tax should not be underestimated, even under low inflation.     

Money,random matching and endogenous growth: A quantitative analysis

In this study, we develop a search-and-matching monetary growth model to analyze the effects of inflation on economic growth and social welfare by introducing endogenous economic growth via capital externality into a two-sector search-and-matching model. We find that the channel through which inflation affects economic growth in the search-and-matching model is different from the traditional cash-in-advance model. To facilitate the calibration, we obtain an empirical estimate of the effects of inflation on economic growth using panel regressions. In the simulation analysis, we quantitatively evaluate the welfare effect of inflation in the search-and-matching endogenous growth model and compare it to a search-and-matching exogenous growth model. We find that the welfare effect of inflation is nonlinear in the endogenous growth model whereas it is linear in the exogenous growth model. Furthermore, we find that the welfare cost of inflation under endogenous growth is up to four times as large as the welfare cost of inflation under exogenous growth.     

The implications of inflation in an estimated new Keynesian model

This paper studies the steady state and dynamic consequences of inflation in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. It is found that 10 percentage points of inflation entail a steady state welfare cost as high as 13% of annual consumption. This large cost is mainly driven by staggered price contracts and price indexation. The transition from high to low inflation inflicts a welfare loss equivalent to 0.53% of annual consumption. The role of nominal/real frictions as well as that of parameter uncertainty is also addressed.     

New monetarism with endogenous product variety and monopolistic competition

I examine the role played by endogenous variety and monopolistic competition in the long-run transmission of monetary policy. I integrate free entry, product variety and monopolistic competition into a New Monetarist framework, considering preferences that give rise to either constant or variable markups. I find that inflation generally reduces variety. Under CES preferences, firms are inefficiently small, with the inefficiency increasing with product differentiation and the extent of search frictions. The Friedman rule is the best policy under CES preferences. In contrast, with variable elasticity of demand, inflation can increase firm size, reduce markups, and raise welfare, even though output is lower. Under CES preferences, the welfare cost of inflation is high; moreover, this cost increases monotonically with the markup and is higher with endogenous variety than with a fixed product space.     

Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals

I analyze the marketing strategy of an incumbent monopolist facing a threat of entry. Product quality is unknown to consumers, and the monopolist's cost is unknown to the potential entrant. The incumbent uses both price and advertising to signal cost and quality. The monopolist faces a dilemma because signaling a high quality attracts customers but requires a high price, whereas signaling low cost prevents entry but requires a low price. I characterize the unique (stable) separating equilibrium and show that dissipative advertising may be used, while it is never used if either quality or cost is known. Some equilibria may involve pooling on cost. A welfare analysis indicates that potential entry may improve welfare and that the effect of unknown quality is not always negative when it interferes with entry deterrence.     

Inflation,financial development,and growth: A trilateral analysis

A large body of evidence links financial development to economic growth, yet the channels through which inflation affects this relationship and its stability have been less thoroughly explored. We take an econometric and graphical approach to examining these channels, and find that higher levels of financial development, combined with low-inflation, are related to higher rates of economic growth, especially in lower income countries, but that financial development loses much of its explanatory power in the presence of high-inflation. In particular, small increases in the price level seem able to wipe out relatively large growth effects of financial deepening when the annual rate of inflation lies between 4% and 19%, whereas the operation of the finance–growth link is less affected by inflation rates above this range. Growth is generally much lower, however, in such high-inflation settings where financial development is typically repressed.     

Wholesale price discrimination: Innovation incentives and upstream competition

In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources, wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives downstream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers’ incentives to decrease the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.     

On the desirability of nominal GDP targeting

This paper evaluates the welfare properties of nominal GDP targeting in the context of a New Keynesian model with both price and wage rigidity. In particular, we compare nominal GDP targeting to inflation and output gap targeting as well as to a conventional Taylor rule. These comparisons are made on the basis of welfare losses relative to a hypothetical equilibrium with flexible prices and wages. Output gap targeting is the most desirable of the rules under consideration, but nominal GDP targeting performs almost as well. Nominal GDP targeting is associated with smaller welfare losses than a Taylor rule and significantly outperforms inflation targeting. Relative to inflation targeting and a Taylor rule, nominal GDP targeting performs best conditional on supply shocks and when wages are sticky relative to prices. Nominal GDP targeting may outperform output gap targeting if the gap is observed with noise, and has more desirable properties related to equilibrium determinacy than does gap targeting.     

Asset price targeting in an open economy with cognitive limitations: The best for macroeconomic and financial stability?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agent expectations have been critical issues addressed by monetary policy management since the financial crisis of 2008. This paper evaluates macroeconomic stability in a new Keynesian open economy in which agents experience both cognitive limitations and asset market volatility. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule with- or without asset price targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, and exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and thus create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Simulations confirm that a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target is the best choice. In contrast, the business cycles induced by Keynesian “animal spirits” are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a credible exchange rate pegging system with an international reserve pooling arrangement can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy, even though its absolute value of the loss function is slightly lower than a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target.     

INFLATION ECONOMICS: THE HEATH–BARBER BOOM, 1972–74

The UK macroeconomic boom of the early 1970s is an experiment that refutes the notion of cost–push inflation. However, such nonsense endures as the consequence of two factors. The first is the convenient ruse by which the state ducks its responsibility for monetary inflation and points the finger in other directions. The second is a potential to confuse the source of an individual price increase (rising scarcity) and the source of general price increases (excessive money).     

Testing the Structural Interpretation of the Price Puzzle with a Cost‐Channel Model*

We estimate a variety of small‐scale new‐Keynesian DSGE models with the cost channel to assess their ability to replicate the ‘price puzzle’, i.e. the inflationary impact of a monetary policy shock typically arising in vector autoregression (VAR) analysis. To correctly identify the monetary policy shock, we distinguish between a standard policy rate shifter and a shock to ‘trend inflation’, i.e. the time‐varying inflation target set by the Fed. Our estimated models predict a negative inflation reaction to a monetary policy tightening. We offer a discussion of the possible sources of mismatch between the VAR evidence and our own.     

On-the-job search equilibrium with endogenous unemployment benefits

This paper develops an on-the-job search model with wage posting where unemployment benefits are proportional to past wages. We emphasize that this contributes to increasing the reservation wages of unemployed workers and introduces a feedback effect of the distribution of wages on the distribution of unemployment benefits. We show that the model predictions are consistent with some stylized French facts and quantify the impact of inefficient rejections of low-wage offers by the unemployed. We find that, by reducing the indexing of unemployment benefits to previous earnings and increasing lump-sum transfers, it is possible to increase both employment and welfare.     

The frequency of price adjustment: A study of the newsstand prices of magazines

Data on the newsstand prices of American magazines is used to investigate the determinants of the frequency of nominal price change. Magazine price changes, often coming after real prices have fallen by one quarter, provide strong evidence for monopolistic sticky price models. The data is examined by applying a fixed effects logit specification to the price change rule implied by a target-threshold model of a firm facing general price inflation, an uncertain future and costly nominal adjustment. The essay concludes that higher inflation leads to more frequent price adjustment and that the real cost of price changes varies with the size of a real price change.     

Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm

This paper studies the welfare consequences of a vertical merger that raises rivals' costs when downstream competition is a la Cournot between firms with constant asymmetric marginal costs. The main result is that such a vertical merger can nevertheless improve welfare if it involves a downstream firm whose cost is low enough. This is because by raising the input price paid by the nonmerging firms the merger shifts production away from those relatively inefficient producers in favor of the more efficient firm. Yet, there is a trade-off between the gain in productive efficiency and the loss in consumers' surplus caused by the higher downstream price that follows a higher input price. It is also shown, through an example, that this result extends to price competition with differentiated products.     

Inflation Uncertainty, Output Growth Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Performance

We use a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) model of inflation and output growth to examine the causality relationship among nominal uncertainty, real uncertainty and macroeconomic performance measured by the inflation and output growth rates. The application of the constant conditional correlation GARCH(1,1) model leads to a number of interesting conclusions. First, inflation does cause negative welfare effects, both directly and indirectly, i.e. via the inflation uncertainty channel. Secondly, in some countries, more inflation uncertainty provides an incentive to Central Banks to surprise the public by raising inflation unexpectedly. Thirdly, in contrast to the assumptions of some macroeconomic models, business cycle variability and the rate of economic growth are related. More variability in the business cycle leads to more output growth.     

The effects of oil price shocks on inflation in the G7 countries

This study examines the effects of three types of oil price shocks on inflation in the G7 countries with a new method of isolating oil price shocks. Based on monthly data from January 1997 to January 2019, we find that each oil price shock has the largest effect on U.S. inflation among the G7 countries and each country’s response to oil price shocks is different. Moreover, a rolling-window analysis shows that supply shocks, demand shocks and risk shocks have dynamic effects on inflation. The effect of supply shocks on inflation is strong before the financial crisis, but weakens during the crisis. However, the effect of demand shocks increases sharply in this time. The effect of risk shocks mainly occurs during the financial crisis and the European debt crisis. In addition, this study uses two ways to verify the robustness of the results. Our empirical results have important implications for policymakers and manufacturers, since the results provide a good explanation for the response of inflation in the G7 countries to the oil price shocks from different sources.     

中国输入型通货膨胀特征研究:程度、来源及渠道

在经济转轨与产业升级的历史进程中通货膨胀一直是焦点问题。本文将中国分别纳入与代表性发达经济体和发展中经济体构成的经济系统,提炼双向通胀溢出特征,认知中国输入型通胀的程度、来源和主要传导渠道。实证结果表明：中国受到来自发达经济体和发展中经济体两个方面的通胀影响,与内源性形成四六开格局;输入型通胀的影响在三个季度到一年的时间段尤为突出;并且来自贸易渠道的影响强于来自外国直接投资的影响。     

制定成本会计准则的必要性——基于价格管制和政府采购的视角

文章运用垄断价格管制理论和福利经济学相关理论分析了当前出现垄断行业的"三高"以及政府采购成本偏高的现象,指出成本会计准则的制定是对垄断行业进行价格管制的前提,同时成本会计准则的制定必将有利于对政府采购成本实行有效控制,最后就如何制定成本会计准则提出了一些建议。     

Fiscal Explanations for Inflation: Any Evidence from Transition Economies?

Recent arguments, motivated partly by the new fiscal theory of price level, suggest that fiscal deficits undermine price stability in transition economies. This paper addresses these claims by examining vector-autoregressive models of inflation for three transition economies (Bulgaria, Romania and Russia). The results indicate that fiscal deficits have increased inflation in Bulgaria and Romania but not in the case of Russia. In Bulgaria and Romania, money aggregates and exchange rate have also been more influential to inflation than fiscal deficits. The analysis based on this method therefore suggests that while fiscal deficits have some influence on inflation, monetary factors mostly determine inflation in these three countries.     

Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion

This paper considers the incentives of a firm with power in a market for one good to tie in the sale of a complementary good even though the complementary good is produced in a zero profit market. If the zero-profit price of the tied good is greater than the marginal cost (which occurs for example when the technology is characterized by a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost), a firm will fie in order to increase the sales of the complementary good, which at the margin is profitable. We show that such tying will lower the effective prices paid by customers and increase welfare. This incentive exists if the firm with market power is a monopolist or one of several competing oligopolists.