The power of negative thinking: corruption,perception and willingness to bribe in Ukraine

This study provides an empirical analysis of the association between corruption perception and the willingness to offer bribes, as well as of the influence of different sources of information on corruption perception in the Ukraine. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization, the more probable it is that a person dealing with that organization will offer a bribe, therefore supporting corruption. Since corruption scandals in Ukraine seldom result in legal action, information about corruption in the mass media might actually encourage people to give bribes. This study found that corruption perception is one of the key factors in giving a bribe and that its positive/negative effects strongly depend on institutions and government policies.     

Natural resources, democracy and corruption

We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980-2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. They are also robust across different samples, and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources, democracy and corruption.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Coups,regime transitions,and institutional consequences

Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the new Bjørnskov-Rode coup dataset, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not. We also explore whether the incumbent regime influences the effect of coup attempts on institutional change.     

Institutions and the Relation between Corruption and Economic Growth

We study the effects of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth in a framework that takes into account that corruption also affects growth through its impact on institutions. We use a formal growth framework in which corruption affects growth negatively because of individual rent‐seeking and stealing of public goods, but where corruption may serve a positive role by taking over the role of institutions. We find that the overall effect of corruption on economic growth is highly dependent on the institutional setting of a country. Particularly in situations where institutions are not well developed corruption may be conducive to economic growth. We also find that the interaction among institutions themselves matters. This underscores the importance of taking into account the complete institutional setting when studying corruption, both in theory as well as empirically.     

Country governance,corruption, and the likelihood of firms’ innovation

Using a sample of firms from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for the period 2006–2016 in emerging and developing countries, we find that corruption has a negative impact on the likelihood of innovations, thus supporting the “sanding-the-wheels” hypothesis. Our empirical results also show that corruption at the firm level, in the manufacturing industry, and in regions with the worst governance or that are more corrupt has a significant negative effect on innovation. In addition, country governance plays a particularly important role in innovative activity for corrupt firms. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption in order to improve firms’ innovation within an environment of corruption.     

Media freedom and democracy in the fight against corruption

Democratization and media freedom have been suggested as useful tools in the fight against political corruption, but so far their interplay in this fight has received scant attention. We present a game theoretic model which allows for varying quality of media freedom and democratic institutions. The model predicts, among others, that democratization and media freedom are complements in the fight against political corruption. We test our theoretical predictions using differences-in-differences estimations and panel data covering 129 countries from 1980 to 2007. We find evidence of causal effects of democratization and media freedom on corruption, and that the two are complements. Our main results hold after controlling for income, country fixed effects, and continent-specific time-varying shocks.     

Corruption and growth: Historical evidence, 1790–2010

We use a newly assembled indicator of corruption from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) to examine the effects of corruption on economic growth. The V-Dem indicator is coded for almost all contemporary and historical polities since the year 1900 and, for some countries, since the French Revolution. This global dataset allows us to exploit long-run, slow-moving variation within countries for identification, circumventing many of the difficulties faced by previous studies based on cross-section data or short panels. We present robust evidence of a negative effect of corruption on steady-state growth. Yet, we find that corruption interacts with political regime type, giving rise to heterogeneous effects. In particular, corruption is found to be significantly more deleterious for growth in democracies than in autocracies. Since corruption tends to be decentralised in democracies and centralised in autocracies, these findings are in line with theories of the ‘industrial organisation’ of corruption. We find little to no evidence that institutional weaknesses along other dimensions (state capacity, regulatory quality, property rights protection) make corruption any less harmful for growth, casting doubt on the thesis that corruption may ‘grease the wheels’ of dysfunctional institutions. Our findings provide a rationale to target anti-corruption efforts to young democracies.     

Environmental performance,corruption and economic growth: global evidence using a new data set

This study investigates the relationship between environmental performance, corruption and economic growth using panel data of 87 countries covering the period from 2002 to 2012. The Environmental Performance Index is used for the first time to evaluate the environmental quality on economic growth. By employing both ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ panel models, we find that environmental performance is positively related to economic growth and is more significant in non-Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) countries. Moreover, when corruption is incorporated, the empirical estimation results indicate that although lower corruption helps economic growth in non-OECD countries, the negative coefficients of the three interactive terms show that the positive effect of environment performance on economic growth will drop, while greater environmental performance combined with natural resource abundance inevitably leads to inefficient bureaucracies and hence disadvantageous economic growth. As a result, policymakers in non-OECD countries should carefully ensure better government quality when they exhibit strong environmental performance so as to avoid any disadvantageous impact upon economic growth.     

How Bad is Corruption? Cross‐country Evidence of the Impact of Corruption on Economic Prosperity

Most people today would argue that corruption is bad for countries' economic development. Yet, we still lack a reliable empirical estimate of the effect. This study addresses the econometric shortcomings of the literature and provides an estimate of the causal impact of corruption on gross domestic product per capita across countries. Certain dimensions of a country's culture are used as instruments for corruption. These instruments stay strong when the other deep determinants of economic development, geography, and the remaining dimensions of institutions and culture are controlled for. In the process of choosing controls, however, the entire set of variables available in the Quality of Governance online database (QOG) that includes all central variables from the literature on institutions and culture are included. It is found that corruption does exert a significant and negative impact on countries' productivity levels.     

Corruption,Bureaucracy and Firm Productivity in Africa

This paper estimates the impact of corruption and poor bureaucratic quality on firm productivity for a unique dataset with firm‐specific data of more than 900 firms over 12 years for Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania. We first discuss why poor bureaucratic quality and, especially, corruption are expected to have negative impacts on firm productivity. We then employ Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate firm productivity and pooled OLS and Tobit regression analysis to estimate the effects of corruption and bureaucratic quality on firm productivity. We find that less productive firms are more likely to engage in corrupt activities; both poor bureaucratic quality and corruption reduce firm productivity; and corruption has a greater negative impact on productivity.     

Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”     

Institutional Quality and Growth

I analyze the dynamic interaction between civil society organizations and the government in a representative developing economy. Government fails to establish efficient institutions by favoring corruption. On its side, civil society exerts pressure to constrain government to cease corruption. I distinguish between an authoritarian government and an unrestrictive one: the latter does not repress protests from the civil society while the former implements punishment mechanisms. I demonstrate analytically the existence of a unique locally stable equilibrium by solving a linear quadratic differential game for three regimes: respectively, the optimal control problem, noncooperative, and cooperative game. Everything remaining constant; numerical assessment indicates that both civil monitoring and government pressure always increase as the government’s ability to extract rents and the effectiveness of institutions increases. The government pressure also increases with an increase in the marginal utility of rent. Both government pressure and civil society's monitoring effort decrease with the increase in the cooperation weight. Total Factor Productivity effects always dominate the detrimental effect of civil monitoring on growth, except when the government’s capacity of rent extraction increases in the second regime and under some restrictions in the first. In a nutshell, I show that civil society contributes to the improvement of institutions fostering growth.     

The distance bias in natural disaster reporting – empirical evidence for the United States

Whenever governments or international organizations provide aid in the aftermath of natural disasters, they typically justify this support by humanitarian motives. Previous empirical research found that media reports on natural disasters have a systematic impact on the amount of provided disaster aid. While this is unproblematic as long as media reports are unbiased and thus deliver an undistorted picture of the occurrence and severity of worldwide occurring disasters, systematic reporting biases would lead to distorted aid flows and perhaps other distortions like an insufficient perception of a region in international organizations. Based on data on three US news shows we show that disaster reporting is subject to a distance bias, e.g., the likelihood that a disaster is covered by the media depends on the distance between the country where the media are located and the country where the disasters occur. We also find evidence that besides the distance bias the state of economic development of a country and importance as export markets have a positive effect on the probability that US news shows are reporting on a natural disaster. As a result, international aid flows might be systematically biased and not distributed in line with the needs of the victims.     

Initial conditions and privatisation as causes of post-communist corruption

This article investigates the economic determinants of corruption in post-communist countries. We conduct an empirical verification of two research hypotheses using EBRD and World Bank data on 27 post-communist economies over the 1996–2014 period. The first hypothesis suggests that corruption is rooted in the communist past, when these countries embraced communist institutions, social norms, as well as low-development structural factors broadly defined as initial conditions. The second hypothesis is that the flawed transition process led corruption to increase because politics and business were never separated. The elites pushed measures that preserved their status while obstructing reform policies that might endanger their interests. Our empirical results demonstrate that both hypotheses are valid to a limited extent, while revealing a more complex view of the reforms and initial conditions. Corruption seems to be related to the natural resource curse, to the lack of small-scale privatisation and to a long history of underdevelopment that could have preceded communism.     

The effect of corruption on microfinance loan portfolio: A semiparametric analysis

In this paper, we examine the extent to which corruption affects the loan portfolio of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We employ robust econometric estimation on a sample of 507 MFIs across 63 countries from 2005 to 2018. Our results show that corruption is negatively associated with the loan portfolio. However, in semiparametric analysis, we find that lower-level corruption is beneficial to increase the loan portfolio while higher-level corruption is detrimental. The results imply that it is not just corruption that matters as far as its effect on MFIs' loan portfolio is concerned; what matters is the degree of corruption. In further analyses, we find that corruption reduces both the number of active borrowers and average loan per borrower indicating that corruption reduces both coverage and amount of credit extension. The results suggest that the effect of corruption on the loan portfolio is gender-sensitive. Corruption facilitates an increase in loans to female borrowers. Our results are robust to alternative variable measurements and different identification strategies, including two-stage least square.     

Investment climate and firm productivity: an application to Vietnamese manufacturing firms

The fundamental aspect of a national competitive advantage is a good investment climate. Understanding the role of the investment climate in generating firm productivity has received extensive attention by policymakers and economists in many countries. The article studies the effect of different dimensions of the investment climate on firm productivity. Using a large dataset of Vietnamese manufacturing firms, the article finds that deficiencies in the investment climate are prejudicial to firm productivity and competition. Furthermore, in examining the effect of corruption in association with the quality of the business environment, the study also investigates the possibility that corruption may compensate firms for a bad investment climate or at least may neutralize the negative impact of inefficient government regulations. In other words, corruption acts as ‘speed money’ to improve the efficacy of the provision of public services or provides leeway for entrepreneurs to bypass the inefficient regulations. This situation, however, is extremely harmful to the economy in the long run because it distorts the market and erodes the incentives for productive investments. Developing countries therefore need to put much more effort into institutional reforms, especially fighting corruption and efficiency in the provision of public goods and services.     

Do natural resources help or hinder development? Resource abundance,dependence, and the role of institutions

The resource curse literature presents conflicting evidence on the relationship between natural resources and development. We evaluate the direct effect of resources on developmental outcomes vis-à-vis their indirect effect through the weakening of political institutions using a 3SLS instrumental variable setup that simultaneously estimates development outcomes and institutions. We find that resource abundance and resource dependence affect development outcomes through different channels. While resource abundance generally has a direct positive effect on developmental outcomes, resource dependence has a stronger negative indirect effect that operates through its negative impact on institutional quality. The results also depend on the type of development outcome considered, with more consistent positive direct effects found for physical capital measures and stronger negative indirect effects for human capital development. The use of a simultaneous framework and dual measures of resources reconciles seemingly contradictory findings in earlier work.     

HUMAN WELL-BEING EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

We examine the effects of income, institutions, and social capital—proxied by the level of corruption and ethnic tensions—on literacy and life expectancy in Africa. Random effects estimates show that income has a robust positive influence. GMM estimates indicate that corruption reduces the effectiveness of institutions in promoting literacy. However, this effect is not monotonic; improvements in the corruption index within the high corruption range reduce the effectiveness of institutions, while continuous improvement within the low corruption range enhances the effectiveness of institutions. Similarly, ethnic tensions reduce the effectiveness of institutions. Based on these findings, we conclude that social capital and institutions can complement each other. ( JEL O11, O17, Z13)     

The transition of corruption institutions and dynamics

The paper analyzes the strong but complex relation between corruption and development. The corruption/honesty index is explained by three variables measuring aspects of development: Income, Polity and Fraser (for Economic Freedom). The last two indices represent the political and the economic system. Two problems arise: (i) Development is a common factor in all four variables, giving the variables strong confluence, so it is difficult to sort out the contribution of each explanatory variable. However, kernel regressions on the corruption/income scatter give a well-defined long-run transition path, which permits an identification of the specific contributions of institutions to corruption. (ii) The correlation of corruption to the first difference of the three development variables is negative. This gives a substantial lag in the corruption/income relation in the form of wide J-curves, but the main direction of causality is still from development to corruption. High income and modern institutions cause low corruption after some time. The corruption/development-relation is a fuzzy but strong long-run connection.